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INTRODUCTION.
The Irish Land Act, 1903 was better known as the Wyndham Act after its author 
George Wyndham, chief secretary o f Ireland from 1900 to 1905. Despite being the 
most comprehensive and ambitious o f all o f  the land acts introduced by the British 
government for Ireland, it has received little attention from historians. In fact, apart 
from some contemporary explanatory legal texts, there is not a single published work 
devoted to the Wyndham Act. This thesis intends to address that lacuna and provide 
the first scholarly study o f the act from its origins to its subsequent amendment by 
the 1909 land act.
By extension this thesis is a study o f various aspects o f  the Irish land question 
from c.1900 to 1909. However, it does not purport to be a systematic examination of 
the nationalist political response to the act or, indeed, o f its contribution to the 
history o f the United Irish League (U.I.L.). Nor is it a comprehensive analysis o f the 
unionist political response. While both have been examined and their relationship to 
the land question and the Wyndham Act investigated they do not form the central 
focus o f this thesis. Instead the main focus is on the origins, operation and legacy o f 
the act.
It should be noted that contemporary usage has been followed in describing 
the parties and factions o f the period covered by this thesis. The term ‘unionist’ 
refers to those who were in favour o f maintaining the political and economic union 
with Britain while the term ‘nationalist’ is used in a broad sense to denote those who 
were largely opposed to the union and were in favour o f some measure o f self- 
government and included such groups as the U.I.L., independent nationalist M.P.s 
and the Irish Parliamentary Party. The I.P.P. refers to the body o f nationalist M.P.s in 
the House o f Commons under the leadership o f John Redmond during the period 
1900 to 1909. Likewise Irish Unionist Parliamentary Party (I.U.P.P.) refers to the 
body o f Irish unionist M.P.s during the time period. It should also be noted that in 
this thesis ‘b ill’ refers to a proposed statute that has not yet been passed into law by 
parliament whereas ‘act’ refers to the statute once it has passed through parliament 
and been made law.
The time period covered by this dissertation corresponds with the 
Conservative party administration o f 1900 to 1905 and that o f the Liberal party from 
1905 up to the passing o f the 1909 Land Act. George Wyndham served as Irish chief 
secretary from November 1900 until his resignation in March 1905, when he was
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succeeded by Walter Long. Following the collapse o f the Conservative government 
in late 1905, James Bryce became the new Liberal chief secretary. However, in 
January 1907 Bryce was appointed ambassador to the United States o f America and 
Augustine Birrell replaced him as chief secretary, a post he held until 1916.
Prior to the 1903 Land Act the two principal political parties in Britain, the 
Conservatives and the Liberals, had both come to accept voluntary land purchase as 
the most suitable solution to the Irish land question. David Cannadine, in his seminal 
work The decline and fa ll  o f  the British aristocracy (1990), identified this: ‘In the 
aftermath o f the Land War, it was widely believed, by Liberals and Conservatives 
alike, that land purchase was the only viable solution to the land question’.1 By 1903 
the question was no longer whether or not land purchase was a viable option but 
whether the transfer o f land would be voluntary or compulsory.
The I.P.P. and the movement led by the independent unionist, T. W. Russell, 
in Ulster were both strongly in favour o f the compulsory purchase o f landlords’ land. 
They had begun to receive increased support from the Liberal party. In the south and 
west o f Ireland the compulsory purchase banner was one behind which many shades 
o f nationalist opinion could unite. It appealed to divergent groups such as the 
smallholders o f Connaught and the graziers o f Leinster who all lent their support to 
the U.I.L. campaign. Compulsory purchase promised a swift transfer o f land from 
landlord to tenant and it dangled the carrot o f lower prices in front o f the tenant 
farmers.
The province o f Ulster was relatively free from agrarian agitation since the 
Land War. In the absence o f such agitation many landlords were relatively content to 
remain as they were and to continue to draw their rents. The compulsory purchase 
campaign potentially provided the means for tenant farmers in the province to obtain 
the ownership o f their farms without resorting to the tactics o f agrarian agitation and 
intimidation which had characterised the south and west o f  Ireland.
On the other hand the vast majority o f landlords were quite opposed to any 
compulsory system, as were the majority o f Irish unionists, although they flirted with 
the issue to undermine T. W. Russell’s support amongst the tenant farmers in Ulster. 
Landlords foresaw that the prices set by the government under a compulsory act 
would not be as generous as those they might obtain through their own negotiations
1 David Cannadine, The decline and  fa l l  o f  the British aristocracy  (New Haven and London, 1990), p. 
65.
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with their tenants under a voluntary scheme. Equally important was the fact that 
some landlords throughout Ireland only wished to sell a portion o f their lands while 
others, such as Lord Clonbrock o f Galway, simply had no intention o f selling at all. 
The Conservative party lead by A. J. Balfour had little time for compulsory purchase 
and was committed to a voluntary scheme. The conflict between the supporters o f 
compulsory purchase and the supporters o f voluntary purchase dominated the years 
prior to the introduction o f the Wyndham Act and continually reoccurred during the 
ac t’s lifetime, culminating in the introduction o f  a modified form o f  compulsion in 
the congested districts under the 1909 Land Act. The first land act introduced by the 
Irish Free State in 1923 also contained significant compulsory purchase powers.2
What was the Irish land question in the first decade o f the twentieth century? 
While the issue o f land purchase was undoubtedly a major ingredient, the transfer o f 
the land from landlord to tenant was only one o f many aspects. There was an 
underbelly to the land question that had more to do with land redistribution than with 
land purchase. The process o f making the tenant farmers o f the country the owners o f 
their existing holdings held little incentives for groups such as evicted tenants, 
agricultural labourers, disinherited farmers’ sons and other landless elements. For 
those living in the agricultural slums o f the congested districts or on uneconomic 
small holdings scattered throughout Ireland land purchase was o f little benefit. They 
required additional land to make their farms economically viable. Evicted tenants, a 
visible reminder o f the Land War o f the 1880s, wished to return to their old holdings 
or be provided with new farms. They also required financial assistance. Agricultural 
labourers hoped for a cottage and a plot o f  land to grow potatoes and vegetables. The 
more progressive hoped to ascend the social ladder by obtaining a farm of land and 
becoming a member o f the farming class. The sons o f farmers who were not in line 
to inherit and the other landless groups in agricultural society hungered for farms o f 
their own. In order to fulfil their ambitions all o f  these groups required untenanted 
land to be redistributed. Such land was often farmed by landlords themselves or let 
on the profitable eleven-month system to graziers often referred to as conacre. Land 
let by landlords on an eleven-month lease was not subject to the rent-fixing 
provisions o f the land courts (established under the 1881 Land Act to regulate the 
fixing o f rents) as they only dealt with tenancies o f a year or greater. The system was
2 The Land A ct 1923: An act to amend the law relating to the occupation and ow nership o f  land and 
for other purposes relating thereto (9 Aug. 1923), (no. 42/1923).
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quite popular among landlords as the rent was determined by the market demand and
not the land courts. This was an aspect o f the land question which land purchase
would do little to alleviate.
At the beginning o f the twentieth century land purchase in Ireland, under the
land purchase acts passed by the British government between 1881 and 1896, had
ground to a virtual standstill. The numbers within the landlord class who wished to
sell had been exhausted but demand from occupiers continued to grow for a
comprehensive land purchase measure. The Wyndham Land Act was introduced in
the House o f Commons on 25 March 1903. The act was the pinnacle o f George
W yndham’s term o f office as chief secretary o f Ireland and it was hailed as one o f
the most important pieces o f social legislation since the act o f  union. Indeed for
many historians it has been regarded as the climax of the Conservative policy known
as constructive unionism which was essentially an attempt to ‘kill home rule by
kindness’.3 George Wyndham had close family ties with Ireland and his mother had
been born in the country. He was the great grandson o f Pamela, the daughter o f Lord
Edward Fitzgerald o f 1798 fame, and was thus related to the Fitzgeralds, dukes o f
Leinster. His uncle, Henry Wyndham, was the second Baron Leconfield. Upon his
death in 1901 Henry’s son and George’s first cousin, Charles Henry Wyndham,
became the third Baron Leconfield. The baron owned a considerable amount o f land
in the counties Clare, Tipperary and Limerick. The seventh earl o f Mayo, Dermot
Robert Wyndham Bourke, was also George W yndham’s first cousin.
Social, political and economic historians traditionally have explained the
origins o f the act in terms o f Captain John Shawe-Taylor’s independent initiative o f
1902. Shawe-Taylor was a little-known Galway landlord who sent a letter to the
press advocating a conference o f landlord and tenant representatives. This led to the
Land Conference that sat over the months o f December 1902 and January 1903,
which comprised both tenant and landlord representatives. Its recommendations
formed the basis o f the Wyndham Act. In the 1930s Edmund Curtis was one o f the
first advocates o f this interpretation:
But in 1902 a landlord gentleman named Shawe Taylor brought about 
a conference between landowners and the leaders o f the home rule 
party as representing the tenants, and following their report which 
was accepted at a landowners’ convention, it was decided that dual
3 See A ndrew  Gailey, Ireland  and the death o f  kindness. The experience o f  constructive unionism  
1890-1905  (Cork, 1987).
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ownership in the land should be abolished. This was the principle 
expressed in the act o f 1903.4
In the 1960s J.C. Beckett followed a similar line o f argument to Curtis. He
concluded that the 1903 act originated from landlord and tenant dissatisfaction with
the 1891 and 1896 land acts which in turn led to the Land Conference. Although
Beckett acknowledged the compulsory purchase campaign in Ulster, he seems to
have underestimated its influence on the origins o f the 1903 Land Act.5 F.S.L. Lyons
carried this interpretation forward into the 1970s:
On 2 September 1902 he [Shawe-Taylor] wrote a short letter to the 
newspapers inviting certain named representatives o f the landlords and 
tenants to meet in conference.. .after only a fortnight’s discussion the 
Conference produced a unanimous report which, though brief, was 
comprehensive enough...The report formed the basis o f the Land Act 
W yndham triumphantly passed through parliament during the session o f 
1903.6
In recent years this view of the act’s origins has been reassessed. Fergus
Campbell, for example, has drawn attention to the campaign o f the U.I.L. He argues
that the U.I.L. agitation for the break up o f large grazing farms, and later compulsory
sale, had a significant bearing on the origins o f the Wyndham Act.7 While
Cam pbell’s interpretation is valid for most o f southern Ireland it needs to be
reappraised in light o f the different conditions that prevailed in Ulster. One o f the
aims o f this dissertation, therefore, is to highlight the compulsory purchase campaign
o f  T. W. Russell in the province thus illuminating the role it played, in conjunction
with the parallel U.I.L. agitation in the south, in bringing about the Wyndham Act.
With the absence o f any concentrated study on the Wyndham Act and its
legacy the conclusions drawn by historians have tended to be vague. The notion that
the sole purpose o f the act was to accelerate land purchase and that the Irish land
question in the period was essentially a struggle to make tenants the owners o f  their
holdings has been to the fore. According to Oliver MacDonagh:
Largely because o f traditional suspicions and the political exploitation o f 
these suspicions on both sides...the 1903 act did not immediately achieve the
4 Edm und Curtis, A history o f  Ire land  (6*  ed., London, 1952), p. 389.
5 J.C. Beckett, The making of modern Ireland 1600-1923 (London, 1969), pp 406-7.
6 F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland since the famine (G lasgow, 1973), pp 218-9.
7 Fergus Cam pbell, Land and revolution: nationalist politics in the west of Ireland 1891-1921 
(Oxford, 2005), pp 8-84; idem, ‘Irish popular politics and the making o f  the W yndham  Land Act, 
1901-1903’ in The Historical Journal, xlv, no, 4 (2002), pp 755-73.
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universal transference in land ownership which it proposed. But in the long 
run, supplemented by further concessions, it issued in the general social 
revolution whereby rural Ireland became a nation o f petty freeholders.8
There has been an assumption that the Wyndham Act consolidated the policy 
o f land purchase as the cure for the agrarian question in Ireland. As D. George Boyce 
stated: ‘The act was defective, and had to be revised by the Liberal government in 
1909; but it established land purchase as the final solution o f the land question.’9 
This thesis shows that land purchase was not the final solution to the land question. It 
failed, in particular, to address the needs o f uneconomic smallholders, evicted 
tenants, agricultural labourers and the various landless elements in agricultural 
society. Land purchase, in fact, only magnified the plight o f these groups.
A close analysis o f the impact o f the Wyndham Act reveals that it created as 
many problems as it solved. While it was highly successful in transferring land from 
landlord to tenant it inadvertently unleashed a wave o f tensions in Irish agricultural 
society. The owners o f small uneconomic holdings quickly realised that land 
purchase did not make their farms economically viable overnight. They sought to 
acquire parcels o f land to consolidate their holdings and looked towards the 
untenanted grazing ranches. With the Wyndham Act having raised expectations to a 
fever pitch there was intense speculation among various sections o f the agricultural 
community that land would become accessible. The act exacerbated matters by 
enabling the sons o f tenants to obtain a farm from any untenanted land which was 
sold along with an estate. This significant group o f young landless men soon became 
disillusioned with the slow rate o f progress. In the early years o f the act the ability o f 
the estates commissioners and the Congested Districts Board (C.D.B.) to buy 
untenanted land was curbed by legal doubts and financial difficulties. Disillusioned, 
these landless men quickly became the backbone of the anti-grazing agitation that 
culminated in the Ranch War o f 1906 to 1909.10
While it has been generally acknowledged that the financial provisions o f the 
act were inadequate there has been virtually no attempt to analyse why. F. S. L. 
Lyons, L. P. Curtis and Eunan O ’Halpin all point out that there were financial
8 O liver M acD onagh, Ireland: The union and its aftermath (London, 1977), p. 50.
9 D. G eorge Boyce, Nineteenth-century Ireland: The search for stability (D ublin, 1990), p. 226.
10 For a study o f  graziers and the Ranch War see David Seth Jones, Graziers, land  reform and  
political conflict in Ireland (W ashington, 1995); idem, ‘The cleavage between graziers and peasants in 
the land struggle, 1890-1910’ in Samuel C lark and James S. Donnelly, Jr. (eds), Irish peasants; 
Violence and  po litica l unrest 1780-1914 (M anchester, 1983), pp 374-417.
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problems but make little attempt to explain them ." Chapter five o f this thesis deals 
exclusively with land purchase and the impact o f the financial difficulties associated 
with the act.
Terence Dooley’s work ‘The land fo r  the p e o p le ’: The land question in 
independent Ireland  (2003) debunked the myth that the adherence by successive 
British governments to the policy o f state-aided land purchase ensured that there was 
no land question in Ireland post-1922. Even where the Wyndham Act had been most 
successful, in terms o f land purchase, the Irish Free State government still required a 
loan in 1923 o f £30,000,000 to complete the process.12 It should be kept in mind that 
the 1923 Act was not simply passed to try to complete land purchase but was 
designed to tackle congestion through the compulsory purchase and division o f  land. 
Groups such as evicted tenants, agricultural labourers, the landless and the holders o f 
uneconomic holdings all formed part o f the land question post-1923 as they had done 
pre-1903. Issues at the core o f the question such as untenanted land, land 
redistribution and congestion were also to the fore. With this in mind the statement 
by Philip Bull that: ‘The claim that the Wyndham Act had finally solved the land 
question has by and large received the endorsement o f history’ certainly needs to be 
reassessed.13 P.N.S. Mansergh and Lawrence W. McBride also adhere to this line o f 
thought in their respective works.14 David W. Miller argued that a ‘land settlement 
had been enacted in 1903’, leaving the I.P.P. free to focus on obtaining home rule.15 
Such an assessment as noted above fails to take into account the underbelly o f the 
Irish land question which was more about land redistribution than land purchase. The 
fact that after 1923 the Irish Land Commission acquired and redistributed 1.5 million 
acres, divided 840,000 acres acquired under acts prior to the creation o f  the Irish Free 
State and migrated over 14,500 farmers from congested areas in the west to the east
11 F.S.L. Lyons and L.P. Curtis in W. E. Vaughan (ed.), A new history o f  Ireland, vi, Ireland under the 
union ii, 1970-1921 (Oxford, 1996), pp 96-7 and p. 158 respectively. Eunan O ’Halpin, The decline o f  
the union, British governm ent in Ireland  1892-1920  (Dublin, 1987), p. 56.
u D ail E ireann parliam entary debates official report (Stationery Office, D ublin), iii, 1147 (28 May 
1923).
13 Philip Bull, L and  politics and  nationalism : A study o f  the Irish land  question  (D ublin, 1996), p. 176.
14 See P. N. S. M ansergh, The Irish question 1840-1921  (London, 1965), p. 201 and Law rence W. 
M cBride, The greening o f  D ublin Castle. The transform ation o f  bureaucratic an d  ju d ic ia l personnel 
in Ire land  1892-1922  (W ashington, 1991), p. 100.
15 David W. M iller, ‘The Roman Catholic Church in Ireland: 1898-1918’ in Alan O ’Day (ed.) 
R eactions to Irish Nationalism  1865-1914  (London, 1987), p. 191.
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and midlands between 1937 and 1978 confirms that the Wyndham Act did not solve 
the land question.16
In order to reappraise the traditional orthodoxy which surrounds the
W yndham Act a wide range o f sources have been consulted during research. To
examine and understand the responses to the introduction and operation o f  the act an
exhaustive search of national and local newspapers was conducted while a number o f
English newspapers were accessed also. Newspapers have proved extremely
important as a source for understanding the attitudes towards and the workings o f the
act at local and national level. A systematic analysis and a very broad cross-section
o f  local newspapers spread over a wide geographical area, representative o f both
nationalist and unionist opinion, was carried out. This helped to ascertain grassroots
opinion which was not always to be found in other primary sources.
The Hansard parliamentary debates have provided a rich source o f
information and reflected the thoughts o f tenant representatives and o f Irish landlords
not always found in private correspondence. The benefits o f carrying out a
painstaking analysis o f Hansard parliamentary debates cannot be overemphasised. In
this context such an analysis provided a freshness to the understanding not only o f
the land question but also as to how the land act was received and viewed during the
period. The analysis for this thesis showed for example, that after the act had only
been in operation for three months, Lord Muskerry effectively called for the
cessation o f its operation:
That the failure o f the Land Act, 1903, to settle the land question, to 
promote goodwill between landlord and tenant, or even check 
emigration, is due to the facts that the only classes it proposes to 
benefit are the substantial farmers already amply benefited by 
previous legislation and that practically nothing has been done for the 
small tenants and cottiers while at the same time the employment of 
labour has been, and will be still more, seriously affected by the 
displacement and exile o f a residential proprietary and o f the 
employing classes dependent on them; therefore it is advisable to 
suspend the working o f the said act...until such time as a proper 
inquiry can be made into the effect o f such legislation on the poorer 
classes in Ireland.17
16 Terence Dooley, 'The land fo r  the people  The land question in independent Ire land  (Dublin, 
2004), p. 20 and Irish Land  Comm ission reports, 1937-78; P.J. Samm on, In the Land  Commission: A 
m emoir 1933-1978  (Dublin, 1997), pp 260-1,
17 The parliam entary debates, fourth series, 1892-1908 (vols i-cxcix, London, 1892-1909) [hereafter 
cited as H ansard  4], cxxx, 524-5 (22 Feb. 1904).
John Dillon made the salient point in 1907 that it was wealthy landlords in 
the north and east o f Ireland, such as the dulce o f Leinster, who had benefited most 
from the ‘bonus’ (all vendors received a 12 % cash ‘bonus’ based on the purchase 
money o f the estate), whereas those in the west where the money was most 
desperately required had gained the least:
W hat was the system? It was this: That the greater the price the more ‘bonus’ 
the landlord got. The great gift o f £12,000,000 [the ‘bonus’ fund for sales], 
intended to settle the cases o f the poor tenantry in the west o f  Ireland, and 
generally to make it possible to buy out the poor estates, had been seized 
upon by the great landlords o f Ulster and Leinster, who had obtained under it 
prices which would make the mouth of any English landlord water. He 
asserted positively that no English landlord dreamt o f getting such prices.
And the ‘bonus’ was availed of by the landlord to squeeze the last cent out o f 
the tenants.18
A further exhaustive investigation o f the various parliamentary papers, 
commissions, returns and committees greatly contributed to the regenerative 
approach o f this work and exposed dimensions to the land question not much debated 
until now. For example, although ostensibly formed to investigate congestion 
throughout Ireland, the royal commission on congestion actually identified many o f 
the weaknesses o f the Wyndham Act and the problems which had arisen during its 
operation.
The annual reports o f the Irish Land Commission, the Estates Commission 
and the C.D.B. also proved invaluable sources. The reports o f these bodies enhance 
the understanding o f the act but particularly its operation and the problems that arose. 
The returns o f advances under the act allowed sales to be examined in great detail 
and for sale prices to be calculated. With the inaccessibility o f the Land Commission 
records this was really the only method o f obtaining the figures for individual sales. 
Fortunately there is such a voluminous amount o f other primary source material 
available that the inaccessibility o f  the Land Commission records has not proved 
problematic.
Landed estates papers provided an abundance o f records and correspondence 
from the period which illuminated the reality o f estate sales under the act. Chief 
amongst these was the estate papers o f the fourth Baron Clonbrock, Luke Gerald
18 H a n sa rd 4, clxxii, 1296 (19 Apr. 1907). The word ‘bonus’ does not appear in the 1903 act.
H owever, the grant-in-aid, as it is called in the act, o f  12 % was com m only referred to as the ‘bonus’.
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Dillon. This is a very extensive collection and because Clonbrock was involved with 
so many landlord organisations there is a wealth o f correspondence with many other 
landlords throughout Ireland. The Leinster estate papers provided a wealth o f 
information on the sale o f the estate. The personal papers o f figures such as George 
Wyndham, John Redmond, and Horace Plunkett were also scrutinised.
This dissertation is essentially divided into two parts. The first section 
encompasses chapters one to three. Chapter one investigates the origins o f the act 
and highlights the influence o f the compulsory purchase campaigns o f the U.l.L. and 
o f the independent unionist M.P., T. W. Russell, in Ulster. Chapters two and three 
clarify what the Irish land question was at the time in addition to exploring the 
parliamentary process that was involved in the passage o f  a land bill. The attitudes 
towards and the response to the bill in both Britain and Ireland are scrutinised.
The second section o f the thesis covers chapters four to six. This section deals 
with the operation o f the Wyndham Act and its legacy concentrating on whether or 
not the generalisations put forth about the act by historians stand up to scrutiny. 
Despite being hailed as the solution to the Irish land question this thesis will show 
that the act failed to adequately address many aspects o f the problem. Through a 
series o f local case studies chapter four explores the sale o f estates under the act and 
the attitudes o f landlords during the period. The financial difficulties and their impact 
on tenants, landlords and the wider community are discussed in chapter five. The 
final chapter tackles the areas o f the land question that the Wyndham Act magnified 
rather than resolved. The question o f land redistribution, the sale o f untenanted land, 
congestion, uneconomic holdings, evicted tenants and the landless are all 
systematically examined. This work is an attempt to offer an original perspective on 
the origins, operation and legacy o f the Wyndham Act.
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CHAPTER ONE: THE ORIGINS OF THE WYNDHAM LAND BILL, 1903.
I). Introduction.
This chapter is intended as an examination o f the origins o f the Wyndham Land Bill 
and will give greater recognition to the role o f  the independent unionist, T. W. 
Russell, in the events leading up to its introduction. Historians such as Fergus 
Campbell have successfully demonstrated the influence o f the U.I.L. campaign for 
compulsory purchase on the origins o f the act.1 Although Campbell acknowledged 
that the ‘architect o f the demand for compulsory land purchase was T.W. Russell’ his 
work concentrated solely on the influence o f the U.I.L.2 Campbell argues that the 
compulsory purchase campaign o f the U.I.L. from 1901 to 1903 had a profound 
effect on the Conservative government and influenced both the ‘timing and substance 
o f  the 1903 Land A ct’.3 This chapter will argue that the U.I.L. took their lead from 
Russell’s compulsory purchase campaign in Ulster and that the two parallel 
campaigns had a significant influence on the genesis o f the 1903 act. However, as 
Cam pbell’s work has adequately covered the U.I.L. campaign this chapter will focus 
predominantly on Russell’s Ulster campaign which has failed to receive sufficient 
acknowledgement to date.
Thomas Wallace Russell was born in Cupar, Fife in Scotland on 28 February 
1841. A Presbyterian, he moved to Ireland at the age o f eighteen and settled at 
Donaghmore, Co. Tyrone.4 He was very involved in the temperance movement and 
between 1864 and 1882 he was secretary o f various temperance organisations. His 
work for this cause led him into politics.5 As a unionist M.P. for South Tyrone 
(1886-1910), he was appointed parliamentary secretary to the Local Government 
Board in 1895. He held this position until 1900.6 In the 1880s and early 1890s, he 
had firmly supported the transfer o f land from landlord to tenant but had drawn a line 
at compulsion, even speaking out against it.
1 See Fergus Campbell, ‘Irish popular politics and the making o f  the W yndham  Land Act, 1901-1903’ 
in The Historical Journal, xlv, no. 4 (2002), pp 755-73 and idem, Land and Revolution. Nationalist 
politics in the west of Ireland 1891-1921 (Oxford, 2005).
2 Ibid., p. 47.
3 Cam pbell, Land and Revolution, p. 84.
4 T.W . Russell, ‘The Irish land question. W hat remains to be done’ in W.T. Stead (ed.), Coming men 
on coming questions (London, 1905), p. 2.
5 W illiam Roulston, ‘Landlordism and Unionism  in Tyrone, 1885-1910’ in Charles D illon and Henry 
A. Jefferies (eds), Tyrone: history and society (Dublin, 2000), pp 741-64.
6 Who's Who 1914: an annual biographical dictionary with which is incorporated "men and women 
of the time" (London, 1914.).
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Unlike the other three Irish provinces, Ulster contained a significant number 
o f  Presbyterian tenant farmers, whose landlords predominantly belonged to the 
Church o f Ireland. Landlord and tenant were united in their loyalty to the union 
during the turbulent 1880s. However, following the defeat o f the second home rule 
bill in 1893 the threat to the union appeared to have receded. Consequently, Ulster 
Presbyterian farmers became more amenable to an alliance with Catholic farmers in 
the rest o f Ireland, in order to secure the ownership o f their holdings. T.W. Russell 
exploited this situation, accurately gauging public opinion, and built a political 
campaign around compulsory purchase.
Brief references to Russell and his campaign have been made by a number o f 
twentieth century historians in a variety o f contexts.7 However, Russell has gained 
more prominence and relevance in recent times owing to the works o f certain 
historians. Alvin Jackson has outlined how Russellism represented a serious electoral 
threat to Ulster unionism between the years 1894 and 1906. Furthermore, he 
identified that Russell’s campaign, allied with the activities o f the U.I.L., ‘compelled 
the unionist governments towards pliability.’8 Andrew Gailey, in his work on 
constructive unionism, highlighted how Russell fractured the fragile unity o f unionist 
Ulster with his campaign. Gailey argued that the adoption o f land reform by the 
government in the period was an attempt to pre-empt Russell’s compulsory purchase 
campaign.9 Paul Bew explored the advent o f T.W. Russell in his work on conflict 
and conciliation during the period 1890 to 1910 while James Loughlin shed light on 
his earlier career between 1886 and 1900.10 This chapter elaborates on the work o f
7 Some o f  these include Elizabeth H ooker w ho acknowledged that Russell com m enced the 
com pulsory purchase m ovem ent o f the period. U nfortunately, she did not touch on the influence o f his 
cam paign on the origins o f  the W yndham Act. See Readjustments of agricultural tenure in Ireland 
(N orth Carolina, 1938). John E. Pom fret w as one o f  the earliest to identify the potential o f  T. W. 
R ussell’s declaration, in favour o f com pulsory purchase, to unite Ireland in support o f  expropriating 
the landlords. See The struggle for land in Ireland 1800-1923 (New York, 1969), pp 276-314. 
Catherine Shannon identified the fears that R ussell’s campaign evoked not only for Irish landlords but 
for the official U lster unionist party. See Arthur J. Balfour and Ireland 1874-1922 (W ashington,
1988), pp 82-135. Sally W arw ick H aller briefly acknow ledged how Russell popularised compulsory 
purchase. See William O'Brien and the Irish land war (Cork, 1990), pp 214-20. Philip Bull briefly 
referred to the m ovem ent in U lster in his study o f  the Irish land question. See Land, politics and 
nationalism: a study of the Irish land question (Dublin, 1996).
8 A lvin Jackson, The Ulster party: Irish Unionists in the House of Commons 1884-1911 (New York,
1989), p. 158; idem, ‘Irish unionism  and the Russellite threat 1894-1906’ in Irish Historical Studies, 
xxv, no. 100 (Nov. 1987), pp 376-404.
9 See Ireland and the death of kindness: the experience of constructive unionism 1890-1905 (Cork, 
1987), pp 171-2.
10 See Paul Bew, Conflict and conciliation in Ireland 1890-1910: parnellifies and radical agrarians 
(O xford, 1987), pp 86-98 and Jam es Loughlin, ‘T.W . Russell, the tenant-farm er interest, and
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these historians and will argue that the U.l.L. took its lead from the compulsory 
purchase campaign that Russell initiated in Ulster and that it was this two-pronged 
assault that helped create the conditions for the Land Conference, which 
subsequently laid the ground for the 1903 act.
II). T. W. Russell at Clogher, Co. Tyrone, September 1900.
On 20 September 1900, at Clogher, Co. Tyrone, Russell publicly advocated
compulsory purchase. By then, the demand for compulsion had garnered
considerable support in Ulster and Russell had begun to promote the compulsory
purchase o f the landlords’ interest in the land as the only solution to the land
question. Compulsory purchase would force the landlords to sell their land, whereas
in previous land purchase acts, sales had been on a voluntary basis. In Russell’s
opinion, the relative success o f the land purchase acts o f 1881 to 1896 in Ulster had
made the introduction o f a compulsory measure more pressing. As the number of
tenant-purchasers increased, unrest grew among those tenants whose landlords
refused to sell. The root o f the unrest lay in the fact that the majority o f  tenants who
had purchased their holdings were paying less in annuities (the repayments o f  the
government loan) than their neighbours were paying in rent. At Clogher, Russell
explained what compulsory purchase would entail:
The central proposition is that the fee simple o f the agricultural land in 
the country not in the use and occupation o f the landlord him self should 
as speedily as possible be transferred to the occupier at a fair valuation, 
the state advancing the purchase money to the purchaser, and in certain 
cases, adding a ‘bonus’ to the agreed sum as a compensation for 
compulsion."
Russell put the cost o f such a transaction at approximately £100,000,000.12 
He argued that there was a precedent for a state ‘bonus’ in the Irish Local 
Government Act o f 1898 whereby landlords were made exempt from their share o f 
the poor rate. This annual charge o f approximately £300,000 a year was now charged 
on the imperial exchequer. I f  such a system could be used to lubricate the operation
progressive unionism in U lster, 1886-1900’ in Eire-Ireland, xxv, no. 1 (1996), pp 44-63. See also 
Paschal A. M cKeown, T. W. Russell: temperance orator, militant Unionist missionary, radical 
reformer and political pragmatist (U npublished Ph.D thesis, Q ueen’s University Belfast, 1991).
11 Northern Whig, 21 Sept. 1900.
12 T.W . Russell, ‘Ireland and Irish land once m ore’ in Fortnightly Review, Ixix, no. 409 (Jan. 1901), p. 
16.
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o f  the 1898 act then something similar could help grease the wheels o f a land act.13
The notion o f a state ‘bonus’ to induce landlords to sell their estates would become
one o f the key recommendations o f the Land Conference and would form an
essential component o f the 1903 Land Act.
Russell’s scheme immediately came under attack from Irish landlords. The
Irish Landowners’ Convention was an organisation o f landlords created in 1886 to
defend landlord interests.14 It adopted the following resolution condemning Russell’s
Clogher speech: ‘We desire to protest in the strongest manner against the scheme of
spoliation and confiscation just proposed by a member o f  government, Mr. T. W.
Russell, under the name of “compulsory purchase” .’15 In addition, a number o f
individual landlords bitterly attacked scheme. Lord Clonbrock o f Galway and
Anthony Traill, who became provost o f Trinity College in 1904, saw it as little more
than confiscation.16 Such criticism did not silence Russell, who in October elaborated
further upon his scheme. He argued that the bulk o f Irish landlords would obtain
nineteen years’ purchase whereas the average price under the existing land purchase
acts was just sixteen years.17
Significantly, the U.I.L. was quick to recognise the potential o f Russell’s
compulsory purchase strategy and William O ’Brien, the founder o f the organisation,
adopted it into the league’s constitution in November 1900.18 The U.I.L. had been
founded in 1898 at Westport, Co. Mayo. The principal aim o f the organisation was
the redistribution o f the grazing ranches (also known as grasslands) in the congested
districts. William O ’Brien declared that they would help the C.D.B. to:
obtain grazing lands for division amongst the people, which efforts had been 
baulked by the action o f landlords in demanding monstrous prices for their 
lands, and above all by the selfishness and greed o f land-grabbers who had 
stepped in and taken land which the Congested Districts Board would 
otherwise have purchased.19
13 Ibid., pp 16-18.
14 For a m ore detailed description see Terence Dooley, The decline of the big house in Ireland 
(Dublin, 2001), p. 304.
15 The Times, 28 Sept. 1900.
16 Irish Times [hereafter cited as IT .} ,  25 and 29 Sept. 1900.
17 Ibid., 29 Oct. 1900. One year’s purchase w as equivalent to the rent a tenant paid to his landlord for 
a single year. Therefore, sixteen years’ purchase was the equivalent o f  sixteen years rent.
18 Cam pbell, Land and revolution, p. 47.
19 ‘The confidential print, 1898-1901’, PRO CO 903/8/31 cited in Fergus Cam pbell, Land and 
Revolution. Nationalist politics in the west of Ireland 1891-192! (Oxford 2005), p. 32.
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Initially, the U.I.L. was confined mainly to Connaught where it helped
organise the boycotting o f auctions where grazing land was available. Labourers who
worked for graziers would be ostracised and shopkeepers who failed to jo in  and
advertise their membership o f the U.I.L. would suffer a loss o f business. As the
movement grew, O ’Brien employed paid organisers who promoted the agitation and
the spread o f the U.I.L. On 19 and 20 June 1900, a national convention was held in
the Mansion House, Dublin and the I.P.P., which had been fragmented since the
Parnellite split, was reunited:
The branches o f the United Irish League became the provincial rank and file 
branches o f the party; the U.I.L. divisional executives were given the 
authority to select parliamentary candidates; and John Redmond, the 
chairman o f the Party, was elected to the presidency o f the national executive 
o f the United Irish League.
In order for the U.I.L. to become a truly national organisation and to spread 
outside Connaught, a new objective or catch-cry, which would appeal to the farmers 
o f Munster, and especially o f Leinster, was required. These provinces contained 
significant numbers o f graziers who were not enamoured by the idea o f dividing the 
grasslands. The compulsory purchase o f the landlords’ interest in the land, advocated 
by Russell at Clogher, provided the U.I.L. with the means o f expanding its power 
base. The U.I.L. enjoyed considerable national success in the 1900 general election 
although Connaught continued to be its stronghold. The Inspector General o f the 
Royal Irish Constabulary (R.I.C.) correctly predicted the direction that the U.I.L. 
would pursue in his October report: ‘William O ’Brien is sufficiently ingenious to 
perceive in the question o f compulsory sale a cry which would once more appeal to 
the cupidity o f certain farmers; and which might with success be used as the basis for 
a new land w ar.’21
Prior to the incorporation o f compulsory purchase into the U.I.L. constitution 
in November 1900, the large grazing farmers o f Leinster had looked on the U.I.L. 
with suspicion when they advocated the break-up o f the grasslands. However, the 
idea o f compulsory purchase appealed to them. As a result the U.I.L. was able to 
expand outside o f Connaught and become a truly national organisation. Throughout
20 United Irish League: constitution and rules adopted by the Irish national convention, 19,h and 20'h 
June, 1900 (Dublin, 1900), pp 1-4 cited in Cam pbell, Land and Revolution, p. 42.
21 Inspector General monthly report [hereafter cited as I. G. monthly report] Oct. 1900, CO 904 part
iii.
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the first half o f 1901 it began to spread throughout the country. In Ulster, where 
branches existed, they tended to be sectarian in nature and largely functioned in 
opposition to Orange Lodges.22
William O ’Brien’s newspaper, the Irish People, proclaimed that there was 
significant nationalist support for the South Tyrone m em ber’s campaign: ‘We may 
regret Mr. Russell’s unionism; but we have to deal with him solely as a land 
reformer, and when he avows him self an irreconcilable enemy o f Irish landlordism, 
we can honestly wish God speed to his mission in the north.’23
In November 1900, George Wyndham, shortly after being appointed chief 
secretary o f  Ireland, acknowledged the potency o f Russell’s campaign and its effect 
on the U.I.L. in a memorandum to A. J. Balfour, first lord o f the treasury: ‘The 
League began by an attack upon “graziers” . Thanks to T.W  Russell they are now 
doubling this policy with “compulsory land purchase” .’24
Russell was sacked from the Conservative government subsequently, because 
o f his stance on compulsory purchase. Lord Salisbury, who was Conservative prime 
minister from 1885 to 1902, stated that Russell could not hope to remain a part o f the 
government after pledging him self to ‘a measure o f the first importance in Irish 
politics which her majesty’s government had given no kind o f indication that they 
were prepared to accept, and to which indeed they are under existing circumstances 
strongly opposed’ 25
In mid-November 1900, Russell received a letter from some of his 
constituents requesting his assistance with the formation o f a South Tyrone Tenant’s 
Defence Association.26 Delighted with its support, he briefly outlined the intentions 
o f the movement: ‘Our course in Ulster is clear. We shall strive to convince 
parliament by every constitutional method o f the justice and necessity o f our 
cause.’27 From the outset he was keen to keep the campaign within constitutional 
parameters.
22 Campbell, ‘Irish popular politics and the making o f the W yndham Land Act, 1901-1903’, p. 761,
23 Irish People, 8 Dec. 1900.
24 George W yndham  to A.J. Balfour, 26 Nov. 1900 in J.W. Mackail and Guy W yndham (eds), Life 
and letters o f  George W yndham vol. ii (London, 1925), p. 410. A. J. Balfour led the Conservative 
party in the H ouse o f  Com m ons as his uncle, the prim e m inister, Lord Salisbury, operated his 
adm inistration from the H ouse o f Lords.
25/. T., 5 Jan. 1901.
26 Ibid., 21 Nov. 1900.
27 Ibid.
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TTTL The official launch o f the com pulsory purchase cam paign in U lster.
On 29 November 1900, Russell’s campaign for compulsory purchase was officially 
launched at Ballymoney, Co. Antrim. While reassuring his audience that he was not 
in league or in competition with William O ’Brien and the U.I.L., Russell did not 
dismiss the idea o f  co-operation: ‘Where Mr O ’Brien’s object in this matter is the
same as mine, and where his methods are lawful and fair, I shall co-operate gladly
28with him or with anybody else.’
At the official launch Russell stressed that it was equally important that both
the landlords and the tenants receive a fair settlement in any compulsory purchase
scheme. He also spelt out the difficulties facing the implementation o f compulsory
purchase. Landlord opposition was, to Russell, the chief obstacle. He was quick,
however, to rubbish claims that he was anti-landlord seeing them only as having
‘been overtaken by a social, economic, and political revolution’.29 Indeed, he
specifically recommended a measure to help those landlords whose estates were
encumbered or indebted, arguing that the British treasury would have to intervene.
Russell also made the point that the coming together o f the land and national
questions since the 1880s had led to the alienation o f landlords:
By birth, by education, and by ability many o f them are entitled to 
lead. Why are they clean out o f the public life o f this country? They 
are out o f it because o f their relationship to the land, and nothing else.
(Hear, hear.). Freed from this encumbrance they would speedily 
regain their proper place. The gentry would once again come to the 
front and lead their districts.30
On the very day that the campaign was launched, the chief secretary George
Wyndham, confided to his brother Guy: ‘My work is cut out for me here and no
mistake. Everybody was up on end and T.W. Russell has gone nap on a wild
compulsory purchase scheme.’31 Wyndham was firmly opposed to any form of
compulsion, holding that it would only consolidate congestion:
Compulsion apart from all other and prior objections would stereotype the 
existing and intolerable situation. The family o f seven, inhabiting a hovel,
28 Ibid., 30 Nov. 1900.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 George W yndham  to his brother Guy, 29 Nov. 1900 in Guy W yndham (ed.), Letters o f  George 
Wyndham 1877-1913  (Edinburgh, 1915), p. 5.
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and reclaiming 4 acres scattered in from 10 to 15 patches, would be made 
owners (!) o f that ‘hereditas’.32
Aside from stereotyping uneconomic holdings, he held that it would also be unfair to
• 33the landlord class and would increase the volume o f costly litigation.
As Russell’s campaign gathered momentum, the I.U.P.P. became increasingly 
concerned. Many Ulster unionist M.P.s felt antagonised by Russell’s entry into their 
constituencies without first asking their permission. Russell, however, claimed that 
he only entered other constituencies upon receiving an invitation to speak. Unionist 
opposition to the member for South Tyrone began to intensify, as did efforts to 
discredit him. This was despite the fact that virtually all Ulster unionist members 
from agricultural constituencies were pledged to support compulsory purchase. In the 
1900 election, such a pledge had become a prerequisite. With the notable exception 
o f Colonel Edward Saunderson, whose constituency contained significant urban 
centres such as Portadown and Lurgan, virtually all Ulster unionist M.P.s from 
predominantly agricultural constituencies had pledged their support for compulsory 
purchase. However, the majority were content to simply pay lip service to their 
pledge.
One o f the most senior Ulster unionists, James Rentoul, M.P. for East Down, 
dismissed the claims that Russell had been ejected from the government because o f 
his stance on compulsory purchase and he held a series o f public meetings 
condemning the member for South Tyrone. However, when Russell obtained Lord 
Salisbury’s permission to publish a letter in the press clearly showing that he had 
been dismissed because o f his stance, Rentoul’s campaign was completely 
undermined. Russell’s confirmation that he had been sacked because o f his 
standpoint only added to his credibility and reputation as the leader o f  the 
compulsory purchase cause in Ulster. It highlighted the virtual inactivity o f the other 
Ulster unionist members on the subject. Rentoul and the other unionist M.P.s were 
placed in an awkward position. They were supporting a government who had 
dismissed a junior minister because o f his advocacy o f a cause they were pledged to 
further.
32 Cieorge W yndham to A.J. Balfour, 26 N ov. ¡900 in M ackaii and W yndham  (eds), The letters o f  
George Wyndham vol ii, p. 411.
33 George W yndham, ‘The Irish land question and the need for legislation’, 1901 (The N ational 
A rchives, Kew [hereafter cited as T.N.A .], CAB 37/59/147), pp 4-5.
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Other attempts to discredit Russell were undertaken by unionists such as
William Moore, M.P. for North Antrim. He had close links with the government and
would later become parliamentary secretary to George Wyndham. He also sought to
discredit Russell in a speech at Finvoy, Co. Antrim, in early January 1901. Moore
held that Russell’s campaign and his speeches would inevitably lead to violence and
lawlessness. He was also keen to associate Russell not only with the nationalists and
the U.I.L. but also their methods o f agrarian agitation.34
Colonel Saunderson, M.P. for North Armagh and the leader o f the I.U.P.P.
and the chief landlord spokesman in the House o f Commons, was also vehemently
opposed to Russell’s movement. He declared that ‘compulsory purchase appeared to
him ...to  be a simple way o f expressing pure and unadulterated robbery.’35 A number
o f anonymous pamphlets were also produced in 1901 attempting to discredit Russell
in unionist eyes and to highlight inconsistencies in his speeches.36 Southern unionists
and landlords such as Dudley Cosby also viewed his campaign with horror. Dudley
was the son o f Col. Robert Ashworth Godolphin Cosby o f Stradbally Hall, Queen’s
County. He believed that Russell’s scheme was confiscation without ‘adequate
compensation’ and that it was ‘downright robbery’.37
Despite the opposition o f the I.U.P.P., Russell continued his campaign with a
series o f  speeches throughout Ulster during January 1901. On 18 January, a large
meeting o f tenant farmers was held at Montnorris, in South Armagh. One o f the
resolutions passed at the meeting declared:
We hail with satisfaction Mr. T. W. Russell’s advocacy o f compulsory 
sale; we rejoice that a member o f parliament, whose services to the 
state were recognised as entitling him to office in her m ajesty’s 
government, has come forward to voice on the public platform, and we 
trust in the House of Commons, the felt need of the Irish tenantry ... and 
we heartily express our confidence in the wisdom and timeliness o f his 
policy, and assure him of our united and earnest support.38
34/. 7 , 4 Jan. 1901.
35 The Times, 13 July 1901. Saunderson was a Co. Cavan landlord.
36 See Anonym ous, “C om pulsorypurchase". A reply to Mr. T. W. Russell (Dublin, 1901) and 
A nonym ous," C om pulsory purchase " in Ireland. Five speeches made by Mr. 71 W. R ussell M.P. 
(Dublin, 1901). The first pam phlet attempted to discredit Russell and his ideas concerning com pulsory 
purchase. The second was concerned w ith portraying him as inconsistent by printing copies o f 
speeches he had given in the late 1880s and early 1890s w here he had spoken against the idea of 
com pulsory purchase.
37 Dudley S. A. Cosby, The Irish land problem  and  how to solve it: a defence o f  the Irish landlords 
(London, 1901) pp 58-87.
38/. 7 , 19 Jan. 1901.
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In his January report, the inspector genera! o f the R.I.C. noted that ‘in Ulster, 
Tenant Defence Associations are springing up in response to T. W. Russell’s 
agitation for compulsory sale; and these bodies may be expected to vigorously back 
up Mr. Russell’s efforts’.39 Russell already had the firm support o f the Presbyterian 
farmers whose clergy were ‘prominently identifying themselves with the proceedings 
at all the meetings’.40 An alliance o f Presbyterians and Catholics would give the 
movement greater force and unquestioned credibility to speak on behalf o f  the tenant 
farmers o f the entire province.
At his speech at Dromore, Co. Down on 16 January 1901, Russell shed light 
on his views and his proposed strategy in relation to the nationalists. As the Irish  
Times reported:
He was not a nationalist, and he had fought them more fiercely than any 
other unionist member. He was prepared to step side by side and 
shoulder to shoulder with the nationalists to achieve that great object 
[compulsory purchase] so long as that agitation was confined to 
constitutional action. He should welcome their aid, and if the two 
parties did not step together for the emancipation o f the land it would 
not be his fault. He did not see anything that would prevent the union o f 
Irishmen on that holy issue.41
Russell continued his campaign, addressing large and enthusiastic crowds in Co. 
Antrim at Lisburn and Larne.42 He now apparently felt that a countrywide agitation 
for compulsory sale would exert greater influence on the government who were 
becoming increasingly alarmed by the growing agitation in Ulster.
Russell was always quick to point out that his movement posed no threat to 
the union and that talk o f home rule was only a scare tactic used by those unionists 
opposed to compulsory purchase. Indeed, he was o f the belief that if the land 
question was satisfactorily solved, any demand for home rule would disappear as 
compulsory purchase would actually secure and reinforce the union. On 20 January 
1901 at Cookstown, Co. Tyrone, John Redmond, leader o f the I.P.P., responded to 
Russell’s overtures o f an alliance with nationalists on the question o f compulsory 
purchase. The Irish Times reported Redmond’s speech:
39 I.G. monthly report, Jan. 1901.
40 County Inspector m onthly report [hereafter cited as C. I. monthly report], Co. A ntrim , Jan. 1901, 
CO 904 part iii.
411.T., 21 Jan. 1901.
42 Ulster Gazette, 26 Jan. 1901.
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When Mr. Russell came to Ulster and took a lead in that province on 
the question o f compulsory purchase they wished him God speed; and 
though they could not travel on the same lines on which he travelled 
they were glad to see him running on parallel lines towards the object 
that they both had in view.43
On 8 February 1901, a demonstration in favour o f  compulsory purchase was 
held in Belfast under the auspices o f the Ulster Tenants’ Defence Association. The 
chairman, Andrew Kennedy, declared that ‘they were met, independently o f creed or 
politics, to discuss the great social question o f land’.44 A petition was drawn up by 
the association, which was to be presented to the House o f Commons, declaring that 
there was a ‘practically unanimous desire among the farmers and other classes in the 
province o f Ulster in favour o f an equitable scheme, to be universally applied, which 
shall compulsorily end the present unsatisfactory system o f dual ownership in Irish 
land’.45
On 21 February 1901, in the House o f Commons, John Redmond proposed an 
amendment to the parliamentary address in reply to the king’s speech 46 It stated that 
the administration o f the land acts in Ireland had broken down and that the only 
solution to the land question was to immediately introduce a scheme of compulsory 
sale and purchase.47 Significantly, Russell seconded the amendment declaring: ‘I 
never rose with a greater sense o f responsibility, with a stronger sense o f duty ... 
[and] I am supported by an absolutely united Ireland upon this question.’48 He 
emphatically stated that ‘no cry o f trafficking with traitors; and no bogey o f  home 
rule will turn the Ulster tenants from the path they have entered on’.49 A. J. Balfour, 
first lord o f the treasury, was scathing in his response to the proposed amendment. 
He accused Russell o f agitating the passions o f the farming class in his Ulster 
campaign and ridiculed the Russell/Redmond alliance.50 The chief secretary, George
43 /. 71, 21 Jan. 1901.
44 Ibid., 9 Feb. 1901.
45 Ibid.
46 The k ing’s speech was presented to parliam ent at the com m encem ent o f a new session. It usually 
contained references to governm ent policy or legislation. Traditionally a vote o f  thanks w as proposed 
in the form o f an address to the king. This was usually followed by debate over any num ber o f  w ide 
ranging issues concerning parliam ent. A m endm ents to the address w ere norm ally attem pts by 
mem bers to highlight specific issues or grievances.
47 H ansard 4, lxxxix, 726 (21 Feb. 1901).
48 Ibid., col. 728.
49 Ibid., col. 732.
50 Ibid., col. 753.
21
Wyndham, was equally combative in his response to the amendment, highlighting 
what he saw as the recklessness and impetuosity o f Russell’s campaign.51
This opposition to Russell’s campaign, in the House o f Commons, can be 
largely explained by the fact that Lord Salisbury and his government, while in favour 
o f extending tenant proprietorship through voluntary purchase, were very much 
opposed to the principle o f compulsion. A. J. Balfour presented the vote on 
Redm ond’s amendment as a vote o f confidence in the government.
Because the majority o f Ulster unionist members were content to only pay lip 
service to the policy o f compulsory purchase, a large number voted against the 
amendment. Only three Ulster unionist members from agricultural constituencies 
voted for Redmond’s amendment (T. W. Russell, T. L. Corbett and John Lonsdale). 
John Gordon, Col. McCalmont, William Moore, William Johnston, Robert O ’Neill, 
Col. Saunderson, John Atkinson, Hugh Arnold-Forster, James Rentoul and the 
marquis o f Hamilton voted with the government while W. E. Macartney abstained.52 
According to the nationalist M.P. for North Donegal, William O ’Doherty, those 
M.P.s who had voted with the government against the wishes o f  their constituents 
had committed political suicide.53 In a published telegram, on 2 March 1901, Russell 
stated that the next step in the campaign was up to the people o f Ulster. Only they 
could decide how they would react to those M.P.s who had broken their pledge to 
support compulsory purchase.54
IV). The Ulster Farm ers’ and Labourers’ Union and Compulsory Sale 
Association.
The report o f the inspector general o f the R.I.C. for March 1901 revealed much about 
the vitality o f the compulsory purchase movement in Ulster and who exactly was 
supporting it:
The great body o f farmers are in favour o f the scheme and associations 
are being gradually formed for the furtherance o f  the movement. It was 
rather remarkable to find at some of Russell’s meetings, the Roman 
Catholic clergy on the same platform with him while a good many 
nationalists were among the audiences. As yet, however, the
51 Ibid., col. 787.
52 See The Times , 22 Feb. 1901.
53 H ansard 4, Ixxxix, 930 (21 Feb. 1901).
541.T., 2 Mar. 1901.
22
Presbyterians and their clergy are the backbone o f this agitation. The 
Episcopalians also favour it but they are slow to take an active part in it.55
The sluggish response from the Episcopalians was probably due to the fact that 
landlords made up a significant proportion o f their congregation and this prevented 
them from publicly supporting compulsory purchase. Interestingly, Russell’s 
movement was increasingly attracting people from all sections o f  Ulster society, 
regardless o f  political or religious background. Indeed, the Irish Times, usually quite 
hostile to Russell, acknowledged that ‘in view o f the reactions accorded to Mr. T. W. 
Russell, and the pledges given by Ulster members generally, there is no doubt that 
the idea o f  compulsory purchase has caught hold o f the imagination o f the northern 
farmer, and will not easily be dislodged’.56
Russell resigned from the South Tyrone Unionist Association, signalling his 
break from the official unionist party, on 27 May 1901. A week later he helped 
establish the Ulster Farm ers’ and Labourers’ Union and Compulsory Sale 
Association in the Ulster Hall, Belfast.57 The attendance was so large that an 
overflow meeting had to be held nearby in the rooms o f the Young M en’s Christian 
Association.58 The aim o f the association was to organise the unionist farmers and 
labourers o f Ulster, with regard to contesting future elections, but it would be ‘non­
sectarian and non-political’.59 However, in the House o f Commons, on 1 August 
1901, A. J. Balfour along with George Wyndham forcefully declared their adherence 
to voluntary sale and their opposition to any scheme in which landlords would be 
forced to sell their estates.60
V). Official launch of the U. I. L. campaign for compulsory purchase.
With Russell setting Ulster ablaze, John Dillon and John Redmond gave permission 
for the U.I.L. to commence an agitation in favour o f  compulsory purchase in August
1901.61 The campaign was officially launched by the U.I.L. on 1 September 1901 at 
Westport. Fergus Campbell outlined how it was to operate on two levels: ‘First, the 
U.I.L. branches were to increase the level o f boycotting in Ireland and thereby
55 I.G. monthly report, Apr. 1901.
56 I.T., 4 Apr. 1901.
57 From here on known as The U lster Farm ers’ and L abourers’ Union.
58 I T., 6 June 1901.
59 Ibid.
60 H ansard 4, xcviii, 877 (1 Aug. 1901).
61 J.V. O ’Brien, William O ’Brien and  the course o f  Irish politics  (Berkeley 1976), p. 130.
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undermine the authority o f the law in an increasingly large area. Second, the Irish
parliamentary party were to articulate the political demand of the agitation in the
House o f Commons’.62 The U.I.L. agitation was greatly helped by both the
provincial and nationalist press who published speeches, lists o f those who were
boycotted, as well as minutes o f branch meetings.
Russell recommenced the Ulster campaign for compulsory purchase on 2
October 1901 in Derry City. During the months o f  August and September, he had
spent a considerable period touring the west o f Ireland and his book Ireland and the
empire was also published.63 The inspector general o f the R.I.C. commented that
‘Russell’s compulsory sale agitation has made considerable progress in the north.
Several meetings were held during the month and the Presbyterian farmers in
Tyrone, Derry &c are zealously supporting it. They are thrifty industrious people and
their influence will be felt at the next election.’64 To allay fears that co-operation
with nationalists would be to renounce unionism, Russell declared:
My unionism is not the unionism o f the landlords’ convention. Much 
less is it the unionism of the Shankill road. (Applause.) The union 
which I fought for, and am ready still to maintain, is one for the benefit, 
the advantage o f all classes o f the Irish people...The machinery o f 
parliament itself has to be reformed, and the frank and fair recognition 
o f Irish opinion in Irish affairs must be recognised. Gentlemen, my 
inmost conviction is that in seeking to make the Irish occupier into an 
Irish owner I am doing work that will make the union between the two 
countries a reality - one o f interest and affection, not o f  mere 
parchment.65
Russell predicted that compulsory purchase would dilute any movement for home 
rule. In fact, he felt that it would make farmers in the south and west loyal to the 
government thus strengthening the union.
The South Tyrone M.P. had garnered considerable support which greatly 
elevated his political standing. By late 1901 his position was fearfully recognised by 
landlords. According to Dudley Cosby: ‘Mr. Russell has apparently secured the tacit, 
if  not active, support o f the Irish home rule members to his plan, and has, we
62 Campbell, L and  and  revolution  p. 59.
63 T. W. Russell, Ireland  and the empire (London, 1901). The w ork dealt w ith the history o f  Ireland 
from the union up until 1901. Russell discusses the education question, the land question, hom e rule 
and the union as well as the financial position o f  Ireland within the empire.
641.G. m onthly report, Oct. 1901.
651.T., 24 Oct. 1901.
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presume, in addition at his back, not only the Ulster tenantry, but those o f the south 
o f Ireland as well.’66
On 24 October 1901 Russell addressed a large meeting at Monaghan town, 
held by the Monaghan Unionist Land Purchase Association. The county inspector o f 
the R.I.C. observed that the meeting was comprised mainly o f Presbyterians and their 
clergy but that there was also a sizeable number o f nationalists present.67 In his 
address, Russell told his audience not to desert its unionism or nationalism but to 
unite on the land question.68 The meeting demonstrated the power o f the compulsory 
purchase movement and its ability to transcend religious and political differences.
The chief secretary, George Wyndham, expressed his concern about the lack 
o f a government land policy to A. J. Balfour on 2 November 1901: ‘I cannot say too 
earnestly how necessary I feel it to be that the cabinet should decide on a 
comprehensive land policy and place me in a position to speak early in the session or 
sooner.’69 Although he was chief secretary o f Ireland, Wyndham did not become a 
member o f the cabinet until A. J. Balfour’s appointment as prime minister in July
1902. On 8 November 1901, a meeting o f the executive council o f the Ulster 
Farmers’ and Labourers’ Union was held in Belfast. It was decided that a deputation 
be sent to George Wyndham. However, Wyndham refused to meet them.
By Christmas 1901, the compulsory purchase campaign had made a deep 
impact in Ulster. The inspector general o f the R.I.C. commented that ‘Russell’s 
campaign for the sale o f estates has been actively worked up by him in the north and 
it has undoubtedly taken a deep hold among a proportion o f the Ulster tenants’.70 As 
support for Russell and compulsory purchase grew, the efforts to discredit him in 
unionist circles became more frantic. The possibility o f home rule and the threat to 
the union were used to motivate opposition.71
In an attempt to allay the fears that Russell’s campaign had aroused among 
landlords, Wyndham attended a dinner in Belfast in early January 1902. The 
company was comprised mainly o f substantial Irish landlords and was chaired by 
Lord Londonderry. The chief secretary forcefully reiterated that the government
66 Cosby, Irish land problem , p. 58.
67 C. I. monthly report, Co. M onaghan, Oct. 1901,
68 Northern Standard, 26 Oct. 1901.
69 W yndham to Balfour, 2 N ov. 1901 in Mackail & W yndham (eds), Life & letters o f  George 
Wyndham vol. ii, p. 428.
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would continue with voluntary purchase and would never introduce a bill applying 
compulsory purchase.72 Such a public gesture betrayed the pressure that Wyndham 
was under. Russell’s compulsory purchase movement, when combined with the 
parallel U.I.L. agitation in the south, was evidently a potent weapon which could be 
used to pressurise the government.
VI). The East Down by-election.
On 15 January 1902, at Saintfield, Co. Down, the Ulster Farmers’ and Labourers’ 
Union selected James Woods to run in the forthcoming East Down by-election as the 
compulsory purchase candidate.73 Woods was a Presbyterian, a solicitor and a 
unionist from the county. The official unionist candidate for the constituency was 
Colonel R. F. Wallace. Fie was a solicitor, a landlord and colonel o f the 5th battalion 
o f the Royal Irish Rifles, otherwise known as the South Down Militia. During the 
election he was in South Africa fighting the Boers.74 Russell and the Ulster Farm ers’ 
and Labourers’ Union portrayed the election as being a matter o f landlord versus 
tenant and compulsory purchase versus voluntary purchase. The official unionist 
party however, sought to prey on unionist fears and depicted the election as a contest 
between home rule and the union.
On 28 January 1902, the U.I.L, executive for East Down decided that the 
nationalist vote should go to Woods as the compulsory purchase candidate.75 On the 
same day William Moore M.P. for North Antrim, at an election meeting in 
Downpatrick in support o f Colonel Wallace, produced a telegram that he had 
received from the chief secretary, George Wyndham. It revealed that a land bill 
would be introduced early in the forthcoming session before Easter.76 A definitive 
statement like this from the government was a deliberate attempt to undermine and 
deflate the compulsory purchase movement.
The East Down by-election steadily assumed greater importance for the 
Conservative government. Strictly adhering to the voluntary purchase principle and 
under pressure from Irish landlords and the unionist press to dilute the compulsory
72 The Times, 13 and 14 Jan. 1902
731.T., 20 Jan. 1901. The representative for East Down, Jam es Rentoul, could longer sit in parliam ent 
after accepting a judgeship in London.
74 Britain fought the Second Boer War (1899-1902) against the Boer republics o f the Transvaal and 
the O range Free State. The Treaty o f  V ereeniging brought the conflict to a close in M ay 1902.
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76 Ibid.
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purchase movement, an electoral defeat for the government would signify a major 
coup for the advocates o f the latter. The election proceedings were followed closely 
in both Britain and Ireland. According to the Irish Times, it was ‘generally admitted 
that the atmosphere o f Ulster has not been to so great an extent charged with 
electricity since the great effort o f 1881-82 to introduce the old Land League into the 
northern counties’.77
A letter from A. J. Balfour, first lord o f the treasury, and a telegram from the 
secretary o f state for the colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, in support o f Colonel 
Wallace, appeared in the press as the government sought desperately to ensure his 
election.78 Meanwhile Wallace him self remained in South Africa for the duration o f 
the election campaign. Ulster unionist M.P.s such as William Moore (North Antrim), 
W. E. M acartney (South Antrim), Colonel M cCalmont (East Antrim) and William 
Johnston (Belfast South) spoke in his stead. However, on 6 February James Wood 
was elected by a narrow majority o f 147 votes.
This was an important victory. Wallace had been a very strong candidate, a 
war hero fighting for the empire and colonel o f the South Down M ilitia who had the 
backing o f virtually the entire unionist press. The margin o f victory was small, but 
when one considers the attempts by certain Ulster unionist M.P.s to portray the union 
as being under threat and the concerted efforts and statements o f Balfour, 
Chamberlain and Wyndham, it was indeed a major victory for the compulsory 
purchase campaign. The election demonstrated, once again, the importance o f land 
issues and their ability to overshadow the home rule debate.
Russell’s political position was thus greatly strengthened by the by-election 
victory in East Down. The electorate had effectively chosen compulsory purchase 
over politics. George Wyndham was consequently put under increased pressure to 
introduce compulsion not only in the south and west but also in the traditional 
unionist stronghold o f Ulster. Russell’s movement now had the real potential to 
shatter the official unionist party in the province.
W yndham ’s announcement in the run up to the East Down by-election, that a 
new land bill was to be introduced, had been intended as a rebuke to Russell and the 
compulsory purchase movement in Ulster rather than a serious attempt to address 
land issues. He had hoped that a voluntary purchase bill would sweep the rug from
77 Ibid., 31 Jan. 1902.
78 Ib id , 4 Feb. 1902.
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under Russell and fragment his support. Nationalists were swift to take Wyndham to 
task and to question his motivation. John Dillon put the question to him in the House 
o f Commons: ‘Was not the bill introduced for the purpose o f influencing the East 
Down election?’79 Wyndham denied the accusation. However, in a cabinet 
memorandum in October 1902, he revealed that the bill had been rushed in for 
‘political reasons before its financial provisions had been determined in all 
particulars, or, in some respects, even considered by the treasury’.80
Horace Plunkett, who had at one stage considered standing in the East Down 
by-election himself, made a most revealing entry in his diary on 14 M arch 1902. 
Following lunch with Russell, he recorded that ‘he [Russell] does not expect to get 
all that he asks - he doesn’t think it ought to be given, or could be, but thinks it 
necessary to put his demands high’.81 Plunkett described such tactics as being akin to 
the traditional Irish method. Russell was using the movement for compulsory 
purchase to force the government to introduce a comprehensive land bill. By setting 
his demands very high, he put considerable pressure on Wyndham to produce such a 
bill. Indeed Russell would later acknowledge that ‘it was impossible for parliament, 
as then constituted, to adopt the principle o f compulsion’.82
After the loss o f the East Down by-election and the excitement evoked by the 
compulsory purchase campaign, Wyndham was, however, increasingly aware of the 
unrest among the Ulster tenantry. On 22 March 1902 he met with his cousin Wilfrid 
Scawen Blunt, who recorded in his diary that the chief secretary had explained to 
him ‘his new Irish land bill after dinner, which he does not profess to regard as 
anything but a m akeshift’.83 Although an Englishman, Blunt had supported the Land 
League and the home rule party during the Land War in the 1880s. His activities 
resulted in his arrest under the Coercion Act o f 1887 and he had served a brief term 
in prison. Wyndham also emphasised to A. J. Balfour that with any new voluntary 
land purchase bill ‘a reduction in the [tenants] instalment is essential if we are to
79 H ansard 4, cix, 102 (9 June 1902).
80 George W yndham, ‘Cabinet mem orandum on the Irish land question’, 8 Oct. 1902, (T.N .A ., CAB 
37/62/139), p. 1.
81 H orace P lunkett diaries, 14 March 1902 (N ational Library o f  Ireland [hereafter cited as N .L.I.])
82 T. W., Russell, ‘The story o f  an agrarian revolution’ in D ublin Review  cxl, no. 280/281 (Jan. 1907), 
p. 23.
83 W.S. B lunt, M y D iaries vol. ii (London, 1922), p. 20
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avoid a dangerous disappointment in U lster’.84 On 25 March 1902, he presented his 
first land bill to parliament.
VII). The response to the 1902 land bill.
On 4 April 1902, a convention o f tenant representatives was held under the auspices 
o f the Ulster Farm ers’ and Labourers’ Union in Belfast to consider the land bill. The 
majority o f the speakers at the meeting were hostile to the voluntary purchase bill 
and particularly to clause thirty-six, which they felt compelled the tenant to buy but 
not the landlord to sell. While Russell agreed and declared his intention to move to 
reject the bill on the second reading in the House o f Commons unless that particular 
clause was removed, he held that the rest o f the bill was negotiable. Russell’s 
conciliatory attitude to the bill prevented the Ulster Farmers’ and Labourers’ Union 
from rejecting it outright.
The I.P.P. and the U.I.L., however, were decidedly hostile to the bill. John 
Redmond considered it ‘as a halting and insincere measure, and which, if  passed 
tomorrow, could not go even an unappreciable length towards settling this great 
question’.
Landlords such as Judge William O ’Connor Morris were rather disparaging 
towards the bill. O ’Connor Morris considered it ‘a mere temporary, if a rather clever, 
m akeshift’.86 On 9 June 1902, Wyndham declared that he was ready to confer with 
the relevant parties on the bill.87
Russell continued to adopt a more patient and conciliatory approach. He 
hoped that certain provisions o f the bill could be amended to make it more 
acceptable. On 19 June, Russell asked Wyndham if he proposed ‘to take any steps to 
convene a conference o f those interested in the land question...to render the Land 
Purchase Acts (Ireland) Amendment Bill non-contentious’.88 Wyndham, in a 
conciliatory gesture, stated, for the first time, his willingness to remove those clauses 
which were contentious.
84 W yndham  to Balfour, 9 Mar. 1902 in M ackail & W yndham (eds), Life & letters o f  George 
Wyndham vol. ii, p. 437. The instalm ent was the annual sum by which the tenant-purchaser repaid his 
annuity. By lengthening the period o f repaym ent the instalm ent would be reduced.
851.T., 5 Apr. 1902.
86 W illiam O 'Connor M orris, ‘The Irish land bill o f  1902’ in Fortnightly Review, Ixxi, no. 425 (M ay 
1902), p. 868.
871. T. 10 June 1902.
88 H ansard 4, cix, 1118-20 (19 June 1902).
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However, on 23 July 1902, Wyndham launched a venomous attack on Russell 
after Russell had visited the De Freyne estate in Co. Roscommon. Lord De Freyne’s 
substantial estate, situated in counties Roscommon and Mayo, had been heavily 
involved in the Plan o f Campaign in the 1880s and early 1890s.89 On 11 May 1899 
the neighbouring estate o f Lord Dillon, consisting o f over 90,000 acres, was sold to 
the C.D.B. Lord De Freyne’s refusal to sell his estate, along with the fact that the 
annuities the Dillon tenants paid to the government were lower than the rent the De 
Freyne tenants paid, lead to disturbances. Paid U.I.L. organisers helped perpetuate 
the agitation. Russell took a keen interest in the estate and even visited it. While 
sympathising with the tenants and understanding their motivation, he was keen to 
avoid illegalities o f any kind and refrained from condoning the agitation. Russell, 
who in his campaign to date had condemned unlawful agitation, declared him self to 
be law abiding:
Why did he [Russell] stand today isolated and alone in the Irish 
representation? He saw a chance in Ulster and in other parts o f Ireland, 
o f  bringing together the Irish people, o f  trying to create a homogeneous 
people for once, and o f trying to get them to agree upon things on 
which they could agree, and to differ only when they must differ. A 
man in Irish politics who chose to stand out from his party and to forgo 
nearly all the friends that he had - he did not speak o f  the pecuniary loss 
- with the object o f trying to unite the Irish people, to teach them that 
they had a common country worth living for, and interests worth 
fighting for-the chief secretary was not entitled to hold up such a man 
as an apologist for disorder.90
Wyndham accused Russell o f ‘palliating disorder’ because the government 
had refused to introduce compulsory purchase.91 Wyndham, by associating Russell 
with the agrarian agitation in the west, was attempting to sully the latter’s reputation. 
Such allegations were clearly intended to create dissension among his Presbyterian 
supporters who were opposed to unlawful methods. On 24 July in the House o f 
Commons, William O ’Brien, who was also opposed to the John Dillon initiated 
campaign on the De Freyne estate, made a very revealing remark when he declared 
that it:
must be a pleasant reflection to the chief secretary as to the success o f his 
administration in Ireland that that coarse kind o f imputation was now 
necessary against a man [T. W. Russell] who was the most powerful unionist
89 See chapter three for a discussion on the Plan o f Campaign.
90 H ansard  4, cxi, 1102 (17 July 1902).
91 See Laurence M. Geary, The Plan o f  Cam paign 1886-189I (Cork, 1986), p. 161.
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in all Ireland. Nobody dared deny on the other side o f the House that he was
• 92the most powerful unionist in Ireland.
VIII). The Land Conference.
On 16 April 1902 Wyndham was forced by the cabinet to take direct action by
• 93proclaiming nine counties under the Crimes Act, also known as coercion. It 
allowed summary jurisdiction in cases o f intimidation, boycotting and unlawful 
assembly. Furthermore, it facilitated trial by special jury and it permitted the 
government to change the trial venue if necessary. This was a direct response to the 
U.I.L. agitation.
On 16 May 1902, a letter had appeared in the Irish Times from Lindsay
Talbot-Crosbie, a Kerry landlord, calling for a round table conference o f tenant and
landlord representatives. Although the letter had failed to evoke much o f a reaction
initially, the seeds of the Land Conference had been sown. With moderates on both
sides, as well as the public, in favour o f such a gathering, the proposal had garnered
significant support by the end o f 1902. The Irish Landowners’ Convention was
firmly opposed to the idea o f a conference, principally because they feared that
compulsory purchase would be a topic for discussion. The convention declared:
As to a ‘round table conference’, those who have been advocating it from the 
tenants’ side (including Mr. J. E. Redmond, Mr. T. M. Healy, and Mr. T. W. 
Russell) propose that it should embrace the whole Irish land question, 
including a scheme o f universal and compulsory sale and purchase... The 
convention have always been practically unanimous in holding that, in 
addition to its manifest injustice, any universal and compulsory measure is 
unnecessary.94
On 7 June a meeting o f the national directory o f the U.I.L. decided to begin a 
fresh campaign o f agitation in the hope o f securing a better land bill and to protest 
against coercion.95 Thanks to Russell’s campaign in Ulster and the U.I.L. in the south 
and west the country was united in its demand for compulsory purchase.
In the meantime the Irish Land Trust was formed by the executive o f the Irish 
Landowners’ Convention as a defensive organisation to combat the U.I.L. It was 
established ‘as a permanent means o f enabling law-abiding persons in this country, 
whether landowners or otherwise, both to defend and assert their legal rights against
92 H ansard 4, cxi, 1220 (24 July 1902).
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the tyranny which the United Irish League had been permitted by the Government to 
establish in a great part o f Ireland’.96 The trustees o f the new body included some o f 
the most powerful and well known landlords in Ireland such as the duke o f Abercorn, 
the marquis o f Waterford, Lord Ashtown, Lord Clonbrock, A. H. Smith-Barry, Col. 
Chas. G. Tottingham and Henry Bruen. They hoped to raise upwards o f £100,000 
which would be put towards fighting the U.I.L.97
Before the annual meeting o f the Irish Landowners’ Convention commenced 
on 29 August 1902, Lindsay Talbot-Crosbie submitted a resolution advocating that 
the convention support the idea o f a conference. However, the resolution was 
withdrawn after some discussion. On 3 September, a letter from a Galway landlord, 
Captain John Shawe-Taylor, was published in the Irish Times. It called for a 
conference o f representatives to meet and discuss the land question.98 Unlike 
previous calls for such a conference, the proposed landlord and tenant representatives 
were actually named. The duke o f Abercorn, Lord Barrymore, Colonel Saunderson 
and the O ’Conor Don were nominated by Shawe-Taylor to represent the landlords. 
John Redmond, T. C. Harrington, William O ’Brien and T. W. Russell were 
nominated to represent the tenants. On 5 September, George Wyndham gave his 
blessing to the proposed conference.99 The four tenant representatives were quick to 
confirm that they would attend. However, despite the fact that the conference had 
caught the imagination o f the public, the four landlord representatives declined the 
invitation. Undoubtedly the fear that compulsory, as opposed to voluntary purchase, 
would be discussed played a part in their decision.
Following the publication o f Shawe-Taylor’s letter in September 1902, 
Russell sought to clarify his own position. He declared that both inducement and 
compulsion would form part o f  any solution to the land question. Where landlords 
could not be persuaded to sell by inducement, then compulsion would have to be 
resorted to .100
Towards the end o f 1902, the demand for compulsory purchase showed no 
sign o f abatement. In his report for October 1902, the inspector-general o f the R.I.C. 
commented that ‘the agitation for a measure o f compulsory purchase continues in an
96 I. T., 25 Aug. 1902.
97 Ibid., 28 July 1902.
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acute form all over Ireland’.101 The inspector-general also reported that ‘the unionists 
o f agricultural Ulster are for the present finding a modus vivendi with the nationalist 
farm ers’.102 Despite their political and religious differences, Irish farmers were 
united in their quest to bring about compulsory purchase. It was clear that farmers in 
the north and south o f the country shared a common objective. This unity o f purpose 
could not be ignored by the government.
On 10 October 1902, a private meeting o f the Irish Landowners’ Convention 
was held. A resolution, put forward by George W yndham’s first cousin, the earl o f 
Mayo, in favour o f a land conference to consider the land question in Ireland was 
rejected by seventy-seven votes to fourteen.103 A statement was issued by the 
convention on 12 October declaring that such a conference would be o f  no benefit 
and that the ‘demand that a conference should discuss proposals for universal and 
compulsory sale by the landlords renders any negotiations for a conference still more 
impossible’.104 However, on 20 October 1902 Wyndham withdrew his bill, 
promising that a new land bill would be the principal measure o f the next session but 
that it would still be based on voluntary purchase.105
The fourteen dissenting landlords o f the Irish Landowners’ Convention set 
up a provisional committee. Circulars, as well as voting papers, were sent to 
landowners to determine whether or not they believed a conference should take 
place. The results o f this poll revealed that a sizeable majority o f  those landlords who 
returned the voting papers were in favour o f  the conference.106 A new committee was 
formed and Colonel Hutcheson-Poe, Colonel Nugent-Everard and the earls o f 
Dunraven and Mayo were announced as the landlord representatives, replacing those 
originally nam ed.107 The first meeting o f the Land Conference took place in the 
Mansion House on 19 December, and on 5 January 1903 the Land Conference 
Report was published.108 Its recommendations formed the basis o f  the 1903 Land 
Act.
101 I.G. monthly report, Oct. 1902.
102 Ib id , Dec. 1902.
103 I  T., 11 Oct. 1902.
104 Ib id , 13 Oct. 1902.
105 Hansard 4, cxiii, 341-4 (20 Oct. 1902).
106 I. T., 18 Nov. 1902.
107 Ib id , 18 Dec. 1902.
108 Return o f the resolution and statement adopted by the Irish Landowners' Convention on l( fh 
October, 1902; and report o f the Irish Land Conference, dated 3"1 January, 1903; and minute on
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The Land Conference Report was adamant that any settlement o f the land 
question would have to satisfy the wants and needs o f both landlords and tenants. 
The conference members were keen that the landlords would remain on in Ireland 
after they had sold and that the money from the sales would be spent in the Irish 
economy. Hence, the inducement, in the form o f the state ‘bonus’, to the landlord 
was critical. The report recommended that the landlord should be able to obtain his 
current net income based on second term rents, minus the costs o f collection which 
were put at 10 % of the gross income, from the investment o f the purchase money.109 
Likewise, the sale and repurchase o f mansion houses and demesnes were regarded as 
a crucial landlord inducement. It was suggested that sporting and mineral rights 
remain as they were.
Critically it was recommended that tenants should receive reductions o f 
between 15 % and 25 % in their annuities based on second term rents or their fair 
equivalent. Tenant-purchasers repaid the state loan they received to buy their 
holdings in the form o f annual annuities. This crucial recommendation would ensure 
that the tenants’ annuities would be lower than their current rents. Decadal reductions 
in the tenants’ annuities were to be retained.110
The Land Conference Report acknowledged that the problem o f congestion in 
the congested districts and elsewhere would ‘require separate and exceptional 
treatm ent’.111 It proposed that landlords be allowed to sell grazing lands and greater 
powers be given to the C.D.B. It was recognised that no settlement could be finalised 
until the evicted tenants question was settled. Likewise the position o f labourers was 
a source o f discontent.
The report stressed that the settlement o f the land question was desired by all 
classes in Ireland and was essential for the future prosperity o f the country. For a 
settlement to be reached financial assistance, in addition to the state loan to tenants to 
purchase their farms, would be required. Notably the report advocated that any such 
aid be confined to sale within the first five years o f the act’s operation.
Land Conference Report, adopted on 7lh January, 1903, by the executive committee o f  the Irish 
Landowners' Convention (89) H.C. 1903, Ivii, 321.
109 See chapter two for an explanation o f first and second term rents.
110 See chapter two for decadal reductions.
111 Return o f the resolution and statement adopted by the Irish Landowners' Convention on IO"' 
October, 1902; and report o f  the Irish Land Conference, dated 3“' January, 1903; and minute on 
Land Conference Report, adopted on 7" January, 1903, by the executive committee o f the Irish 
Landowners' Convention, (89) H.C. 1903, Ivii, 321.
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Russell’s role in the conference has received little acknowledgement from 
historians. However, William O ’Brien was acutely aware o f his importance to the 
tenant representatives at the time, stating that they ‘had the advantage o f the constant 
counsel and unsurpassed debating power o f Mr. T.W. Russell, who has every 
provision o f the land code on the tip o f his tongue’.112 Russell actively supported and 
promoted the Land Conference Report and at Aughnacloy, Co. Tyrone on 9 March 
1903 he declared:
The Clogher speech [Co. Tyrone, Sept. 1900] holds the field with one point 
excepted. Compulsion by coercion is ruled out. Compulsion by inducement is 
substituted for it. The two things were, no doubt, different. But he had never 
said, and never thought, that there was only one form of compulsion, and 
provided it was effective he cared nothing about the term .113
The chief secretary, George Wyndham, was delighted with the report. He 
confided to A. J. Balfour, who had succeeded Lord Salisbury as prime minister in 
July 1902, that the ‘conference and its report have been a great success, not only in 
essence but - and in Ireland this is equally important - in effect also on public opinion 
o f all kinds. Notably the [Irish] Landowners’ Convention have blessed the Report. 
[Lords] Londonderry, Barrymore and Erne, all here, are pleased.’114 This apparent 
change in the attitude o f the Irish Landowners’ Convention can be attributed to the 
facts that the issue o f compulsory purchase had been avoided and that the ‘bonus’ 
clause looked set to offer a genuine incentive to landlords to sell their estates. Thus on 
25 March 1903, George Wyndham introduced his second land bill in the House o f 
Commons, based on the recommendations o f the Land Conference.
IX). Conclusion.
T. W. Russell and his campaign for compulsory purchase played a very significant 
role in the genesis o f the 1903 land act. The land question was once again brought to 
the fore both in Britain and Ireland and serious pressure was put on the Conservative 
government to introduce a comprehensive land bill that would solve the question. 
Because Russell’s agitation was strictly along constitutional lines this meant that 
Presbyterians, and especially their clergy, gave the movement their support. Many
112 William O’Brien, The Land Conference and its critics (Dublin, 1904), p. 10.
113 I.T., 10 Mar. 1903.
114 Wyndham to Balfour, 11 Jan. 1903 in Mackail and Wyndham (eds), Life A  letters o f George 
Wyndham vol. ii, p. 453.
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Catholics and nationalists were equally enthusiastic supporters, demonstrating that 
the land question could cross not only political but also religious boundaries.
Russell recognised that the land acts introduced by the British government in 
the past had nearly always been in response to agitation and had adopted a similar 
strategy. The U.I.L. and the I.P.P. were also shrewd enough to realise the important 
potential o f Russell’s movement. With Ulster ablaze on the issue, a new campaign 
for compulsory purchase had been officially launched by the U.I.L. on 1 September 
1901 at Westport, Co. Mayo, almost a year after Russell had commenced his 
campaign.115 With north and south thus united on the issue o f compulsory purchase, 
the pressure on the government to produce a comprehensive land purchase bill was 
immense.
Many landlords, however, felt that there was a danger that the movement for 
compulsory purchase might prove overwhelming and that the government would be 
forced to introduce it as part o f a land act. Hence Wyndham was also put under 
pressure by the unionist press as well as by prominent and powerful Irish landlords, 
who were adverse to compulsory sale. According to Russell himself: ‘To mention the 
word compulsion to the then chief secretary [George W yndham] was to send him 
into a fury. He would not hear o f it. It was the agitation for compulsion that had 
produced the [1903] land bill. But the landlords had bound Mr. Wyndham to resist 
even its beginnings.’116
With Wyndham under pressure from unionists and the majority o f  Irish 
landlords to resist compulsion, he was forced to accelerate his plans for a voluntary 
bill. Russell confided to Horace Plunkett in March 1902, that he was using the 
movement for compulsory purchase to force the government to introduce a 
comprehensive land bill. It was under this pressure that Wyndham gave his support 
to the notion o f the Land Conference. Interestingly W yndham’s cousin, the earl o f 
Mayo, was one o f the landlord representatives and his presence undoubtedly 
provided Wyndham with first hand knowledge o f the Land Conference’s proceedings 
if not an indirect influence. It also ensured that the principle o f compulsory purchase 
would not be adopted.
It was clear that the majority o f landlords were vehemently opposed to 
compulsion. An influential minority seem to have realised that only by negotiating
115 Campbell, Land and revolution, p. 59.
116 Russell, ‘The Irish land question’, p. 10.
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on the land question to enable a comprehensive voluntary land bill to be produced, 
could they prevent the call for compulsory purchase becoming unstoppable and the 
actions o f landlords such as Talbot-Crosbie and Shawe-Taylor support such a view. 
In order to pre-empt the countrywide demand for compulsory purchase an extensive 
voluntary bill was necessary. Thus it was the landlords who seized the initiative and 
called for a land conference.
Russell’s inclusion as a tenant representative at the conference was a serious 
recognition o f his campaign and an acknowledgement o f his status as the spokesman 
for the Ulster tenantry. Although he believed that compulsory purchase would have 
to be used eventually in order to bring about a final solution o f the land question, 
Russell was willing to use the campaign to force the government to introduce a truly 
comprehensive land settlement even if it was along voluntary lines. In order for the 
Land Conference Report to become a reality though, Russell had had to modify his 
idea o f compulsion. Likewise the three nationalist representatives had to alter their 
stance on compulsory purchase. However, Russell saw the bill as compulsion by 
inducement as opposed to compulsion by force and while he was willing to accept a 
comprehensive voluntary measure as a stepping stone, he firmly believed that a 
compulsory purchase bill was inevitable if Ireland was to become a country o f 
peasant proprietors.
Contemporaries such as C.F. Bastable, a professor o f  political economy at
Trinity College Dublin (T.C.D.), were in no doubt as to the influence Russell’s
campaign had in focusing the government on the land issue. He wrote in 1903:
Two influences w ere... o f peculiar importance in hastening on the act o f 
1903. One was the strong movement in favor o f compulsory purchase 
initiated by Mr. T. W. Russell, and supported by the Protestant and unionist 
farmers o f the north. Another was the increasing difficulty experienced in 
keeping up the agitation connected with the Irish party's policy. A general 
recognition o f the loss that long-continued disturbance inflicts on all classes 
made conciliation or compromise seem desirable. To these must be added the 
disposition o f English statesmen to deal more liberally with Ireland, in order 
to raise her material condition and thereby remove the source o f political 
discontent.117
Another contemporary, R. Barry O ’Brien, also acknowledged that the government 
were forced to take up the land question and introduce a new act because o f the
117 C.F. Bastable, ‘The Irish land purchase act of 1903’ In The Quarterly Journal o f  Economics, xviii, 
no.l (Nov. 1903), p. 5.
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U.I.L. agitation and Russell’s movement in U lster.118 The parallel campaigns o f 
Russell and the U.I.L. accelerated the government’s attempts to tackle the land 
question. Indeed, in a cabinet memorandum in late 1901 entitled ‘The Irish land 
question and the need for legislation’ Wyndham acknowledged the effects o f 
Russell’s compulsory campaign in Ulster and the U.I.L. agitation in the south as the 
factors which necessitated new legislation.119 Furthermore, with the tenant farmers o f 
Ireland united in their demand for compulsory purchase the Conservative 
government had been forced to come up with a comprehensive voluntary land 
purchase bill on a previously unsurpassed scale.
118 R. Barry O’Brien, ‘Ireland at Westminister’ in Monthly review , xxvii, no.79 (Apr. 1907), pp 81-82.
119 George Wyndham, cabinet memorandum on the Irish land question, 1901 (T.N.A., CAB 
37/59/147), pp 1-2.
CHAPTER TWO: INITIAL REACTIONS TO THE 1903 LAND BILL.
I). Introduction.
The government’s reasons for introducing the 1903 land bill and the objectives o f the 
legislation were outlined on its first and second readings in the House of Commons. The 
first reading of the failed 1902 bill further illuminated Wyndham’s thoughts as he 
referred the house to it upon introducing his 1903 bill.1 Two cabinet memorandums were
• . . . .  . > 9submitted in 1901 and late 1902 which give an insight into Wyndham’s ambitions. 
When taken in conjunction an idea of the government’s intentions and aims can be 
formalised.
There were two systems in operation in Ireland as regards the ownership of 
agricultural land. There was land purchase and there was the rent fixing process under 
the land courts which had been established under the 1881 Land Act. The tenant was 
entitled to go to court to get his rent fixed by an independent tribunal. The rent would be 
reviewed every fifteen years. Rents fixed in the fifteen years following the 1881 act were 
known as first term rents. Those which had been revised after 1896 were second term 
rents. The majority of tenants who had gone to the land courts had received significant
reductions in their rents. George Wyndham revealed that on average landlords had
« *2 . . .  
received reductions of approximately 40 %. The rents would be up for review again in
1911. The rent fixing process based on dual ownership had not proved beneficial for
Irish agriculture. The notion of both a landlord and a tenant interest in the land had not
led to economic progress.
The 1881 act had led to some unexpected consequences. According to
Wyndham, 336,000 rents had come before the land courts. Of the 240,708 that had been
fixed, there had been 73,756 appeals.4 The volume of litigation, and more importantly its
cost, was bleeding Irish agriculture dry. Landlords were not inclined to invest in their
land owing to the fact that their incomes had fallen by an average of 40 % since the
1 H ansard  4, cxx, 182-3 (25 Mar. 1903).
2 George W yndham , ‘The Irish land question and the need for legislation’, 1901 (T.N.A., CAB 
37/59/147). For an earlier version o f this see W yndham , ‘The Irish land question and the need for 
legislation’, 1901 (T.N .A ., CAB 37/59/1 15). See also W yndham , ‘C abinet m em orandum  on the Irish land 
question’ 8 Oct. 1902, (T.N .A ., CAB 37/62/139).
3 H ansard  4, cxxii, 132 (7 M ay 1903).
4 Ibid., cv, 1033 (25 Mar. 1902).
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introduction of the land courts. Likewise tenants were unwilling to develop the land as it 
would have a negative effect on their rents, which were reviewed every fifteen years. 
Wyndham neatly summed up the situation: ‘The landlords of Ireland are being ruined 
financially: the tenants are being ruined morally. Agriculture is starved of capital and 
industry.’5
As regards land purchase the transfer of land from landlord to tenant had slowly
ground to a halt. The number of applications for advances (government loans to the
tenant to purchase his holding) had steadily decreased in the years prior to 1903. The
number of tenant-purchasers had been 8,000 in 1898, 5,000 in 1900 and by 1901 it had
fallen to 3,000.6 The policy of land purchase urgently required a new impetus. The
members of the landed gentry who were willing to or who could afford to sell had been
exhausted. According to Wyndham:
What are the reasons for that decrease? I believe that we have got - at all events, 
that we are getting - to the end of the landlords who are prepared to sell for a 
capital sum which can be advanced under the existing law. Those who have sold 
belong chiefly to three classes - either they are landlords who have other sources 
of income and other interests often in this country [England], or they are 
landlords who were tempted to sell by the premium on land stock during 1897-99 
inclusive, or, in the third place, they are landlords who have been forced to sell 
because they were embarrassed, and their creditors urged them to take that 
course.7
Without fresh legislation though, many landlords could not sell even if  they 
wished to. There were a number of mitigating factors which prevented them from 
availing of land purchase. The legal costs involved in a sale, the cost of proving title to
the land and the inevitable delays which would ensue all discouraged sales. Many
• 8 landlords had two or even three superior interests between themselves and the land. The
5 Ibid., cxx, 186 (25 Mar. 1903).
6 W yndham, ‘C abinet m em orandum  on the Irish land question’, 8 Oct. 1902 (T.N .A ., CAB 37/62/139), p. 
3.
1 H ansard 4, cv, 1035 (25 Mar. 1902).
8 ‘The expression “ superior interest” shall include any rent, rentcharge, annuity, fees, duties, services, 
payable to or to be rendered in respect o f the land sold to any person, including her m ajesty and her 
successors, and any estates, exceptions, reservations, covenants, conditions, or agreem ents, contained in 
any fee-farm  grant, or other conveyance in fee, or lease, under which such land is held, and, if  such land is 
held under a lease for lives or years renewable forever, or for a term o f years o f w hich not less than sixty 
are unexpired at the date o f the sale, shall include any reversion or estate expectant on the determ ination of 
such lease or expiration o f such term, and notw ithstanding that such reversion or estate m at be vested in
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holders of such interests were entitled to the produce of the land before the actual 
landlord. The redemption of these charges would involve considerable legal expenses 
which meant that many landlords could not afford to sell. Importantly, Wyndham 
declared that it was the presence of such ‘complicated legal embarrassments’ which 
justified giving a cash ‘bonus’ to the landlords in addition to the purchase money.9 
Under the bill a grant-in-aid or ‘bonus’ fund of £12,000,000 was set aside to induce 
landlords to sell. According to the T.C.D. Professor C. F. Bastable: ‘The real effect [of 
the ‘bonus’] is to increase the purchase money received by the landlord, and thus induce 
him to arrange sales.’10 It was initially envisaged that it would be distributed in an 
inverse ratio to the purchase money. Thus the higher the purchase price given to the 
landlord for his land the lower the cash ‘bonus’ he received. Wyndham estimated that it 
would not be necessary for the government to advance much more that £100,000,000 to 
tenant-purchasers in order to sell all the saleable land in the country.11
There was also the problem of congested and uneconomic holdings. The Land 
Commission often refused to sanction advances to such small holdings. The landlord 
was left in the awkward position whereby he could sell his best holdings but could not 
part with his poorer ones. Such holdings were not confined only to the congested 
districts but could be found in pockets throughout Ireland. These farms were not a good 
security for the state and they needed to be enlarged before purchase could proceed.
To allay apprehensions and jealousy about the ‘bonus’, the bill provided that 
£390,000 would be the maximum figure that the British government would have to 
provide towards it in any one year. In this way British finance would not be 
unexpectedly stretched. To counteract the cost of the ‘bonus’, Wyndham promised to 
make annual savings of £250,000 in the costs of Irish government.12 These cutbacks 
would principally effect the R.I.C. and the Land Commission. Therefore, the annual 
savings in Irish government were to offset the cost of the ‘bonus’ fund. While it
the [crow n]’. See Irish Land Act, 1896, 31 (8). Linder the 1903 act the term  was further broadened to  
‘include any reversion or estate expectant on the determ ination o f  an estate tail or base fee, w hether such 
reversion or estate is or is not vested in the crow n’. See Irish Land Act, 1903, 98 (2).
9 H ansard 4, cxx, 203 (25 Mar. 1903).
10 C.F., Bastable, ‘The Irish land b ill’ in The Econom ic Journal, xiii, no. 50 (June 1903), p. 172.
11 H ansard 4 , cxx, 201 (25 Mar. 1903).
12 Ibid., col. 203-5
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certainly appealed to British wishes for economy of finance there were doubts as to the 
feasibility of Wyndham’s plan.
The Conservative government was committed to the policy of voluntary land 
purchase. It was hoped that the 1903 act would shift the emphasis away from the rent 
fixing process and onto land purchase. Since the rent fixing process had proved so costly 
it had to be abolished or at least greatly reduced in order to allow land purchase to 
operate on a large scale. The inclusion of the ‘zones’ would facilitate this end. The 
‘zones’ were based on the principle that the tenant had to receive a certain minimum 
reduction in his current rent which in future would be represented by the annuity he 
would repay to the government. To ensure that the landlord received a fair price, 
however, there was a certain maximum reduction that a tenant could receive. Essentially 
the ‘zones’ were to guide the two parties towards a satisfactory purchase price. By 
incorporating first and second term rents into the bargaining process, the necessity for 
further rent revision was removed. Further cost, delay and litigation could be avoided. 
This also freed up funds and personnel, which would be much needed if land purchase 
was to prove a success. The word ‘zones’ does not appear in the act, however, it was the 
contemporary term used to describe the system.Ij
The Land Commission was costing the state £140,000 annually by 1903. 
Agrarian unrest and agitation had also escalated and the R.I.C. had annual costs of some 
£1,400,000.14 Thus, outright ownership of the land needed to be established. However, 
as far as the prime minister, A. J. Balfour, was concerned the principal objective o f the 
legislation was ‘to substitute a good system of land tenure for a bad one’.15
While the extension of land purchase was one of the principal aims of the new 
bill, the issue of congestion and uneconomic holdings was of equal importance. In many 
areas, particularly in the west of Ireland, ownership of the land would be of little benefit 
unless the holdings were enlarged. The security to the state for the loan to the tenant- 
purchaser was strengthened if the holding was viable and economic. For these reasons 
the bill provided for the enlargement of holdings, the funds for improvements and the 
means of acquiring and distributing untenanted land. Although the 1903 land bill
13 See chapter three for m ore on the price ‘zones’,
14 H ansard 4, cxx, 186 (25 Mar. 1903).
15 Ibid., cxxi, 1254-5 (4 May 1903).
42
addressed congestion and uneconomic holdings in both the congested districts and
elsewhere Wyndham was well aware of the uniqueness of the western problem:
We ought to build up the agrarian situation in Ireland from the bottom. Some 
system of village communities seems in the west o f Ireland to have decayed, and 
at some stage in this decay to have become fossilised. So, if it were not a 
contradiction in terms, you might say it was at once rotten and rigid.16
Indeed, a clear distinction was made between the treatment of congested and non­
congested estates. Wyndham believed that such areas required extensive surgery and 
described them as ‘centres of racial deterioration and seed-plots of agrarian 
discontent’.17 Clearly then, the bill also had an important humanitarian agenda.
This chapter examines the immediate response to the 1903 land bill from the
principal parties concerned in both Ireland and Britain. It essentially covers the period
* • 18 from the bill’s introduction to the committee stage in the House of Commons. The
chapter is structured so that the reaction of the various groups is dealt with separately.
Confusion and needless repetition is avoided by analysing in turn the response of the
Conservative party, the Liberal opposition, the nationalists, the unionists and the
landlords.
II). The response of the Conservative party.
Despite the bill being a Conservative government measure there were elements within 
the Conservative party itself who were openly hostile to its progress. Although there was 
virtually no chance of it succeeding, Douglas Coghill, M.P. for Stoke-upon-Trent, 
proposed that the bill be dropped on the seconding reading. His proposal was seconded 
by his party colleague Sir George Bartley, M.P. for Islington, North. In addition, the pair 
received strong support from Gibson Bowles, M.P. for Lynn, Regis. Whilst they 
represented only a tiny minority of the Conservative party their apprehensions were such 
that they were willing to oppose the wishes of their party leader and indeed of their 
prime minister, A. J. Balfour.
16 Ibid., cxx, 190 (25 Mar. 1903).
17 W yndham, ‘Cabinet m em orandum  on the Irish land question’ 8 Oct. 1902 (T.N .A ., CAB 37/62/139), p. 
9.
18 See chapter three for an explanation o f  the various parliam entary stages that a bill passed through.
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Like their Liberal counterparts the opposition to the bill within the Conservative
party centred mainly on finance. The British government would effectively become the
new landlord o f much of Ireland under the bill as the tenant-purchasers would have to
pay the state annuities for approximately sixty-eight and a half years. They believed that
the security for the loan was totally inadequate and were keen to protect the interests of
the British taxpayer. Thus the spectre of a no-rent manifesto weighed heavily on their
minds. Gibson Bowles, M.P. for Lynn, Regis, painted a bleak picture of the position the
government would find itself in:
We shall be in the position of an absentee landlord unable to collect our rents in 
times of dearth and stress, and unable to give those deductions which a personal 
landlord is able to do. I hold, therefore, that this bill offers no settlement, 
political or agrarian... To me it seems a crazy scheme founded on crazed 
finance.19
Despite the unique opportunity which had arisen, due to the united opinion of 
both nationalists and unionists in favour of the bill, there was a definite sense that the 
finance directed towards Ireland was much begrudged. Douglas Coghill M.P. for Stoke- 
upon-Trent, for example, claimed that Ireland was ‘in a state o f prosperity which has 
never been equalled in her history’ and that the bill was really unnecessary.20 The 
wisdom of granting huge sums of British credit to a people who were considered 
disloyal and who had been prominent supporters of the Boers during the recent war was 
questioned. Wyndham’s claims that expenditure on the R.I.C. and the Land Commission 
would be reduced as a consequence of the bill were dismissed as fantasy.
The conciliatory attitudes of the nationalist and unionist M.P.s and their co­
operation, as regards the bill raised suspicions. The absence of the hostility that usually 
characterised the relations between the two Irish parties was seen by certain 
Conservatives M.P.s as a warning that the treasury and the British taxpayer were about 
to be pillaged. According to Douglas Coghill:
We now find that there is a union between orangemen and nationalists, and all 
because there is an alluring prospect of a raid upon the British treasury... When
19 H ansard  4, cxxii, 74 (7 May 1903)..
20 Ibid., cxxi, 1224 (4 M ay 1903).
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we find a union of this kind between two parties, I think it behoves the
* 21 representatives of the British taxpayer to look very closely into these proposals.
The Conservative opposition to the bill believed that there were causes of equal
if not greater worth in their own constituencies which would have benefited from such a
significant cash injection. Douglas Coghill asked the House of Commons: ‘Why has so
much been done for Ireland and so little for England?’ Gibson Bowles went further
and summed up what he considered the English opinion of the bill to be:
I think I am right in saying that there is absolutely no limit to the advances [to 
tenant purchasers] under the bill. An estimate has been made, that it may be 
£100,000,000 or it may be £150,000,000 but there is no limit. To enable the Irish 
tenants to buy the land cheap and the landlords to sell it dear, this unlimited loan 
is to be made, and then an out and out gift of £12,000,000 [the ‘bonus’ fund] is to 
be added, in order to procure the acceptance of the loan. That represents the
99English view of the transaction.
Following the costly Boer War there was little appetite for expending imperial capital
and British minds were more concerned with economy of finance rather than increasing
expenditure. According to Douglas Coghill:
But there is one vital objection to this bill. We have not the money to carry it out. 
However, benevolent we may feel, there is no money for a land purchase bill. At 
the present time we are spending £34,000,000 on our army, and £34,000,000 on 
our navy. Where is the money to come from?24
While a rare opportunity for dealing with the Irish land question had presented itself it 
was argued by some Conservatives that the British treasury ought not to further extend 
itself at that moment in time.
Opposition to the bill within the party was closely linked to the question of home 
rule. There was a suspicion that the measure was effectively granting home rule by the 
side door. Douglas Coghill, for example, believed the land question and home rule were 
almost inseparable and that the logical outcome of the bill was a measure granting home 
rule or some form of self-government. In fact, Coghill’s principal opposition to the
21 Ibid., cxx, 228 (25 Mar. 1903).
22 Ibid., cxxi, 1232 (4 M ay 1903).
23 Ibid., cxxii, 68-9 (7 M ay 1903).
24 Ibid., cxxi, 1230 (4 May 1903).
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entire bill was that it made home rule inevitable.25 His perception was that once the bill 
was passed it would be impossible for any government to resist the Irish call for self- 
government:
My point is this, that by this bill the government are giving home rule to 
Ireland... If  this bill is once passed it will be impossible for us to refuse home 
rule or anything else the Irish people demand. This bill is, from my point of view 
giving Ireland home rule, not in a straightforward way, which would enable us to 
oppose it, but by a side wind. That is the chief ground of my opposition to the 
bill.26
Notwithstanding the outlay of British credit towards attempting to solve the land 
question in Ireland, the I.P.P. were adamant that they would continue their demand for 
home rule even if the bill was passed. The fact that the measure would not offer a 
political solution acceptable to many Conservatives was also a prime motivation in 
opposing it.
Contrary to Wyndham’s assertions there was little confidence among the
Conservative opponents of the bill that it would provide the solution to the Irish land
question. Sir George Bartley prophesised that the bill would do ‘practically nothing to
go to the root of the evil in ... [the] congested districts’.27 Moreover, despite Wyndham’s
avowed intention to relieve congestion there was little confidence in the bill’s ability to
achieve that goal. Douglas Coghill summed up the mood of the opposition group
towards the end of his second reading speech:
I venture to say that this bill is a bad bill. Its finance is utterly unsound and will 
not stand examination. It is a bill based on false hopes, false expectations, and 
false sentiment, and I believe, though it may be too late, that the British taxpayer, 
when he finds that he has parted with his money and lost control of his millions, 
will recognise that... he has been duped, deluded, defrauded, and betrayed.28
However, a number of Conservative M.P.s who were Irish landowners or 
associated with the landed gentry such as Sir John Colomb (Great Yarmouth), John 
Butcher (York) and Herbert Robertson (Hackney South), spoke in favour of the bill but 
the majority held their counsel. In response to the criticisms of his fellow party members
25 Ibid., col. 1227-9.
26 Ibid., col. 1228-29.
27 Ibid., col. 1235.
28 Ibid., col. 1233.
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the prime minister, A. J. Balfour, addressed the house on the second reading o f the bill. 
He found the notion that the tenants could repudiated their debts absurd. He argued that 
if  such a situation arose the annuities would simply be put on the rates and the 
government could withdraw the grants for local government. Hence he claimed that 
every ‘Irish ratepayer in the country would have the strongest interest in seeing that he 
was not burdened with a debt because his neighbour did not choose to fulfil his legal 
obligations’.29 On the question of lending such a large sum of money to people whom 
Sir George Bartley considered disloyal, Balfour had a simple response. He insisted that 
the Irish land system was intolerable and that the measure was required to remove a
30social sore. Shortly after the prime minister’s robust defence of the bill, on its 
seconding reading, Douglas Coghill’s motion to reject it went to a division where it was 
defeated by 443 votes to 26.31
III). The response of the Liberal opposition to the bill.
The Liberal party formed the main opposition to the Conservative government in
parliament. The attitude of the Liberal party towards the new bill was somewhat
guarded. Having supported compulsory purchase, their attitude towards Wyndham’s
voluntary measure was lukewarm. Such an outlay of British finance on a bill that did not
compel the landlords to sell was a source of concern. While the Liberals acknowledged
that sacrifices would have to be made to solve the Irish land question, they feared that
the £100,000,000 loan might not be repaid. The leader of the party, Sir Henry Campbell-
Bannerman, espoused these sentiments on the first reading o f the bill:
But the very fact that we have to face certain efforts and sacrifices, that we are to 
have, what is almost more serious, our imperial credit hypothecated to such an 
enormous extent, makes it our duty not only to look into the detailed provisions 
of the b ill... but also to see ... whether this scheme will really attain the object for 
which those sacrifices and efforts are to be made.32
Despite his misgivings, though, Campbell-Bannerman acknowledged that Britain had a 
historical responsibility to the landlord class in Ireland.
29 Ibid., col. 1249.
30 Ibid., col. 1254.
31 Ibid., cxxii, 148 (7 May 1903). A division was when the M .P.s in the House o f  Com m ons w ent into the 
division lobby to  vote on an am endm ent or a proposal.
32 Ibid., cxx, 221 (25 Mar. 1903).
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The Liberal party leader admitted that the British public were not entirely 
satisfied with the bill, principally because of the huge outlay of British credit required.33 
Had the bill been put to the British electorate it would have had little hope of success. 
Indeed, John Fletcher Moulton, the Liberal M.P. for Cornwall, Launceston, neatly 
summed up what he personally perceived to be the public’s reaction: ‘I am satisfied that 
the constituencies of this country will say that we should not cripple powers of dealing 
with other national needs simply to jump at a bargain whereby the landlords of Ireland 
are so grossly overpaid.’34 Obviously, many were unconvinced that the bill would secure 
an end to the longstanding conflict.
With the volume of money that would be going to Ireland should the bill be 
passed, it was not surprising that jealousy reared its head among the non-Irish M.P.s 
Although the leader of the Liberal party acknowledged that they had a duty to the 
landlords of Ireland, there were elements within the party who felt differently. These 
elements held that the bill should be compulsory considering the huge outlay of British 
credit. Furthermore, they failed to see why British landowners should not get the same 
advantages as Irish landlords would get under the bill. The clause in the bill which 
enabled landlords to sell and repurchase their demesnes on the same annuity terms as the 
tenants was considered particularly repugnant. Thomas Ashton, M.P. for Beds, Luton, 
believed that the £12,000,000 ‘bonus’ fund was really intended to bribe Irish landlords 
in the House of Lords to pass the measure.35 Indeed, the first day of the committee stage 
in the House o f Commons commenced with the rejection of a motion by the Liberal 
M.P. for Merthyr Tydvil, D.A. Thomas, to extend the bill to include Wales and 
Monmouthshire.36
Some Liberal M.P.s held that tenants would be forced to pay unreasonable 
prices. Others simply did not think that the Irish landlords were deserving o f such 
generous treatment. The extension of the tenant’s period of repayment and the reduction 
o f the rate of his annuity, compared to previous acts, was also viewed with suspicion. 
George Lambert, Liberal M.P. for Devon, South Molton, accused Wyndham of
33 Ibid., cxxi, 1259 (4 M ay 1903).
34 Ibid., col. 1488 (5 M ay 1903).
35 Ibid., col. 1285-91 (4 M ay 1903)
36 Ibid., cxxiii, 957 (15 Jun. 1903).
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incorporating those changes into the bill in order to secure higher prices for the 
landlords.37
For many the annuities were a cause for concern. Under the proposal the tenants
would be tied to the treasury for almost seventy years. If the tenants were forced to pay
extortionate prices for the land it was likely that they would falter on the repayment of
their annuities during difficult periods. Unlike a benevolent landlord, the state could not
grant a reduction as it would be immediately demanded countrywide. William Robson,
Liberal M.P. for South Shields, questioned whether the tenants would be able to repay
the annuities and pondered the possible consequences:
The Irish tenants will no doubt fulfil their obligations to the best of their ability, 
but now and again, in times of stress and bad seasons they will find it impossible 
to fulfil them. What will happen then?...you will have a recrudescence of the old 
trouble. The state cannot make any sort of abatements which the tenant formerly 
got out of the landlord... The state dare not make any abatement, because if it 
were made in one district it would immediately be demanded in another. You 
will, in this way, have a new wrong created in Ireland.. ..Irish national sentiment 
will arrange itself on the side of these distressed tenants. Irish sentiment has 
always taken advantage of such an opportunity, and it will not cease to do so in 
the future.38
With the state effectively becoming the landlord for the whole country, there was
a fear that the government would not be able to resist a widespread refusal to pay
annuities. Some Liberals worried that the non-payment of annuities would be harnessed
for political purposes. Similarly, if  the tenants were forced to pay exorbitant prices they
might default in times of hardship and economic depression. The state could not simply
evict the whole countryside. Furthermore, the security for the exchequer would not be
improved by allowing those tenants with small uneconomic holdings to purchase. Joseph
Compton Rickett, the Liberal M.P. for Scarborough, warned:
We have also to remember that there are other improvements needed. A vast 
number of these farmers are very poor. A mere reduction of 15 per cent in their 
rent is not sufficient to make them capable farmers, or to bring their land to a 
cultivatable condition. To suppose that we shall change the condition of the
37 Ibid., cxxi, 1402-8 (4 M ay 1903).
38 Ibid., col. 1436 (5 M ay 1903).
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population, and effect a reformation in economic conditions simply by a 
reduction in rent is surely beyond the conception of any reasonable man.
He cautioned that land purchase alone would not necessarily improve economic
conditions for the tenant-purchasers because further investment would be required.
The security for the state loan that would be provided to the tenant-purchasers
was closely scrutinised. The extension of the period of repayment to sixty-eight and a
half years under the bill as compared to forty-nine years under earlier acts, was a
particular cause for concern. Liberals such as Alfred Emmott, M.P. for Oldham, were
particularly worried about the tenants’ ability to repay their loans:
My real doubt is as to whether the tenants will be able to pay up their 
instalments. Land-hunger still exists in Ireland, and where it exists it must make 
the tenants weak. We ought not to make the terms too high, because if we do 
there is a great danger of the bill breaking down before twenty years go by.40
As far as the Liberal party was generally concerned, the safety of the treasury depended
on the fairness of the tenants’ obligations. On the first reading of the bill Wyndham
announced that only five million would be made available annually for advances to
tenant-purchasers for the first three years.41 William Robson, M.P. for South Shields,
predicted that as a consequence many tenants would be waiting for years to purchase
and that would undoubtedly lead to tension.42
Closely linked to the financial concerns was the absence of compulsion against
the landlords. Liberals found it difficult to accept such an investment of British credit
without the use of compulsion. Thomas Shaw, M.P. for Harwich Burghs, predicted that
without the use of compulsion even greater trouble would arise in Ireland because side-
by-side with those tenants whose landlord agreed to sell would be neighbouring estates
where the landlord refused. This, according to Liberals, would lead to a widespread
situation similar to that which had occurred on the Dillon and De Freyne estates a few
years previously. This would lead to only one outcome according to Thomas Shaw:
More and more the idea of universal compulsion will come forward, and more 
and more men’s minds will turn to some compromise between universal 
compulsion and a case of specific policy of intervention on the ground of social
39 Ibid., cxxii, 94 (7 May 1903).
40 Ibid., cxxi, 1495 (5 M ay 1903).
41 Ibid., cxx, 201 (25 Mar. 1903).
42 Ibid., cxxi, 1439 (5 M ay 1903).
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disorder - such disorder as forms an overwhelming case for particular 
compulsion.43
The question of home rule was unavoidably tangled up with the bill. The effect
that the bill and the removal of the land question would have on the issue of Irish self-
government was a source of much speculation. Many Liberals, such as William Robson,
felt that the bill would further home rule in the long term:
There are two views put forward. On the one hand we have the ministerial view, 
which is that by this bill you will settle a long-standing dispute which has 
destroyed social order in Ireland, and having made the problem of social order so 
much easier to solve, they infer, not unnaturally, that Irish government will be a 
simpler matter. On this ground they commend the bill to the country as one 
which will make against home rule... [the nationalists] think that if they achieve 
the object they have so long desired of abolishing landlordism in Ireland, they 
will have captured a position which has been very steadily contested, and 
promote the solidarity of different classes in Ireland, and they will proceed as a 
more united, and firmer and stronger force for the attainment of their final end, 
namely, the self-government of their country.44
Robson considered that those landlords who remained in the country after selling would
gradually become nationalists and help reinforce the calls for home rule. Since the bill
did apparently nothing for the labourers, Robson foresaw that class as providing the
necessary element of agitation and unrest on the nationalist side.45
Many Liberals saw something of a paradox in the Conservative government’s
rejection of home rule and its assurances that the security for the loan to the tenant-
purchasers was ample. George Lambert, M.P. for Devon, South Molton, was incredulous
concerning the Conservative government’s attitude towards the Irish tenants:
I am absolutely astonished at the attitude of [the government]... when they tell us 
we may, with perfect security, invest £100,000,000 in Irish land, and expect the 
Irish tenant to repay that money with regularity and punctuality - in fact, that the 
Irish tenant, in his dealings with the British exchequer, will be one of the most 
punctual and honourable of men. They almost invest him with a set of wings, but 
when it comes to a case of Irishmen dealing with Irish affairs in Ireland, then it 
appears that they are invested with a double dose of original sin, and cannot be 
trusted to manage their own affairs.46
43 Ibid., col. 1474.
44 Ibid., col. 1434.
45 Ibid., col. 1436.
46 Ibid., col. 1401.
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While the Liberals in general held that the bill would make it increasingly impossible for
any British government to deny self-government to Ireland, they were under no illusions
as to its potential. John Morley, M.P. for Montrose Burghs, who had served as chief
secretary to Ireland from 1892 to 1895, considered the bill to be quite revolutionary:
This bill plucks up the old land system root and branch, and you are going to pay 
£12,000,000 down and are going to risk £100,000,000, or £150,000,000, 
afterwards in order to abolish it. Do not let us deceive ourselves that this is an 
old-fashioned purchase bill. This is a bill that points to, and will lead to, an 
immense social revolution. It will require a far bolder man than I am, to attempt 
to gauge the political and social effects of this bill. 47
The initial response of the Liberal party to WyndhanTs bill overall then was 
rather wary. The main concern of the party centred on finance. There was a feeling 
among many members that the landlords did not deserve the ‘bonus’ or the increased 
prices which they would receive under the bill. Some even had their suspicions that the 
whole bill was built around the theme of increasing the price of land for the landlords. 
Additionally, there was much anxiety over the security for the loan of approximately 
£100,000,000 to the tenant-purchasers. The treasury was being put in direct contact with 
the tenants for a considerable period of time and there was no guarantee that they would 
not default on their annuity repayments. The fact that British credit was being pledged to 
such an extent and yet there was no compulsion on the landlord to sell was a source of 
irritation. However, despite their concerns the vast majority o f the party were willing to 
pass the second reading of the bill. Notwithstanding their apprehensions over certain 
areas such as finance they believed that it deserved to reach the committee stage where 
hopefully it could be amended adequately. Another decisive factor in their support for 
the bill on the second reading was that Irish opinion, both nationalist and unionist, was 
united in favour of the measure. No British party was willing to risk the collapse o f a 
bill, which had found such unprecedented support in Ireland, on its second reading.
IV). Nationalist reaction to the bill.
The nationalist response to the bill on its first reading was somewhat restrained owing to 
the fact that the national convention of the U.I.L. was scheduled for 16 and 17 of April
47 Ibid., cxxii, 127 (7 May 1903).
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at which a judgement would be made. Nevertheless the bill was acknowledged as a 
genuine attempt by the Conservative government to tackle the land question. While there 
were areas which would require clarification and amendment, the nationalists were 
pleased with the general shape of the proposed legislation. Indeed, John Redmond’s 
enthusiasm was such that he announced that ‘it is the greatest effort ever yet made to
■ 48settle the Irish land question by purchase. This is a great bill.’
However, despite its scope there was a growing faction within the nationalist
ranks that opposed the bill. In Glasgow on 5 April, Michael Davitt, for example, was
critical of a number of its provisions but he stopped short of dismissing the measure.
Davitt was in favour of land nationalisation. He was also disparaging o f the
Conservative government and the landlords:
The settlement of the Irish land question has fallen into the hands of a landlord 
and capitalist government, and the conditions they impose and the price they fix 
are dictated solely by the desire to obtain for the Irish landlords the highest 
possible terms at the expense of the Irish people.49
On 13 April, just before the national convention o f the U.I.L., Davitt denounced
the bill at a meeting of nationalists in Toomebridge, Co. Antrim. He found fault with its
financial proposals especially the ‘bonus’ to the landlords:
These millions which the landlords were to receive over the real value of their 
property would have to be paid by Irish tenants and Irish taxpayers. As to the 
financial proposals, he confessed it was just maddening to think of them. If  these 
financial proposals of the bill passed into law unamended, it would be the biggest 
piece of deliberate blackmailing ever carried out in Ireland under English 
legislation... It was not an honest bill. An honest bill would proceed upon 
straight and honest lines, and this bill did nothing of the kind. He hoped that at 
the coming National Convention the tenants, through their representatives, would 
dem and... drastic changes in the bill.50
The independent nationalist M. P. for North Louth, T. M. Healy, was not entirely 
satisfied with the bill either but he felt it best to publicly support the measure, hoping 
that it would be amended in committee. Cognisant of the bill’s precariousness, he 
recorded:
48 Ibid., cxx, 216 (25 Mar. 1903).
49 F reem an’s Journal [hereafter cited as F.J.], 6 Apr. 1903.
501.T., 14 Apr. 1903.
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I am hardly pleased with the bill, but if I were to say so this would kill it. A puff 
of wind would throw Wyndham out. He is so nervous that he has been wanting 
to see me all this week...The government are in a shaky condition. Enthusiasm 
for them there [London] is none, and none for the purchase bill... Dillon, Davitt 
and Sexton are hostile to O ’Brien, and if I were to join them the bill would be 
killed, and William dished, but I could not be guilty of such faction as to oppose 
it. I hope it may be modified.51 
Healy also was aware that the Freeman's Journal, the principal nationalist newspaper of
the day and controlled by Thomas Sexton, was hostile to the measure. Healy put
Sexton’s opposition down to the fact that O’Brien had promised to confer with him
52before the Land Conference report was published but he had allegedly forgotten.
The evening before the national convention in Dublin, T. P. O ’Connor visited 
William O ’Brien with a letter from Thomas Sexton. Sexton advised that the Land 
Conference not be mentioned at the convention, and he counselled against endorsing the 
bill. O ’Brien considered that this was ill-advise as Wyndham had informed Redmond 
that a ringing endorsement from the convention was o f the utmost importance.53 At the 
meeting O’Brien also ascertained that O’Connor had been in talks with Wyndham and 
Sir Anthony MacDonnell, undersecretary 1902 to 1908, as well as Sexton and Davitt, 
unknown to and without the approval of Redmond or the party. Sir Anthony 
MacDonnell had been appointed Wyndham’s undersecretary in the autumn of 1902 
replacing Sir David Harrell. MacDonnell was a Catholic who had carved out a fine 
career in the Indian civil service. He also had a brother in the I.P.P. O ’Connor was in 
contact with Dillon, and O ’Brien believed that it was at Dillon’s prompting that 
O’Connor had approached him. Opposition to the bill, then, appeared to have been 
instigated by the figures of Davitt, Dillon, Sexton and O’Connor.54
The national convention, under the auspices of the U.I.L., was held in the 
Mansion House, Dublin on 16 April 1903. John Redmond chaired the meeting. T. W. 
Russell was present and was given a seat on the platform along with Michael Davitt, 
William Redmond, T. P. O’Connor and William O’Brien. Russell’s inclusion was
51 T. M. Healy, Letters and  leaders o f  my day vol. II (London, 1928), p. 462.
52 Ibid., p. 462. Thom as Sexton controlled the F reem an's Journal w hich was the principal nationalist 
newspaper at the tim e. He had served as an Irish Parliam entary M.P. for Sligo, W est Belfast and N orth 
Kerry at various tim es in the 1880s and 1890s.
53 W illiam O ’Brien, An olive branch in Ireland  (London, 1910), p. 226.
54 Ibid., pp. 222-31.
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Redmond, in the course of his speech, presented the bill as an opportunity that occurred
once in a generation and he impressed on his audience the importance of supporting it:
If we, representing the people o f Ireland, declare the land bill to be worthless, 
and incapable of being mended and moulded into a great measure, which will lay 
the foundations of social and agrarian peace in Ireland, and if we decide here and 
now to reject that measure - (cries of ‘no’) - there will be an absolute end of the 
bill, which will never be heard o f again. And if, upon the other hand, we decide 
to accept this bill as a measure capable of amendment - (hear, hear) - as a 
measure when so amended will end the land war... then, believe me, Ireland’s 
representatives will go back to the British parliament with greater power than 
ever before existed in the hands of the Irish representation for enforcing our just 
demands with a brighter hope of advancing the prosperity and freedom of Ireland 
than ever appeared since the infamous Act o f Union was carried.35 
William O ’Brien acknowledged that the measure was not without fault, but he
considered that it had the potential to bring an end to the Land War and landlordism in
Ireland.56
A motion to reject the bill was tabled by Patrick White, M.P. for Meath North,
who asserted that the measure ‘was one of the faultiest that was ever introduced into the
House of Commons for the people of Ireland. It was introduced absolutely in the
interests of the landlords’.57 However, after considerable interruption, his motion was
defeated. Michael Davitt announced that John Dillon, who was absent, would soon
return from Egypt. He proceeded to caution against approving the bill without
reservation and the Irish Times reported his speech:
He was not going to praise the bill there today. He did not believe in the wisdom 
of praising gifts that came from the Greeks. He looked with suspicion on 
everything that came from Westminister to Ireland. But he was not in favour of 
rejecting the bill because he hoped and believed that if  the amendments on the 
agenda paper were carried out, then they might have the prospect o f seeing the
5 8great question ... finally settled.
Davitt recommended that the convention be postponed until after the committee stage of 
the bill and then reconvened to announce its final decision. However, upon Redmond 
declaring that this would greatly weaken the position of the I.P.P., Davitt withdrew the





proposal. The day’s proceedings concluded with the decision that the bill be accepted on
condition that the necessary amendments would be made in the committee stage. The
onus was now on the I.P.P. to negotiate better terms in parliament.
According to William O’Brien, Fr. Denis O’Hara, a priest from John Dillon’s
East Mayo constituency, had warned him the night before the convention to expect
trouble from Sexton and his followers. Sexton had apparently been in secret talks with
Sir Anthony MacDonnell before the Land Conference and he felt that he had come to a
settlement of the land question. The Land Conference had derailed his plans, however,
and due to the huge support among the delegates'for the bill Sexton appears to have
abandoned his plans.59
On the second day of the convention, a resolution was passed in favour of home
rule. While some nationalists such as John Dillon were wary of the bill’s potential to
retard the movement for self-government, John Redmond was confident that it would
have the opposite effect. The Irish Times reported: ‘He believed the settlement of the
land question would remove the greatest obstacle in the path of home rule... and would
mean a great step in the march of home rule.’60
The convention called attention to those aspects of the bill which were of
concern to the tenants. Many of these concerns were expressed in parliament on the
second reading stage although the I.P.P. expressed its willingness to seek amendments
during the committee stage. Despite the bill’s deficiencies the party recognised that the
government was offering a measure of unparalleled potential as regards the settlement of
the land question. John Redmond, the leader of the I.P.P., readily acknowledged as much
in the House of Commons:
It is the greatest measure of land purchase reform ever seriously offered to the 
Irish people, and that it is intended to contain, and may quite easily be made to 
contain, all the elements of a settlement of the Irish agrarian difficulty, and the 
ending of the Irish land war, the permanent unity of all classes in Ireland and the 
laying broad and sure of the foundations of social peace.61
59 See O ’Brien, A n olive branch in Ireland, pp 222-23.
60 I T . ,  9 April 1903.
61 H ansard  4, cxxi, 1208 (4 May 1903).
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The day after the convention Redmond was visited by Davitt. He warned the I.P.P. 
leader that he would face opposition from Dillon, O’Connor and himself.62
However, those sections of the bill which dealt with the congested districts were 
a source o f anxiety for those nationalists who believed that the land question would not 
be settled if that particular issue was not adequately addressed. According to John
63Redmond no section of the measure was ‘such a crushing disappointment’. Therefore, 
prior to the second reading of the land bill in the House of Commons, the Catholic 
bishops o f Connaught met to draw attention to the bill’s shortcomings. The bishops 
stated that ‘the proposals outlined in the bill for dealing with the great question of 
congestion and the cultivation of the vast tracts of prairie lands in the west of Ireland are 
quite inadequate. Larger and more extensive powers should be conferred on the 
Congested Districts Board’.64 The I.P.P. wanted the powers of the board expanded to 
include compulsion, in order to acquire and divide the grazing ranches. They called for 
an acceleration in its operations, an element of popular elected representation on its 
board and the expansion of its jurisdiction to include the whole province of Connaught. 
The bill failed to take these demands into account, however, John Dillon warned that 
unless the bill was revised ‘the people of Connaught will be driven back again to 
commence agitation’.65
O f equal importance was the issue of evicted tenants.66 These were tenants who 
had been evicted during the Land War of the 1880s. No settlement of the land question 
could be contemplated that did not provide for their reinstatement. The general 
consensus in the I.P.P. was that the provisions were wholly inadequate. The danger of 
leaving the question unresolved was highlighted by William O ’Brien: ‘To leave it 
unsettled, or only half settled, would be to leave everything unsettled and to keep up a 
state of fermentation that might easily enough be fatal to the satisfactory working of the
cn
whole o f the vast national settlement contemplated by the bill.’
62 O’Brien, A n  olive branch in Ireland , p. 230.
63 H ansard 4, cxxi, 1218 (4 May 1903).
64 1.71, 10 April 1903.
65 H ansard 4, cxxi, 1310 (4 May 1903).
66 See chapter six.
67 H ansard 4, cxxi, 1382 (5 May 1903).
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The agricultural labourers also stood to gain very little under the proposed
legislation. John Redmond held that the labourers section was ‘absolutely worthless and
futile’ and a ‘mockery o f the claims of the labourers’.68 The I.P.P. proposed that a
revised section or a separate bill be introduced to tackle the problem.
The inclusion of the price ‘zones’ had provided considerable anxiety. While
there was little enthusiasm for them the inclusion of a maximum reduction which the
tenant could receive rankled with nationalists. They wanted the tenant to be free to
bargain and to pay similar purchase prices to those which had been paid under the
Ashbourne Act of 1885 and that the gap would be bridged by government finance. Their
fear was that the poorer sections of the tenantry might be persuaded into paying prices
which they might find impossible to repay in the future. If the ‘zones’ enabled the
landlords to receive an exorbitant price from their tenants then the security for the state
was threatened as regards the repayment o f the purchase annuity. T. P. O ’Connor I.P.P.
M.P. for Liverpool, Scotland, made an impassioned plea to ensure that the tenants
received adequate protection under the terms of the bill:
I know I am expressing the opinion of every man around me when I say that the 
tenant has to be protected against himself. The land hunger still rages with its old 
voracity in Ireland... The tenants, even if the bill be not amended, will get a large 
reduction of their rents, which is an immediate advantage, while the 
responsibilities are remote; and thrifty as they are, the temptation is great - the 
sense of ownership, the idea of having something stable in the land... [is so great 
that] the Irish tenant would pay almost any price for the land, and it is the duty of 
the Irish representatives in this house to stand between him and his fighting 
soul.69
In order to prevent sub-division or immoderate mortgaging a clause was included 
in the bill which forced the tenant-purchaser to pay a perpetual rent charge on his 
holding. The perpetual rent charge was opposed as it was felt that it would diminish the 
tenant’s sense of ownership. The I.P.P. also bemoaned the absence o f decadal reductions 
in the tenant’s annuity as it had eased the financial obligations of the purchaser. Under 
the 1896 act, a system of decadal reductions had been introduced to help tenants repay 
their amiuities. The system had operated as follows:
68 Ibid., col. 1221 (4 May 1903).
69 Ibid., cxxii, 84 (7 May 1903).
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The repayment by the tenant-purchasers are divided into periods of ten years, 
dating from the time the amiuity commences to run, or ‘decades’, as they are 
called in the act. During the first decade the tenant’s annuity... is at a uniform 
rate of four per cent per annum on the amount of the purchase money. During the 
second decade, he will pay an annuity of four per cent on the amount o f the 
advance remaining unpaid at the end of the first decade. Similarly at the end of 
the 2nd, 3rd, and remaining decades he will pay an annuity of four per cent on the 
amount of the advance remaining unpaid at the expiration of the previous decade. 
In other words, the Land Commission, with the assistance of the treasury, will 
make up the tenant’s account every ten years, ascertain what the tenant has 
repaid on account of principal, calculate what amount of interest his repayment 
on account of principal should be credited, and by that means determine, what 
balance of the advance remains unpaid, and on that balance the tenant will pay 
four per cent for the ten years following. It will thus be seen that at every
70recurring period of ten years the tenant’s instalments will be decreased.
There was also strong opposition to the clause which stipulated that if  three-quarters of 
the tenants on an estate agreed to sell the remainder lost the right to have a rent fixed in 
the land courts. Likewise, the ambiguity over the position, tenure and salaries of the 
three estates commissioners, a new administrative body designed to oversee the 
operation of the act, was viewed with suspicion and not a little unease.
According to the bill, the ‘bonus’ to the landlord was to be allocated in an 
inverse ratio to the purchase price. While this would benefit poorer landlords, those 
selling large estates were at a disadvantage. Redmond proposed that the ‘bonus’ be set at
7 1a standard rate of 15 % but that a time limit of five years be imposed on its operation. 
This would put pressure on landlords to sell as the cash ‘bonus’ would only be available 
for a limited period. Such a rate would hopefully sufficiently compensate the landlord 
for selling without the tenant having to pay higher prices than had been given under 
previous acts. Finally the independent nationalist M.P., T. M. Healy, shrewdly foresaw 
that greater resources would have to be put towards those departments dealing with
77proof of title.
The I.P.P. were swift to emphasise to the House of Commons the extraordinary 
circumstances which prevailed in Ireland in 1903 as a result of the Land Conference and 
its report. The unprecedented union of classes in favour o f ending the Land War and
70 John G eorge Fottrell, Practical guide to the L and  Purchase Acts (Ireland), 1870-1896  (Dublin, 1897), 
p. 83.
71 H a n sa rd 4, cxxi, 1212 (4 May 1903).
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facilitating a final settlement of the Irish land question was highlighted. John Redmond 
described the golden opportunity that had arisen: ‘Never before - let him [George 
Wyndham] never forget that - since the Act of Union has an English minister in Ireland
the chance that he now has of successfully dealing with this Irish agrarian difficulty.
• • 73Ireland today is united in her demands in almost all essentials.’ However, for the I.P.P.
the ultimate success or failure of the measure would depend on whether or not the
government listened to nationalist opinion when the bill was in committee. John Dillon
outlined the prospects of a bill where their voices were ignored:
And if the government should refuse to adopt these amendments, I am convinced 
that the prospects o f their measure will be overclouded, that its fate will be the 
same as those of its predecessors, and that its passage into law will be followed 
by fresh agitations and further land bills in the future.74
V). Unionist reaction to the bill.
Like their nationalist counterparts the I.U.P.P. emphasised the unique atmosphere that 
existed in Ireland. On 2 April 1903 a meeting of the Irish unionist members of 
parliament was held during which they acknowledged that the bill was a sincere effort to 
solve the land question in Ireland.75 Colonel Edward Saunderson, the leader o f the party 
in the House of Commons and also a spokesman for landlords, surmised ‘that during the 
last 800 years such an opportunity has never presented itself as this to the parliament of 
England’.76 To allay fears about financing the bill, he stressed the unity o f all classes in 
Ireland in support of the measure. Saunderson spoke of the uniqueness of the proposal: 
‘It is the only bill that I ever knew of which induced the hon.[ourable] and learned 
member for Waterford [John Redmond] to stand up on that side of the house and I on
• 77this side of the house to give our approval.’
The I.U.P.P. accepted that the bill had the potential to end the extended Land 
War and bring about a new era in Irish life. T. L. Corbett, M.P. for North Down, spoke 
in halcyon tones about the prospects: ‘These are days when old men are seeing visions 
and young men are dreaming dreams of a new era of peace, plenty and prosperity for
73 Ibid., cxxi, 1222 (4 May 1903).
74 Ibid., col. 1306.
75 IT .,  3 Apr. 1903.
76 H ansard 4, cxx, 218 (25 Mar. 1903).
77 Ibid., col. 217.
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Ireland.’78 While these predictions were genuine they were undoubtedly a way of 
convincing non-Irish M.P.s that the outlay of imperial credit was justified and 
worthwhile.
The I.U.P.P. also felt that sections of the bill itself needed to be amended. Like 
the I.P.P. they too were opposed to the perpetual rent charge and the clause that 
penalised the minority o f the tenants where three-quarters were willing to buy. The 
‘zone’ limits were a cause for concern and the I.U.P.P. also believed that the bill had 
ignored the plight of agricultural labourers.
Calls to increase the ‘bonus’ fund were repeated. While John Redmond had 
thought £15,000,000 would suffice, Charles Craig, M.P. for South Antrim, advocated 
that it be increased to £20,000,000.79 Irish M.P.s were confident that if  the ‘bonus’ to the 
landlord was sufficiently large, then the tenant would not have to pay higher prices. 
However, if the ‘bonus’ was unsatisfactory, landlords would likely hold out for better 
terms in order to make the sale financially worthwhile. Furthermore, John Lonsdale, 
M.P. for Mid Armagh, appealed for a time limit to be set on its distribution and for it to
o n
be allocated at a fixed rate.
Some I.P.U.P members feared that landlords in the north o f Ireland would not be 
motivated to sell under the bill. In that part of the country there had been little trouble as 
regards the payment of rent and virtually no agrarian agitation since the Land War. T. L. 
Corbett stated: ‘I fear that in the north, where the tenants have readily paid their rent,
and where they are a law abiding and peace loving people, the landlords will not be so
■ • 81 anxious to sell as they are in the south and west.’
The conciliatory attitude of the I.U.P.P. was no better demonstrated than on the 
question of the evicted tenants. They were willing to assist the I.P.P. in pressurising the 
government to help this group. However, they qualified this by stressing that the current 
occupiers of such holdings, often called ‘planters’ by nationalists, should not be
78 Ibid., cxxii, 105 (7 M ay 1903).
79 Ibid., cxxi, 1464 (5 M ay 1903).
80 Ibid., col. 1412.
81 Ibid., cxxii, 104 (7 M ay 1903).
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disturbed. Charles Craig was of the opinion that no settlement could be reached until the
82matter was tackled.
While the I.P.P. and the I.U.P.P. were unanimous on those sections of the bill
that needed to be revised, they disagreed on the effect that the bill would have on the
movement for home rule. Redmond and his followers insisted that the measure would
not neutralise the movement while the unionists held the opposite opinion. According to
John Gordon, M.P. for Londonderry South:
If  I thought the union was in any danger here, not only would I not support this 
bill but I would go much farther, but my belief is that the union will be 
strengthened by this bill rather than weakened, and I...believe that giving the 
tenants an interest in their holding, and giving them to understand that they will 
no longer be subject to interference in their holdings or in the cultivation of them, 
would have a great tendency to prevent them from continuing to contribute to the 
keeping up of an agitation which is largely based on agrarian discontent.83
The I.U.P.P. held that home rule would be disarmed by the bill as the agrarian agitation
which had fuelled the movement would be pacified.
Aside from the official I.U.P.P. there was the independent unionist T. W. Russell
and his followers. By the time that the bill was introduced on 25 March 1903 two other
parliamentary representatives had joined Russell. James Wood had triumphed in East
Down in 1902 while Edward Mitchell had secured a seat in North Fermanagh just days
before the first reading.
As a member of the Land Conference, Russell naturally welcomed the
introduction of the new legislation. He hailed the ‘epoch making proposals’ which it
contained and he predicted the dawn of a new era.84 However, the absence of
compulsion would prove a bitter pill for many of his supporters to swallow. Signs of
discontent quickly emerged among his followers. The Freeman's Journal reported that
at meeting of the executive of the Ulster Farmers’ and Labourers’ Union in Belfast on 5
April 1903, the absence of compulsion was bemoaned:
There is a growing feeling of disappointment with Mr. Wyndham’s land bill...It 
appears that the members of the union are more convinced than ever that no
82 Ibid., cxxi, 1465 (5 May 1903).
83 Ibid., cxxii, 90 (7 M ay 1903).
84 Ibid., cxx, 222 (25 Mar. 1903).
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settlement of the land question is possible by means of any bill which does not
* 85include the element of compulsion.
However, no public announcement on the matter would be made until after the union’s 
conference on 15 April.
T.W. Russell M.P., Edward Mitchell M.P. and James Wood M.P. all attended the 
union’s conference which had been called to debate the bill. A report by a sub­
committee was read which condemned the measure. The report lamented the omission of 
compulsory purchase and declared that the bill was a deliberate attempt to inflate the 
price of land. The report concluded with the following statement:
We wish to state emphatically that even with all the alterations and amendments 
suggested, the bill could never, in our judgement, finally settle the Irish land 
question, and no measure that is not based on compulsory sale and purchase onor
fair terms can ever effect such a final settlement.
T. W. Russell cautioned the members of the Ulster Farmers’ and Labourers’ Union 
against being overly critical of the bill: ‘[The bill] was not a popular bill in Great Britain. 
It could easily be defeated in the House of Commons, it could be still more easily 
withdrawn by the government.’87 Russell counselled that they should present a united 
front and co-operate closely with the I.P.P. to secure the passage of the second reading 
and then work for comprehensive amendments during the committee stage. Following 
Russell’s speech, an outright rejection o f the bill was avoided and the conference 
concluded.
The lack of enthusiasm amongst certain sections of the Ulster tenantry seemed to 
stem from the absence of compulsion. While the demand for compulsory purchase in the 
south and west had been reinforced by a campaign of agrarian agitation by the U.I.L. no 
such methods appear to have been adopted in Ulster. The tenants in the province had 
generally put their faith in parliament passing a compulsory act. With the introduction of 
a comprehensive voluntary bill it appeared that the tenants in the rest of Ireland would 
secure the ownership of their holdings. However, in Ulster it was held that landlords 
would be far less inclined to sell due to the lack of agrarian agitation and the absence of
85 F.J., 6 Apr. 1903.
861.T., 16 Apr. 1903.
87 Ibid.
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delays in the collection of rent. Indeed, even with the ‘bonus’ incentive there was an 
apprehension that the inducement to the landlords o f the province would be insufficient. 
James Wood, Russellite M.P. for East Down, summed up the anxieties felt by the Ulster 
tenants:
We recognise that Ulster landlords will not be so willing to sell as they are in the 
south and west; we believe that they will be the last to go; we believe that in the 
south and west they have been able to supply their own compulsion, but we in 
the north prefer or preferred to have compulsion by an act of parliament. In that 
belief largely the Ulster farmer is doubtful whether or not his representatives 
should support the bill and see it right through. They have actually expressed the 
fear that the Irish party, having secured for the farmers in the south and west 
their holdings.. .they might wish not to give their aid to the farmers and labourers 
of Ulster.88
The fear that Ulster landlords might not sell their estates was felt within the 
I.P.U.P also. T. L. Corbett identified the possibility that sales might not occur to the 
same extent in the province.89 Indeed it appeared that the tenantry in the north, who had 
paid their rents on time and not resorted to agrarian agitation, would actually suffer 
under the bill while the most troublesome tenants in the south and west of Ireland would 
secure their holdings.
T. W. Russell, however, acknowledged that there would be landlords who would 
refuse to sell under any circumstances and he predicted that compulsion would have to 
be resorted to in these instances. He urged the acceptance of the bill for three primary 
reasons. Firstly, it represented the beginning of the end for landlordism. Secondly, it was 
a genuine and comprehensive attempt to further land purchase. Lastly, the 
unprecedented utilisation of imperial credit, in the form of the £100,000,000 loan and 
the £12,000,000 ‘bonus’, meant that it was vital that the bill be accepted. Russell warned 
the supporters of compulsion that they should not disregard the measure because of its 
absence:
This bill has been born of compulsion. But those of us who have been the 
strongest in demanding this solution of the question would incur a grave 
responsibility if we for a moment stood in the way of a government carrying out
88 H a n sa rd 4, cxxi, 1458 (5 M ay 1903).
89 Ibid., cxxii, 104 (7 M ay 1903).
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a great scheme such as embodied in this bill. What I call the remnant can, and 
will be, dealt with in due season.90
With many of their constituents under the impression that they would have to 
remain tenants for a number of years to come, Russell and his two parliamentary allies 
were determined that the present rights of tenants would not be eroded. For this reason 
they were deeply opposed to the introduction of the clause whereby a section of tenants 
who did not wish to buy would lose their right to go to the land courts to get a fair rent 
fixed. The inclusion of such legislation might set a dangerous precedent. The abolition 
of decadal reductions and the absence of provisions for labourers were also much 
lamented. Likewise, they were opposed to the perpetual rent charge.
Their main concern, however, focused on the price ‘zones’. There was much 
opposition to the presence of a maximum reduction which the tenant could receive as 
this ensured there had to be a minimum price that the landlord could obtain. The 
inclusion of this provision, which was intended to protect the landlord, could adversely 
effect the tenant in the future. If the ‘zones’ forced tenants to pay exorbitant prices, they 
might be unable to pay their annuities in years to come. Consequently, this was a major 
threat to the security of the state loan.
Russell admitted that it was unrealistic to expect land prices to remain at the 
same level as they had been under previous acts. The landlords who had been willing to 
sell under the terms of previous acts had been exhausted, hence the necessity of the bill. 
However, Russell was determined that the increase should not be such that the tenants 
were overburdened. Landlords would receive after all a number of what he called 
‘submerged ‘bonuses’ in the bill such as the payment o f the costs of transfer and the 
purchase and resale of the demesne.91 Under the bill it was proposed that landlords 
would have the option of selling and repurchasing their demesnes on the same annuity 
terms as the tenants. As an inducement to ensure that the landlords remained in the 
country it contained obvious advantages according to M. MacDonagh Bodkin: ‘In effect 
the clause is a provision enabling the landlords to borrow money at a low rate of interest 
from the treasury on the security of their own mansion houses and demesnes. To the
90 Ibid., cxxi, 1283 (4 May 1903).
91 Ibid., col. 1268-72 (4 M ay 1903).
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encumbered landlord, and in that class the great majority are included, this will be an 
inestimable advantage.’92 There was a fear was that the government would go too far to 
safeguard the security of the landlord. This would result in the tenants being shouldered 
with burdens they would be unable to bear in the future.
VI). The attitude o f Irish landlords.
Since the I.P.P. and the I.P.U.P predominantly represented the views of Irish tenants a 
separate sub-section was necessary here to outline the response of Irish landlords to the 
bill. On 24 April 1903 the annual meeting of the Irish Landowners’ Convention was held 
in Dublin. The duke of Abercorn, who chaired the meeting, approved the bill. However, 
while Abercorn thought that the bill should be accepted, he still retained a number of 
reservations: ‘I cannot say in all sincerity that the bill will solve the problem. It goes a 
very long way, but that makes it all the more to be regretted that it does not go the whole
93way. To be quite straight, I am bound to say that it falls short in the matter of money.’
Abercorn had doubts as to whether the inducements to the landlords were sufficient,
especially since he considered that the sale money, when invested, would not produce
their current income. As well as that he expressed concerns that tenants would try to
hold out for prices that were not feasible.
The convention was willing to support the bill but there were a number of areas
where landowners considered that amendments were vital. The O ’Conor Don proposed
the following successful resolution, for example:
That, while in the opinion of this convention, the provisions of the land bill fall 
short o f the views already placed on record by the convention and by the 
members of the Land Conference, it is most desirable that all parties in Ireland 
should accept its principles and assist the government to pass a bill which, if 
widely made use of, would go further towards the solution of the land question 
on the lines of voluntary sale and purchase than any other bill which has 
heretofore been laid before parliament.94
A number of amendment’s to the bill were passed by the Irish Landowners’ Convention 
at their meeting which they hoped their representatives in parliament would pursue. Lord
M. M cD., Bodkin, ‘The Irish Land Q uestion’ in Fortnightly Review, lxxiii, no. 436 (Apr. 1903) p. 743. 
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Clonbrock, got a motion passed to either omit or considerably increase the limits in 
terms of advances to tenants and to change the limits of the ‘zones’ within which sales 
could occur. A proposal by Dr. Anthony Trail to maintain the system of decadal 
reductions as an option to the tenant was also passed. On the question o f the ‘bonus’, 
Lord Belmore proposed that it should be issued at a fixed rate and not apportioned out 
according to scale. The earl of Westmeath agreed and declared the ‘bonus’ ought to be 
greater. After some discussion it was decided that the ‘bonus’ should be at least 15 % of 
the purchase money.95
The Land Conference Committee met in private on 28 April under the 
chairmanship of the earl of Dunraven. The committee consisted of landlords who had 
helped initiate the Land Conference in December 1902. A sub-committee consisting of 
Colonel W. Hutcheson-Poe, Colonel Nugent-Everard, the earl of Mayo and the earl of 
Dunraven was appointed to follow the bill through parliament and to produce any 
necessary amendments.96 The Land Conference Committee wanted to ensure that the 
purchase money that the landlord received would equal their present rent when invested, 
that the cash ‘bonus’ to the vendor would be issued at a rate of not less than 15 % during 
the first five years, that landlords’ legal costs would be paid and that the limit, in terms 
of the amount of purchase money a tenant could receive to buy their holding, would be 
enlarged.97 The committee also expressed their dissatisfaction with the current condition 
of the clauses dealing with sporting and shooting rights, fishing rights, turbary and 
mineral rights.98 Dunraven contacted Redmond about co-operating with the I.P.P. while 
the bill was in committee, in order to present a united front to the government 
concerning amendments, but the I.P.P. leader declined the offer. According to William 
O ’Brien, Redmond welcomed the offer but refused because he was daunted by the effect 
such co-operation might have on John Dillon. Dillon was opposed to any co-operation 
with landlords.99
The representatives of the landed gentry in the House o f Commons and the 
House of Lords were prominent in their attempts to address the needs of that class as
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid., 29 Apr. 1903.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 O ’Brien, A n olive branch in Ireland, pp. 233-36.
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regards the bill. Like the other Irish representatives, who were predominantly concerned
with the interests of the tenants, they were swift to assure the British taxpayer that there
was no fear of the Irish tenants repudiating their annuities. The earl of Dunraven
vouched for the honesty of Irish tenant-purchasers by declaring that he did ‘not believe
for a moment that the Irish tenant farmer will ever evince any desire to repudiate’.100
There was a sense of disappointment among landlords that the ‘bonus’ fund was
not larger and there was a desire that it should be distributed at a fixed rate. The earl of
Dunraven advocated 15 %.101 The ‘bonus’ would hopefully provide the bridge between
what the tenant could afford to pay for the purchase of his holding and what the landlord
could afford to accept. However, if  the ‘bonus’ was not sufficient to bridge the gap there
was greater room for disagreement between both sides as regards price. Sir John
Colomb, Conservative M.P. for Greater Yarmouth and landlord spokesman, defended
the grant-in-aid to the landlords.102 He declared:
It is not a dole, it is not a bribe, and it is not a ‘bonus’. It is a fund to provide for 
the payment of the lawyers, costs and conveyance expenses, which are 
unavoidable. Lawyers must be paid, and when they are satisfied, and the 
expenses met, very little, I think, will be left out of this £12,000,000 to go into 
the landlord’s pocket as cash to provide interest for the support of his family. I 
think it will mostly find its way into the lawyer’s pocket. Another point which I 
wish to draw attention to is that when the transaction is complete and the 
occupier has a reduced rent, having had no disturbance, and no anxiety, the 
landlord has the anxiety of making and watching investments and of adapting
• * 103himself to an entirely new condition of things.
The landlords as a class were in favour of the price ‘zones’. While the tenants’ 
representatives were quite opposed to the inclusion of a maximum reduction which the 
tenant could receive, it being the equivalent of the minimum price a landlord could 
receive, the landlords viewed such a limit as essential. The marquess o f Londonderry 
stressed that a landlord would not sell their lands unless he could secure his current 
income upon investing the money he would receive from sale.104
11111 H ansard 4 , cxxvi, 1185 (3 Aug. 1903).
101 Ibid., col. 1193.
102 Colom b w as a Conservative M.P. and an Irish man. He would take up the role o f  a representative o f  the 
Irish landlords throughout the bills passage through the House of Commons.
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The retention of the sporting and fishing rights in the hands of the landlord was
considered essential. The enjoyment of these rights was advocated as one o f the sole
reasons for keeping the landed gentry in the country once their lands had been sold.
Moreover, if  the rights were divided up among a host o f tenant-purchasers the game
would disappear as they would not have the inclination or the resources to manage its
upkeep. Similarly, there was a strong belief among the representatives of the landed
gentry that they should receive compensation for any future development of any
minerals on the land they sold. The earl of Donoughmore felt that it was only fair that
the landlord should be entitled to at least 50 % of the profits in any such case where the
minerals were developed by the government.105
On the question of evicted tenants the majority of the landlords’ representatives
professed a wish to resolve the issue. The removal of such centres o f social discontent
could only help the operation of the act. John Butcher, Conservative M.P. for York and
landlord spokesman, espoused such sentiments:
I have come to the decided conclusion that if  you treat the evicted tenants 
generously, by restoring them as far as possible to their holdings, or finding other 
holdings for them, you will go a long way to establish that harmony and goodwill 
which the successful operation of this act depends.106
However, the landlords were adamant that the interests of the so-called ‘planter’ tenants
were protected. While the evicted tenants were often referred to as the ‘wounded
soldiers’ of the Land War, the ‘planters’ were seen as the equivalent on the landlord
side. Any settlement of the evicted tenants question would also have to ensure that the
‘planters’ were not discriminated against or pressurised. Indeed, for many members of
the landlord class the protection of the ‘planters’ was regarded as a matter of honour.
The earl of Arran espoused the feelings of his class on the matter:
The ‘planters’ have fought the battle of England in Ireland during the last twenty 
or thirty years, even at the risk of their lives, certainly at the expense of their own 
comfort and happiness, and at the expense of the comfort and happiness of their 
own families. Although I have heard evicted tenants described as wounded 
soldiers of the war, yet I think these men, although not wounded soldiers, have 
been the faithful servants of the empire through a very difficult and dangerous
105 Ibid., col. 1210.
106 Ibid., cxxii, 98 (7 May 1903).
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time, and I think, that unless they are fully protected from all pressure and 
annoyance, it would be a betrayal of which our posterity would be ashamed.107
The 1903 land act provided a number of incentives for landlords to sell their
estates. The most important were the cash ‘bonus’, the receipt of the purchase money in
cash not stock and the option of selling their demesne and repurchasing it back on the
same annuity terms as the tenants. Despite these attractions many landlords felt that the
emotional sacrifice involved in the selling of their land was not sufficiently appreciated.
The Co. Tyrone landlord, the duke of Abercorn, voiced such sentiments:
To part with an estate that has been in your family for generations, to sever your 
connection with your tenants with whom you lived on the best of terms, is an 
unpleasant wrench. Money cannot obliterate the old associations connected with 
family ties, and I might almost say, with historic connections. To part with the 
familiar acres, and to receive in lieu thereof money, the investment of which is 
always attended with anxiety and is never free from risk, is not a very agreeable 
exchange.108
For many landlords, particularly those of the older generation, the idea of essentially 
becoming businessmen and living off the investment of the proceeds o f their estate sale 
was quite unappealing. For men who had spent their lives living off the rent of their 
estates investment in the world of stocks and shares appeared quite intimidating.
The earl of Dunraven, who would sell nearly all of his Limerick estates under the 
act, was intensely aware of the emotional attachment that many landowners felt towards 
their land:
Ought no account to be taken of the enormous sacrifice of sentiment that they 
will have to make? Is it reasonable to tell me that the Irish landowners are the 
only Irishmen who attach no importance and have no love for the soil? No man 
will part with a light heart, or with anything but a very sore and sad heart, broad 
acres which have descended to him from father to son for generations and
109centuries.
For many the sale of their land signalled the end of a way of life which had existed for 
centuries. The world of business and trade, often viewed as unfit for a gentleman, must 
have seemed daunting for landowners who were often inexperienced and untrained in its 
traditions.
107 Ibid., cxxvi, 1217-8 (3 Aug. 1903).
108 Ibid., col. 1170.
109 Ibid., col. 1189.
70
Lord Oranmore and Browne was keen to emphasise that many members of his
class had no inclination to sell their lands:
I protest strongly against the suggestion that this bill is a boon to the Irish 
landlords. We have no wish to part with our property. In many cases our estates 
have been held by the same families for centuries, and we have the same 
affection for our old homes as your lordships feel for your houses in this country. 
We do not wish to become a sort of glorified villa residents enclosed in our own 
park wall, and separated in sympathy from the outer world, but we wish to live as 
Irishmen among Irishmen.110
The fear that the sale of their estates would leave them isolated and separated from 
society was a prominent one. Oranmore and Browne’s foreboding that landlords would 
become detached from society was quite evident. The demesne wall would become a 
barrier and separate landlords from their fellow Irish men. Others such as Sir Algernon 
Coote, were quite content with their income from rents and there had been little agrarian 
unrest on his estate. He confided to Lord Clonbrock in early 1903 that he was ‘not the 
least anxious’ to sell his property.111 Judge William O ’Connor Morris, a landlord in 
King’s County, was completely opposed to any scheme o f voluntary purchase. He
considered the bill to be little more than ‘pernicious agrarian quackery, pregnant with
1 1 2many and far-reaching evils’.
Many Irish landlords, however, simply viewed their position as untenable. 
Despite their sentimental attachment towards their lands, many held that their 
occupation was no longer profitable or viable. The earl of Dunraven neatly summed up 
their position:
If landlords attach so much importance to ownership, why are they willing to sell 
at all? They are willing to sell because the present system in Ireland is a system 
not only ruining them, but ruining and demoralising the whole country, checking
• • • 113and crippling her industry and smothering all her aspirations.
The earl of Westmeath highlighted that since land purchase had become official 
government policy the position of his class had become increasingly difficult:
110 Ibid., col. 1201-2.
111 Sir A lgernon Coote to Lord Clonbrock, 17 Feb. 1903, (National A rchives o f  Ireland [hereafter cited as 
N .A .I.], C lonbrock papers, MS 35,774 (7)).
112 W illiam O 'Connor M orris, ‘The Irish land b ill’ in Nineteenth century and  after: a m onthly review , liii, 
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Since the abolition of dual ownership was adopted by the government, our 
position has become every day more unsatisfactory, dangerous and untenable. 
We are now only limited rent chargers on the properties we once absolutely 
owned, and that small rent charge is diminishing so rapidly that in many cases it 
has almost reached a vanishing point.114
British fears that the Wyndham Act was a raid on the treasury would have been 
confirmed by the duke of Abercorn’s view of the matter in April 1903. Despite his 
unionist beliefs the duke was willing to join with the nationalists to obtain the best terms 
possible for his class: ‘In my opinion the nationalists and ourselves should work together 
in order to get as much money as possible out of the treasury, and if we are successful in 
helping the tenant farmers the representatives of that class may also be willing to help 
us.’115
While the movement for compulsory purchase, pushed by T.W. Russell in Ulster 
and by the U.I.L. in the south and west, had been instrumental in the creation of 
Wyndham’s bill the measure would remain a voluntary one. There was no legal 
compulsion on the landlord to sell his lands. During the second reading of the bill in the 
House of Lords Lord Clonbrock stressed that there was ‘no moral obligation on the 
landlord to sell’.116 The voluntary nature of the bill was essential for landowners. It gave 
them the freedom to sell if  and when they wished. In addition, they could attempt to 
negotiate what they viewed as a reasonable price for their lands unlike a compulsory 
measure where the fixing of the price would almost certainly be outside their control.
It was feared that many landlords would have no reason to remain on in Ireland 
once their estates were sold. Lord Oramnore and Browne opined that this would result in
* ■ 117a serious financial and cultural loss. Lord Castletown of Queens County took a 
slightly different view of the effect the bill would have: ‘In my opinion the present 
generation may live on in Ireland, but I cannot help thinking that the next generation will 
not do so. I think the old homes will then pass into the hands of others - rich merchants, 
rich solicitors and other persons of wealth.’ While southern landlords such as Lord 
Oranmore and Browne and Lord Castletown were pessimistic about the future o f their
114 Ibid., col. 1224.
115 Duke o f  A bercorn to Lord Clonbrock, 4 Apr. 1903, (N.A.I., C lonbrock papers, Ms 35,774 (7)).
116 H ansard  4, cxxvi, 1245 (3 Aug. 1903). \
117 Ibid., col. 1202.
118 Ibid., col. 1250-51.
72
class, the earl of Belmore, an Ulster landowner, believed that if they could sell without 
incurring a loss of income then landlords would remain on in the country.119 Likewise 
the marquess of Londonderry thought there was a hope among all sections of the 
community that the landlords would not leave the county but would rather remain on in 
the land of their birth.120
VIP. George W yndham ’s struggle to get the bill to the committee stage.
Before the bill entered the committee stage Wyndham outlined three key challenges 
facing it. Firstly, congestion and the question of uneconomic holdings would have to be 
addressed. Secondly, the expense and delay associated with land and the judicial process
would have to be eradicated. Thirdly, the British taxpayer could not be overburdened
121financially as a result of the measure.
Wyndham readily admitted that the introduction of the bill was poorly timed.
Owing to the expense of the Boer War and the calls for further investment in the army
and navy there was little enthusiasm for such an outlay of imperial credit in Ireland.
However, a unique situation had arisen in Ireland following the Land Conference.
Wyndham outlined the position as follows:
After a great war, when £250,000,000 have been added to the national debt, 
when taxation stands at a higher figure than it has stood since our great struggle 
with Napoleon - that is not the moment which any minister, with a due sense of 
the situation would have chosen to bring forward a bill of this kind. Yes, but 
think of the occasion in Ireland. Has not the tragedy of the past in the relations of 
the two countries always been the occasion in Ireland did not synchronise with
the occasion in England? Must not great reasons be adduced if we are to let so
1 22marked an occasion go by without profiting from it?
Wyndham emphasised that both landlord and tenant representatives had met and had 
negotiated, what was essentially, a peace settlement. He hoped to convince parliament 
and the British public that a rare opportunity to finally settle the Irish land question was 
before them.
119 Ibid., col. 1204.
120 Ibid., col. 1240-1.
121 Ibid., cxxii, 143 (7 M ay 1903).
122 Ibid., col. 130.
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It was estimated that advances to tenant-purchasers would cost the British
government some £100,000,000. Wyndham, mindful of the administration’s misgivings,
called attention to a couple of details. Firstly, he pointed out that most Irish tenant-
purchasers, under previous acts, had been most conscientious in repaying their annuities
and he foresaw little trouble in that respect. Secondly, he emphasised that, in the case of
the repudiation or failure to pay annuities, the losses would be recovered from Irish
finances. Thus the loan of around £100,000,000 would covered by what the chief
secretary called the moral and cash securities.123
Stressing that the British state had a responsibility to tackle the problems within
Irish agricultural society and that it was necessary to do so if progress was to be made on
the wider Irish question, Wyndham sought to justify such a vast expenditure at such an
inopportune time. The chief secretary and the prime minister, A.J. Balfour, sold the bill
as the final solution to the Irish land question. On its second reading, Wyndham
indicated that he held a different view to that of John Redmond. Redmond held that the
measure would not be a final solution, whereas Wyndham hoped that the legislation
would finally settle Irish land question.124 Wyndham’s personal promotion of the bill as
the final solution, though, was instrumental in winning over non Irish-M.P.s and the
British public. Likewise the prime minister, A.J. Balfour, had stressed the finality o f the
bill to the king in March 1903:
This is a very far reaching measure; and the Irish government are sanguine that it 
will settle for all time the Irish land difficulty. The objections to it arise from the 
fact that it makes a heavy call on British credit...The cabinet are clearly of 
opinion that in the interests of a great policy minor difficulties must be 
ignored.125
The question of home rule was unavoidably linked with the bill. The chief 
secretary faced criticism from members of his own party who feared that the legislation 
would introduce home rule by the backdoor. Such suggestions were flatly denied by the 
government. The prime minister, A. J. Balfour, considered such fears to be unfounded as 
the bill aimed to resolve a long standing social problem:
,2J Ibid., col. 138-9.
124 Ibid., col. 145-6.
125 A.J. Balfour to King Edw ard VII, 10 Mar. 1903, PRO CAB 41/28/5 cited in Cam pbell, ‘The m aking o f 
the W yndham A ct’, p. 771.
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Well, the bill is not intended to make people loyal. I admit that. It is not intended 
to turn home rulers into unionists. I admit that. But it is intended to take away
one of those sores which fester and which aggravate every political movement
12.6which might otherwise be innocuous.
Therefore, the bill could be regarded as part of the Conservative policy of ‘killing home
rule with kindness’. By attending to Ireland’s social and economic problems, it was
hoped that the movement for home rule would be disarmed. By facilitating wide scale
land purchase, remedying congestion and creating economic holdings, the causes of the
agrarian agitation which had helped fuel the home rule movement would be removed. It
was assumed that the Irish tenant-purchasers, who had previously formed the backbone
of the movement, would lose interest in the campaign for self-government once their
land concerns had been met.
The Conservative government was keen that the landed gentry remain on in the
country after sale where they would hopefully come to the fore in the fields of
agriculture and industry. The removal of the poison that had been the Irish land question
from Irish life would hopefully bring to an end the social disharmony that had plagued
Ireland. Wyndham neatly summed up the position in the country:
We can prolong for another 100 years, for another 150 years, a tragedy.. .which 
is indeed the more tragic because it is thin and long drawn out. Or we can today 
initiate, and henceforth prosecute, a business transaction.. .based in common with 
all sound and hopeful transactions upon the self esteem, the probity, and mutual 
good will of all concerned...All interests - landlord and tenant, nationalist and 
unionist, British and Irish, can hope for no tolerable issue to any view, 
constitutional, political, economic, which they severally may cherish until, by 
settling the Irish land question, we achieve social reconciliation in Ireland. 127
It was hoped that the bill, if successful in resolving the land question, would also remove 
the barriers which had heretofore existed between landlords and tenants. This would 
allow the other economic and social problems on the island to be tackled in a 
conciliatory spirit. One should be mindful that the bill was, in part, an attempt to save 
the landed gentry. Wyndham was a member of that class and had numerous family 
connections with Irish land and landed families. By 1903 the ownership of Irish estates 
no longer guaranteed a healthy financial investment and the ownership of land was no
126 H ansard 4, cxxi, (4 May 1903).
127 Ibid., cxx, 208-9 (25 Mar. 1903).
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longer a prerequisite for an involvement in politics. More importantly the influence 
exerted by the Irish landed gentry over Irish government had greatly declined. This new 
land bill, however, offered the landed gentry a chance to escape the millstone which the 
ownership of Irish land had become, while obtaining a beneficial financial settlement in 
most cases.
Issues outside of Ireland had an impact on the bill. Approximately half a million 
British troops had fought in the Boer War. This had proven a lengthy and costly 
campaign, with costs exceeding £222,000,000. A number of war loans, totalling 
£135,000,000, had been raised by the chancellor of the exchequer, Sir Michael Hicks- 
Beach, to provide the finance to defeat the Boers. Much of the Boers’ homeland was
devastated after the conflict, and a grant o f £3,000,000 was provided by the government
* 128towards reconstruction and the restocking of farms. In addition, expenditure on the
army and the navy continued to rise. The arms race with Germany, that would prove so
significant in the lead up to World War I, was already in its infancy. When all these
considerations are taken into account it is little wonder that Wyndham found it difficult
to gain support for a loan of over £100,000,000, not to mention the free ‘bonus’ fund of
£12,000,000. British minds were focused on more economy of finance than on the
furtherance of land purchase in Ireland.
George Wyndham introduced the land bill in the House of Commons on 25
March 1903. The days and weeks leading up its first reading had proved difficult for the
chief secretary and he confided to his cousin Wilfrid Scawen Blunt about the struggle he
had had with the cabinet. Blunt wrote:
He told me what a desperate fight he had had to get it adopted by the cabinet and 
how nearly it had more than once been wrecked... it was only the splendid 
support given him by Arthur Balfour that had carried the day, as I understand 
him, by a single vote against [Joseph] Chamberlain’s opposition.129
With the cabinet’s support uncertain, it was feared that the measure would have to be 
dropped, particularly if  Wyndham failed to emphasise its importance as the solution to 
the land question in Ireland. With the secretary of state for the colonies, Joseph
128 Sir Robert Ensor (ed.), The O xford history o f  E ngland  1870-1914  (Oxford, 1992 ed.), pp. 345-50.
129 W ilfrid Scawen Blunt, M y D iaries p a rt II. 1900-1914  (London, 1922), p. 45.
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Chamberlain, and his supporters waiting in the wings for the first sign of trouble,
Wyndham truly felt he was ‘fighting for his [political] life’.
The period between the bill’s first reading on 25 March and its second reading on
4 May was of paramount importance to its fortunes. At the meeting between W. S. Blunt
and George Wyndham, it was agreed that Blunt should act as a messenger between the
chief secretary and John Redmond in order to secure the safe passage of the bill.131
Wyndham faced intensifying resistance from many of his government colleagues as
Blunt recorded in his diary:
Everything had worked out most fortunately till parliament met in the spring. 
Then the financial difficulties had begun... But for Ritchie [chancellor of the 
exchequer], the whole thing would have had to be abandoned as involving the 
government in ru in ... What I gather from George is that the Liberal Unionists 
opposed the bill. The duke of Devonshire, Lords Lansdowne and Londonderry, 
and probably also Broderick and Lord George Hamilton, all these being Irish
132absentee landlords or representing them.
There was considerable opposition among members of the government at the 
prospect of £112,000,000 being spent in Ireland. Devonshire, Lansdowne, Londonderry,
133Broderick and Hamilton and Joseph Chamberlain were all members of the cabinet.
Their opposition was potentially lethal. It was imperative, therefore, that Wyndham
communicate with Redmond so as to prevent any indiscretion on the part of the I.P.P.
which might threaten the bill. A rash statement would provide the opposition with the
pretext to move the withdrawal of the bill. Wyndham’s view of the situation and the
necessity of Blunt’s role as intermediary was highlighted further in Blunt’s diary:
Since the first reading... one of the most representative members of the old tory 
phalanx had been to Arthur Balfour and had represented to him that much of the 
bill is hard to swallow, and that the only thing that makes it possible for them is
130 Ibid., p. 45.
131 Ibid., pp 45-46.
132 Blunt, M y D iaries p a rt II. 1900-1914  p. 46. A t first Charles Ritchie was not overly keen on a land 
purchase bill involving a considerable outlay o f  British credit and especially the ‘bonus’. However, 
follow ing W yndham ’s recom m endation he paid a visit to Ireland w here he was given a tour o f som e o f  the 
poorest and m ost desolate areas o f  the country. The visit by the chancellor o f the exchequer seems to  have 
won him over to the necessity o f a land purchase bill on generous term s. For a more detailed and rather 
hum orous account o f  the trip see Elizabeth, countess o f Fingall, Seventy years yo u n g  (Dublin, 1991 
edition), pp 280-82.
133 The duke o f D evonshire was lord president o f  the council in the House o f Lords, the m arquess o f 
Lansdowne w as foreign secretary, the marquess o f  Londonderry was president o f the board o f  education, 
W illiam St. John Broderick w as secretary for w ar and Lord George Ham ilton was secretary for India.
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the idea that the settlement is a fina l one of the whole land quarrel, and that 
unless the Irish members will declare in this sense there will be a revolt. The 
situation, therefore, is very critical, and if you can do anything to make the Irish 
leaders understand how not only I [George Wyndham] but the whole cause of 
Irish land legislation may be wrecked by a lack of discretion on this particular 
lead you will be doing a good service... I have twice thought o f my own 
resignation and political ruin a certainty, and it may be so yet.134
The financial aspects of the bill proved contentious among several cabinet
members. While the £100,000,000 set aside to enable tenants to purchase would
eventually be paid back over approximately sixty-eight and a half years in the form of
annuities, the £12,000,000 ‘bonus’ to landlords proved less acceptable. Although
£12,000,000 was the maximum sum Wyndham had been able to secure from the
treasury, privately he had grave doubts as to whether or not it would prove a sufficient
inducement to landlords to enable a complete transfer o f the land to the tenants.
Needless to say, he did not voice these misgivings, and publicly he maintained that this
huge outlay of British credit would finally solve the Irish land question. The matter
required great delicacy and any demands from Irish M.P.s, such as calls to increase the
‘bonus’, could have lead to its collapse. Wyndham’s words were recorded by Blunt:
Of course I quite understand that the present vote may really not be quite enough, 
and perhaps in a few years three or four millions may be necessary. But when the 
time comes and the thing has proved a success nobody will then grudge a 
supplement. Only to declare now that it is only an instalment and not final would
• * 1 3 5ruin everything and we could not pass the bill.
On 1 April 1903 Blunt described a lunch with John Redmond. Redmond was 
sympathetic to Wyndham’s position but confided to Blunt that he had serious problems 
of his own: ‘I quite understand Wyndham’s difficulties, but you must believe me when I 
say mine are quite as great. There is a party in Ireland headed by Dillon and Archbishop 
Walsh that is determined to go against the bill.’136 With the national convention to 
consider the land bill fixed by the U.I.L. for 16 April 1903, those members who did not 
support the bill were liable to cause trouble. For these reasons Redmond readily agreed
134 Blunt, M y D iaries p a rt II. 1900-1914  pp 46-47.
135 Ib id , p. 47.
136 Ib id , p. 48. W illiam  W alsh was ordained in 1866 and was made A rchbishop o f D ublin in 1885. He was 
renowned for his involvem ent in public life.
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that Blunt should act as an intermediary between Wyndham and himself to secure its
safe passage. It would have been dangerous for Redmond and Wyndham to have been
seen publicly collaborating. It would have provided the opposition with further
ammunition. He also appreciated the point that Wyndham had conveyed to Blunt
concerning the importance of presenting the bill as a final solution to the land question:
I [John Redmond] saw Wyndham yesterday evening, and he said something 
about the necessity of accepting the bill as final, not as an instalment, and I am 
entirely in accordance with all he said. O f course the bill will require amending, 
but I will do my best to get it through, and let the English imagine if they like 
that they are doing a fine and generous thing. But we can’t stop the talk. I can 
depend thoroughly on William O ’Brien who thinks exactly as I do about it, and 
all our parliamentary party, even John Dillon, who I know does not like the bill. 
He would be quite loyal to us. The difficulty is outside. Davitt is a land
i nn
nationalise^ and is altogether opposed, and so is Archbishop Walsh.
On 3 April 1903 Wyndham spoke in Manchester as a guest of the Manchester 
Conservative Club. He declared that the Irish people understood the bill to be a genuine 
attempt to solve the land question and he emphasised that there was no danger of the
138annuities being repudiated in the future. There was a fear that the non-payment of 
annuities might be used as a political weapon by the nationalists in years to come. Such 
fears stemmed from the Land War of the 1880s and particularly the Plan of Campaign 
when rents were withheld. On 6 April Blunt met with Wyndham in London. He showed 
him a letter that he had received from Redmond outlining the amendments to the bill 
which would probably be sanctioned at the national convention on 16 April. 
Wyndham was amenable to most of the proposed amendments but was he adamant that 
the ‘bonus’ could not be increased. He told Blunt: ‘I fear that any attempt and above all 
any attempt now, to increase the £12,000,000 would give a dangerous advantage to 
those in England who are hostile to the whole plan. I  think this is a great danger' ,140 
Wyndham was clearly coming under increasing pressure from Joseph Chamberlain who 
suspected that he was in direct contact with the nationalists.141 Blunt considered:
137 Blunt, M y D iaries p a rt II. 1900-1914 p. 48.
138 7.71, 4 Apr. 1903.
139 Blunt, M y D iaries pa rt II. 1900-1914  p. 49.
140 Ibid.
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It was certain that the great danger for the bill lies in him [Chamberlain]... 
[although] he will find it difficult to oppose it openly now, but his jealousy of 
George’s success may make him oppose it secretly, and he will be without 
scruple. The truth of the matter is that the land bill is supported now in the 
cabinet by Arthur Balfour and the tories. It is opposed by the liberal unionists. 
Chamberlain has held an ominous silence since his return from South Africa.142
On 25 April John Redmond visited Blunt and discussed the recent national 
convention. Redmond confided that Davitt, upon realising that the bulk of the members 
opposed him, was forced to adopt an amenable attitude to the bill. He declared that 
‘[Thomas] Sexton was still a considerable danger, as he was clean against the bill... he 
and the Archbishop [Walsh], and Davitt and, if  they could get him, John Dillon, when he 
returned from Egypt, would make a very strong combination’.143 With the second 
reading of the bill scheduled for 4 May, it was crucial for Redmond that Wyndham 
adopted a positive attitude towards amendments, so as not to give any opportunity to 
those opposed to the bill on the nationalist side.144
Blunt wrote that Wyndham agreed to ‘adopt as conciliatory a tone as he dares 
about the amendments’. The bill’s future was far from assured and Wyndham believed 
that Chamberlain in particular would seek to sabotage the bill given the opportunity.145 
John Redmond visited W.S. Blunt again on 30 April and Wyndham’s cousin recorded 
their conversation:
He [John Redmond] tells me John Dillon is back from Egypt, very much 
opposed to the bill. He does not want reconciliation with the landlords, or 
anything less than their being driven out of Ireland. He will not, however, do 
anything ‘shabby’ in opposing the bill. But it makes the situation more difficult. 
Sexton is ‘bitterly opposed’, and has the Freeman to back him and Archbishop 
W alsh... Such being the case, there are certain points Redmond must press at the 
second reading, the chief of which is the withdrawal of the 30 and 40 per cent 
limit of reduction [in the ‘zones’]; but he will not insist upon an augmentation of 
the ‘bonus’, though in reality the twelve millions will not prove enough.146
On 1 May 1903, Blunt visited Wyndham, and communicated to him Redmond’s 
thoughts. Wyndham agreed to make some concession at the committee stage but could
not promise anything at the second reading.147 The chief secretary’s room to manoeuvre
had been severely restricted as a result of a recent cabinet meeting. According to Blunt
Wyndham had told him that:
there had been a new cabinet council, at which his enemies, Chamberlain and the 
rest, had raged, and he had been obliged to give a promise that he would give no 
pledges whatever to the Irish party before the second reading, nor hold any 
communication with them.148
Later on that day Blunt met with Redmond and relayed what Wyndham had told him.
On 2 May William O’Brien visited Blunt to discuss the bill. O’Brien announced
that he would push for the ‘bonus’ to be distributed at a fixed rate of 15 %. This caused
Blunt great concern as Wyndham had confided to him that the ‘bonus’ ‘was one of the
most dangerous points, as Chamberlain is lying in wait to demand a withdrawal of the
bill if the twelve million limit is threatened, also George believes, Hicks-Beach’.149
The solicitor-general for England, Sir Edward Carson, heightened tensions upon
giving a speech at Oxford University. Filling in for the chief secretary who was ill, he
appeared to dismiss the bill. The Times reported that he declared:
That he should give to it the minimum of his support, and he should do so 
because of his official position, and for the simple reason that he knew no other 
alternative. Having said so much, he would pass away from the land bill, and in 
doing so he should look forward to the next one.150
It was abundantly clear from this report that not all government members were as 
enthusiastic about the land bill as Wyndham. The precarious position of the bill during 
the period between the first and second readings was further emphasised by Liberal 
criticism. George Lambert, M.P. Devon, South Molton, taunted the prime minister, A. J. 
Balfour, commenting that he was afraid to discipline Sir Edward Carson for his poor 
public support of the measure, because any hostile criticism from a government minister 
would prove to be the bill’s undoing.151
Early on the morning of 5 May, before the second reading debate commenced, 
John Dillon visited W.S. Blunt and expressed his views on the bill. According to Blunt:
147 Ibid., p. 52.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid., p. 53.
150 The Times, 4 M ay 1903.
151 H ansard 4 , cxxi, 1401-8 (5 M ay 1903).
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He spoke last night in support of the bill, but he tells me that but for loyalty to his 
party he should be inclined to oppose it in committee, and vote against it on the 
third reading. His view is that it is useless trying to get the landlord class on the 
side of nationalism, that they would always betray it when the pinch came, that 
the land trouble is a weapon in nationalist hands, and that to settle it would be to 
risk home rule, which otherwise must come... He should, however, of course, 
support it, since it had been decided to do so, for the one thing for Ireland was
152union in the parliamentary party.
The following day, W.S. Blunt recorded in his diary that he felt the second reading 
would pass without a hitch, owing to the fact that the opposition from the tories in
■ • * 1 5 3cabinet, and especially from Chamberlain, had lessened.
On 15 May George Wyndham spoke at a meeting of the Christchurch and 
Bournemouth Conservative and Liberal Unionist Association where he reiterated his 
belief that the bill would finally settle the land question and hence usher in a new era in 
Ireland.154 On the same day Joseph Chamberlain gave a speech in Birmingham 
expressing his preference for imperial protectionism as opposed to free trade. The issue 
of fiscal policy was to be a very divisive one in Balfour’s government throughout the 
land bill’s passage through parliament.155 Indeed, the issue of free trade versus imperial 
preference threatened to split the cabinet. Chamberlain received a lot of support from the 
Conservative members on the ground while the older leaders such as Devonshire, 
Ritchie and Hamilton opposed him. Throughout the summer Balfour managed to avoid a 
split and attempted to come to some compromise between both sides. However, in 
September and October, prominent figures from both camps including Chamberlain, 
Ritchie, Hamilton and Devonshire resigned and Balfour was forced to reshuffle his 
cabinet. Wyndham tried to avoid taking sides on the issue and he attempted to play the 
role of peacemaker between both sides in order to ensure that the land bill would not be 
jeopardised.
152 Blunt, M y D iaries part II. 1900-1914, p. 54.
153 Ibid., p. 54.
154 I T . ,  16 M ay 1903.
155 See Ensor, E ngland  1870-1914 pp. 371-76 and Blunt, M y D iaries pa rt II. 1900-1914  p. 58.
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VIII). Conclusion.
George Wyndham’s 1903 land bill had two main objectives both of which were regarded 
as equally important - to facilitate land purchase and to relieve congestion. By changing 
the focus from rent-fixing to land purchase the country would be relieved of the volume 
and expense of continuous litigation. On the other hand there was little point in 
stereotyping congestion and uneconomic holdings by land purchase. Hence it was vitally 
important that uneconomic holdings were enlarged with untenanted land so that they 
would be good security for the tenant loan and an economically viable farm.
Although George Wyndham refuted claims that his bill was a ‘landlord re lief 
measure there certainly was an element of truth in the accusation. As a member of the 
landed gentry who had many family connections with Ireland and Irish estates 
Wyndham was perfectly placed to influence the circumstances of the landed gentry. The 
bill had the potential to free landlords from perpetual litigation, while enabling them to 
escape from the Irish land question with a sum of money, which when invested would 
provide them with their present incomes. With the prospect of compulsory purchase 
looming in the future under a Liberal government the bill was a lifeline for the Irish 
landed gentry.
The request, for a massive loan of approximately £100,000,000 and a gift of 
£12,000,000 in the form of the ‘bonus’ fund from the treasury, came at an inopportune 
time. The Boer War had proved decidedly expensive and economy of finance was the 
catch-cry of the day. Wyndham, however, with the close support of the prime minister, 
A. J. Balfour, managed to overcome significant cabinet opposition to his bill.
Two main factors were decisive in enabling the bill to advance to the committee 
stage with its finance intact. Firstly, the result of the Land Conference was an 
extraordinary fusion of public opinion in Ireland in favour o f an immediate peaceful 
settlement of the land question. The virtually unanimous support of all shades of Irish 
opinion in favour of the bill could not be ignored by the government. The principal 
landlord and tenant organisations signalled their support for the measure which further 
strengthened Wyndham’s hand. The unity of opinion prevented the enemies of the bill 
within the Conservative party and elsewhere from openly opposing it.
83
Secondly, the bill was propagated as the final solution to the Irish land question. 
By promoting it as a conclusive measure British fears that imperial credit would be 
dangerously hypothecated were soothed. This helped the British public and their 
parliamentary representatives digest the more unpalatable sections of the legislation.
The issue of home rule was unavoidably entangled up with the bill. As unionists 
Wyndham and Balfour were loath to introduce legislation which might undermine the 
union. However, despite their avowals that the bill was necessary in order to relieve a 
social sore in Ireland and was justified no matter its impact on home rule, there seems 
little doubt that it was a further step in the policy of killing home rule with kindness. A 
contented peasant proprietorship in Ireland would rob the nationalist agitators o f the 
train that had previously pulled the home rule carriage. The creation of peasant- 
proprietors and the relief o f congestion would hopefully increase the benefits o f the 
union in the eyes of the tenant-purchasers.
Opposition to the bill among the two main British parties was centred 
predominantly on the financial aspects particularly the extent to which the imperial 
credit was pledged. There was a fear that the tenant-purchasers would be unable to repay 
their annuities in the future or that the nationalists would use the repayment of annuities 
as a political weapon. There was a suspicion of the new-found unity between nationalists 
and unionists which suggested that an Irish raid on the treasury was on the cards. 
Opponents of the bill on all sides, both in Ireland and England, were also irate at the 
opportunities available to landlords under the bill. The incentives such as the ‘bonus’ 
and the clause enabling them to sell and repurchase their demesne on easy terms were 
quite repugnant while the new system of price ‘zones’ appeared to secure higher prices 
for the landlords.
As the committee stage approached both nationalists and unionists, while in 
favour of the bill in principle, hoped to propose various amendments to the measure. 
Areas such as the price ‘zones’, the perpetual rent charge and the absence of decadal 
reductions were particular aspects that both sides wished addressed. However, the 
nationalists hoped to obtain extensive amendments in the sections concerned with the 
‘zones’, the C.D.B., evicted tenants and labourers while the unionists were more 
concerned with land purchase issues. In the House of Lords the representatives of the
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Irish landlords stood ready to uphold the interests o f  their class once the bill had passed 
through the Com m ons. Therefore, as the debates w hich  w ould forge the bill in 
com m ittee drew  near, all the Irish interests hoped to obtain beneficial am endm ents w hile 
the non-Irish  M .P.s w ere intent on keeping a keen eye on the m easu re’s finance.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES THAT FORGED THE
WYNDHAM LAND ACT, 1903.
I). Introduction.
The bill’s passage through parliament followed a preordained course. The first and 
second readings in the House of Commons essentially introduced the measure. The 
speeches up to this point addressed a range of issues relating to the Irish land question. It 
was not until the committee stage that the content of the bill was examined in detail. The 
basic principles upon which the measure would operate were thrashed out and the bill’s 
machinery was also fine-tuned. After the committee stage the bill, as amended, was 
reported to the house where M.P.s could attempt to effect last minute changes. Finally 
the bill received a third reading. This, in effect summarised the proceedings which had 
gone before, and it provided a forum whereupon all members could express their hopes 
and fears for the measure.
Once the bill had passed through the House of Commons, it proceeded to the 
House o f Lords. The procedure in the second house was virtually identical to that in the 
Commons. The bill enjoyed a first and second reading before entering the committee 
stage which was followed by the report stage and the third reading. Any amendments 
which the Lords made to the proposed legislation went back to the Commons for 
consideration. The Commons could either accept or reject the proposed changes. 
Contentious issues or amendments usually passed from one house to the other until they 
were teased out.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the debates that forged the Wyndham 
Act. The debates in parliament shed light on the Irish land question. The bill was 
portrayed as an attempt not just to further land purchase but to solve the land question. 
What exactly was the land question in 1903? While land purchase was an essential 
ingredient in any solution, the bill aimed to tackle the underbelly of the question. 
Congestion, evicted tenants, untenanted land and the labourers’ question were all matters 
that needed to be addressed. By scrutinising the discussions of these contentious issues 
the background to the act can be understood.
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II). The Estates Commission.
Under the bill a new body was established within the Land Commission known as the 
Estates Commission. It consisted of three commissioners, Frederick Wrench, Michael 
Finucane and William Bailey whose job was to administer the operation of the act. The 
three commissioners were under the general control of the lord lieutenant of Ireland who 
at the time was the earl of Dudley. Wrench was already a land commissioner and a 
member of the C.D.B. In addition, he was a member o f the Privy Council of Ireland. 
Finucane was an Irishman who had served as the Director of Agriculture and the 
Commissioner of the Presidency of Bengal. He had worked under Sir Anthony 
MacDonnell for many years in India and may have been given the post on MacDonnell’s 
recommendation. The third member of the new body, William Bailey, was already an 
assistant commissioner in the Land Commission. Just prior to the introduction o f the bill 
his report on the condition of tenant-purchasers under previous land acts had been 
published.1
Once the names of the three commissioners were made public Wrench was 
labelled as a landlord man while Finucane was seen as the champion of the tenants. 
Bailey held a somewhat neutral position between the two. The debates concerning the 
appointed commissioners were dominated by the questions of salary and of tenure. Upon 
the introduction of the bill it was found that the three commissioners were not being paid 
the same salary. Frederick Wrench was to receive a wage of £3,000 a year compared to 
the two other commissioners who were to receive £2,000 a year. Wrench’s salary was to 
come out of the consolidated fund (civil servants were usually paid out of this 
government fund) making him immune to parliamentary criticism, unlike the other two 
commissioners. Bailey and Finucane were removable at the pleasure of the government 
of the day. The exact nature of Wrench’s tenure was not disclosed during the committee 
stage in the Commons.
The I.P.P. were suspicious of Wrench and felt he was being placed in a 
position of superiority over the two other commissioners. They objected to him 
remaining as a member of the C.D.B. As John Dillon outlined the future of the bill
1 Hansard 4, cxx, 198-9 (25 M ar. 1903). For W illiam B ailey’s w ork see Report by Mr. W. F. Bailey, legal 
assistant commissioner, o f  an inquiry into the presen t condition o f  tenant purchasers under the land  
purchase acts (92) H.C. 1903, lvii, 333.
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‘depended to an enormous extent on the method of administrating it’ and thus the I.P.P.
were determined that all three commissioners should be put on an equal footing.2 John
Dillon proposed an amendment to put the three estates commissioners on an equal basis
in terms of salary and position. While it was vital that the commissioners had some
security of tenure so as to resist the pressures of prominent landlords or public opinion,
Wrench appeared to hold a superior tenure to the other two commissioners who would
be hamstrung by the terms in which they held their position. T. M. Healy warned o f the
consequences of leaving Finucane and Bailey on a less secure tenure than Wrench:
With the influence of the constant hammer-hammer o f society in a little island 
where everyone was known, and where the telescope and microscope of public 
opinion were on everyone, were these gentlemen to be given a scavenger’s 
tenure?...But if  the estates commissioners were to be the merest shadows, whose 
breath was to depend on the thunders and vetoes of the House of Lords, they 
might as well appoint the three greatest landlord partisans in Ireland. No man 
could stand up in Ireland against debates by influential men.3
Wyndham was keen that the three commissioners should remain in an 
administrative capacity and not in a judicial one. According to the bill all cases dealing 
with law were to be referred to the judicial commissioner. He was willing to have all 
three open to criticism in parliament and intended that their tenure should be similar to 
civil servants:
[They] should be subject to the criticism of parliament.. .and he [George 
Wyndham] would see that it was carried into effect. His suggestion was that it 
should be made clear that the estates commissioners were an administrative and 
not a judicial body, and their action in that capacity could be reviewed on the 
estimates year by year. Their tenure, he thought, should be the tenure of the civil 
service. [John Dillon] suggested that there should be a levelling up as regards 
salaries: but he would prefer not to discuss that suggestion. [Wyndham and the 
treasury thought] that £2,000 was an adequate salary for the w ork... The salary 
which a man received did not add weight to his influence in council.4
T. M. Healy’s suggestion to give the commissioners terms of office similar to a county 
court judge was rejected by Wyndham as he felt that that would make the process 
judicial which he wished to avoid. Wyndham’s reluctance to alter Wrench’s salary
2 H a n sa rd 4, cxxiv, 1010 (30 June 1903).
3 Ibid., col. 1014-5.
4 Ibid., col. 1013.
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seems to be linked to the fact that Wrench was being paid out of the consolidated fund. 
The change of service could result in a loss of earnings as it might involve the alteration 
of Wrench’s pension.
The I.P.P. were adamant that Finucane and Bailey ought not to be removable at 
the pleasure of the government of the day but that their conduct should be open to 
criticism in parliament. Eventually Wyndham consented to find a means of enabling the 
salaries of all the commissioners to appear on the parliamentary votes hence permitting 
all three to be open to criticism in parliament.5 John Dillon heralded the announcement 
as satisfactoiy but felt the issue of ‘bringing the other two commissioners to an equal 
status, as regarding their tenure still had to be resolved.6 Although he was ready to
facilitate the three members having the same status, hence making all three accountable
t 1
to parliament, Wyndham refused to accept equality of emolument.
Under the act, which became law on 1 November 1903, important questions of 
law could be forwarded to a judicial commissioner by the estates commissioners. Under 
clause seventy-one, the judicial commissioner, if  he saw fit, could pass on a question of
Q . . . .
law to the high court. Where the estates commissioners considered an issue 
inconsequential, an appeal could be lodged with the high court to have the matter 
referred to a judicial commissioner. The high court’s decision was final.
The procedural rules under which the clauses dealing with land purchase would 
operate were drawn up by the estates commissioners and the judicial commissioner, after 
taking counsel with the president of the Incorporated Law Society of Ireland. These 
rules were subject to ratification by the lord lieutenant. Regular reports of the dealings of 
the estates commissioners were required to be presented to parliament.
In order to defray the costs of sale, the vendor was not charged for 
advertisements, publications or any work carried out by the Land Commission or its 
employees.9 Any sales to the estates commissioners provided the option for the owner to 
employ his agent, clerk or solicitor to work out the terms of the sale. Where no
5 Ibid., col. 1036-7 (1 July 1903).
6 Ibid., col. 1038.
7 Ibid., col. 1039-40.
8 Irish Land Act, 1903, [3 Ed. VII, c. 37.] (14 Aug. 1903), 71.
9 ‘Provisional rules under the Irish Land Act, 1903 (Sections 1 to 23), 23 October, 1903’, cited in Cherry 
and M axwell (eds), Irish  L and  Acts, pp 1173-4.
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recommendation was put forward, the estates commissioners could appoint people to 
negotiate the sale. Those put forward to negotiate the sale were paid by the Land 
Commission at a set price or percentage of the purchase money. In the case o f direct 
sales between landlord and tenants, where the owner employed an agent to negotiate the 
sale, his fee would come out of the purchase money.10 Interestingly, stamp duty and 
registration fees were not required to be paid to the treasury under the act.11
III) The system of price ‘zones’.
Of all the bill’s clauses few were as controversial or as bitterly contested as those that 
determined the purchase price. Clause one provided a guide in the form of a system of 
price ‘zones’. When the bill was introduced the ‘zones’ applied to both non-judicial and 
judicial tenants. Judicial tenancies referred to those holdings whose tenants had gone to 
the land courts and had had their rent adjusted. Non-judicial tenants were those who had 
never gone to the land courts to have a judicial rent fixed. Since the passing of the 1881 
Land Act rents could be examined every fifteen years. The price ‘zones’ operated as 
follows; where a judicial rent had been determined since the passing of the 1896 Land 
Act (15 Aug. 1896), known as a second term rent, the annuity that the tenant would have 
to repay could not be less than 10 % or more than 30 % below his current rent. Where a 
judicial rent had been determined before 15 August 1896, it was known as a first term 
rent and the tenant’s annuity could not be less than 20 % or more than 40 % below his 
current rent. Once an agreement occurred within the relevant bargaining ‘zone’ the 
estates commissioners were obligated to sanction the advances without examining the 
land in terms of security for the advance or as regards price. The ‘zones’ did not apply to 
congested estates bought by the estates commissioners or land purchased by the C.D.B. 
It was hoped that the ‘zones’ would accelerate the processing of sales by avoiding time 
consuming inspections.
Early in the committee stage in the House of Commons, John Redmond called 
for the maximum reductions a tenant could receive in his current rent (40 % on a first 
term rent and 30 % on a second term rent) to be omitted from the measure and for the
10 Irish Land Act, 1903,23.
11 Ibid., 49 and 50.
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minimum reductions a tenant could receive to be increased to 15 % on second term rents 
and 25 % on first term rents respectively. If  a second term tenant only got the minimum 
reduction of 10 % in his rent he would have to pay the maximum price allowed under 
the bill. Similarly, if the tenant got the maximum reduction in his rent of 30 % he paid 
the minimum price allowed. Therefore, the lower the reduction in rent the higher the 
price the tenant paid.
Redmond felt that the minimum reductions a tenant could receive had to be 
retained in order to protect both the tenant and the state. Without a limit on the minimum 
reduction of rent a tenant could receive, there was a danger that the tenant would pay a 
price that would prove too great a burden for him to repay. As long as there was a 
minimum reduction in rent there could only be a certain maximum price the tenant could 
give. Redmond sought to protect the tenant further and thus the security o f the state loan, 
by increasing the minimum reduction a tenant could receive. The leader o f the I.P.P. 
advocated the omission of the maximum reductions because a tenant had to pay at least 
the minimum price in order to buy his holding, even though the landlord might be 
willing to sell at a lower price than the minimum price stipulated by the bill. He believed 
such interference was absurd in a voluntary measure and that the successful operation of 
the act depended upon the outcome of the debate on the ‘zones’.12
Under the 1896 act, a system of decadal reductions had been introduced to help 
tenants repay their annuities. Opposition to the ‘zones’ was reinforced by the absence of 
these reductions in Wyndham’s bill. The abolition of the decadal reductions was seen as 
increasing the burden on the tenant-purchasers. If they were forced to pay high prices 
under the ‘zones’ they would not have the benefit of reductions which had been of great 
assistance under previous acts.
Conservatives such as Ernest Flower, M.P. for Bradford West, called on the chief 
secretary to keep the limitations as they were so as to ensure the smooth operation of the 
act. Many English M.P.s were keen for the ‘zones’ to remain unchanged, as they hoped 
to provide better security for the £100,000,000 that was being provided. Moreover, land
12 H ansard 4, cxxiii, 983-88 (15 June 1903). The F reem an 's Journal had created a huge furore over the 
price 'zones’ claim ing that they w ould inflate the price o f land. Therefore, in an attem pt to disarm  the 
newspaper Redm ond moved to omit the ‘zones’. This lead to a division which broke the unity o f  the 
supporters o f the measure, one o f the key reasons it was being accepted by British members, for the first 
time. See O ’Brien, A n olive branch in Ireland, pp 237-38.
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purchase had ground to a halt mainly because landlords had stopped selling under the 
existing legislation. The ‘zones’ would hopefully encourage landlords to sell as they
13would be guaranteed a certain minimum price.
Like his party colleague Herbert Robertson, landlord spokesman, argued that the
‘zones’ were essential for the fluid operation of the act:
If they were once abandoned, the position between the landlords and the tenants 
would be so vague that he himself did not anticipate that they would come to any 
agreement at all. The great advantage of the ‘zones’ was that they pointed to both 
landlords and tenants what the effective limit of their power was: it did not leave 
it perfectly indeterminate as to what was to be sold and bought.14
Conservative M.P. and landlord spokesman, John Butcher, thought that the price ‘zones’
were very important as they would ensure that bargains were made more quickly and
would save the landlord a considerable amount of legal expense. Under the bill bargains
within the ‘zones’ would be automatically approved unlike previous acts where there
was delay as the agreement had to come before the Land Commission to be approved.15
The Conservative M.P. and landlord spokesman, Sir John Colomb, urged the
government not to accept Redmond’s amendment:
In expressing that hope, he echoed the universal demand of the Irish landlords 
that the government should adhere to the zone principle. The lion, member for 
South Tyrone [T. W. Russell] spoke as if every landlord was a devil, and every 
tenant an angel. As a matter of fact, landlords and tenants were very much of a 
muchness in looking after their own interests.16
As far as landlord spokesmen like Colomb were concerned the minimum and maximum 
reductions were included to guard the landlords against agrarian agitation. Without the
17‘zones’ the bill would not function and friction would arise on many estates.
William O ’Brien, however, held the opposite view to Colomb. He felt that the 
inclusion of the ‘zones’ would lead to agrarian agitation. He foresaw a disaster in the 
making for the state if  tenants were beguiled into making bargains which they would be 
unable to keep in times of future hardship:
13 H ansard 4, cxxiii, 988-90 (15 June 1903).
14 Ibid., col. 1011.
15 Ibid., col. 1015-7.
16 Ibid., col. 997.
17 Ibid., col. 998-9.
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Hon. members could not realise what a powerful attraction the prospect o f any 
reduction of rent was. Large bodies of tenants would risk anything to get some 
immediate relief, and the danger of these improvident bargains would apply 
principally to the poorest and most defenceless class of the community.18
O ’Brien felt that the minimum reduction that a tenant could receive in his rent ought to
be kept on and if possible increased as it safeguarded both the state and the tenant.19
John Murphy, M.P. for Kerry East, drew attention to some o f the problems that
the ‘zones’ would create and made the point that:
The poorer class of tenants in certain districts were to a large extent dependent 
on the intelligence of the larger and better class. It would be easy for the larger 
class of tenants to give a larger price for their holdings, and it might be supposed 
that they, acting on the dictates of human nature, would be inclined to argue the
poorer classes into bargains which, before many years were passed, they would
20have reason to regret.
Since all of the tenants on an estate sold under the act would have to give the same 
number of years’ purchase, based on their rents, the danger identified by Murphy was a 
very real one. Once the price agreed upon was within the ‘zones’ there was no 
inspection by the Estates Commission. It was quite feasible that wealthier tenants on an 
estate would agree to terms which would be detrimental to those less well off. In 
subsequent years those poorer tenants might find the repayment o f their annuities 
impossible.
Thomas Shaw felt that the Liberal opposition was in complete sympathy with the
Irish M.P.s on the amendment. He found it very peculiar that the government ‘should
21propose a hard and fast line in regard to the price for every variety of Irish land’. Like 
many English M.P.s he held it was imperative that the tenant made a bargain that 
enabled him to be so prosperous enough as to guarantee his ability to pay his amiuities, 
thereby indirectly ensuring the security of the exchequer.
The Liberal M.P. for North Tyrone, Charles Hemphill, argued that the price 
‘zones’ was the most vital area of the whole bill. However, he was in favour of omitting 
the maximum reduction a tenant could receive in his rent. Hemphill was concerned that
18 Ibid., col. 1000.
19 Ibid., col. 1000-01.
20 Ibid., col. 1007.
21 Ibid., col. 1004.
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tenants might agree to a high a price which they would not be able to repay in the future,
thus the minimum reduction provided some security:
Care must be taken that the burden accepted by the tenant was not too heavy for 
him. As this bill now stood without any provision for decadal reduction the 
tenant-purchaser undertook for sixty-eight and a half years to pay a fixed 
immutable rent, immutable no matter how prices fell or how bad times might be. 
He would have no means of escape from his obligation except by surrendering
his holding. He should not, therefore, be allowed to agree to pay an extravagant
22price.
By the second day of the committee stage debates the dispute over the price
‘zones’ had still not been resolved and the passage of the bill actually looked to be in
danger. John Dillon regarded the situation as particularly grave:
If this most important amendment from the Irish benches was defeated in the 
lobby by English votes with the overwhelming preponderance of the Irish 
representatives in favour of it - if  this amendment proposed by the leader of the 
Irish nationalist party and supported by a majority of the Irish unionists in this 
house, were to be defeated by an English vote, he asked the chief secretary to 
consider what would be the effect of such a proceeding upon the tone and the
23temper in which the further consideration of this bill would be carried on.
Despite Dillon’s warning the leader of the I.U.P.P. and landlord spokesman, Colonel
Edward Saunderson, urged the government to keep the price ‘zones’ as they were and to
ignore John Redmond’s amendment:
The proposed limits were vital to the settlement. It was necessary that the 
transactions should be carried through as quickly and as efficiently as possible, 
and by a fixing of these limits the long, tiresome, and costly examination by the 
Land Commission, which was the great difficulty in land purchase, would be 
done away with.24
The chief secretary, George Wyndhan, argued that the British taxpayer and the 
large corporations with investments in Irish land had to be considered as well as the 
landlords and tenants: ‘He admitted that they had not given to the tenants o f Ireland 
decadal reductions, but short of that, they had given the tenants everything 
recommended by the [land] conference’.25 In addition, Wyndham put forth a number of
22 Ibid., col. 1019.
23 Ibid., col. 1062 (16 June 1903).
24 Ibid., col. 1078.
25 Ibid., col. 1088.
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important advantages of the ‘zones’. He believed that in the absence of maximum 
reductions that the tenant could receive in his rent, landlords and tenants would end up 
back in the land courts and no bargains would occur. Similarly, if there were no 
minimum reductions that the tenant could receive in his rent, a situation could arise 
where the terms of the bargains on two neighbouring estates were very different. This 
could potentially lead to unrest and agitation. While unable to abolish the maximum 
reduction or increase the limits regarding the minimum reduction Wyndham did offer a 
concession. He declared himself ready to listen to reasonable arguments that certain 
classes of tenants be left out of the ‘zones’ system.
The I.P.P. were determined to force John Redmond’s amendment to a division of 
the Commons if necessary and considered that Wyndham’s refusal to alter the zone 
limits was endangering the bill. Redmond pleaded with him to take into account that 
apart from two or three M.P.s all the Irish representatives in the Commons, both 
nationalist and unionist, were in favour of the amendment.26 The independent nationalist 
M.P. for North Louth, T. M. Healy, questioned whether or not some other member of 
cabinet such as Lord Londonderry was preventing Wyndham from accepting the 
virtually unanimous will of the Irish members.27 The I.P.P. felt that the chief secretary 
was being pressurised by the solicitor-general for England, Sir Edward Carson, and the 
attorney-general for Ireland, John Atkinson, both of whom were known to unenthusiastic 
about the bill. Dennis Kilbride M.P. for South Kildare, for example, observed that 
Wyndham ‘looked very much like a man suffering from gross intimidation’ while
Jeremiah MacVeagh, M.P. for South Down, believed that the chief secretary was being
* ■ 28 bullied by Irish landlords such as Lords Clonbrock, Ardilaun and Londonderry.“
The Liberal opposition M.P.s called on the government to listen to the opinions 
of the Irish M.P.s asserting that if some change to the ‘zones’ was not accepted many 
M.P.s would seriously consider withdrawing their support for the bill altogether. The 
Liberal M.P. John Morley revealed that many Scottish and English M.P.s were only 
supporting the bill because they believed Irish members considered it a final settlement
26 Ibid., col. 1094-97
27 Ibid., col. 1104-9.
28 Ibid., col. 1145.
29 Ibid., col. 1097-9.
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of the land question. If the clause was passed in opposition to the Irish M.P.s who felt it 
would restrain the bill’s operation, then Morley and other Scottish and English members
30would have to consider withdrawing their support for the measure.
With Russell asserting that the House of Commons was ‘at a parting of the ways 
on the question’, Wyndham reaffirmed that he could not accept John Redmond’s 
amendment but would allow non-judicial tenancies to be exempt from the ‘zones’ if that 
would help the house come to an agreement.31 However, Redmond rejected his 
concession for not being substantial enough. With neither side willing to concede 
ground the house went to the division lobby. John Redmond’s amendment, to omit the 
maximum reductions that a tenant could receive on his rent and to increase the minimum 
reductions a tenant could receive on his rent to 15 % on first term rents and 25 % on 
second term rents, was defeated by 217 votes to 176. However, the government did 
accept an amendment by T. W. Russell to exclude non-judicial tenants from the 
‘zones’.33
Before the third day of debates on the ‘zones’ resumed a meeting of a number of
M.P.s took place in the opposition lobby. According to William O’Brien, John
Redmond, John Dillon, Edward Blake, M.P. for South Longford, T. P. O’Connor and
himself were present. O’Brien described the proceedings as follows:
Mr. Dillon then renewed a proposal he had already made to Mr. Redmond, that, 
as soon as committee on the bill was resumed, Mr. Redmond should get up and 
move the adjournment of the debate. Some of us were really stricken dumb by a 
proposition of such moment made within half an hour of the resumption of the 
debate, and without any notice to the special committee appointed by the party to 
supervise the arrangements in committee. Mr. Redmond acted in the emergency 
with an admirable decisiveness, not altogether exempt from indignation. ‘Why’, 
he said, ‘if our action is not to be a sham, Wyndham will immediately get up and 
agree, and announce the withdrawal of the bill’. Dillon muttered something to 
the effect that it would be a small loss. Mr. Redmond at once replied, ‘Dillon, ill 
do nothing of the kind. If you want to move the adjournment and lose the bill, 
you will have to do it on your own responsibility’... Mr. Redmond’s firmness 
had its effect. Mr. Dillon shrank from the terrific responsibility of carrying out 
his own suggestion, and the debates proceeded.34
30 Ibid., col. 1109-10.
31 Ibid., col. 1113.
32 Ibid., col. 1148.
33 Ibid., col. 1151-55.
34 O ’Brien, A n olive branch in Ireland, p. 238.
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The debate over the ‘zones’ had given opponents of the bill, such as Dillon, an
opportunity to destroy the conciliatory atmosphere which had existed between all sides.
Indeed the bill never came so close to collapse as it did on the question of the ‘zones’.
On the third day of the committee stage in the Commons John Redmond raised
the contentious issue of the ‘zones’ again. He proposed an amendment to increase the
minimum reduction on second term rents that a tenant could receive from 10 % to 15 %.
His belief was that the limit was too low and that some tenants might be persuaded to
purchase at an inflated price. T. C. Harrington, M.P. for Dublin Harbour, attempted to
stress the significance of the decision before them:
In future the tenant would not have assistance from his landlord, which was now 
given in many cases. He would not be allowed voluntary abatement. His rents 
would not be allowed to run into arrear: and the question which the committee 
had to consider was, not in the average of cases but in extreme cases, what was 
the minimum of reduction the instalment should represent.35
The Conservative M.P. and landlord spokesman, Sir John Colomb, was opposed to the 
amendment and indicated that Irish landlords felt that a minimum reduction of 10 % on 
second term rents was a sufficient security for the state and an increase might discourage 
some of the more substantial landlords from selling.36 He was supported by other 
landlord representatives such as John Butcher and Colonel Saunderson.
The chief secretary, George Wyndham, also refused to accept the amendment 
because an increase in the minimum reduction that a tenant could receive in his rent 
would mean that landlords would be unfairly deprived of a couple of years’ purchase in 
the region of bargaining. In addition, Wyndham regarded a 10 % reduction on second 
term rents as a sufficient security for the state.37 Redmond’s amendment was forced to a
38division and was defeated by 217 votes to 175.
Unperturbed by the defeat John Redmond moved yet another amendment on the 
issue of the price ‘zones’. He proposed to increase the maximum reduction on second 
term rents that a tenant could receive from 30 % to 40 %, asserting that since the 
government refused to abolish the maximum reduction altogether he would attempt to
35 H ansard  4 , cxxiii, 1205 (17 June 1903).
36 Ibid., col. 1198-1200.
37 Ibid., col. 1207-9.
38 Ibid., col. 1218.
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improve them as much as possible.39 Wyndham refused to accept this amendment also
and elaborated as to why:
His main defence of those ‘zones’ was that if they abandoned them, or even 
altered them materially, they would inevitably go back to the procedure of the 
Landed Estates Court. Even if the amendment were to be carried, when they 
came to work the bill did anyone suppose that the great English societies, who 
had large sums of money invested in Irish land... [would] on hearing that their 
property was jeopardised, move for an injunction to restrain the sale of properties 
at a figure which would imperil their securities.40
A possible solution to the impasse emerged in the form of an amendment by 
Henry E. Duke, Conservative M.P. for Plymouth, which proposed to give the Land 
Commission the discretion, upon inquiry, to allow sales to go ahead if both the landlord 
and tenant agreed to terms that granted more than a 30 % reduction in the second term 
rents.41 The commotion over the question of the ‘zones’ continued to threaten the future 
of the bill. There was a serious possibility that the measure would be dropped unless a 
compromise was reached. With stalemate in the Commons attempts were made outside 
of parliament to surmount the difficulties which imperilled the bill.
On 18 June, for example, Colonel Saunderson was one of the guest speakers at a 
dinner of the United Club in London where he commented on the land bill. Saunderson 
highlighted the danger that the bill faced from some nationalists: ‘A certain section of 
home rulers, led by Mr. Dillon and Mr. Sexton, however, desired to wreck the bill, but 
any man who took that course in connection with such a promising measure would incur 
a terrible responsibility.’42
William O’Brien, seeking to stress the dangerous nature of the situation to the 
government wrote a memorandum which Redmond in turn conveyed to the chief 
secretary:
If the bill is to be saved, the government ought to realise at once that the 
acceptance of Mr. Duke’s amendment is the very least that, in the opinion of its 
best friends in our party, can avert a disaster. If the present attitude of obstinate 
insistence on the ‘zone’ limits is persisted in, nothing can prevent a series of 
angry debates, which will make it impossible to proceed with the bill. Mr.
39 Ibid., col. 1221.
40 Ibid., col. 1223.
41 Ibid., col. 1278.
421. T. , 19 June 1903
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Wyndham will make a fatal mistake if he thinks that the Irish hostility to clause I 
is a game of bluff. The opposition to the bill is intense, and is rapidly growing 
uncontrollable. Some of us have been straining our influence to prevent its 
showing itself in a much more dangerous form than anything that has occurred 
yet.43
The day after O’Brien’s memorandum reached Wyndham the Irish Landowners’
Convention met in the Westminster Palace Hotel. The consensus of the convention
members was that the ‘zones’ ought to be retained unaltered as presented in the bill. The
earl of Dunravcn, who was not a member of the convention, attended and made an
impassioned plea to the convention members not to jeopardise the bill by ruling out any
compromise on the ‘zones’. The situation was saved by the late arrival of the duke of
Abercorn, the president of the convention, who managed to convince those present to
accept Henry E. Duke’s amendment.44 On the 23 June, the parliamentary sub-committee
of the Land Conference Committee met and the meeting was chaired by the earl of
Dunraven. The committee pronounced that they were in favour of Duke’s amendment
thus providing a huge boost to the nationalist supporters of the bill.45
On the same day, just before the committee stage resumed in the House of
Commons, John Redmond met with George Wyndham at W. S. Blunt’s London
residence in an attempt to resolve the issue of the ‘zones’. Blunt described the outcome
of the secret meeting as follows:
The final agreement was that George should adopt the Duke amendment or 
something like it, as his own: that Redmond should express his satisfaction with 
it, and his belief that it would be accepted as satisfactory in Ireland: and that no 
other amendment should be pressed to a division. Redmond next brought up the 
evicted tenants question, and here, too, they came, after some fencing, to an 
amicable agreement.46
The committee stage recommenced then with the acceptance of an amendment 
by Wyndham, similar to Duke’s, by which bargains outside the ‘zones’ limits could be 
ratified in certain cases. The concession was welcomed by the I.P.P. leader John 
Redmond, who stated that he felt most of their concerns had been met:
4j O ’Brien, An olive branch in Ireland, p. 240.
44 Ibid., pp. 242-43. See also the earl o f Dunraven, Past times and pastim es vol. I I  (London, n.d.), pp 21- 
22.
45 I. T., 24 June 1903.
46 Blunt, M y D iaries part II. 1900-1914, pp 59-60.
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Under the clause as it now stands a number of tenants, who he calculated at 
about half the tenantry of Ireland, would be excluded from the operation of the 
‘zone’, the only tenants to whom the ‘zone’ would apply being the judicial 
tenants [who].. .would now be free to make any bargain they liked with their 
landlord. If the bargain fell within the ‘zone’, the purchase would take place 
without delay or inquiry: if it fell outside the ‘zone’, the bargain would be 
sanctioned...after due inquiry into the security for the loan on the one side, and 
into the equities of the case on the other.47
After a considerable number of M.P.s rising to congratulate Wyndham for unearthing a 
solution to the issue, the amendment was passed.
Wyndham’s concession on the ‘zones’ was viewed with considerable scepticism 
by Irish landlords in the House of Lords. Lord Clonbrock proposed an amendment 
which he hoped would arrest the relaxation of the ‘zones’ which had occurred in the 
Commons. He proposed an amendment which he hoped would clarify when a farm
48could be sold outside the ‘zones’. Many landlords in the House of Lords held that the
bill had been tarnished by the chief secretary’s concessions. The earl of Westmeath
argued that the amendment would help those landlords in the west of Ireland: ‘He and
others who lived in the west of Ireland believed that great attempts would be made to
make this the rule and not the exception, and therefore they regarded the amendment as
affording them a certain amount of protection.,49
The lord president of the council in the House of Lords and Conservative
government representative, the duke of Devonshire, felt that very little could be gained
from the amendment. He held that since the bargain had been agreed to outside the
‘zones’ that proved it was an exceptional case and it would be of little benefit to force
the commissioners to declare that publicly.70 The earl of Dunraven hoped that Clonbrock
would drop his amendment elaborating:
All the transactions which came within the ‘zone’ were sanctioned without any 
inquiry, but if they fell without the ‘zone’, they would have to be inquired into 
and settled after hearing all the persons interested and if the commissioners were 
satisfied that the price agreed upon was equitable. That was perfectly clear and
47 H ansard  4, cxxiv, 414 (24 June 1903).
48 Ibid., cxxvii, 7 (6 Aug. 1903).
49 Ibid., col. 9.
50 Ibid., col. 7-8.
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distinct, but if the commissioners had also to decide whether a holding was 
exceptionally circumstanced or not, he did not know how they would do it.51
Clonbrock felt compelled to force a division of the House of Lords as he held that if the 
clause remained unamended tenants might resort to making deals outside the ‘zones’ as
52 53the norm. Clonbrock’s amendment was defeated by 59 votes to 58.
Undeterred, Lord Clonbrock moved another amendment to compel the Land 
Commission to state the reasons for allowing a sale to go ahead if the price was outside 
the ‘zones’ limits.54 The duke of Devonshire opposed this amendment as it would 
actually be harmful to the landlord as the ‘specific reasons would be taken advantage of 
by anyone who wished to agitate in the direction of reducing the instalments beyond the 
limits provided in the ‘zones” .55 However, after further discussion, the amendment was 
passed 64 votes to 6 1.56 Thus clause one, as amended, was passed.
Under the act, as passed by parliament, clause one dealt only with judicial 
tenancies and advances where an estate was being sold. Under the 1903 act, land was to 
be sold by estates and not by individual holdings as under previous acts. An ‘estate’ was 
defined in clause ninety-eight as ‘any lands which the estates commissioners may 
declare fit to be regarded as a separate estate for the purposes of this act’. This allowed 
the landlord to sell portions of his land and townlands or even a couple of holdings could 
be declared an ‘estate’ under the act.
The estates commissioners had to ascertain that the tenant was in occupation of 
his holding and there were restrictions as to how much could be advanced to a single
58 • •purchaser. Sales of judicial tenancies outside of the ‘zones’ limits could be endorsed 
by the estates commissioners once certain conditions were fulfilled. They had to be 
certain that the security for the loan to the tenant was adequate and after providing an 
opportunity for any party with an interest in the estate to be heard, through a notice in
51 Ibid., col. 9.
52 Ibid., col. 10.
53 Ibid., col. 12.
54 Ibid., col. 13.
55 Ibid., col. 13-14.
56 Ibid., col. 16.
57 Irish Land Act, 1903, 98 (1).
58 There is no definition o f ‘tenant’ in the W yndham  Act. Under the Land Law Act, 1881, 57, ‘T enant’ is 
defined as a person occupying land under a contract o f tenancy, and includes the successors in title to  a 
tenant’.
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the Dublin Gazette,59 they could authorise the sale so long as they considered the price 
was fair.60 In each ‘estate’ sale the estates commissioners kept an index of people who 
were obliged to be notified once they had accepted the vendor as someone entitled to sell 
under the act, and of persons claiming an interest in the estate.61 Where a holding was
occupied by more than one tenant the estates commissioners had the power, if they
62deemed it necessary, to divide the holding and the rent between the parties.
Tenants of non-judicial holdings, who had never got a judicial rent fixed in the 
land courts, could secure an advance for all or part of the purchase money. In the case of 
judicial tenants, the advance had to equal the purchase money whereas non-judicial 
tenants could also pay part of the purchase money in cash. However, the commission 
had to be content that the price was fair and that there was sufficient security for the 
advance.63
IV). The ‘bonus’ and the financial clauses of Wvndham’s Land Bill.
The financial clauses of the bill, though numerous and complicated, received scant 
attention during the committee stage in the House of Commons. Most were passed 
without debate primarily owing to time constraints. Earlier clauses such as the ‘zones’ 
had been discussed at such length that the financial clauses had to be rushed through. 
This may explain why the financial structure faced collapse within five years. Under the 
bill the landlords were to receive a grant-in-aid upon the sale of their ‘estate’. As 
mentioned earlier this grant-in-aid quickly became known as the ‘bonus’ although the 
word does not appear in the act at all. This variance in terminology is highly significant 
in itself. Grant-in-aid suggests the money was simply in aid of facilitating the sale
59 ‘Provisional rules under the Irish Land Act, 1903 (Sections 1 to 23), 23 O ctober’, rule 22, cited in 
Richard R, Cherry and T. Henry M axwell (eds), The Irish Land  Acts, 1903 and  1904 (Dublin, 1906), pp 
1168-9.
60 See Cherry and M axwell (eds), The Irish L a n d  Acts, 1903 and  1904, p. 1054.
61 ‘Provisional rules under the Irish Land Act, 1903 (Sections 1 to 23), 23 O ctober’, rule 39, cited in 
Cherry and M axwell (eds), Irish Land Acts, p. 1172.
62 Irish Land Act, 1903, 1. ‘W here there are holdings upon an estate so large that the purchase price w ould 
exceed the limit m entioned in sub-section 4, [£7,000] a possible m ethod o f  carrying out the sa les...m igh t 
be found by selling a portion o f  the holding to the tenant h im self under this sub-section, [three] and the 
rem ainder to his sons, or to any o f  the other classes o f  persons mentioned in section 2. The tenant’s 
consent would, o f course, be required for such partition and sales’. See Cherry and M axwell (eds.), The 
Irish Land  Acts, p. 1054.
63 Irish Land Act, 1903, 5.
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whereas the word ‘bonus’ has connotations of bribery. This grant-in-aid or ‘bonus’ 
would provide the impetus for sales. Stanislaus J. Lynch, a land commissioner, would 
recollect in 1912 that the ‘abnormal increase in the number of applications’ in the early 
years of the Wyndham Act ‘was largely due to the desire of landlords to secure the 12 
per cent ‘bonus’ provided by the... act’.64 The cash ‘bonus’ went to the vendor, who 
could use it as he wished. It was not subject to estate charges unless the estate was in the 
land judge’s court or the purchase money failed to cover all the encumbrances. The 
‘bonus’ was to provide the bridge between what the tenant was willing to pay and what 
the landlord was able to accept. In addition, it would assist those landlords whose estates 
were subject to legal difficulties.
The debate centred principally on the ‘bonus’ and the percentage that it was to be 
allocated at. Some English M.P.s were particularly anxious about the bill’s finance. 
Liberals such as George Lambert failed to see how the issue of guaranteed land stock at 
2 % % could raise the cash for a huge loan of approximately £100,000,000 or the 
£12,000,000 grant-in-aid fund.65 The potential for loss appeared quite high especially if 
Irish land stock was issued considerably below par (where £100 of stock raised below 
£100 in cash). Lambert moved an amendment to issue the land stock needed to provide 
the loan for land purchase at 3 % instead of 2 3/i % (investors in the stock would receive 
a higher return of 3 % as opposed to 2 % %). He explained that Irish land stock at that 
moment stood at ninety-two meaning that for every £100 worth of stock issued, £92 in 
cash would be raised: ‘If they took the present price at 92, that meant a loss of £8 on 
every £100 to be raised.’66 The losses on the flotation of stock were to be covered by the 
Irish Development Grant which consisted of £185,000 annually. It was supposed to go 
towards Irish education and other development projects. Lambert argued that the grant 
would be insufficient to cover the annual losses on the issue of stock and held that it 
should be used for Irish education anyway: ‘His own impression was that the rate was 
put at a low level in order to artificially increase the price of land in Ireland.’67
64 Stanislaus J. Lynch, L and  purchase in Ire land  in Ireland. A retrospect and  a forecast. A ddress read  
before the S tatistical and  Social Inquiry Society o f  Ireland. 29'h November, 1912 (Dubl in, 1912), p. 4.
65 See chapter five for how the issue o f guaranteed 2 % %  land stock was to provide the finance for land 
purchase.
66 H ansard 4, cxxiv, 1088 (1 July 1903).
67 Ibid., col. 1088.
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The Conservative M.P. Gibson Bowles was in agreement with Lambert. He
judged that there was inadequate security for the loan and he predicted that the British
taxpayer would suffer as a result. While promising not to impede the bill’s passage, he
summed up his feelings on the matter:
It was an invidious thing to utter a discordant note when two sides of the house 
so seldom in agreement were ready to fall upon each other’s necks and embrace 
each other. If he were to describe the present condition of things from the fiscal 
point of view, he should picture up a remote and inaccessible cave in which a 
band of brigands was engaged in cutting the throat of the British taxpayer, and 
complaining that he did not bleed to death quickly enough.68
The fact that the stock for the Transvaal loan, to help restock and rebuild farms after the
second Boer War, was issued at 3 % gave rise to much scepticism as regards the
feasibility of issuing Irish land stock at 2 V4 %. English M.P.s such as Gibson Bowles
feared that the British taxpayer would suffer in the future from the bill’s reckless
finance. They feared that the finance for the bill was based on political and emotional
grounds when it should have been structured on a purely economic basis.
Wyndham disagreed stating that the matter had been investigated and that the
treasury would not have assented otherwise. He outlined his view of the situation:
The hon. member seemed to think that the difference would fall perpetually on 
the Irish Development Grant. That was not so. Assuming the loan as floated at 
£95 or even £92, the interest on the difference was to be paid at the same rate as 
the repayment by the purchaser-viz., at sixty-eight and a half years. It would be 
found that the charge would not fall as a heavy burden on £185,000 a year. He 
apprehended no difficulty on that score... The hon. member had challenged his 
estimate of the security of the whole transaction, and had asked him only to lend 
the money to Ireland at 3 per cent... They had felt it their duty to Ireland, to this 
country, and to the empire to lend the money at the lowest possible rate.69
The chief secretary concluded by adding that he could not accept Lambert’s amendment 
as it would fundamentally alter the financial basis of the whole measure. With no chance 
of success Lambert withdrew his amendment. Despite their reservations the vast 
majority of English M.P.s were content to support the measure owing to the unparalled 
unity amongst the Irish M.P.s.
68 Ibid., col. 1091.
69 Ibid., col. 1090.
104
Liberal unrest over the generous treatment of the landlords emerged in the person 
of Thomas Aston. He moved to leave out the sub-section creating the £12,000,000 grant- 
aid-fund. He protested against the ‘bonus’ and compared the British taxpayer to ‘the 
voice of one crying in the wilderness’.70 Aston represented the feelings of many English 
M.P.s who felt that the Irish landlords were generally being treated munificently, the 
‘bonus’ apart. If the measure were compulsory there would have been no need for such 
an outlay of British credit: ‘He [Aston] looked upon this compensation as a bribe to
71satisfy the House of Lords, who always looked after the interests of their friends’.
Aston’s fellow Liberal, Francis Channing, supported Aston’s amendment.
Charming determined that compulsory purchase would have been a far better option. He
concurred with Aston that the ‘bonus’ was effectively a bribe to landlords to sell:
They all knew perfectly well that such proposals would never have been made or 
supported but for the fact that the Irish landlords exercised a controlling 
influence in another place [House of Lords], and were thus able to dictate the
79terms on which the any bill should pass.
The terms that the Irish landlords would receive did not just antagonise English M.P.s. 
The independent nationalist M.P. for South Leitrim, Jasper Tully, saw the measure ‘as a 
landlord relief bill’ and judged that the landlords would receive exorbitant prices. John 
Dillon, who was becoming increasingly vocal in his opposition to the Wyndham Act, 
admitted that he ‘had a sneaking sympathy for the views put forward by the supporters 
of the amendment’ but felt that they should accept the inclusion of the ‘bonus’.74
Wyndham dismissed compulsory purchase as an impractical option as 
highlighted by the massive majority received by the bill on its second reading. He 
considered that ‘an integral principle of that scheme was that a ‘bonus’ of £12,000,000 
must be supplied by the general taxpayer to meet the drop in the income of the landlords
• 7S •which was inevitable under any system of land purchase in Ireland’. As the inclusion 
of the ‘bonus’ was the key-stone of the bill Lambert’s amendment was defeated without 
a division of the house.
70 Ibid., col. 1096.
71 Ibid., col. 1097.
72 Ibid., col. 1099.
73 Ibid., col. 1101.
74 Ibid., col. 1100.
75 Ibid.
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At first it was intended that the ‘bonus’ would be distributed in an inverse ratio to 
the purchase money. In order to ensure that tenants did not pay excessive prices and to 
accelerate the rate of purchase John Redmond moved to increase the ‘bonus’ to 15 % of 
the purchase money for all landlords who purchased in the first five years of the act’s 
operation. AH Irish M.P.s, both nationalist and unionist, expressed themselves in favour 
of a time limit. Despite the unanimous opinion of the Irish members Wyndham refused 
to budge. He feared that if he accepted the time limit it would lead to impulsive sales 
by landlords and would ‘embarrass the financial operation of the bill’.76
For the I.P.P. a time limit was a prerequisite if the ‘bonus’ was to be calculated at 
a fixed rate. There was a worry that the wealthier landlords would benefit to the 
detriment of the poorer estates in the west. Dillon believed it was illogical that the more
• 77the landlord received from his tenants the higher the ‘bonus’ would be. The 
independent nationalist M.P., T. M. Healy, was in favour of more fluid system, which 
left the matter to the estates commissioners, to ensure that the poorer estates such as
78those in Connaught would receive more than the wealthier estates.
Ultimately Redmond’s proposed amendment was a failure. Towards the end of 
the committee stage Wyndham proposed an amendment to put the ‘bonus’ at 12 % of the
7Qpurchase money but no mention was made of a time limit. John Dillon held that the 
amendment was grossly unjust as the ‘bulk of the money would go to the richest parts of 
Ireland, and the lesser amount to the poorest parts’.80 Similarly, T. P. O’Connor
considered that a fixed ‘bonus’ would encourage landlords to squeeze as much as
81possible from their tenants. The danger was that the poorest tenantry on the most 
disadvantaged estates would suffer greatly under a fixed ‘bonus’. The higher the price 
the more the landlord received. Liberal unease over the matter was voiced by J.H. 
Whiteley, M.P. for Halifax. He professed that the British taxpayer was willing to agree 
to the £12,000,000 ‘bonus’ because it was understood that it would go mainly to the
76 Ibid., col. 1111.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid., col. 1111-13.
79 Ibid., cxxv, 117-8 (8 July 1903).
80 Ibid., co l.l 18-19. This was because if  the ‘bonus’ was distributed at a fixed rate o f  12 %, the greater the 
am ount o f  purchase money received the higher the ‘bonus’ would be for the landlord. H ence poorer 
estates w ould have less o f an incentive to sell as the ‘bonus’ would be lower.
81 Ib id , col. 120.
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poorer landlords. However, Wyndham’s amendment altered this and more affluent 
landlords would now receive the lion’s share of the ‘bonus’, to the detriment of the 
poorer class of landlords.82 Despite these concerns Wyndham’s amendment was passed 
and the allocation of the ‘bonus’ was fixed at 12 %.
V). Advances to tenant-purchasers.
When the bill was initially introduced the maximum advance (loan) a tenant-purchaser
could obtain was £3,000. In special circumstances, dependent on the discretion of the
estates commissioners this limit could be increased to £5,000. Sir John Colomb moved
to omit the section which limited the advance a tenant-purchaser could receive to
£3,000. He feared that many large farmers and graziers would be excluded and he called
for the limit to be extended. The landlord representatives also argued that it was vital
to enable the large farmers to purchase. These people would be the leaders in their
districts and the providers of employment and with the future of the landed gentry
uncertain, they would take the lead in agricultural society.84
The position of the I.P.P. was far from straight forward. On the one hand, they
were vehemently opposed to graziers and the holders of grasslands availing of the act.
Their fear was that the graziers would be able to purchase the untenanted grasslands.
According to John Dillon:
They [limitations] were not sufficient to secure that the grasslands, which were 
essential for the resettlement of the people and the rescue of the population of the 
west from a condition described by the chief secretary as worse than that of the 
Hottentots or Kaffirs, should not pass into the hands of graziers.85
Conversely, the party were keen to ensure that large tillage, dairy and mixed farms the 
benefited.
The chief secretary, George Wyndham, was adamant that the specified limits be 
maintained. He declared that he would not increase the financial burden on the state as 
proposed by the amendment. Wyndham summed up the position as follows:
82 Ibid., col. 119.
83 Ibid., cxxiii, 963-4 (15 June 1903).
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid., col. 968.
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If any difficulty arises over a large farm, rather than not sanction the sale of that 
farm, of course it will be the usual practice for the sale commissioners to 
sanction an advance up to the higher limit of £5,000... In the case of such a farm 
outside the concession, but not outside the estate, other arrangements would have 
to be made to get the additional £1,000 or £2,000.86
87Certain Conservative M.P.s also voiced their strong objections to any such increase.
It appears then, that Wyndham did not want to make distinctions between various 
types of farms. The bill allowed the tenant to borrow up to £5,000 and he could raise
what remained of the price himself by other means. Wyndham believed that the limit of
88£5,000 ‘was large enough to embrace all the transactions which were likely to arise’. 
However, when the matter resurfaced later on in the committee stage, the chief secretary 
relented and the limitation was extended to £7,000.
The affair came to the fore once again in the House of Lords when Irish 
landlords and their supporters attempted to assist large farmers in the purchase of their 
farms. Lord Clonbrock moved an amendment which proposed that ‘any advance which 
shall not exceed three-fourths of the price paid for a holding shall be repaid by means of
89a purchase annuity calculated at the rate of £3 per cent on the amount of the advance’. 
As the bill stood, the annuity (the tenant’s repayment for the advance he had received) 
was calculated at £3 5s. per £100 advanced. By lowering the rate of the annuity the 
period of repayment would almost extend to almost hundred years but they would pay 
less in their annual instalments. The government representative in the Lords, the duke of 
Devonshire, although sympathetic, could not accept the amendment as it would alter the 
bill’s financing and would be an extra burden on the treasury.90 After a division, the 
amendment was defeated by the government by 56 votes to 54.91
In order to accelerate sales, a provision was included in the bill that in the case of 
a sale to the Land Commission, where three-quarters of the tenants were willing to 
purchase their holdings, the remainder became tenants of the Land Commission. 
Unfortunately the minority lost their right, under the 1881 Land Act, to go to court and
86 Ibid., col. 966-7.
87 Ibid., cxxiv, 428 (24 June 1903).
88 Ibid., cxxiii, 972 (15 June 1903)
89 Ibid., cxxvii, 269 (7 Aug. 1903).
90 Ibid., col. 270-71.
91 Ibid., col. 272.
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have a fair rent fixed. An amendment was put successfully put forward by T.W. Russell 
which prevented the minority from obstructing the sale. Instead where a three-quarters
92majority agreed to purchase, the remainder would also be deemed to have purchased. 
The independent nationalist M.P., T. M Healy, considered the amendment to be 
pragmatic:
It might very well be that two or three wastrels on the holdings would set up their 
backs and obstruct the sale to the whole of the tenants. If they did so, surely it 
was fair and reasonable that the Land Commission should be empowered to act 
according to this provision. The terrible penalty was that these tenants were to be 
made owners of their land.93
The majority of the Irish M.P.s were fiercely opposed to the perpetual rent 
provision as they felt it would detract from the sense of ownership. According to 
William O’Brien:
To the Irish farmer the whole charm of the bill was the notion of property and the 
notion that the holding would be his own and that no man could ever interfere 
with him, but this perpetual rent-charge would be a perpetual reminder to him 
that he was not the holder but that some power which was not even defined, 
could step in and affect his interest in the property.94
J. P. Farrell, M.P. for North Longford, proposed an amendment to omit the perpetual 
rent charge from the bill which Wyndham agreed to accept.95
The vast majority of advances under the act would go to occupying tenants. 
However, clause two enabled other groups to receive advances for parcels of untenanted 
land which were being sold along with the tenanted land of an ‘estate’. Under previous 
acts only an occupying tenant had been eligible to purchase. Now a tenant who occupied 
a holding on the estate, his sons, and any tenant in the locality who occupied a holding 
whose valuation was below five pounds were all eligible. Tenants who had been evicted 
within the previous twenty-five years also qualified to receive a parcel if they could not 
be restored to their original holding. If the evicted tenant was dead, a representative of 
the deceased, approved by the Land Commission, could be put forward. The maximum 
advance that a purchaser could receive under clause two was £1,000. However, an
92 Ibid., cxxiv, 992-3 (30 June 1903).
93 Ibid., col. 996.
94 Ibid., cxxiii, 1190 (17 June 1903).
95 Ibid., col. 1191-97.
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advance exceeding this could be authorised by the Land Commission if they deemed it 
necessary, so long as it was ‘without prejudice to the wants and circumstances of other 
persons residing in the neighbourhood’.96 The purchase inspector, who was a Land 
Commission official, was obliged to state in his report whether or not he believed the 
limitation ought to be surpassed.97 He visited the land after an agreement for sale had 
been concluded and he drew up a report describing the land and the condition of the 
holdings. In addition, he made observations and recommendations relating to evicted 
tenants, turbary rights, subdivision, accommodation for labourers and where advances 
exceeding the limitations in the act were applied for.
Any tenancy established after 1 January 1901 was only eligible for an advance of 
£500 or less under the act. This was designed to prevent landlords creating bogus 
tenancies out of untenanted land that would allow large graziers to avail of the act. The 
limitation could be exceeded at the estates commissioner’s discretion except where the 
holding was in a congested district. Where the estates commissioners bought an estate in 
the Land Judges Court the limit of an advance available to such tenants was £1,000 but it
98could be increased to £2,000 at the commissioners’ discretion. The purchase inspector, 
if he felt the limit ought to be exceeded, was obliged to state the grounds upon which his 
opinion was founded.99
The estates commissioners had the authority to declare a subtenant a tenant and 
his parcel of land a holding. In such cases where there was any interest between the 
owner and the subtenant, the estates commissioners could remove that interest by 
financial compensation. This intervening interest was usually in the form of a 
middleman. The owner and the holder of the interest had one month, from the notice that 
the subtenant was to be recognised as a tenant, in which to agree upon the compensation 
that the holder of the interest would receive. Anyone unhappy with the estates 
commissioner’s assessment had the option of appealing to a judicial commissioner
96 Irish Land Act, 1903 ,2  (2).
97 ‘Instructions for the guidance o f inspectors, 9 February, 1905’ cited in Cherry and M axwell (eds), Irish  
L and  Acts, p. 1193.
98 Irish Land Act, 1903, 53.
99 ‘Instructions for the guidance o f inspectors, 9 February, 1905’ cited in Cherry and M axwell (eds), Irish  
L and  Act, p. 1195.
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within fourteen days of the pronouncement.100 In the absence of such an agreement the 
states commissioners set a price and the redemption money was taken out of the 
purchase money.
The issue of joint tenancies and where more than one tenant held a holding did 
not prevent a sale under the act. In such a situation, the estates commissioners could 
recognise the occupiers as tenants and their sections of land as separate holdings. The 
rent of the original holding would be divided equitably between the former tenants. The 
purchase inspector was obliged, in his report, to state the position of subtenants and joint 
tenancies and the commissioner’s decisions were based on his recommendations.101
A tenant who bought his holding under the act held it subject to certain rules. 
Only one individual could be registered as the titleholder of the land. The land could not 
be subdivided in the future without the permission of the Land Commission and if it 
was, the commission could order that the holding be sold. The Land Commission could 
order the sale of the holding if the tenant-purchaser lost his title to it due to bankruptcy 
or upon the occupier’s death the holding was due to be subdivided to facilitate an 
inheritance settlement. The Land Commission had the option of putting forward another 
individual as the owner instead of selling the land, and any claims such as those to 
whom money was owed were put on the holding. Tenant-purchasers were forbidden, 
without acquiring the Land Commission’s permission, to mortgage their holdings for a 
sum more than ten times the total of their purchase annuity.102 If the Land Commission 
decided that a holding was to be sold, any claims or charges on the holding were affixed 
to the purchase money with the exception of a purchase amiuity or any charge
103concerning public works. Where the Land Commission failed to find a buyer, it could 
empower the county sheriff to appoint a person recommended by them as the occupier 
of the holding.104
100 ‘Provisional rules under the Irish Land Act, 1903 (Sections 1 to 23) 23 October, 1903’ cited in Cherry 
and M axwell (eds), Irish L and  Acts, p. 1170. The tim e period o f one m onth, within w hich the vendor and 
the owner o f the intervening interest had to com e to term s, could be extended under rule forty-three if  the 
estate com m issioners considered it necessary.
101 ‘Instructions for the guidance o f inspectors 9 February, 1905’ cited in Cherry and M axwell (eds), Irish  
Land Acts, p. 1196.
102 Irish Land Act, 1903,54.
103 Ibid., 55.
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Poor-rate collectors were required to notify the commissioner of valuation and 
boundary surveyor if any tenant-purchaser subdivided their holding. The commissioner 
was required to report this to the Land Commission and provide the commission with 
maps if necessary. Similarly, the district registrar of births and deaths was obliged to 
inform the Land Commission of the death of a tenant-purchaser who had subdivided his 
holding. Both the poor-rate collector and the district registrar were liable to a fine of up 
to two pounds if they failed to report cases of subdivision.105
An ‘ancient monument’ was defined under the act as ‘any ancient or medieval 
structure, erection, or monument, or any remains thereof.106 Numerous monuments 
were situated on estates that would be sold under the act. To ensure the survival of these 
monuments the estates commissioners could vest an ancient monument in the 
Commissioners of Public Works, rather than letting it pass into the hands of the tenant- 
purchaser. Henceforth they would be responsible for its upkeep and preservation. Where 
the Commissioners of Public Works objected to the monument being vested in them, the 
estates commissioners could place it in the care of the local county council.107
Certain trustees who were acceptable to the Land Commission, could hold
parcels of an estate being sold ‘for the purposes of turbary, pasturage, the raising of sand
or gravel, the cutting or gathering of seaweed, the planting of trees, or the preservation
of game, fish, woods or plantations, or for the purposes of the Labourers (Ireland) Acts, 
1081883 to 1896’. The purchase inspector was obliged to state the condition of these 
aspects on the estate. He could also suggest proposals to deal with the resources and he 
could advise on the appointment of trustees.109 There was no official limitation to the 
amount of the advance which could be authorised under this clause. The matter was left 
to the lord lieutenant’s discretion.110
The Land Commission could draw up regulations regarding turbary on a holding 
which consisted of bog where the tenant-purchaser had no exclusive right to cut turf. 
These rules drawn up by the commission would sanction ‘the cutting of turf on that bog
105 Ibid., 56.
106 Ib id .,14 (4).
107 Ibid., 14.
108 Ibid., 4 (1 ) .
109 ( Instructions for the guidance o f inspectors, 9 February, 1905’ cited in Cherry and M axwell (eds), Irish 
Land Acts, p. 1198.
110 Irish Land Act, 1903, 4.
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by any occupiers of land in the neighbourhood of the said holding for whose 
requirements such turf appears to be necessary’.111 The Land Commission regulations 
were also to outline the terms regarding payment, compensation for any defacement of 
property caused while extracting turf and that the owner of the holding had to have 
adequate turf and grass land for himself. In addition, the rules had to ensure that the bog
could be reclaimed in the future if desirable. A fine up to five pounds was the penalty for
112any violation of the regulations.
VI). Sale and repurchase of demesnes.
The purpose of enabling landlords to sell and repurchase their demesnes was to
encourage them to remain in the country once they had sold. It also provided the
landlord with what was essentially a low interest rate loan. Upon introducing the bill,
Wyndham was quick to outline the government’s position on the landed gentry:
I have seen it stated that we propose to expropriate Irish landlords and to leave 
Ireland without the benefit of their residence there. But the policy of the 
government and the policy of those who signed the Conference Report was to 
make it possible for Irish landlords to remain in Ireland and be the leaders of the
113agricultural industry in that country.
The advance to be given to the landlord could not be greater than one third of the
purchase money or £20,000, whichever was smaller.114
Although the I.P.P. were keen for the landlords to remain in Ireland they feared
that the clause would be exploited by absentee landlords who would try to obtain a large
sum of money on easy terms. Through T. P. O’Connor, an amendment was proposed
which called for the clause to be limited to landlords who had resided in Ireland for
more than six months of the previous five years and to exclude absentee landlords.115
John Dillon was of the belief that there were a number of uninhabited and dilapidated
demesnes throughout the country, and he felt that they should come into the possession
of the C.D.B. in order to relieve congestion and enlarge holdings.116
Ibid., 21 (1).
112 Ibid., 21.
113 H ansard 4, cxx, 191 (25 Mar. 1903).
114 Irish Land Act, 1903, 3.
1 13 H ansard 4, cxxiv, 469 (24 June 1903),
116 Ibid., col. 471.
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The landlord spokesman, Sir John Colomb, highlighted the difficulty in defining 
a ‘resident landlord’. Many, due to their careers in the armed forces, navy or civil
117service, were obliged to be absent from the country for long periods. The attorney- 
general for Ireland, John Atkinson, agreed with Colomb. In addition, he believed that 
there was little chance of a landlord repurchasing his demesne if he did not intend to live 
on it.118 George Wyndham argued that it would prove impossible to hammer out such a 
definition and an attempt to do so would adversely affect sales.119 With little hope of 
success, O’Connor withdrew his proposed amendment.
Many non-Irish M.P.s resented the amount of money being spent on Irish 
landlords. The provision which allowed landlords to sell and repurchase their demesnes 
fuelled their discontent. The Liberal M.P. Thomas Aston moved to omit the proposal 
from the bill altogether and he was supported by his colleague Francis Channing. They
were already angered by the proposed ‘bonus’ to landlords and the inclusion of a further
• • 120 • • inducement was seen as ‘legislation gone mad’. They questioned the Conservative
government as to why Irish landowners were to be treated differently to landowners in
England and Scotland. However, the fact that Ireland was united in support of the bill
was enough to prevent such proposals gaining widespread support and Aston withdrew
the proposed amendment without pressing it to a division.
VII). The evicted tenants question.
From the start of the Land War in 1878, the question of evicted tenants increasingly 
assumed greater importance in Ireland. Many were evicted in the agrarian disputes and 
unrest of the era and in the lead up to the 1881 Land Act. This act established dual 
ownership of Irish land and it recognised that tenants had a legal interest in their 
holdings, apart from the landlord’s interest, and gave them fixity of tenure. Tenants were 
entitled to sell their interest in the land or bequeath it to a successor. The act established 
the Irish Land Commission which, in turn, created the land court where a tenant could 
apply to have a fair rent fixed. These so called judicial rents, once fixed, could be
117 Ibid., col. 469-70.
118 Ibid., col. 471-2.
119 Ibid., col. 475-5.
120 Ib id , col. 487.
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reviewed every fifteen years. In the mid-1880s, when agricultural prices in Ireland fell 
significantly many tenants, whether they had had their rent fixed or had never entered 
the land court, called for a reduction in rents.
In order to pressurise landlords who refused to give voluntary reductions or who 
sought to collect arrears of rent, a Plan of Campaign was set in motion. In essence, this 
amounted to the tenants on the estate paying a portion of their rent into a common fund 
instead of paying rent to the landlord. The fund was normally under the control of a 
committee of tenants from the estate. If the landlord failed to make concessions, it was 
intended that the fund would provide for the evicted and their families. The campaign 
received the support and guidance of the nationalist leaders of the day and was co­
ordinated by the Irish National League. The Irish National League was founded in 1882 
and was essentially the successor to the Land League which had been founded in 1879 to 
reduce rents and to make the tenant farmers the owners of their holdings. However, 
owing to its suppression by the government during the Land War of 1879-82, it was 
disbanded and a broader based organisation known as the Irish National League was 
founded.
On some estates matters were resolved peacefully. On estates such as that of the 
earl of Clanricarde in Co. Galway and the Brooke estate at Colgreaney, Co. Wexford, 
however, evictions occurred and new tenants were found for the holdings. The new 
occupants became known as ‘planters’ although most nationalists referred to them as 
‘grabbers’. Some of the ‘planter’ tenants were genuine farmers but many were merely 
caretakers of the holdings for the landlord.
The first attempt to address the evicted tenants question was in 1891 when the 
Conservative chief secretary of the day, A. J. Balfour, introduced his land purchase act. 
The act contained a clause which enabled an evicted tenant to be reinstated on his 
holding as a tenant-purchaser albeit with the consent of the landlord. However, there was
a time limit of six months from the passing of the act within which the reinstatement had
12]
to happen. Parliament legislated for a further period of six months, which commenced 
from 5 September 1895, and under the 1896 Land Act a period of twelve months was
121 Purchase o f Land (Ireland) Act, 1891 [54 & 55 Viet. c. 48.}. (5 Aug. 1891).
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sanctioned from the passing of that act.122 Unfortunately these initiatives achieved very 
little success as very few evicted tenants were restored.
In 1894 a bill was introduced by the chief secretary, John Morley, under Lord 
Rosebery’s Liberal government, to facilitate the reinstatement of evicted tenants. The 
bill was primarily based on the report of an evicted tenants commission which had 
investigated seventeen of the principal Plan of Campaign estates and which had 
concluded in 1893.123 The bill permitted the use of compulsion in order to reinstate 
evicted tenants in their former holdings if they were occupied, and was thus bitterly 
opposed by the Conservatives. It was eventually defeated in the House of Lords. The 
next development in addressing the evicted tenants question was the Land Conference 
Report of early 1903 which recommended that the resolution of the evicted tenants 
question was necessary in order to bring about the end to the Land War and the 
settlement of the land question.
The settlement of the evicted tenants question was an emotive issue. The I.P.P. 
believed that the reinstatement of these tenants was of the utmost importance and that 
the land question could never be settled while that matter remained unresolved. In effect 
the evicted tenants question was an open wound which desperately required treatment. 
T. P. O’Connor even went so far as to compare evicted tenant to prisoners of war.124 The 
land question would remain so long as these tenants remained displaced.
On the landlords’ part there was a genuine desire to reach an amicable solution. 
However, they were chiefly concerned with protecting the ‘planter’ tenants who, in 
many cases, were farming the former holdings of evicted tenants. Colonel Saunderson 
warned that the Irish landlords ‘had no objection to restore an evicted tenant to his 
holding if it was not occupied, but they had the strongest objection to displacing a tenant
125for the purpose of restoring his predecessor who had been evicted’. The landlords 
feared that the ‘planters’ would be subject to intense intimidation in an effort to restore 
the evicted tenant to his former holding.
122 Land Law (Ireland) Act, 1896 [59 & 60 Viet., c. 47] (15 Aug. 1896).
123 Report o f  the evic ted  tenants commission, 1893-94  [C. 6935] [C. 6935-1] xxxi. 13, 111.
124 H ansard 4, cxxiv, 458 (24 June 1903).
125 Ibid., col. 449.
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The debates on the evicted tenants in the committee stage of the House of 
Commons focused on two key issues - the maximum advance that an evicted tenant 
could receive and whether or not he could be restored to his former holding when it was 
occupied. As already mentioned the evicted tenants were judged under clause two, to be 
entitled to a parcel of untenanted land being sold on an estate. A tenant on the estate, his 
sons and tenants in the locality whose valuation was below five pounds were also 
considered eligible. The limit on the advance that someone from either of these four 
groups could receive was £500. Those evicted tenants who could not be reinstated to 
their former holdings were to be given an equivalent parcel of untenanted land instead. 
The stumbling block for the I.P.P. lay in the fact that many of the evicted tenants’ 
original holdings had been significantly larger than anything an advance of £500 could 
purchase.
William O’Brien proposed that the advance available to evicted tenants be
increased above £500. Wyndham, however, was aware that there would be intense
competition for the limited amount of untenanted land that would become available and
thus he was slow to favour the evicted tenants over the other groups:
His [Wyndham’s] desire would be to facilitate the solution of the question as 
much as possible, provided that no pressure was used to put in people who were 
not really farmers... He could not go as far as he was here asked to go. They 
were dealing with the quantity of land that was available. He was, as he had said, 
prepared to alter the £500 to £1,000 or £2,000, which would make it possible for 
an evicted tenant to get an advance to make a start in life. But he could not make 
any advance to evicted tenants against others.126
Despite Wyndham’s proposal to raise the limits, which would enable the clause
to deal with the vast majority of evicted tenants, a tiny minority would still remain
outside. In John Redmond’s opinion:
There remained the one section of men whose farms had been ‘grabbed’. Even of 
these cases the great majority would come in under the limitation of... 
[Wyndham’s] and so it came to this, that they were now standing out for a 
limitation which would hit only a handful of men in Ireland. But in order to 
exclude these few men what were the government going to do? They were going 
to leave a sore in Ireland which would not only have an evil effect... but also
126 Ibid., col. 449-50.
117
inflict injury on every part of Ireland.. .and militate against the chances of the bill 
being satisfactorily received and worked.127
The I.P.P. were adamant that this minority of evicted tenants should not be prevented, by 
a financial limit, from attaining holdings which were the equal of their original farms.
The chief secretary, George Wyndham, outlined the position of the government 
as follows:
The amount at the disposal of the government was limited, the classes to be 
relieved were many. Their means were small, their needs great, and he could not 
take the responsibility of asking the committee to go further than he had 
indicated-viz., where it was possible to reinstate a tenant in his old holding to 
allow him to have the benefits which others enjoyed: but where it was not 
possible let him take his holding on equal terms with all other persons who 
sought the benefits of the act, and come in on a scale which was higher than he 
had originally intended, and which would be dangerously high if he increased it19 Rto the exclusion of many who deserved to have their needs attended to.
The matter was eventually resolved as a result of Herbert Robertson’s suggestion that
the Land Commission be given discretionary powers to increase the limit in certain
• 129cases, and make this applicable to all classes of tenants under the clause. The
maximum advance an evicted tenant could receive was eventually fixed at £1,000.
It would also prove equally problematic to reinstate evicted tenants to their
original holdings where they were occupied. The I.P.P. were keen to provide an
opportunity for those who occupied evicted holdings to give up the land in return for
financial compensation or a new holding. They viewed the current occupiers as political
‘planters’ who had been introduced to fight the land war for the landlords. Many of these
men were not genuine farmers and had no interest in farming the land full time. William
O’Brien put forward an amendment in the committee stage that would allow the so-
called ‘planter’ tenants to move if they so wished:
He [William O’Brien] did not propose any hostile action or any compulsory 
action whatever against the new occupiers... All that the amendment purported 
to do was that whenever an estate was sold, and whenever the commissioners 
found there were feuds of this kind existing, that they should have the power of 
acting as mediators, and in a friendly way composing without any compulsion or
127 Ibid., col. 451-52.
128 Ibid., col. 455.
129 Ibid., col. 463.
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injustice these feuds which, if left unsettled, would keep the entire community in 
a state of ferment.130
Colonel Saunderson was certain that the inclusion of the amendment would lead 
to the current tenants being pressurised and intimidated into abandoning their holdings. 
Additionally, there was a reluctance among some non-Irish M.P.s to provide British 
taxpayers’ money to assist men who had allowed themselves be evicted for political 
purposes.
John Redmond repudiated Saunderson’s claims that there would be a renewal of
the land war or any prospect of intimidation. He observed that many of the current
tenants were not farmers at all but men, who, for political reasons, had been installed
onto these holdings due to the hostile circumstances of the Land War in the 1880s. He
attempted to clarify what O’Brien’s amendment hoped to achieve:
The picture which had been drawn of all the evicted tenants of the last twenty- 
five years rushing from the ends of the earth to regain their old homes was 
absurd. The real object of the amendment was to enable tenants to be restored to 
their homes in cases where the new tenants were willing to give up the farms and 
make other arrangements, and the power for that purpose should be placed in the 
hands of the commission. There was no intention to put into the bill any 
provision by which pressure, direct or indirect, could be brought to bear upon 
existing tenants.131
Redmond’s assurances that the current tenants would not be intimidated were met with 
scepticism by the landlord representatives. They anticipated that he would be unable to 
control all of his followers or those nationalists who were outside the party.
Wyndham believed that Redmond was sincere in his assurances but he foresaw a 
danger from other nationalists. He wanted to ensure that no pressure would be exerted 
on the current occupant, that all classes under the clause would be treated equally and 
that no distinctions would be made. The chief secretary eventually brought the affair to 
an end by clarifying that the estates commissioners had the power to reinstate an evicted 
tenant in his original holding where the current occupier was willing to move.
In the House of Lords, Irish landlords moved swiftly to protect the interests of 
the ‘planters’. As far as Lord Ardilaun was concerned, it was ‘a matter of honour’ for
130 Ibid., col. 848 (29 June 1903).
131 Ibid., col. 853.
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their class.132 If the question of the evicted tenants was one close to nationalists’ hearts, 
then the welfare of the ‘planter’ tenants was equally emotive for landlords. The earl of 
Westmeath tabled a motion to protect the ‘planter’ tenants. He suggested that the section 
of the bill dealing with the reinstatement of evicted tenants should not apply to holdings 
which were occupied on 1 January 1903. The landlords in the house held that the 
amendment would remove the ‘opportunity to the agitators to bring great pressure on the 
tenants of evicted holdings to surrender their holdings’.133 Despite the assurances of the 
marquess of Lansdowne, secretary of state for foreign affairs, that there was no danger 
of the ‘planter’ tenants being forced to surrender their holdings, the amendment went to 
a division where it was defeated by 71 votes to 61.134
VIII). The retention of sporting and mineral rights.
During the committee stage, the issue of sporting and mineral rights came to the fore, 
sparking impassioned debate. The preservation of sporting rights was viewed as pivotal 
in any effort to persuade the landed gentry to remain on in Ireland after they had sold 
their land. Wyndham considered the sporting rights to be a great national asset which 
was worthwhile protecting. Under the 1903 Land Act the expression sporting rights 
included ‘any right of hunting, shooting, fishing, and taking game or fish on any 
land’.135
Many of the tenants’ representatives felt that the sporting rights should pass to 
the tenant-purchasers upon the completion of the sale. The psychological aspect of the 
question was obvious. Having waited so long to purchase their land, the tenant- 
purchasers had no intention of allowing outsiders to traverse their property. According to 
William Redmond, M.P. for East Clare: ‘if they said that the tenants when they bought 
their land were to allow strangers to trespass in pursuit of game they would raise very 
great trouble indeed in Ireland’.136
Ij2 Ibid., cxxvii, 21 (6 Aug. 1903).
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The Liberal M.P. for North Tyrone, Charles Hemphill, found it absurd that the
tenant would not possess the sporting rights on his own land.137 The independent
nationalist M.P., T. M. Healy, argued that the tenants should be given a reduction in
price if the landlord reserved the game. He also recommended that the sporting rights be
vested in the county councils or the Agricultural Board, with the landlord having the
right of pre-emption.138 Despite Wyndham and Redmond both recommending that the
landlord and the tenants should negotiate an agreement themselves the debate dragged
on. With the committee seemingly having reached a stalemate, the solicitor-general for
England, Sir Edward Carson, came up an amendment that proved satisfactory to all in
the House of Commons:
Where at the time of sale of any land to the Land Commission, or to tenants or 
others, the vendor has, subject to the provisions of the Ground Game Act, 1880, 
the exclusive sporting rights, those rights may, by agreement between the 
landlord and the tenant, either conveyed to the tenant or reserved to the 
landlord.139
Members of the House of Lords remained uneasy however. Lord Massy, a
Munster landlord, opined that the retention of the sporting rights would be significant in
enticing landlords to remain on in Ireland. It was, therefore, essential that they be
reserved to the landlords or a government authority that would have the means to
maintain them. Lord Massy summed up the situation as follows:
Their [landlords] object in trying to protect the game was to try and induce 
British sportsmen to come over to Ireland, where they would have something to 
shoot, and to spend their money in the country. To attain that object they thought 
the best thing would be, where an estate was sold under this bill, not to hand over 
the sporting rights to the tenants, who would have perhaps, neither the power nor 
the inclination to preserve the game on their holdings, many of which were so 
ridiculously small that they could not preserve the game, but to vest the sporting 
rights in the Land Commission: to give the vendor the primary right to buy the 
rights if he wished, but if he did not wish to do so the Land Commission should 
dispose of them as they thought fit.140
137 Ibid., col. 945.
138 Ibid., col. 938-9. Pre-em ption essentially m eant that where the rights were put up for sale the landlord 
had the first option to purchase ahead o f anybody else.
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The landlords in the House of Lords were adamant that if the sporting rights were given
to the tenant-purchasers, they would soon be of little value because small farmers had
not the means to maintain the game. Their fears were allayed to a degree by a
successfully carried amendment proposed by the marquis of Lansdowne. This stated that
if the landlord held the rights he retained them, but where the landlord and tenants failed
to agree, the rights would be vested in the Land Commission.141
The whole area of mineral rights would prove similarly taxing to negotiate. The
landlords’ position was straightforward. They wanted to be able to retain their rights
even after sale or receive financial compensation for them. In the House of Commons
the Conservative M.P. John Butcher, a landlord spokesman, proposed an amendment
which would guarantee that the Irish landlords would retain the mineral rights:
The object of his amendment was to preserve the mining rights and water rights 
to those whom they now belonged by law... The effect of the amendment would 
be that where a bargain for the sale of any land was made, based as it would be 
on the agricultural value of the land, the mining rights should remain exactly as 
they were. It could not be right that the tenants, or the Land Commission should 
be given these rights unless they paid for them, and the amendment proposed that 
the Land Commission, should be empowered to purchase them.142
Landlords also asserted that they ought to be compensated for what lay under the surface 
in addition to what was above ground. Colonel Saunderson posed the question: ‘Could it 
be conceived that the owner would sell his land at its surface value when that which was 
under the surface was worth ten times as much.’143 If the rights were to be given to the 
new tenant-purchasers or vested in the Land Commission, landowners wanted to be 
financially compensated. Furthermore, there was a fear that existing mines or similar 
operations would be interfered with.
The I.P.P. was outraged by the landlords’ position. They held that once the 
landlord had sold, all rights should either pass to the tenants or to the Land Commission. 
They cited the landlords’ position as a further example of their greed. According to 
James Flynn M.P. for North Cork: ‘The amendment was a most fantastical proposition, 
put forward on behalf of a section of the community who were already getting
141 Ibid., col. 68.
142 Ibid., cxxiv, 968-9 (30 June 1903).
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exceptionally generous terms.’ 144 The party were also concerned that the tenants would 
be unable to use any sand or gravel on his holding after he had purchased.
The attorney-general for Ireland, John Atkinson, rose to clarify the position of 
the government:
It would...be impossible for small proprietors reasonably to develop such rights, 
and so the bill provided that the mining rights should be vested in the 
commission, and disposed of by them in a maimer to be provided by parliament. 
It was felt that the Land Commission, if they held the mining rights of a couple 
of hundred small properties, might be able to develop them in a manner that the 
individual tenant could not. By an amendment lower on the paper, the chief 
secretary proposed to secure to the tenant-purchaser the right of mining and 
taking stone, gravel, sand, or clay, not merely for the cultivation of his farm, but 
for sale. On the other hand, other minerals, such as ores and so forth, would be 
vested in the commission.145
Butcher reluctantly dropped his proposed amendment after the chief secretary assured 
him that the commission would not interfere with any mine or a commercial enterprise 
already in operation on a landlord’s estate.146
Once the bill entered the House of Lords, the earl of Donoughmore moved to 
ensure that landlords would be adequately compensated for mineral rights on their lands. 
He proposed that where mineral rights vested in the Land Commission were ‘let, leased, 
sold, or demised by them, the vendor.. .shall be entitled to receive 50 per cent of any 
rent, purchase money, or other net profit received by the Land Commission’.147 Thus, 
under the proposed amendment, the landlord would receive half the profits of any future 
development of the minerals. The lord chancellor of Ireland, Lord Ashbourne, declared 
that he had discussed the matter with Wyndham, who was willing to accept the proposal 
if it was reduced from 50 % to 25 %.148
Upon returning to the House of Commons for consideration, the earl of 
Donoughmore’s controversial amendment caused uproar. The independent nationalist 
M.P., T. M. Healy, considered that ‘a more grasping and greedy proposal could not have
144 Ibid.
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been suggested’.149 Healy asked that it only apply during the life of the landlord or for
twenty years after the passing of the act and he proposed an amendment to
Donoughmore’s amendment to replace the 25 % cent with one 1 %.150
The government justified their willingness to agree to the 25 % in order to
facilitate land purchase going ahead. Wyndham held that the amendment was directed
toward estates where minerals did exist and that it would be most unlikely for a landlord
to sell his land without the minerals being taken into account:
He held that what would most probably happen would be that, where there was 
such property containing minerals, the state, would buy out the mineral rights by
paying the 25 per cent, or else the owner having sold the thing out and out,
would buy the mineral rights back from the state, and come in not as a landlord, 
but as a man who bought capital and enterprise to the development of the mineral 
resources of Ireland.151
The opposition to the 25 % was such that Healy’s amendment went to a division of the
house where it was defeated by 102 votes to 70.152 The 25 % was eventually
incorporated into the bill.
Under the act the Estates Commission had the power to acquire the ‘exclusive 
right of mining and taking minerals, and digging and searching for minerals, on or
153under...land’. The rights of the tenant-purchasers were catered for by excluding the 
taking of any stone, gravel, sand and clay which they might need for personal use. The 
clause did not extend to demesnes or other land repurchased by the vendor under clause 
three (sale and repurchase of demesnes) or to mines already in operation. Any future 
development of the mineral rights was to be decided by parliament. The former owner 
was to be allocated 25 % of any future profits made from the land unless the Estates 
Commission bought out his interest, which they were free to do at any time subject to 
consultation with the treasury. In order to utilise their sporting and mineral rights, people 
were authorised to enter onto land so long as they compensated the owner for any 
damage caused.154 Mineral rights in sales under the act had to be reserved ‘by express
149 Ibid., col. 1049 (12 Aug. 1903).
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declaration and words inserted in the vesting order or fiated agreement’.155 Clause 
ninety-nine provided that the act had no bearing on sporting, mineral or water rights not 
held by the owner at the time of sale. Any quarry or mine which was in operation or an 
entitlement to water power that was being used by the owner was exempt.156
IX). Congested Districts.
The debates on the clauses dealing with the congested districts were almost completely 
dominated by the I.P.P. Although they considered the C.D.B. a useful organisation they 
wanted to see greater progress in its work. The I.P.P. saw the congested districts section 
as one of the most important areas of the bill and were very disappointed with those 
clauses. John Dillon announced that this section ‘of the bill was still very defective’.157 
William O’Brien emphasised the importance of that aspect of the bill and the need for 
amendment:
He [William O’Brien] was afraid that the congested districts clauses of the bill 
were its weakest part. Had it not been for the congested districts difficulty they 
would never have had that bill, and it could not be too strongly stated that if the 
principal object of the bill was the peace of Ireland it ran a serious risk of failure 
unless these clauses were very materially altered for the better, and unless above 
all the Congested Districts Board could be in some way stimulated and spurred
1 c o
on to more rapid progress.
Like O’Brien, T. W. Russell realised the importance of the section dealing with
the congested districts and the need to adequately address the question:
The present bill was imperfect, perhaps not to the same degree as previous bills, 
but still imperfect, in that it would not settle the great problem in the west of 
Ireland. They were now dealing with a part of the country where revolutions 
were made. There would have been very few land bills had it not been for this 
area, and he felt convinced that in leaving this question unsettled they were 
leaving the Irish land question unsolved. He [T. W. Russell] had never said that 
this bill would settle the Irish land question. What he had said was that it would 
put everything in the way of settlement. He was not very sure that it would put 
the congested districts even in the way of settlement.159
155 ‘Provisional rules under the Irish Land Act, 1903 (Sections 1 to 23), 23 October, 1903’ cited in Cherry 
and M axwell (eds), Irish Land  Acts, p. 1168.
156 Irish Land Act, 1903,99.
157 Ibid., cxxiv, 1486 (6 July 1903).
158 Ibid., col. 1475.
159 Ibid., col. 1485.
125
The I.P.P.’s grievances centred on a number of key issues including the fact that 
the principal obstacle the board faced was insufficient funding to purchase untenanted 
land and to effect improvements. Due to their financial inadequacies the amount of 
untenanted land that could have been purchased had been restricted. When the board 
purchased estates or untenanted land the delay in carrying out of their operations was a 
source of grievance. The board tended to be overly paternalistic and operated what 
William O’Brien referred to as a system of ‘benevolent despotism’.160 The I.P.P. argued 
that the board needed to be reorganised and its operations accelerated.
Under the bill the C.D.B. would receive an augmented income of £90,000
annually as well as approximately £1,250,000 extra to buy untenanted land.161
Nonetheless, there was a significant demand for compulsory powers to be granted to the
C.D.B. or at least the right of pre-emption. While compulsory purchase would force the
landlord to sell to the board, pre-emption simply gave the board the first call on any land
that a landlord chose to sell. The I.P.P. feared that unless such powers were granted it
would prove impossible to acquire sufficient untenanted land to alleviate congestion and
to assist in migration. While land purchase was important in itself, the social and
economic position of the people on the land would never be improved unless their
holdings were enlarged through the acquisition of the grasslands. As William O Brien
outlined: ‘The great point was not merely to get possession of the land in derelict
districts, but to take the people out of the morasses, and buy for them the magnificent
plains that were waiting to be colonised. That was the only real remedy for the present 
• 162state of things.’ This was symptomatic of the problems which lay ahead and which 
found a focus in the Ranch War.16j Although the I.P.P. and independent nationalists 
moved amendments in favour of compulsory purchase and of pre-emption, they were 
flatly rejected by the government.
Animosity towards the grazier class was quite evident during the debates in the 
committee stage on the congested districts especially from the I.P.P. who represented
160 Ibid., col. 1476.
161 Ibid., col. 1483.
162 Ibid., col. 1484.
163 See chapter six.
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these areas. According to John Roche M.P. for East Galway: ‘The grazing system was in
his opinion a greater curse to their country than landlordism, and he would never cease
agitating until the rich grazing lands now practically lying idle were made available for
dealing with the difficulty of congestion.’164 There was a fear that graziers would
manage to avail of the act to purchase tracts of untenanted land that was urgently wanted
to treat congestion and to enlarge uneconomic holdings. Demands for specific terms in
the act against the grazier class were dismissed by the chief secretary who declared that
to ‘legislate against graziers as a class would be an act of economic insanity’.165
Wyndham held that there were sufficient safeguards in the bill to ensure that congestion
was adequately addressed without penalising the grazier class.
The constitution of the C.D.B. was in need of review as far as the I.P.P. were
concerned. There was a strong movement in favour of securing some form of elected
representation on the board. During the committee stage Dr. Edward Thompson, M.P.
for North Monaghan, sought to allow the county councils in the congested districts to
convene to elect two members to the board.166 The I.U.P.P. and landlords were
vehemently opposed to popular representation. Colonel Saunderson argued that such
members would be ‘actuated by political motives’.167 With little prospect of any
concession from the government Thompson withdrew his amendment.
Aside from the board’s constitution the I. P. P. attempted through Conor O’Kelly,
M.P. for Mayo North, to include the whole of the counties Clare, Limerick, Donegal,
Cork and Kerry, as well as all of Connaught in the congested districts:
Several districts in the west were wrongly excluded from the operation of the 
Congested Districts Act, because the board in making their valuations included 
valuations of each grazing rancher so as to artificially increase the valuation per 
head of the population to more than the 30s1. limit.168
Kelly wanted counties as a whole to come under the board’s theatre of operations. As 
matters stood an electoral division did not come under the C.D.B.’s care unless the 
valuation per person was below 30s. The chief secretary sympathised with Kelly’s
164 H ansard 4, cxxiv, 1539 (7 July 1903),
165 Ibid., col. 1569
166 Ibid., col. 1544.
167 Ibid., col. 1550.
168 Ibid., cxxv, 99 (8 July 1903).
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proposal but could not accept it as it ‘was impossible to re-schedule the congested 
districts without altering the fundamental financial provisions of the bill and existing 
acts’.169
Despite the sympathetic stance of the chief secretary the I.P.P. failed to get any 
appreciable changes to the section of the bill dealing with the C.D.B. Their calls for 
compulsory powers, pre-emption, elected representation and an enlargement of the 
C.D.B.’s jurisdiction came to nought. At an early stage in the debates William O’Brien 
had appealed to Wyndham to be generous and emphasised the importance of the section 
dealing with the congested districts: ‘By proportionate concessions being made here a 
greater work would be done towards the settlement of the land question than would be 
accomplished by forty land acts as they had had in the past.’170 Indeed for many Irish 
M.P.s such as John Dillon the congested districts question was ‘the root and source of all 
the trouble’.171 The independent nationalist M.P., Jasper Tully, was incensed over the 
condition of the congested districts portion of the bill: ‘In his opinion the congested 
districts were boycotted by this bill, and the clauses dealing with them were not worth 
the paper they were written on. ’172
Despite his sympathetic words Wyndham had ignored virtually all of the 
demands of the I.P.P. regarding the congested districts. With the new resources allocated 
to the C.D.B Wyndham was confident that it would make greater progress than ever 
before. The problem of congestion outside the scheduled districts was addressed by 
giving the estates commissioners similar powers to the C.D.B. for dealing with such 
cases. Indeed Wyndham announced that the government’s ‘plan for dealing with the
1 77problem of congestion was scattered all through... [the] bill’.
Although he hoped that the congested districts clauses of the bill would be given
a fair trial Wyndham did admit that they had suffered from neglect:
He admitted that the congested portions of the bill had suffered at the expense of 
the main provisions of the bill... The point of all he had said was that it was not 
possible for a minister in charge of a bill of this magnitude to elaborate every 
part of it in order to meet the wishes of hon. members, however reasonable they
169 Ibid., col. 104.
170 Ibid., cxxiv, 1483 (6 July 1903).
171 Ibid., col. 1488.
172 Ibid., col. 1491.
173 Ibid., col. 1557 (7 July 1903).
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might be: and having achieved what all his colleagues on the board had long 
desired-viz., the power of buying land when it came into the market, and of 
applying working capital to the land in order to cure congestion, all he asked was 
that they should be allowed during the autumn and winter to take up those 
facilities and turn them to the best account.174
John Dillon lambasted Wyndham for his failure to devote more time and resources 
towards the C.D.B. For such M.P.s the congested districts question was the Irish land 
question in its most acute form. The fact that Wyndham had allowed the relevant clauses 
of the bill to suffer was seen as deplorable. For the I.P.P. members both the urgency and 
merit of the congested districts question ought to have occupied Wyndham’s attention 
before any other. Considering the disappointment in the west over the act and the 
subsequent renewal of agrarian agitation Wyndham might have taken heed of Conor 
O’Kelly’s warning:
By satisfying Connaught the government would have one of the best guarantees 
for public peace in Ireland, but if they had a dissatisfied and disaffected 
Connaught, they would find that this bill, instead of producing peace, would 
leave behind it a record of disappointed hopes.173
Under the act the C.D.B. could buy estates just like the estates commissioners. 
The finance the C.D.B. needed to acquire land and sanction advances was provided by 
the Land Commission. They could decide whether or not there was adequate security for 
any advance made by them to a tenant-purchaser and the Land Commission would be
1 7obliged to authorise the advance.
Where the C.D.B carried out improvements on an estate which subsequently 
caused the holdings to be sold at a higher price, the Land Commission paid the 
difference between the old and the new price to the board.177 On the issue of untenanted 
land, the quantity the board could hold in terms of valuation was thirty times the interest
178on the Church Surplus Grant. Prior to the 1903 act, the C.D.B. obtained most of its
174 Ibid.
175 Ibid., col. 1483 (6 July 1903).




income from the interest on the grant. The grant of £1,500,000 provided approximately 
£41,250 annually.179
X). The position of the agricultural labourers.
Of all the groups within Irish agricultural society who had hoped to benefit from the 
Wyndham Act none were more disappointed than the agricultural labourers. Under the 
act agricultural labourers were defined as ‘any person (other than a domestic or menial 
servant) working for hire in a rural district whose wages...do not exceed two shillings
and sixpence a day and who is not in occupation of land exceeding one quarter of an
180acre’. Since the bill was introduced late in the parliamentary session, time was at a
premium. When the section of the bill dealing with the labourers was reached there was
little time to spare and there was an urgent need to conclude the bill before the end of the
session. As the bill was already overloaded Wyndham had brushed over the labourers
question in order to focus on other areas.
Early on in the committee stage in the House of Commons it became evident that
the labourers’ question was not adequately dealt with. T. W. Russell decreed that ‘there
was nothing in this bill which would make anything like a settlement of the labourers’ 
181question’. Wyndham acknowledged as much and agreed to facilitate the labourers as
much as possible in the bill but to introduce another separate bill if necessary:
He [Wyndham] did not say that these clauses were a satisfactory settlement of 
the labourers’ question, which must be hereafter dealt with. Not only was it a 
large and complicated question, dependent on finance, local government and 
other questions, but alternative methods of dealing with it were recommended by 
different sections of the house. He had therefore come, with the greatest regret, 
to the conclusion that it would not be possible to deal with the subject, as it 
should be dealt with, in the bill. It was, however, desirable to retain the 
labourers’ clauses, as they were of some value.182
All Irish M.P.s were deeply concerned that the labourers would be abandoned. They 
pressed Wyndham for an assurance that a separate bill would be introduced in the next 
parliamentary session. Eventually the chief secretary promised that ‘he would undertake
179 W illiam F. Bailey, ‘Ireland since the famine. A sketch o f fifty years’ econom ic and legislative change’ 
in Journal o f  the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society o f  Ireland, xi, no. 83 (1902/03), p. 148.
180 Irish Land Act, 1903, 93.
181 H ansard 4, cxxv, 36 (8 July 1903).
182 Ibid., col. 36.
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to give the matter his consideration during the autumn’.183 Irish M.P.s understood him to 
mean that a bill would be introduced in the following year.
There was naturally great disappointment at the inadequacy of the labourers’ 
clauses among the members of the I.P.P. John Murphy, M.P. for East Kerry, emphasised 
that ‘the land agitation was due primarily to the condition of the congested districts and 
the condition of the agricultural labourers’.184 There was a sense, despite Wyndham’s 
assurance, that the labourers were being abandoned in order to secure a significant boon 
for the tenant farmers. The I.U.P.P. was equally dissatisfied with the bill’s treatment of 
the labourers. John Gordon, M.P. for Londonderry South, warned that in the north of 
Ireland ‘very great disappointment would be felt among the labourers in that part of the 
country if nothing adequate was done for them in this measure’.185
The introduction of Wyndham’s bill had raised expectations among the labourers 
who anticipated a share of the untenanted lands. James O’Shee, M.P. for West 
Waterford (I.P.P.), emphasised that ‘in the south of Ireland the great question at present 
was not the amendment of the Labourers’ Acts.. .but as to whether the labourers were to 
get allotments of land’.186 A proposed amendment by O’Shee to provide labourers with 
an allotment of untenanted land was unsuccessful.
In the House of Lords Lord Emly championed the labourers’ cause. He believed 
that the inadequate treatment of the class in the bill would lead to serious consequences: 
‘The land agitation that was now disappearing would be followed by a labour agitation 
of a far worse and more far-reaching character.’187 He proposed an amendment to enable 
labourers, who were in occupation of a cottage received under the Labourers Acts, to 
purchase their residence with the Land Commission advancing the money under the 
same terms as it was advanced to agricultural holdings under the bill. Although the 
proposal was unsuccessful it did demonstrate that many felt that the agricultural 
labourers were being sacrificed for the benefit of the tenant farmers.
As the bill stood labourers whose daily wage was less than 2s. 6d. could apply 
for a cottage under the labourers’ acts but had to get their application signed by six men.
183 Ibid., col. 42-43.
184 Ibid., col. 45.
185 Ibid., col. 46.
186 Ibid., col. 48.
187 Ibid., cxxvii, 340 (7 Aug. 1903).
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A labourer who applied or signed a request for a cottage but who was dismissed within a
year could apply to the courts for compensation due to unfair dismissal because of his
involvement in the matter. Lord Emly moved a motion to include the proviso that if a
labourer was appealing against what he perceived to be a wrongful dismissal, the appeal
should be brought before a county court judge and not a ‘court of summary jurisdiction’
which would contain large farmers who would be biased against the labourer.188
On behalf of the government the duke of Devonshire explained why an appeal
due to wrongful dismissal had been put in the bill in the first place:
In certain parts of Ireland, he [the duke of Devonshire] did not believe in the 
south or west at all, but to a large extent in the north, the Labours (Ireland) Acts 
had been rendered completely nugatory by the action of district councils and the 
tenant farmers. In a great many districts the practice had arisen of intimidating 
labourers from making use of their rights under the Labourers Dwellings Act by 
threatening them with dismissal, or by actually dismissing them.189
Thus, Lord Emly’s proposed amendment was defeated by 66 votes to 48 after a 
division.190
Subsequently, Lord Inchiquin moved to omit the clause altogether. Many Irish 
landlords in the house were opposed to the idea of allowing the dismissed labourer to go 
to court for compensation simply because of his involvement in an application by 
another for a cottage. If such a labourer was incompetent he could not be dismissed 
without the fear he would successfully apply to the courts for compensation, after 
blaming his dismissal on his involvement in an application for a cottage. Lord 
Inchiquin’s proposal was passed by 68 votes to 44 after a division.191 However, the 
clause was later reintroduced after some minor alterations. Following a division of the 
house it was barely carried by 63 votes to 62.192
XI). Trinity College Dublin.
On the final day of the committee stage in the House of Commons Wyndham introduced 
a new clause dealing with the land of T.C.D. which proved to be one of the most
188 Ibid., col. 345.
189 Ibid., col. 348.
190 Ibid., col. 350.
191 Ibid., col. 354.
192 Ibid., col. 632 (10 Aug. 1903).
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controversial clauses in the bill. The new clause would facilitate an annual payment of 
£5,000 to T.C.D. out of the Irish Development Grant, to indemnify the college from any 
loss of income which might accrue under the act. The clause outlined that this loss could 
arise:
from the redemption under the land purchase acts of any superior interest owned 
by the college, that is to say, the difference between the annual income payable 
in respect of the superior interest and the annual income of the investment in
. . . .  193which the redemption money of the superior interest is invested.
Such losses could have a negative effect on the college’s educational capacity.
Wyndham acknowledged that the clause was divisive and felt that it would be difficult
to get it passed. He apologised for introducing such a controversial clause at such a late
stage but admitted that it was the only solution he could see to the question of the T.C.D.
lands a matter which directly affected approximately 10,000 tenants. The chancellor of
the exchequer, Charles Ritchie, had insisted that the matter be met out of Irish money.
Therefore, Wyndham had had to use the Irish Development Grant as it was already in
the bill.194 William O’Brien, however, held that the clause had been inserted to pacify
the solicitor-general for England, Sir Edward Carson, M.P. for T.C.D. who was opposed
to the bill overall.195
The second M.P. for the college in the house was the solicitor-general for
Ireland, James Campbell. He pointed out that the Trinity College Leasing and Perpetuity
Act had been passed in 1851, at the request of the lessees who rented the land off the
college and sublet it to the tenants, to standardise the dealings between them and T.C.D.:
The principal object of that act was to bring relief to the lessees, and to accede to 
their request to have their tenure changed from terminable lease into perpetuity. 
That act went on to provide that Trinity College should be at liberty to give 
leases for a period not longer than ninety-nine years, provided the rent was not 
less than three-fourths of the annual value of the land, but it also gave an 
alternative right to the lessees to demand a lease and grant in perpetuity.. .subject 
to a rent fixed upon a basis having reference to standard commodities.196
By 1903 T.C.D. owned approximately 200,000 acres the vast majority of which was 
held by landlords who paid the college a head rent. These landlords in turn sublet the
193 Ibid., cxxv, 53 (8 July 1903).
194 Ibid., col. 50-3.
195 See O ’Brien, An olive branch in Ireland, p. 245.
196 Hansard 4, cxxv, 65 (8 July 1903).
133
land to tenants and the rents paid by these intermediary landlords were subject to the 
Trinity College Leasing and Perpetuity Act, 1851 which were up for examination every 
ten years. Due to the rent reductions which judicial tenants had received, in 1881 and 
1896, the middlemen had had their rent reduced by approximately 44 %. However, since 
the leasing and perpetuity act of 1851, the middlemen had had their head rent to T.C.D. 
increased by approximately 31 %.197 The commodities upon which the head rent was 
based were mutton, butter, beef, oats and wheat. James Campbell M.P. maintained these 
middlemen had made considerable profit between 1851 and 1881. While the price of the 
commodities upon which the middlemen’s rent was based had risen from the 1880s, the 
rent the middlemen charged the tenants had, in many cases, received two major
reductions in the land courts. Campbell held that this was no fault of T.C.D. as it had
198faithfully upheld their part of the bargain made with the middlemen.
The opposition of the I.P.P. to the new clause was intense as the whole area of
Irish education and the Catholic university question were unavoidably dragged into the
debate. Their opposition centred on a number of key issues. Firstly, there was little
sympathy for T.C.D., as many other landlords would also be put in a similar position by
the bill yet they would not be receiving compensation. According to John Redmond:
The right hon. gentleman said that Trinity College was in a peculiar position: that 
it had leased out its land at long leases: that the middlemen had re-let to other 
tenants: and that the land could not be sold under this bill without inflicting a loss 
on Trinity College. But Trinity College was not the only landlord in that position. 
Other landlords had leased their property in the same way, and they would lose 
out just as Trinity College would lose...Yet there was to be no provision made 
for dealing with them: and Trinity was to be specially selected to receive this
199compensation.
Much anger was generated over the fact that money for T.C.D. would be taken 
out of the Irish Development Grant. The grant consisted of £185,000 and was the Irish 
counterpart of the English education grant. It was liable for any loss which accrued from 
the flotation of stock to raise finance for land purchase. In addition, annual charges of
197 Ibid., cxxvii, 99-104 (6 Aug. 1903).
198 Ibid., cxxv, 64-70 (8 July 1903).
199 Ibid., col. 55.
134
£50,000 for the Irish Land Purchase Fund (until 31 Mar. 1907) and £20,000 for the 
C.D.B. were to come out of the grant.
T.C.D. was viewed as an exclusively Protestant college and its representatives in 
parliament were openly opposed to a Catholic university. The fact that money set aside 
for Irish education was to be diverted to a university for a privileged minority for non- 
educational purposes was a bitter pill for the I.P.P. to swallow. The question arose as to 
why T.C.D. was to receive preferential treatment when other bodies such as Maynooth 
College and the Presbyterian Church were in a similar position under the bill.
John Dillon objected that such an issue had been raised so late in the passage of 
the bill and he was disgusted that the labourers question had been brushed over only to 
have the matter of compensation to T.C.D. raised. He urged the chief secretary to deal 
with the issue in a separate bill in the next session.200 T.M. Healy was not enamoured 
with the clause either but felt that there was no alternative but to accept it in order to 
give the large number of T.C.D. tenants, who let their land from middlemen, a chance to 
purchase their holdings. However, he found the use of the Irish Development Grant very 
inappropriate:
It seemed to be an irony of fate that this development grant, which was the
equivalent grant to which Ireland was entitled in respect of the grant for
education, should go not to the unfortunate national schools of the country but
should go in relief of one of the one exclusive university in the country which
had distinguished itself in the late election by pledging the solicitor-general to 
• . . .  201 oppose anything in the nature of a Catholic university.
Healy suggested that Wyndham create a commission to look into the T.C.D. dilemma 
whose report would then have to be followed by the estates commissioners. 
Opposition to the T.C.D. clause was forced to a division where the Conservative 
government was successful by 197 votes to 134.203
On the report stage of the bill in the House of Commons the position of T.C.D. 
arose again.204 T.W. Russell moved to drop the clause which gave the college £5,000 a
200 Ibid., col. 59-63.
201 Ibid., col. 57.
202 Ibid., col. 57-8.
203 Ibid., col. 86.
204 The report stage follow ed the com m ittee stage and offered M .P.s a final chance to m ake am endm ents to 
the bill before it w ent to the third reading stage.
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year out of the Irish Development Grant. The lack of transparency and accountability in 
terms of exactly where the money was going and who was receiving it were his chief 
concerns. Russell considered the ‘grant of £5,000 to Trinity College as hush money’ and 
it ‘was a job of the first magnitude’.205 John Dillon considered the grant to T.C.D. ‘a 
most scandalous job’.206 The justification for it was that it would help the tenants to 
purchase, but there was little confidence amongst many Irish M.P.s that the money 
would be of any benefit to the T.C.D. middlemen and would not encourage them to sell. 
Wyndham was confident that the money would assist the tenants and the amendment 
was rejected.207 T. M. Healy’s suggestion that a commission be established to investigate 
the issue was, later in fact, adopted by the government. It would consist of Healy, Lord 
Justice Gerald Fitzgibbon and George F. Trench.
In the House of Lords efforts were made to assist the middlemen to sell under the 
measure. Many doubted whether the middlemen would sell because after T.C.D. had 
taken its portion to redeem the head rents and after the costs of sale had been paid, the 
profit remaining would be quite small. Therefore, to facilitate the middlemen selling the 
earl of Donoughmore wanted a proviso to enable T.C.D. to lower the rents they charged 
the middlemen. This would be achieved by making the rents the college charged the 
middlemen subject to the fair rent provisions of the 1881 Land Act and allow them the 
same reductions judicial tenants had received in 1881 and 1896. Although the 
amendment received support from a number of Irish landlords in the house the 
government refused to deviate from their position. Other suggestions that the middlemen 
receive an extra ‘bonus’ or a double ‘bonus’ to facilitate the sale of their lands were 
equally unsuccessful.208
XII). The response to the act.
The reaction to the act which was passed by parliament was, in the main, enthusiastic as 
far as Irish opinion went. The I.P.P. welcomed it as a significant act albeit imperfect. 
Redmond acknowledged that it was a genuine attempt by the government and he
205 H ansard 4, cxxv, 1064 (17 July 1903).
206 Ibid., col. 1066.
207 Ibid., col. 1068-69.
208 Ibid., cxxvii, 108-11 (6 Aug. 1903).
136
p ro m ised  it w o u ld  rece iv e  a  fa ir  tria l. H o w ev er, he  w as  sw ift to  em p h asise  th a t  it w as a
g o v ern m en t m easu re  and  th a t th e  re sp o n sib ility  lay  w ith  them . H e m a in ta in ed  th a t  the
L an d  C o n feren ce  te rm s h ad  been  d ep a rted  fro m  in  a n u m b er o f  a reas w h ich  en su red  it
w o u ld  no t so lve  the  lan d  q u estio n .209 T h ere  w ere  a  n u m b er o f  a reas w h ere  th e  I.P .P .
w e re  q u ite  d issa tisfied . T h e  p ro v is io n s reg a rd in g  th e  co n g es ted  d is tric ts  an d  the
ag ricu ltu ra l lab o u re rs  w ere  he ld  to  be  w h o lly  in ad eq u a te , a lth o u g h  th ey  h ad  m an ag e d  to
o b ta in  a  p led g e  fro m  W y n d h am  tha t a sep ara te  lab o u re rs ’ b ill w o u ld  be  in tro d u ced  in  the
n e x t p a rliam en ta ry  session .
O n the  q u es tio n  o f  th e  ev ic ted  ten an ts  th e re  w ere  so m e do u b ts as to  w h e th e r th e
a c t ac tu a lly  p ro v id ed  th e  m ean s to  re so lv e  the  p ro b lem . L ik ew ise , th ere  w as som e
un ease  o v er the  p rice s  th a t w o u ld  be g iven  u n d e r th e  p rice  ‘z o n e s ’. Jo h n  D illo n  p re d ic ted
th a t th ey  w o u ld  e s tab lish  a fa lse  standard  o f  p rice  and  h e  b em o an e d  th e  fac t th a t the
‘b o n u s ’ w as n o t d is trib u ted  at a  h ig h er rate. A s it w as  th e re  w as ro o m  fo r co n flic t
b e tw een  lan d lo rd s  and  ten an ts  over the  p rice .210 E q u a lly  th e  re a lity  th a t the  w ea lth ie r
lan d lo rd s  w o u ld  rece iv e  a  la rg e r ‘b o n u s ’ th an  th o se  w h o  w ere  m o re  im p o v erish ed
th rea ten ed  to  lead  to  a s ta lem ate  as reg ard s  sa les in  th e  p o o re r a reas o f  th e  w est.
T h e  ad m in is tra tio n  o f  the  ac t w o u ld  be c ru c ia l acco rd in g  to  the  I.P .P . I f  it w as
ad m in is te red  in  w h a t th ey  co n sid ered  a co n c ilia to ry  sp irit th e n  m an y  o f  th e ir
ap p reh en sio n s w o u ld  d isappear. W illiam  O ’B rien  id en tified  the  p rin c ip a l flaw s in  the
m easu re  as the  ab sen ce  o f  d ecad al red u c tio n s, the  ab sen ce  o f  a tim e lim it fo r th e  ‘b o n u s ’
211 •an d  the  fa ilu re  to  p ro v id e  a  la rger ‘b o n u s ’ to th e  lan d lo rd s . A cco rd in g  to  O ’B rien  
th ese  w ere  th e  a reas  w h ere  the g o v ern m en t h ad  d ep a rted  fu rth e s t fro m  th e  L an d  
C o n feren ce  report.
F o r th e  ac t to  be  a  success fo r the  I.P .P . th e re  w ere  a n u m b er o f  g o a ls  th a t h ad  to 
be  realised . T h e  ev ic ted  ten an ts  w o u ld  hav e  to be re in s ta ted , th e  C .D .B . w o u ld  h av e  to  
acce le ra te  an d  im p ro v e  its operations, the  p ro m ise  o f  a  sep a ra te  lab o u re rs  b ill w o u ld  
hav e  to  be  fu lfilled  an d  th e  p rices  p a id  by  th e  ten an ts  fo r th e ir  h o ld in g s  co u ld  no t be  
exo rb itan t. W h ile  th ey  h e ld  th a t the  act co n ta in ed  a n u m b er o f  d efec ts  th ey  w ere  w illin g  
to  g ive it a fa r tria l as it w as still reg ard ed  as a g reat m easu re . A s reg a rd s  th e  q u es tio n  o f
209 Ibid., cxxv, 1322-9 (21 July 1903).
210 Ibid., col. 1340-7.
211 Ibid., col. 1351-2.
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h o m e ru le  th ey  ad h e red  to  th e ir b e lie f  th a t th e  ac t w o u ld  o n ly  fu rth e r th e  case  fo r self- 
governm en t.
W h ile  th e  ac t rece iv ed  the royal a ssen t on  14 A u g u st 1903 it d id  n o t co m e  in to
o p e ra tio n  un til 1 N o v em b er. D esp ite  h is av o w al o n  the th ird  read in g  th a t it w o u ld
212rece iv e  a fa ir  tria l, Jo h n  D illo n  q u ick ly  v o iced  h is  d is tru st o f  the  n e w  act. O n  25
A u g u st h e  spoke  at S w in fo rd , Co. M ayo  w h ere  he a ttack ed  th e  w h o le  co n c ep t o f
co n c ilia tio n  w ith  the land lo rds. T he Freeman’s Journal repo rted :
To th e  am az em en t o f  som e o f  us o ld  cam p a ig n ers , w e h ea r Ir ish  lan d lo rd s  ta lk in g  
o f  co n c ilia tio n , and  o f  in ten tio n  to  go in to  co n fe ren ces  w ith  th e  lead e r o f  th e  Irish  
p a r ty . . .w h en  th e  lan d lo rd s ta lk  o f  co n c ilia tio n , w h a t do th ey  w an t?  T h ey  w a n t 25 
y e a rs ’ p u rch ase  o f  th e ir la n d . . . I  am  so fa r scep tica l th a t I h av e  no  fa ith  in  th e  
d o c trin e  o f  co n c ilia tio n .213
D illo n  co m m en ted  th a t h av in g  ach iev ed  so m u ch  by ag ra rian  ag ita tio n  it w o u ld  n o w  be 
fo o lish  to  ch an g e  th e ir  p o licy  and  h e  re co m m en d ed  th a t the  ag ita tio n  b e  ren ew ed  w ith  
even  g rea te r v igour.
R ed m o n d  an d  O ’B rien  w ere  in ten t on  g iv ing  the  b ill a  fa ir ch an ce  an d  ad o p ted  a 
co n c ilia to ry  app roach . T he n a tio n al d irec to ry  o f  the U .I.L . m e t in  D u b lin  o n  8 
S ep tem ber. N o tab ly , th o se  op p o sed  to  the  ac t su ch  as John  D illo n  and  M ich ae l D av itt 
fa iled  to  a ttend . W illiam  O ’B rien  m o v ed  a  list o f  re so lu tio n s  w h ich  can  be  su m m arised  
as fo llo w s; (i). T h e  U .I.T . w e lco m ed  the  ac t w h ich  w as it c la im ed  w as  due  to  th e ir 
cam p a ig n in g  an d  ex p ressed  the  ho p e  it w o u ld  en ab le  all Ir ish m en  to  u n ite  fo r the 
co u n try ’s b en efit, (ii). T h at w h ile  the  ac t fa iled  to  live up to  som e o f  th e  L and  
C o n fe re n c e ’s reco m m en d a tio n s  the  ac t s till w en t fu rth e r th an  any  p re v io u s  p iece  o f  
leg isla tion . T h an k s w as ex p ressed  to  the  I.P .P ., T. W. R u sse ll and  the  U ls te r  ten an ts , th e  
L an d  C o n feren ce  lan d lo rd s , the  L ib era l p a rty  and  G eorge  W y n d h am  an d  h is  a sso c ia te s  
in  go v ern m en t, (iii). T he U.I.L. co u n se lled  that the lan d lo rd /ten an t n eg o tia tio n s  sh o u ld  
be frien d ly  and  am icab le . T he ten an ts  shou ld  p o se  a u n ited  fro n t and  n o t re a c t h astily  to 
o ffe r to  sell. (iv). In  cases w h ere  the  la n d lo rd ’s ask in g  p rice  w as too  h igh , ten an ts  shou ld  
seek  ad v ice  and  n o t do any th in g  ru in o u s to  th em se lv es  or h u rtfu l to  th e  te n an try  in 
general, (v). T h e  U .I.L . co n g ra tu la ted  th e  lab o u re rs on the p led g e  re ce iv ed  fro m
212 Ibid., col. 1340.
213 F.J., 26 Aug. 1903.
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Wyndham to have a labourers bill in the next session of parliament, (vi). The 
administration of the act would have to be closely watched, (vii). That the operation of 
the measure would lead to a greater demand for home rule. All of the resolutions were 
passed amidst general agreement.214
In the interlude between the act receiving the royal assent and 1 November 1903 
Redmond spoke in all four provinces in support of the new act. On 13 September at 
Aughrim, Co. Wicklow at a meeting held under the auspices of the U.I.L., he heralded
• • 215 •the act as ‘the greatest measure of the kind since the union’. Likewise O’Brien made a 
number of public speeches in favour of the act and promoted the spirit of conciliation as 
regards sales negotiations.
T. W. Russell was an enthusiastic supporter of the new act which he regarded as 
‘the greatest measure passed for Ireland since the act of union’.216 However, he 
prophesised that it would not solve the land question and that there would have to be 
further amending bills in the future. Poignantly he identified that the financial provisions
of the act would collapse.217 Russell believed that compulsion would have to be resorted
■ 218to in the future as some landlords simply would not sell under any circumstances.
Furthermore, he was keen to outline to his constituents the benefits that had accrued
from their alliance with the nationalist tenant farmers:
There would have been no land bill but for the sacrifices of the Irish people in 
the west, and other districts of the country. There would have been no land bill 
but for the agitation carried on by their organisations. And all I claim to have 
done is that, at the psychological moment I stood in with them for a great 
purpose, that I did my best to make Ulster a factor in the war, and, that thus 
united, Ireland has secured in an incredibly short space of time, a land bill such 
as no land reformer now living ever expected to see. I say this is the only sane
9 1 Qpolicy for Ireland.
On 9 October 1903 the Ulster Farmers’ and Labourers’ Union held a conference 
in Belfast. R.B. Canghey J.P. presided, and T. W. Russell M.P., James Wood M.P. and
2141.T., 11 Sept. 1903.
215 Ibid., 14 Septem ber 1903. Redmond spoke in D ow n on 27 September, in Roscom m on on 11 October, 
and in Kerry on 25 October.
216 H ansard 4 , cxxv, 1349 (21 July 1903).
217 Ibid., col. 1349.
218 IT., 20 Aug. 1903.
219 Ibid., 8 Oct. 1903.
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Edward Mitchell M.P. were present. The first portion of the meeting was held in private
and a number of resolutions were adopted. These included an appeal to its members to
prepare for an eminent general election and a recognition that compulsory purchase
would have to be used in the future against those landlords who refused to sell. As well
as that there were concerns over the price to be paid for land. The Irish Times reported:
This conference sees with alarm and regret an apparently combined movement 
amongst Irish landlords to demand about 26 years’ purchase of second term 
rents, exclusive of the ‘bonus’, as the basis for sale, and whilst recognising that 
each estate must be judged by its own circumstances, deprecates such terms as
uneconomic, entirely unnecessary to safeguard the landlord from loss against the
220Land Conference, and dangerous to the tenant-purchaser.
Russell, however, declared the act to be ‘a fair and reasonable compromise and 
ought to be worked for all that it is worth’.221 He advised the tenants not to rush into 
bargains and stated that landlords asking for twenty-six years purchase or greater were 
not acting in the spirit of the act. On the issue of the labourers he called for a
continuation of the alliance with the nationalists to resolve the matter and ridiculed the
222poor record of the I.U.P.P. on the land question.
Although the Irish Landowners’ Convention did not meet in the months before 
the act came into operation the measure had secured their approval. The president of the
99  ^convention, the duke of Abercorn, acknowledged the legislation as a ‘great land bill’.
Likewise, the duke of Devonshire, who was an absentee landlord, held that the act was
‘a great attempt to restore agrarian peace in Ireland’.224 However, there was a minority
who were unhappy with the act. Lord Muskerry held that there was a serious peril that
the act would not be a final settlement of the land question and was annoyed with the
government for conceding far too much, in his opinion, to the nationalists:
The government have thrown over their loyal supporters in favour of the 
nationalist party...This bill now before your lordships is in reality a strong step 
to bring home rule about. The whole of this legislation has not only been unjust 
and dishonest, but it has shown great cowardice on the part of successive
220 Ibid., 10 Oct. 1903.
221 Ibid.
222 Ibid.
223 H ansard 4, cxxvii, 811 (11 Aug. 1903).
224 Ibid., col. 824.
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governments, who have prostituted their sense of justice to the outcry of 
agitator’s and for the purpose of gaining a few votes.225
The other prominent landlord organisation, the Land Conference Committee, met 
on 27 August where they issued a statement in favour of the act. Colonel Hutcheson-Poe 
chaired the meeting in the absence of the earls of Dunraven and Mayo. The committee 
expressed their gratitude to the chief secretary for following the recommendations of the 
Land Conference as closely as possible. However, they believed that the adoption of the 
earl of Dunraven’s proposed amendment to allocate the ‘bonus’ at a standard rate of 15 
% would have been a far greater tonic to sales under the act. A resolution to this effect 
was proposed by Lindsay Talbot-Crosbie and seconded by Lord Castletown.226
The I.U.P.P. welcomed the act. The leader of the party, Colonel Edward 
Saunderson, was quite hopeful that it would bring prosperity and peace to Ireland. 
Moreover, he held that the act would increase the loyalty of the people as it would 
remove the land question as a weapon which could be wielded by the nationalist
agitators.227 Similarly, John Lonsdale heralded the new legislation as ‘by far the greatest
228measure of land reform ever passed by any parliament’.
The reaction of the two dominant English parties differed from Irish opinion. The 
leader of the Liberal party, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman declared the act to be ‘more 
than a great agricultural or agrarian reform’, a ‘social and political revolution’. There 
was an appreciation of the statesmanship and skill with which Wyndham had piloted the 
bill through parliament especially as the Liberal leader considered that the chief 
secretary had had little support from his cabinet colleagues during the debates. The fact 
that the bill had been debated almost elusively by Irishmen was held as a justification for 
the claim of self-government. However, there was an element within the Liberal party 
who begrudged the benefits the landlords were to receive, and who feared that the 
tenants would be unable to repay their annuities and that the British taxpayer would 
suffer in the future. Such fears were espoused by George Lambert who compared
225 Ibid., col. 809-10
226 /. 71, 28 Aug. 1903.
227 H ansard 4, cxxv, 1329-33 (21 July 1903).
228 1.T., 31 Oct. 1903.
229 H ansard 4, cxxv, 1336 (21 July 1903).
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Wyndham to a ‘very charming highwayman’ who was putting the imperial credit at 
great risk.230
The Conservatives held that the new act would bring peace and prosperity to 
Ireland and that it would be detrimental to the cause of home rule. Although the Irish 
question would remain there was a hope that with the agrarian element removed much of 
the bitterness and associated problems would be extinguished. The prime minister, A. J. 
Balfour, decreed that the act would forward the cause of the two principal problems
231associated with the land question, namely, land purchase and the congested districts.
XIII). Conclusion.
A common theme expressed in both houses of parliament, especially during the 
committee stages, was that members felt they were working against the clock. It was late 
in the parliamentary session when the serious debating began which meant that certain 
sections of the bill were not discussed as fully as some M.P.s would have liked. William 
O’Brien identified the shortage of time as a major problem: ‘In accordance with the 
usual vile habit as to Irish legislation, the committee stage was deferred to the last weeks 
of the session, when every hour was of gold, and we were forced to debate under the 
incessant threat that, unless the bill reached the House of Lords by a brief date named, it 
must be lost.’232
Wyndham, on a number of occasions, called for proposed amendments which 
were only of minor importance to be dropped in order not to impede the progress of the 
bill. Thus the I.P.P. moved no amendments on the report stage, despite their unhappiness 
with certain aspects of the bill, in order to give it a free run. The question arises as to 
whether or not this was a deliberate ploy by Wyndham to capitalise on the unique 
atmosphere which had been created by the Land Conference, so as to deprive the 
members of the luxury of time which could have led to further contentious issues 
emerging.
Once the actual examination of the bill got underway there were a number of 
issues which dominated the proceedings in both houses. The issue which almost resulted
230 Ibid., col. 1364.
231 Ibid., 1338.
232 O ’Brien, A n olive branch in Ireland, p. 246.
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in the bill’s demise was the ‘zones’. Opposition to the ‘zones’ had been worked up by 
the Freeman’s Journal to the point where Redmond felt he had no choice but to attempt 
to abolish, or at least amend them. The lack of unity in the I.P.P. also came to the fore 
on this issue when Dillon proposed that Redmond should move for the adjournment of 
the debate which would almost certainly have led to the bill’s demise. However, 
following concessions from Wyndham, the Land Conference Committee, the Irish 
Landowners’ Convention and a secret meeting between the chief secretary and 
Redmond, the potentially fatal crisis was resolved.
The appointment of the estate commissioners caused considerable debate. Nearly 
all parties felt that the administration of the act would be the key to its success but the
I.P.P. were especially keen to stress this point. The fact that Frederick Wrench appeared 
to have a different status than the other two commissioners was a cause for grave 
concern. As the bill originally stood Wrench had a higher salary and was exempt from 
parliamentary criticism because his salary was to come out of the consolidation fund. 
Eventually, Wyndham enabled all three commissioners to be subject to parliamentary 
criticism but the difference in salary remained a cause for concern for many tenant 
representatives as it appeared Wrench held a superior position to the other two 
commissioners.
On the issue of the evicted tenants William O’Brien was the principal speaker for 
the I.P.P. Landlord spokesmen such as Colonel Saunderson, while in favour of a 
settlement of the question, did not want the present occupiers of the evicted tenants’ 
holdings to be subject to intimidation as a result of government legislation. The I.P.P. 
denied that there would be any such agitation. The issue was resolved, however, by 
raising the limit of advances available to evicted tenants, from £500 to £1,000, and 
allowing the estates commissioners to go outside this limit in certain special cases. 
Where the old holding could not be acquired they could buy another holding from the 
landlord on the estate or from untenanted land acquired by the estates commissioners.
The section of the act that dealt with the agricultural labourers had been seen as 
completely inadequate by virtually all sides in both houses. The chief secretary was 
eventually compelled to promise that a labourers’ bill would be introduced in the next 
parliamentary session, a promise which was sufficient to pacify the Irish M.P.s.
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Clauses dealing with the congested districts formed a substantial portion of the 
bill. Calls from the I.P.P. and T.W. Russell to grant the C.D.B. compulsory powers or 
the right of pre-emption were rejected by the government. Dr. Edward Thompson’s 
proposal to introduce an element of popular representation onto the board was resisted 
by Colonel Saunderson as he held it would introduce sectarianism onto the board and 
was eventually withdrawn. Wyndham, under the bill, had increased the board’s annual 
income to £90,000 and put aside £1,250,000 to buy untenanted land. A proposed 
amendment Conor O’Kelly to enlarge the areas under the board’s jurisdiction was also 
rejected.
The retention of sporting rights proved to be a topic of major debate. The 
preservation of the game was of crucial importance to the landlord representatives who 
were keen to keep the landlords in the country and to encourage tourists. Many tenant 
representatives held that the tenant ought to hold the rights once he had purchased his 
holding. Conversely, the landlord representatives believed that such an outcome would 
lead to the destruction of the game as the tenant-purchasers would not have the means or 
the capital to maintain them. Eventually and after much debate in both houses, it was 
decided that if the landlord already held the rights he kept them. Where it was unclear or 
there were concurrent rights and the landlord failed to agree with his tenants they would 
be vested in the Land Commission.
Mining rights also caused some heated debate in both houses of parliament. 
Landlord representatives believed that they ought to get some compensation for minerals 
on their land or the future development of them. A proposal by the earl of Donoughmore 
in the House of Lords, in cases where the mineral rights were vested in the Land 
Commission, was altered to entitle the vendor to 25 % of the future profits made out of 
the mineral rights. The measure was passed despite strong opposition from the I.P.P. 
Wyndham, however, ensured that the tenant-purchasers could use the gravel, stone and 
clay of their holdings without violating any law.
The clause dealing with the sale and repurchase of a landlord’s demesne was 
intended to encourage the landlords to remain on in Ireland. T. P. O’Connor tried to 
limit the provision to landlords who had resided in the country for more than six months 
in the last five years and to exclude absentee landlords altogether. The proposed
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amendment was dropped due to the impracticality of proving what a ‘resident landlord’ 
was. Liberal opposition was evident in the proposal of Thomas Aston, seconded by 
Francis Canning, who moved to omit the provision altogether but this proposal was not 
forced to a division.
The maximum limit of an advance to any one tenant was raised to £7,000. When 
the bill had been introduced it had stood at £3,000, and could go up to £5,000 in certain 
circumstances. The I.P.P. were very concerned with preventing graziers benefiting from 
the measure while permitting dairy or tillage farmers to acquire their holdings and the 
final version of the clause expressed that sentiment.
The ‘bonus’ was probably the cornerstone of the whole bill. Its purpose was to 
bridge the gap between what the tenant was able to pay for their holdings and what the 
landlord was willing to accept. There was certainly some truth in the claim by the 
Liberal M.P., Francis Channing, that the ‘bonus’ was a bribe to ensure that the House of 
Lords passed the bill. During the committee stage Channing and Thomas Aston moved 
to abolish the ‘bonus’ as they felt that the British taxpayer was being exploited and that 
if compulsion had been used there would have been no necessity for the £12,000,000. 
Their protests failed to garner sufficient support.
At first the ‘bonus’ was to be allotted at an inverse ratio to the purchase money. 
An amendment by Redmond to fix it at 15 % and have a time limit of five years was 
unsuccessful. Eventually Wyndham fixed it as at a uniform 12 % The amount put aside 
for the ‘bonus’ was felt to be insufficient by many Irish M.P.s and £20,000,000 was 
what many had hoped for as it would ensure there was no room for argument between 
tenants and landlord. However, £12,000,000 was the maximum that Wyndham had been 
able to procure from the treasury although he acknowledged that it would probably fall 
short of what was required.
The clause which indemnified T.C.D. against loss provoked considerable 
controversy. In the event of the middlemen of the college selling, £5,000 was to be taken 
annually from the Irish Development Grant. The clause was introduced on the final day 
of committee in the Commons which left little time for debate and was bitterly opposed 
by the I.P.P. Wyndham apologised but it was probably at Sir Edward Carson’s request 
that the clause was included. The clause was inserted in the bill after a division which
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was almost the only one in the Commons outside of those on the ‘zones’. Many tenant 
representatives consoled themselves that it was the only way that the tenants of T.C.D. 
could avail of the bill.
In the House of Commons the Irish landlords were represented by only a handful 
of members. Colonel Edward Saunderson was the principal Irish landlord representative. 
Sir John Colomb and John Butcher, both representing English constituencies, were also 
to the fore in attending to the needs of landlords. Aside from T. W. Russell, who played 
a prominent role in the debates, the absence of the Ulster unionist members and their 
poor participation during the discussions on the key features of the bill was noteworthy. 
In the House of Lords the Irish landlords were well represented with many large Irish 
landowners taking a prominent role in the discussions. Like the Commons virtually all 
the debates were left to members from Ireland.
On the I.P.P. side John Redmond, William O’Brien and John Dillon were to the 
fore during the discussions on the bill. They were ably supported by numerous other 
M.P.s on various occasions. Notwithstanding the odd interjection from some Liberal and 
Conservative members the bill was essentially debated by Irish representatives.
One of the striking features of the bill’s passing was the level of praise directed 
toward the chief secretary. In both the Commons and the Lords, Wyndham was 
congratulated on the skill, diplomacy and courage with which he had handled the 
measure. The accusation of the Liberal leader Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, on the 
third reading, that Wyndham received little help from his fellow government ministers 
certainly had a strong element of truth. Aside from the prime minister, A. J. Balfour, 
who spoke on a couple of occasions, the chief secretary was left to steer the bill’s 
passage on his own. Carson, Atkinson and Campbell spoke on small matters that 
concerned them and could hardly be said to have been pillars of support for Wyndham. 
The fact that the chief secretary was often almost a solitary figure, in his attempts to 
further the bill’s progress, revealed much about the attitude of his cabinet colleagues 
towards the measure.
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CHAPTER FOUR: ‘AN IMMENSE SOCIAL REVOLUTION’: THE SALE OF
ESTATES.1
I). Introduction.
The terms of the Wyndham Land Act proved very enticing to landowners in Ireland and 
when it came into operation on 1 November 1903 there was a rush to avail of the act. By 
31 December 1904 the applications for advances to tenant-purchasers totalled 
£15,439,256. Just over £12,500,000 of that sum related to direct sales between landlord 
and tenants.2 Landlords preferred to deal directly with their tenants as opposed to selling 
to the estates commissioners or the C.D.B. The advantages to the landlord of a direct 
sale to his tenants were obvious. So long as the purchase price agreed upon fell within 
the ‘zones’, the agreement had to be sanctioned by the Land Commission. In a sale to 
the commissioners or the C.D.B. the price they offered the landlord was based upon an 
evaluation of the estate. There was no such visit in direct sales. Therefore, the landlord 
had greater room in which to manoeuvre and he could try to convince his tenants to 
agree to a higher price than he might otherwise obtain.
Fears had been expressed in parliament that landlords, once they had sold, would 
abandon their residences and leave the country. The ad interim report of the estates 
commissioners for the period up to 31 December 1904 quickly dispelled those fears. The 
commissioners found that in virtually every case up to 31 December 1904 landlords had 
kept their demesnes and houses or repurchased them under clause three. The mass 
exodus of landlords from the country had not materialised. One of the objectives of the 
estates commissioners was to enable the resident landowners ‘to repurchase so much of 
the untenanted land in his occupation as he may require for the purposes of a home farm 
and amenities of a country gentleman’s life’.4 The commissioners had to balance this 
with cases where there were uneconomic holdings and where the landlord wished to 
retain more untenanted land than they deemed necessary for him to enjoy the lifestyle of 
a country gentleman. Thus landlords had the option of effectively becoming comfortable 
members of the farming class.
1 John M orley Liberal, M .P., H ansard A, cxxii, 127 (7 M ay 1903).
2 A d  interim report o f  the estates com m issioners fo r  the p er io d  fro m  I '1 November, 1903, to 3 1'1 December, 
1904, 25 [Cd. 2471], H.C. 1905, xxii, 177.
3 Ibid., p. 9
4 Ibid.
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Under the terms of the 1903 act, the ‘bonus’ that was to be given to landlords 
upon sale was up for consideration after five years. The 12 % ‘bonus’ rate was 
guaranteed up until 1 November 1908. Correctly identifying that the ‘bonus’ was to be 
reduced and fearing that it might be abolished altogether, Irish landlords rushed to take 
advantage of the act before the deadline. With a Liberal government in power from early 
1906 and a new land bill in the pipeline, the generous terms of the Wyndham Act looked 
set to disappear. The estates commissioners highlighted the frenzied efforts of landlords 
to lodge their sales applications in time to avail of the 12 % ‘bonus’. From 1 April 1908 
to 31 March 1909, in cases of direct sales between landlords and tenants, advances 
involving 2,536 ‘estates’ and totalling £22,577,803 were applied for. In the month of 
October 1908 alone, applications worth approximately £11,000,000 were lodged. 
Augustine Birrell, Liberal chief secretary from 1907 to 1916, revealed how in one week 
in October, £7,000,000 worth of agreements were lodged.5 On 24 November 1908 notice 
was given that the ‘bonus’ was to be reduced to 3 % from that date. From then until 31 
March 1909, purchase agreements worth £863,662, which had been entered into prior to 
24 November, were lodged.6
According to the report of the estates commissioners for the year ending 31 
March 1909, applications for advances under the Wyndham Act amounted to just over 
£78,000,000. However, the actual sum that had been advanced up to that date was just 
over £27,000,000. The treasury had rarely been able to advance more than £5,000,000 a 
year for the duration of the Wyndham Act. The 1909 Land Act was introduced by the 
Liberals to address the problems that had arisen out of the Wyndham Act. Clause three 
of the 1909 Land Act was an attempt to alleviate the problem of pending sales under the 
Wyndham Act and to provide landlords with more options. A landlord who had sold but 
who was waiting on the distribution of the purchase money had the option of taking it 
‘either wholly or partly in 2 3/4 % guaranteed land stock at 92’.7 Many landlords simply 
could not afford to wait for a number of years to receive payment. The interest paid on 
the purchase money by the tenants, in lieu of rent prior to its distribution, rarely
5 A ugustine Birrell, ‘Proposed [Irish] land bill’ 13 Nov. 1908 (T.N.A., CAB 37/96/151), pp 3-4
6 Report o f  the estates com m issioners fo r  the year ending 31 M arch 1909 and fo r  the p er io d  fro m  1st 
Novem ber 1903 to 31st M arch 1909, xii-xiv, [Cd.4849] H.C. 1909, xxiii, 737.
7 R eport o f  the estates com m issioners fo r  the yea r ending 31 M arch 1911 a n d fo r  the p er io d fro m  1st 
Novem ber 1903 to 31st M arch 1911, iii, [Cd.5795] H.C. 1911, xxix, pt. i, 331.
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exceeded 4 % while the charges on many estates were 5 % and 6 %. A landlord who was 
solvent at the time he agreed to sell his lands could be in a very different position if he 
elected to wait for a cash payment.
The regulations regarding the allocation of money and pending sales under the 
Wyndham Act came into force from 1 April 1910. Once a portion had been set aside for 
the operation of the labourers’ acts, the money available for pending advances in each 
financial year was to be allocated as follows; four-tenths was to be put towards direct 
sales in cash; four-tenths was to be put towards direct sales partly in cash and partly 
stock; one-tenth each would go towards sales to the Land Commission and the C.D.B. In 
order to establish the priority in which the vendors of estates would receive payment, 
three ‘principal registers’ were created. The first register contained all the direct sales 
pending under the Wyndham Act. Priority was allocated according to the date on which 
the application was lodged with the estates commissioners. The second register 
comprised all the pending sales to the estates commissioners. Sales were prioritised 
according to the date an application was lodged, the date a preliminary price estimate 
was accepted by the vendor or the date when the land judge forwarded to the 
commissioners the particulars of an estate. The final register dealt with pending sales to 
the C.D.B. and sales were prioritised in the same way as those under the second register.
Each of the three ‘principal registers’ contained two ‘subsidiary registers’. One 
would deal with pending sales where it had been agreed that payment would be in part- 
cash and in part-stock while the second subsidiary register was concerned with payments 
wholly in stock. Once a vendor agreed to take payment wholly or partly in stock, they 
were transferred from the principal register to the relevant subsidiary register. The same 
system of prioritisation applied to subsidiary registers.8 On 1 April 1911 a new set of 
regulations replaced those dated 15 February 1910. Apart from a few minor alterations 
they were essentially the same.9 In 1915 further minor changes were made to the 
regulations.10
8 Regulations made by the lord lieutenant under section 23 (8) o f the Irish land act, 1903, and section 4 of 
the Irish land act 1909 dated 15 February 1910 in Report o f  the estates com m issioners fo r  the ye a r  ending  
31 M arch 1910 and  fo r  the p er io d  fro m  1st Novem ber 1903 to 31st M arch 1910 [Cd. 5423] H .C. 1910, 
xxxi, 847.
9 Regulations made by the lord lieutenant under section 23 (8) o f the Irish land act, 1903, and section 4 of
the Irish land act 1909 dated 28 M arch 1911 in Report o f  the estates com m issioners fo r  the ye a r  ending 31
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In the estates commissioners’ report for the year ending 31 March 1911, the 
breakdown was as follows: £3,143,246 went towards pending sales in cash; £2,723,205 
towards half-cash half-stock payments and £946,158 towards payments wholly in 2 3A % 
guaranteed land stock.11 Upon the publication of the estates commissioners’ final report 
in 1921, £61,728,777 had been advanced in cash. In half cash, half 2 3A % stock, 
£12,004,113 had been advanced while advances wholly in 2 3/4 % stock amounted to 
£3,251,281.12 Many landlords who could not afford to wait for the purchase money in 
cash opted for the part-cash part-stock option or took the purchase money wholly in 
stock.
II.) Types of landownership
Before examining the sales under the act through a series of case studies, a basic 
understanding of how landlords held their land in the period is necessary. Land held in 
fee simple meant that the owner was in absolute control of his land. According to Ruth 
Cannon: ‘The word “fee” is a reference to “forever”. The word “simple” means “without 
qualification”. The owner of a standard fee simple estate has the right to ownership of
13the relevant land forever. He is the absolute owner of the land.’ Variations of fee 
simple included determinable fee simple and fee simple subject to a condition. These 
were known as modified fee simples which, as the name suggests, did not equate with 
unconditional ownership. A determinable fee simple terminated upon the occurrence of 
a certain incident or event. The land returned to the individual who had granted the 
determinable fee simple or to somebody specified by the grantor. The interest of the 
grantor of the determinable fee simple was known as a possibility of reverter. If the
M arch 1911 and fo r  the p er io d  fro m  1 st N ovem ber 1903 to 31st M arch 1911, [Cd.5795] H.C. 1911,xxix,
pt. I, 331.
10 See Statutory rules and  orders, 1915. No. 291. L andlord and  Tenant, Ireland. 'Regulations, da ted  April 
1, 1915, made by the lords ju stices  under section 23 (8) o f  the Irish L and  Act, 1903 [3 Edw. 7. c. 42] and  
section 4 o f  the Irish L and  Act, 1909 [9 Edw 7, c. 42] in Irish Land Com m ission, Report o f  the estates 
commissioners fo r  the ye a r  fro m  f  April, 1920, to 3 V  March, 1921 and fo r  the p er io d  fro m  f  
November, 1903 to  31 March, 1921 (Dublin, 1922).
11 Report o f  the estates com m issioners fo r  the yea r ending 31 M arch 1911 and fo r  the p er io d fro m  1st 
N ovem ber 1903 to 31st M arch 1911, iv, [Cd.5795] H.C. 1911, xxix, Pt. I, 331.
12 Irish Land Com m ission, Report o f  the estates com m issioners fo r  the yea r fro m  f  April, 1920, to 3 T 1 
March, 1921 and  fo r  the per io d  fro m  T ' November, 1903 to 31 March, 1921 , p. vi.
13 Ruth Cannon, L and  law  (Dublin, 2001), p. 6.
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event never materialised, the owner would hold the land indefinitely. A fee simple
subject to a condition was almost indistinguishable from a determinable fee simple:
The distinction between a conditional and determinable fee is that with a 
conditional fee the mere happening of the event will not automatically cause the 
estate to end. It merely gives the grantor or the holder of the gift over a right of 
entry and the estate only terminates on the exercise of this right.14
Where land was held in fee tail the occupant held the land for the duration of his 
lifetime. This was known as a life estate and the person who held the fee tail was known 
as the tenant in tail. Upon the death of the tenant in tail, the land passed to his eldest son 
by primogeniture. In this way, land could be kept within a family for generations. 
However, it was extremely difficult for a tenant in tail to sell his land. He could only sell 
his life interest in the land. Anyone who bought such an interest would hold the land pur 
autre vie which meant that they would hold the land until the tenant in tail died. In order 
to overcome these restrictions, a tenant in tail could apply for a disentailing assurance 
which was lodged with the high court. This would essentially transform the fee tail into 
a fee simple.
The issue of future interests was also relevant to the 1903 act. Future interests did 
not establish ownership rights at the time but could do so at a future date.15 Reversions 
and remainders were future interests. A reversion referred to an instance whereby land 
reverted back to the grantor when a life estate or fee tail terminated. When the grantor 
had specified that the land was to go to a person other than himself upon the termination 
of the life estate or fee tail, this was known as a remainder. The person in receipt of the 
land upon such an occurrence was known as a remainderman.16
The Settled Land Acts 1882-90 were pertinent to the Wyndham Act. According 
to Jack Anderson: ‘The basic objective of the legislation...[was] to give the limited 
owner-the immediate possessor of the land-greater powers to deal with the settled land, 
including the power to sell the land. Under the acts, the limited owner...[was] called the 
tenant-for-life.’17 The tenant-for-life was given the power to sell the fee simple. Thus the 
purpose of the Settled Land Acts was to allow the sale or transfer of land which
14 Ibid., p. 7.
15 Ibid., p. 21.
16 Ibid., pp 21-25.
17 Jack Anderson, Irish land  law (Dublin, 2002), p. 83.
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otherwise would have been inalienable. It applied principally to land held under a
settlement, land held under a trust for sale and the land of a minor. A settlement could
‘denote any disposition of any kind of property in favour of successive owners, usually
with the motive of retaining the property in the family name’.18 Land held by fee tail,
estates pur autre vie and modified fee simples all fell under the umbrella of settlement.
The individual who held land in this way or who held the land for the duration of his
lifetime was known as the tenant-for-life. He could sell, lease and even mortgage the
land. The settled land acts provided that future interests in the land, such as reversions
and remainders, could not be terminated upon sale but rather attached to the purchase
money. The purchase money was given to the trustees of the settlement who were
responsible for allocating it in accordance with the terms of the settlement.
Trustees of the settlement were created under the Settled Land Acts 1882-90.
Their purpose according to Anderson was:
to ensure, by and large, that the tenant-for-life in exercising his powers under the 
acts does so for the benefit of the settlement as a whole. The task of the trustees 
is a delicate balancing act between regulating the significant powers given to the 
tenant-for-life by the acts and not overly restricting the actions of the tenant-for- 
life. The latter would go against the key objective of the acts, which is to free the 
land, and the immediate possessor of that land, from the fetters of the original 
settlement.19
Trustees could have been appointed under the original settlement or to facilitate the 
settled land acts. Where a minor held land he was considered a tenant-for-life. However, 
he could not sell the land. In such a case, the trustees of the settlement had the power to 
sell a minor’s estate.20
M L  Persons eligible to sell under the Wyndham Act.
Under the land purchase acts, the following people had the right to sell:
The persons having power to sell under the land purchase acts comprise absolute 
owners in fee-simple, or in fee-farm, tenants-for-life and other limited owners of 
such estates under the Settled Land Acts... Absolute and similarly limited 
owners of leasehold estates, where the lease is for lives or years renewable for
18 Ib id ., p. 82.
19 Ib id .,  p. 88.
20 Ib id ., pp 82-92.
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ever, or for a term of years of which not less than sixty are unexpired at the time 
of the sale being made.. .Trustees for sale or with power of sale, bodies 
corporate, and trustees for charities, have also power to sell.. .Mortgagees, in 
possession, with power of sale are also similarly entitled.21
Anyone who wished to sell under the Wyndham Act had to provide prima facie 
evidence in the form of deeds and other documentation that he was actually entitled to
sell. The vendor had to prove that rent had been paid to him ‘or his immediate
* ■ 22 predecessor in title’ for at least six years prior to the sale. Once the estates
commissioners had established the vendor’s right to sell, they informed anyone with an
interest in the estate and published a notice in the Dublin Gazette, 2 3  In the absence of
any difficulties, the commissioners drew up a certificate which declared the vendor’s
right to sell.24
A limited owner was someone who held an interest in land which was less than a
25  • •fee simple such as a life tenant. He could be recognised by the estates commissioners
9 Aas the owner. Clause seventy of the Wyndham Act abolished ‘all covenants,
agreements, and conditions in any lease or fee-farm grant prohibiting, restraining, or
27tending to restrain the alienation of any land held thereunder’ in order to further sales.
Under the Settled Land Acts 1882-90, the tenant-for-life could not sell the 
mansion house without first obtaining the permission of the trustees of the settlement. 
Under the 1903 act, however, this was no longer necessary. The estate of a minor could 
be sold by ‘the trustees of the settlement, if there are any, and if there are none, than by 
persons appointed by the court to exercise on their behalf the powers of sale of a tenant- 
for-life’.28 An example of such a case was the sale of the Leinster estate in Co. Kildare 
where the duke was only sixteen years old when it was sold in 1903. Similarly, the estate 
of a ‘lunatic’ could be sold under clause twenty-six if sanctioned by the lord
21 Cherry and M axwell (eds), Irish L and  Act, p. 1077.
22 Irish Land Act, 1903, 17 (1).
23 The cost o f  all advertisem ents was paid by the Land Com m ission in order to defray the expenses o f the 
vendor. See ‘Provisional rules under the Irish Land Act, 1903 (Sections 1 to 23), 23 O ctober, 1903’, rule 
45 cited in Cherry and M axwell (eds), Irish Land Acts, pp 1173-4.
24 ‘Provisional rules under the Irish Land Act, 1903 (Sections 1 to 23) 23 October, 1903’, rules 16-18, 
cited in Cherry and M axwell (eds), Irish L and  Acts, p. 1168.
25 Henry M urdoch, M urdoch’s dictionary o f  Irish law 3rd  edition  (Dublin, 2000), p. 472.
26 Irish Land Act, 1903, 17.
27 Ibid., 70.
28 Cherry and M axwell (eds), Irish L and  Acts, p. 1077. See Irish Land Act, 1903, 17.
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chancellor.29 It may have been necessary to sell such an estate in order to pay the debts 
of the ‘lunatic’, to pay off encumbrances on his estate or to provide for his future 
upkeep.
Clause three of the Wyndham Act dealt with advances to landlords which would 
enable them to repurchase their demesnes. The expression ‘demesne’ included ‘any 
mansion house or other buildings thereon’.30 Where a landlord was selling his estate to 
his tenants, the Estates Commission could buy his demesne and any ‘other land in his 
occupation and adjacent to, or in the neighbourhood of, the estate’ at a price they 
considered equitable and resell it back to him.31 The clause also applied to estates sold to 
the Estates Commission, the C.D.B., and estates bought by them from the land judge 
under clause seven. The maximum advance which could be made to the landlord was 
£20,000 or one-third of the total purchase money whichever was smaller.
Sub-section three of clause three placed a responsibility on the estates 
commissioners, before they resold any land to the owner, to take into account the 
acreage that would remain for the expansion of small holdings. Where the proprietor of a 
demesne, whose land was held conditional to a settlement, did not repurchase, the 
estates commissioners could give an advance to the trustees of the settlement to
19repurchase the demesne and land formerly in the owner’s occupation.
Instead of negotiating a direct sale with his tenants a landlord could apply to sell 
his estate to the Land Commission who would investigate the circumstances of the estate 
and the prices that the tenants would be able to pay. A price would then be offered to 
the landlord who had one month to decide whether or not he wished to sell. The price 
would be based on both the commissioners’ valuation of the holdings and the price that 
the tenants were willing to pay. Three-quarters of the tenants, both in number and 
valuation, had to be willing to purchase in order for the sale to go ahead. The remainder 
could be forced to purchase if the estates commissioners considered it beneficial and
29 Irish Land Act, 1903, 26.
30 Ibid., 9 8 (1 ).
31 Ibid., 3 (1 ).
32 Ibid., 3.
33 ‘Provisional rules under the Irish Land Act, 1903 (Sections 1 to 23) 23 October 1903’ rule 23, cited in 
Cherry and M axwell (eds), Irish L and  Acts, p. 1169. U nder rule 43 the tim e limit could be extended.
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practical.34 This was essentially a form of compulsory purchase but it only compelled 
the tenant to buy, not the landlord to sell.
Under clause six sub-section five of the Wyndham Act, a ‘congested estate’ was 
defined as ‘an estate not less than half of the area of which consists of holdings not 
exceeding five pounds in rateable value, or of mountain or bog land, or not less than a 
quarter of the area of which is held in rundale or intermixed plots’.35 Congested estates 
were not confined to the congested districts but were scattered throughout Ireland. The 
estates commissioners had the power to purchase and improve such estates. The 
purchase of a congested estate could be authorised even if the resale would likely incur a 
loss.36
Once the estates commissioners decided to buy an area of land they made an 
order vesting the land in the commission. At least two months prior to the date of the 
vesting order, they had to publish in the Dublin Gazette their intention to issue such an 
order and inform any persons with an interest in the land.37 The vesting order, conferring 
the fee simple of the land on the commission, was made conditional to any public or 
sporting rights, maintenance charges or other rights such as superior or intervening 
interests and encumbrances. Any claims on the land would subsequently be affixed to
3 8the purchase money.
The vendor had a window of one month, from the date that the estate was vested 
in the Land Commission or C.D.B., in which to deposit a draft allocation schedule and 
an abstract of title and to register the affair as a lis pendens. Where the sale was not to 
the Land Commission the landlord had one month from when the estates commissioners 
declared that he was entitled to sell.39 A draft allocation schedule disclosed how the 
vendor proposed to distribute the purchase money, in addition to outlining the claims on 
it. An abstract of title demonstrated the vendor’s right to sell. It outlined the history of 
the ownership of the estate in addition to any claims such as mortgages or easements. An
34 Irish Land Act, 1903, 19.
35 Ibid., 6 (5).
36 Ib id .,  6.
37 ‘Provisional rules under the Irish Land Act, 1903, (Sections 1 to 23), 23 October, 1903’, 29 cited in 
Cherry and M axwell (eds), Irish Land Acts, p. 1170.
38 Irish Land Act, 1903, 16.
39 ‘Provisional rules under the Land Purchase Acts, 4 D ecem ber 1903’ order iv (3) cited in Cherry and 
M axwell (eds), Irish Land Acts, p. 1209.
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easement was a right of use of another person’s land for a particular purpose. In this 
context, lis pendens essentially meant that the matter was registered as a pending lawsuit 
concerning the title of the land. Interest of 3 V2 % was paid by the estates commissioners 
on the purchase money to the vendor from the time of the agreement to sell until the land 
was vested in the Land Commission. All rent and arrears of rent transferred to the 
commission from the date of the agreement to sell. In direct sales between landlords and 
tenants the rate of interest, in lieu of rent prior to the distribution of the purchase money, 
could be negotiated but it had to be at least 3 V2 %.
Disagreements between tenant-purchasers over the ‘boundaries of holdings, 
easements, or appurtenances’ could be brought before the estates commissioners who 
had the power to resolve them.40 An appurtenance was a right or restriction that was 
attached to an area of land. The prescribed form, which gave the details of the situation 
and was signed by all those involved in the dispute, had to be delivered to the estates 
commissioners who would attempt to remedy the situation.41
In 1849, the Encumbered Estates Court was established to supervise the sale of 
estates which were mired in debt. In the late 1850s, it was replaced by the Landed 
Estates Court. This was, in turn, incorporated into the Land Judges Court in 1879. 
Encumbered estates in the Land Judges Court could be purchased by the estates 
commissioners. The land judge was obliged to supply them with the necessary 
documentation and information relating to the estate.42 A price could be offered to the 
land judge by the Land Commission. If the land judge did not think that the offer was 
adequate, and it was not withdrawn, he could put the estate up for sale at a public 
auction. The land judge had ‘all the powers for the apportionment and redemption of 
superior and intervening interests’ 43 Thus, any claims connected with the estate became 
a charge on the purchase money and were resolved before the land changed hands 
According to the 1903 act: ‘An order of the land judge declaring the Land Commission 
to be the purchasers of any land shall have the effect of an order vesting land in the
40 Irish Land Act, 1903,22.
41 ‘Provisional rules under the Irish L andA ct, 1903 (Sections 1 to 23), 23 October, 1903’, rule 34 cited in 
Cherry and M axwell (eds), Irish L and  Acts, p. 1171.
42 A rental o f  the estate, maps and descriptions o f  any superior interests w ere som e o f the particulars 
w hich had to  be supplied. See ‘Provisional rules under the Irish Land Act, 1903 (Sections 1 to 23) 23 
October, 1903’, rule 25 cited in Cherry and M axwell (eds), Irish L and  Acts, pp 1169-70.
43 Irish Land Act, 1903, 7 (4). See Irish Land Act, 1903, 15 (2).
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commission...and shall also vest in them the right to collect and recover any arrears of 
rent specified in that order.’44
Clause fifty-seven of the 1903 act specified that in sales in the Land Judge’s 
Court interest was paid at 3 Iri %, by the tenant-purchasers on the purchase money to the 
Land Commission. The interest was due from ‘the date of the order of the land judge 
accepting the offer of the tenants’ 45 Interest was paid until the payment of the purchase 
annuity commenced.
IV). The Leinster estate.
Sales under the Wyndham Act shall be examined through a series of case studies. This 
will provide an insight into the process involved and the difficulties that often arose 
during negotiations. One of the earliest and largest estates to be sold under the 
Wyndham Act was the Leinster estate centred at Carton in Maynooth, Co. Kildare. It 
was sold in late November 1903 by the trustees, on behalf of the duke of Leinster, who 
was still a minor. The estate comprised approximately 45,000 acres and was mainly 
situated in Co. Kildare with a few hundred acres in Co. Meath. The returns of advances 
made under the Wyndham Act listed Lord Frederick Fitzgerald and Arthur Fitzgerald, 
Baron Kinnaird, as the two trustees. The 1903 act allowed the trustees to sell, despite the 
duke being a minor.
Lord Frederick Fitzgerald (1857-1924) was a son of Charles William Fitzgerald, 
the fourth duke of Leinster. He held the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the army and saw 
service in Afghanistan, Egypt and South Africa. He was a member of Kildare C.C. and 
was the national commissioner for education in Ireland.
Arthur Fitzgerald (1847-1923) was the eleventh Lord Kinnaird of Inchture and 
third Baron Kinnaird of Rossie. His grandfather Charles Fitzgerald, eighth Lord 
Kinnaird of Inchture, had married Olivia Letitia Catherine Fitzgerald (1787-1858), the 
youngest daughter of William Robert Fitzgerald, the second duke of Leinster. Lord 
Frederick Fitzgerald’s grandfather Augustus Frederick Fitzgerald, third duke of Leinster, 
and Arthur Fitzgerald’s grandmother were brother and sister. Arthur Fitzgerald was a
44 Ib id ., 7 (5).
45 Ibid., 57 (1).
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prominent figure in the development of soccer in Britain. He was an accomplished 
footballer winning five Football Association Cup medals with Old Etonians and 
Wanderers in addition to representing Scotland. His record of eleven F.A. Cup final 
appearances is still unequalled. In 1890 he became president of the F.A. Outside of 
football he had a successful career in banking and became a director of Barclay’s Bank 
Ltd in 1896 46
On 15 September 1903 the trustees informed the tenants on the Leinster estate 
that they were willing to sell. They offered ‘to sell the different Leinster estates at 26 
years’ purchase subject to a reduction of 12 A per cent on first term rents with a view to 
adjusting them to the second term standard’.47 One years’ purchase was the equivalent of 
one years’ rent. On the same day the tenants were notified, a meeting was held in Athy, 
Co. Kildare to consider the question of purchasing under these terms. Just how many 
tenants could have been notified in such a short space of time is open to question,
48although a newspaper at the time reported that the meeting was well attended. Matthew 
J. Minch, the chairman of the meeting and a former M.P. for the I.P.P., revealed that ‘of 
course, our meeting here today does not comprise all the Leinster tenants, inasmuch as 
the time was short and circulars were only sent out to those whose names we could 
secure at very short notice’.49 Minch was also head of the Athy branch of the U.I.L. 
although he did not appear to be involved in the negotiations in that capacity. Even 
though the U.I.L. was quite weak in Co. Kildare its absence from the sale negotiations 
was notably. Minch had resigned as M.P. for South Kildare and had been replaced by 
Dennis Kilbride in May 1903.
Much of the meeting was spent trying to come to a decision as to the terms of 
purchase they would accept. It was eventually decided that they would be willing to buy 
at a price not exceeding twenty-four years purchase of the second term rents. Certain 
members at the meeting considered that they were being too generous towards the 
trustees and that they would be criticised. J. B. Deegan, vice-chairman of Athy Urban 
District Council, stated that ‘they would be erring on the side of generosity on offering
46 H. C. G. M atthew and Brian Harrison (eds), Oxford dictionaiy o f  motional biography, xxxi (O xford, 
2000), pp 732-4.
47 The Times, 19 Sept. 1903.
48 L einster Leader, 19 Sept. 1903.
49 Ibid., 19 Sept. 1903.
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24 years’ purchase’ and ‘he believed their meeting would be unfavourably criticised by 
the majority of the tenants in Ireland in consequence of their generosity!’50 A committee 
was appointed in Athy which consisted of the following gentlemen: M. J. Minch, R. 
Anderson, T. Anderson, J. Gannon, R. Wright, P. Barrington, C. Greene and E. Heydon. 
A. Reeves and A. K Pennycook were appointed secretaries.51 Although Matthew Minch 
did acknowledge that it was only a preliminary meeting, it was not clear whether the 
committee would be representing the whole estate or just the Athy section when they 
met with the trustees.
On 17 September 1903, the Athy committee met with the agent of the estate, 
Charles R. Hamilton, in Dublin. Stephen J. Browne, solicitor and chairman of Kildare 
C.C., attended on behalf of the Maynooth tenantry but played no part in the discussions. 
The agent told them that the ‘trustees had made up their minds, after consultation with 
their London solicitors, not to sell under 26 years’ purchase, inasmuch as, being trustees, 
they had no power to reduce the income of the present duke’.
After the meeting, Matthew Minch stated that it was unreasonable and unjust to 
expect all the tenants to pay the same standard price for their holdings and that their 
varying positions and circumstances had to be taken into account. He considered 24 
years’ purchase the maximum that the tenants could offer. A correspondent for the 
Freeman’s Journal illuminated the attitudes of many of the tenants. There was a feeling 
that the large farmers were dictating the pace and terms of the sale. These were men 
‘who have heaps of money, made in business, and others who have splendid situations’. 
Others held that the sale was being ‘run by the big men and Scotchmen who have got the
c  q
fat of the land’. The mention of Scotchmen referred to the introduction of a number of 
Scottish tenants by the third duke after the famine.
In the second week of negotiations, the divisions among the tenants became more 
obvious. A meeting of the Maynooth tenantry was called for 21 September in Maynooth 
town. Unlike previous gatherings it was decided to conduct the meeting in private. The 
press representatives would be subsequently informed of the tenants’ decisions by
50 Ibid.
51 See append ix  I.
52 Nationalist and Leinster Times, 19 Sept. 1903
53 Ibid.
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Thomas Shaw, who chaired the meeting, and Laurence Ball. The meeting was held at 
two p.m. and the Leinster Leader estimated that approximately fifty tenants were 
present. Stephen J. Browne informed the gathering that the trustees had reconsidered 
their original offer and had intimated their willingness to sell at twenty-five years’ 
purchase.54
The Nationalist and Leinster Times described the Maynooth portion of the estate 
as being ‘mostly made up of grazing lands, held by some of the leading graziers of 
Kildare and Meath. There are, however, some portions of the lands under tillage, and 
this, needless to say, is of the poorer quality, and is let in comparatively small farms’.55 
Accusations that the larger tenants were setting the pace were confirmed in Maynooth as 
‘the grazier element predominated and took charge of the meeting’.56 Most of the 
meeting was concerned with the appointment of a deputation to attend the meeting in 
Athy on the following day. The Maynooth deputation consisted of Thomas Shaw, 
Laurence Ball, John Langan, Mark Travers, Mr. McGrath, James Patterson and Richard 
McKenna. Stephen Browne, chairman of the Kildare C.C., would accompany the 
deputation in his capacity as solicitor for a number of the Maynooth tenants.57
On 22 September 1903 a general meeting of the Leinster estate tenants was held 
in Athy. The Maynooth delegation was in attendance and they held a private conference 
with the Athy committee prior to the main meeting. The tenants were there to consider 
the report of the committee which had met the agent, Charles R. Hamilton, on 17 
September. The meeting was not completely representative of the Leinster tenantry, 
however, as tenants from the Castledermot section of the estate were conspicuous by 
their absence. Edward Heydon, county councillor, made the point that the tenants on the 
Castledermot manor had asked him to ‘call a meeting for next Sunday for them to 
consider their own position and I asked them why not come forward on today as there 
was a meeting in Athy. They told me that the Athy land was not at all on equal 
grounds’.58 Heydon’s statement also showed how the Castledermot tenants considered 
their land to be of a different quality to land around Athy. With the Castledermot tenants
54 Leinster Leader, 26 Sept. 1903
55 Nationalist and Leinster Times, 20 Sept. 1903.
56 Ibid.
57 See appendix I.
58 Leinster Leader, 26 Sept, 1903.
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not represented, Edward Heydon asked the meeting not to make terms for them. Thus
the question of whether all tenants on the estate should pay a uniform price, regardless
of the quality of their land, came to the fore.
The unrepresentative nature of the meeting was called to attention as the Leinster
Leader reported: ‘Mr. E. Heydon said it was a serious thing to come to an arrangement
and only one tenth of the tenants present. The chairman said, this was a public meeting.
If the tenants came they would only be too pleased to have them’.59 The committee
which had met with the agent Charles R. Hamilton on 17 September came under fire at
the meeting. Indeed, there was considerable confusion as to who the committee had
represented at that meeting:
Mr. J. B Deegan - By whom was the committee formed - by the tenants? 
Chairman - There was a committee appointed on this day week to interview the 
trustees. You were present yourself. Mr. Deegan asked had any committee been 
formed by the majority of the agricultural tenants on the Leinster estate for the 
purpose of making terms on their behalf? Chairman - You have all the 
information I have. Mr. Deegan - Then there has been no committee formed. 
Chairman - Well it is a matter for our own opinion. I suppose. There was a 
committee appointed’.60
J. B. Deegan complained that the local M.P. for South Kildare, Dennis Kilbride, 
ought to have been asked to attend as his advice would have been beneficial. There 
certainly appeared to be two conflicting groups at the meeting, one side urging caution 
and more discussion about the terms, the other anxious to force the sale of the Leinster 
lands through as quickly as possible. The concerns of the smaller tenants were also 
articulated, especially concerning the number of years’ purchase that had to be paid. 
Edward Heydon, county councillor, made the point that ‘25 years purchase is frightening 
everybody’ and that they ‘ought to consider it from the farmers point of view alone, 
from the point of view of people with 60 and 50 and 30 acres of land’.61 A contemporary 
newspaper commented that the Targe farmers were prominently in evidence at the
• 6 9meeting in Athy’ which might have accounted for the palpable tensions. The
59 Ibid., 26 Sept. 1903.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 U nidentified newspaper article, 25 Sep. 1903, (Public Record O ffice Northern Ireland [hereafter cited as 
P.R .O .N .I.], Leinster Papers, D  3078 /2 /15 /3).
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conclusion of the tenants’ meeting was to appoint a deputation to meet with the trustees 
with powers to make terms for the purchase of their holdings.
On 24 September the appointed deputation met one of the trustees. The Irish 
Times stated that ‘a joint deputation representing the tenantry of Maynooth and of the 
Manor of Athy, waited by appointment on Lord Frederick Fitzgerald, one of the 
trustees’.63 The meeting was brief, between thirty minutes and an hour.64 The 
proceedings were held in private with the press being informed of the following terms: 
‘1) 25 years purchase. 2) All arrears up to March 1903, to be added to the purchase 
money. 3) The gale [impending rent] due on September 29th and November 1st to be 
forgiven. 4) Payment of interest on the purchase money to commence from 29th 
September, 1903. 5) Sporting rights reserved to the duke’.65 Even though it was only a 
joint deputation from Maynooth and Athy which agreed to these terms ‘they [Leinster 
Leader] consider the terms of sale as accepted by practically the whole of the Leinster 
tenantry’.66
The Castledermot tenants only met for the first time on 27 September and they 
had had little or no input into what terms they would purchase their holdings. The 
puipose of their meeting was to decide whether or not to accept the terms agreed on 24 
September. Rev. M. Walsh P.P., chaired the Castledermot meeting, and was closely 
assisted by Edward Heydon who had been at the meeting with the trustees. Although 
Heydon had land in Castledermot, his position at that meeting was rather ambiguous as 
no meeting had been held in Castledermot to appoint a deputation or representative. 
Among the Castledermot tenantry there was a sense of apprehension about purchasing 
their holdings. Edward Heydon, speaking of the late duke was reported as having 
declared that ‘he always gave the tenants better terms than other landlords, (hear, hear.) 
A voice - he was a good man. Another voice - better than the government will be’.67 
This highlighted the doubts held by some tenants who perhaps realised that a 
government in Dublin or London would not be influenced as easily as the local landlord. 
Unlike a benevolent landlord, the government would demand that land purchase
63 I T ,  25 Sept. 1903.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Leinster Leader, 26 Sept. 1903.
67 Nationalist and Leinster Times, 3 Oct. 1903.
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annuities be paid in full and on time, no matter how good or bad an agricultural year had 
been.
At the meeting on 24 September 1903 with the trustees, Edward Heydon and 
Richard Wright had tried to persuade them to forgive arrears on smaller tillage farms. 
Heydon declared that they ‘did their best to get the trustees to forgive all arrears on 
tillage farms under £50, and they explained that people on these farms were generally 
harder set, particularly about Castledermot, where the land was colder. They failed to get 
the trustees to agree to that’. The newspaper accounts of the meeting indicate that 
much of the Castledermot tenantry were anxious about agreeing to twenty-five years’ 
purchase because they considered their land to be inferior to the rest of the estate. John 
Keogh, a Castledermot tenant, made the revealing comment that ‘it’s all very well for 
the big bugs about Athy to give twenty-five years’ purchase, but it’s different with us’.69 
Eventually the meeting decided to accept the terms already agreed to by the Athy and 
Maynooth deputations and the motion was carried with only three dissentients.70
In analysing the sale of the Leinster estate, it is of the utmost importance to 
examine the people who actually negotiated the terms. A joint deputation from 
Maynooth and Athy negotiated the terms with the trustees. The Maynooth section of the 
deputation consisted of eight men. The Leinster Leader placed a Mr. McGrath on this 
deputation but he was replaced by William Chamberlain, who was present at the 
meeting of 22 September in Athy and the meeting of 24 September with the trustees.71 
Mr. McGrath would appear to be James McGrath who rented 173 acres in Maynooth. 
When we examine appendix I, we can see that the deputation consisted of men who 
were large farmers, holding well over a 100 acres, except in the case of Joseph Langan 
who had 46.73 It was possible that some of these men held land under other landlords in 
the region. Thomas Shaw does not appear on the return of advances made under the 
1903 act but two substantial farmers, John and Hugh Shaw, farmed over 200 acres each 




71 Leinster Leader, 26 Sept. 1903.
72 Return o f advances made under the Irish Land Act, 1903 during the period from  1'" November, 1903 to 
31'1 December, 1905, vol. I  parts i, ii, and Hi [C d.3447, C d.3560, C d.3547] H.C. 1907, Ixx, 1.
73 See appendix I.
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all J.P.s. McKenna was a county councillor as was Browne. Browne also happened to be 
chairman of Kildare C.C. and was solicitor for some of the Maynooth tenants. The 
members of the Maynooth section of the deputation were no ordinary tenants. In fact 
they would be considered the elite of the tenantry, owing to the significant tracts of land 
they rented and the prominent positions some of them held in local government.74
As regards the Athy deputation, aside from Anthony Reeves, who rented 80 
acres the rest held well over 150 acres each. Matthew Minch, Thomas Anderson, 
Richard Wright and John Gannon were all J.P.s. Minch was a former M.P. and a wealthy 
malt and corn merchant. Edward Hey don was a county councillor. Philip Barrington 
farmed 201 acres at Glassely, Athy. Andrew Pennycook and Anthony Reeves acted as 
secretaries for the deputation. Wright and Heydon had 24 and 59 acres in Castledermot 
respectively, although the vast majority of their land was in Kilkea. The Athy deputation 
also comprised large farmers, many of whom held prominent positions in local 
government. This eighteen-man deputation rented approximately 3,580 acres between 
them.75 Even with the best intentions, it is questionable whether or not these large 
farmers actually appreciated or understood the needs and concerns of the smaller 
tenants. While these wealthier tenants might be expected to be prominent in any 
negotiations for sale, the fact that there were no small tenant farmers surely influenced 
the outcome of the negotiations. The question also arises as to whether or not the 
unrepresentative nature of the tenant meetings had a bearing on who was chosen for the 
deputations.76
Denis Kilbride, M.P. for South Kildare, was more noticeable by his absence than 
by any involvement in the sale. He was not present at the meeting in Maynooth, the two 
meetings in Athy or that meeting in Castledermot. At the Athy meeting of 22 September, 
questions arose as to his absence which the Leinster Leader reported as follows: ‘Mr. 
J.B. Deegan - has the parliamentary representative of the district been asked to attend 
here today? Chairman - not aware he has. Mr Deegan - wouldn’t it have been well he 





would only be too pleased if Mr. Kilbride the representative of the district were here’.77
The M.P. for North Kildare, Edmund Leamy (I.P.P.), played no role in the sale although
the reason for this may have been his ill-health. He died in the south of France in late
1904 where he had been living for his health.
On 11 October 1903 Denis Kilbride gave an instructive speech on the Wyndham
Act at Athy, Co. Kildare. The gist of Kilbride’s speech, aside from explaining the act’s
operation, was that landlords were going to benefit far more than tenants. He also made
a number of valuable points concerning the sale:
Whatever was said in Athy or Dominick Street [duke of Leinster’s town 
residence] has no binding effect on anybody. As long as agreements are not 
effected the tenants are neither legally or honourably bound by the terms. He had 
heard that a circular was sent out to the Leinster tenants calling a meeting in 
Athy. That circular was received in most cases on Monday, and the meeting was 
called for Tuesday, while several tenants never got a circular at all. How could a
78tenant imagine that he is bound by an agreement made behind his back.
Even seventeen days after these terms had been agreed there was still considerable anger
among sections of the Leinster tenantry at the manner in which they had been
negotiated. The grievances of many tenants on the Leinster estate were given voice by
Stephen Heydon, Kildare county councillor:
In south Kildare at the present time the headline has been set but he was afraid it 
was the wrong headline for south Kildare. It was set generally by those north 
Kildare men, graziers, who are living within easy access of Dublin, and having 
prime grassland. Those are the men who proposed 25 years’ purchase, which he 
considered was not fair for this part of the country at all.79
Many were displeased with the price of 25 years’ purchase which they would have to 
pay.
One of the most controversial aspects of the Leinster estate sale was the issue of 
sporting rights. It had been intimated to the tenants that the trustees wanted to retain the 
sporting rights. At the Athy meeting of 22 September, after a heated debate, it still 
remained uncertain who would retain the rights. Some of those present held that the 
rights ought to be vested in the Land Commission, who would decide how to deal with
11 Leinster Leader, 26  Sept. 1903
78 Nationalist and Leinster Times, 17 Oct. 1903.
79 Ibid.
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the matter. Others opined that they should be transferred to the tenants or even handed 
over to the county council.80 A considerable number of tenants wanted the sporting 
rights reserved to them once they purchased their holdings. They were anxious about the 
rights being reserved to the duke for a number of reasons. The tenants were chiefly 
concerned that the rights might be let out for profit, in which case, there might be a 
considerable number of strangers traversing their land. A resolution read out by the 
chairman at the Athy meeting of 22 September, M. J. Minch, summed up the tenants’ 
fears: ‘They didn’t object to the sporting rights being retained by the duke of Leinster for 
his own personal use and that of his family and friends, but they strongly objected to 
those rights being let out for profit.’81 Eventually it was decided to empower the 
committee, which would meet the trustees on 24 September, to deal with the matter. At 
that meeting it was agreed that the sporting rights would be reserved to the duke until he 
came of age.
At the Castledermot meeting of 27 September, which had been convened to 
approve or reject the terms of sale, there was commotion over the duke’s retention of the 
sporting rights. The Castledermot tenantry shared the same apprehensions about 
strangers intruding on their land. John Nolan, a Castledermot tenant, commented that 
there was ‘some objection to the game rights being given up. We don’t want to have 
gamekeepers coming in on our farms when we have purchased’, adding ‘I would not 
object to the duke or any of his friends coming on my land to shoot, but I would object 
to outsiders’.82 The issue of sporting rights revealed much about the mindset of the 
tenant farmers. After waiting so long to finally own their land, they had no intention of 
allowing strangers access to it.
Another contentious issue as far as sections of the Leinster tenants were 
concerned was the payment of the Lerr drainage scheme. The River Lerr ran through 
south Kildare around the Castledermot/Kilkea section of the Leinster estate. These 
charges were ‘a charge for construction of drainage works ... created under the award of 
the Commissioners of Public Works made upon the completion of the drainage works in
80 Leinster Leader, 26  Sept. 1903
81 Ibid.
82 Nationalist and Leinster Times, 3 Oct. 1903.
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the district, and is a charge upon the lands’.83 As the drainage of the Lerr had been part 
of an arterial drainage scheme a sum of £14,121 16s. Id. remained to be paid back to the 
Board of Works at a half yearly charge of £363 8 .^ 9d.M This sum was now to be repaid 
out of the purchase money received from the sale of the estate. Prior to the sale it was 
being repaid in annual instalments by the duke of Leinster. At the Athy meeting of 27 
September the matter came to the fore as the Nationalist and Leinster Times reported: 
‘Mr. Hay don said another fact of great importance to many tenants was that the duke 
would pay for the maintenance of the Lerr drainage... the duke would either invest a 
sum of money or mortgage a piece of property to produce what would pay for the
85maintenance. A Voice - We are not paying for it’. The possibility that they would have
to pay drainage charges on top of their annuities worried many tenants in the
Kilkea/Castledermot area of the Leinster estate.
However, it was agreed that the duke would continue to pay these charges after
the sale. In the statement of the money received under the act, £14,121 16s. Id. was set
aside to be taken out of the purchase money in the Kilkea section of the estate to pay the
half yearly charge of £363 8s. 9d.S6 The tenants were indemnified against any drainage
charges and their fears proved to be unfounded
The sale of the Leinster estate received considerable attention both locally and
nationally. The tenants came in for some severe criticism over the price they had paid
for their holdings. Even the Irish Times was taken aback at the financial scale of the sale
and sounded a note of caution:
The small estates, with moderate valuation, constitute the Irish agrarian 
difficulty...the act will be a complete failure unless it affects the small farmers 
and poorer agriculturalists.. .Businesslike and agreeable as is such an agreement 
as the Leinster tenants have made, we should prefer to see the smaller landlords 
and poorer tenants coming in for the fruits of this piece of beneficent legislation. 
If the big landlords follow the example of the representatives of the Duke of 
Leinster, the five millions which the estates commissioners can advance the first
83 Cherry and M axw ell (eds), The Irish Land Acts, 1903 and 1904, p. 1116
84 ‘Statem ent o f  m onies realised from sales to tenants under the purchase o f  Land (Ireland) A ct o f  1903 
com pleted betw een the 1st N ovem ber 1903 and 1st October 1904 and the distribution th ereo f (P .R .O .N .I., 
Leinster papers, D  3078 /2 /15 /5).
85 jNationalist and Leinster Times, 3 Oct. 1903.
86 ‘Statem ent o f  m onies realised from sales to tenants under the purchase o f  Land (Ireland) A ct o f  1903 
com pleted betw een the l slN ovem ber 1903 and 1st October 1904 and the distribution th ereo f (P .R .O .N .I., 
Leinster Papers, D  3078/2 /15 /5).
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year will very quickly be eaten up, so that it behoves those for whom the act was 
especially intended -  namely, the less well-to-do, whether landlords or tenants -  
to see that they are not indefinitely shut out from its benefits.87
Critics of the Leinster sale felt that other landlords would follow the precedent it 
had set. A letter from a Maynooth resident, signed W.H., which appeared in the 
Freeman's Journal remarked that ‘a more grievous wrong could hardly be inflicted... on 
the small tillage tenants than by their inclusion in Mr. Minch’s cast-iron mould of 
uniformity, and this is just the body of tenants least capable of understanding the 
injustice’.88 The author saw the terms as ‘most mischievous in its results if adopted, and 
it should be noted that its chief support comes from a swarm of new comers who
• • * 89represent the wealth of the tenancy and to whom any reduction is quite a god send’.
Another tenant on the Leinster estate, writing under the pseudonym ‘Nemo’, expressed
his disgust at the manner in which the sale had been carried out:
In the negotiations which have been carried on with the Leinster trustees I have 
seen the names of these shop-keepers and business men in a very prominent 
position, together with the names of a few descendents of those Scotchmen, who 
in the old days were fondled by Hamilton [agents for the dukes of Leinster] and 
his master, the then duke of Leinster, and who got their farms at a figure never 
dreamt of by Irish men. These men certainly have cogent reasons for the eulogies 
which they have passed upon the dukes of Leinster.90
Despite being taken aback by the scale of the sale the Irish Times dismissed the 
claims that the Leinster estate would set the price for land under the act as absurd: ‘The 
twenty-five years purchase on the Leinster estate cannot rule the sales for Ireland, for 
Kildare is a choice bit of land with exceptional advantages,’ and ‘that no one with any 
intelligent appreciation of the situation would hold up the action of the Leinster tenants 
as an example which must be necessarily followed’.91 The Freeman’s Journal was 
severely critical of the sale of the Leinster estate and declared that the tenants were 
paying too much for their land. It argued that the ‘contention that because the tenants on 
the Leinster estate have got reductions less than the average received by tenants in the
land courts throughout Ireland, therefore the landlord is entitled to an increased number 
of years’ purchase, is one of those crazy fallacies that have got hold of the minds of
* no ,
many people on the subject’. The tenants of the earl of Dartrey’s estate in Co. 
Waterford passed a resolution which condemned the high price the Leinster tenants 
agreed to pay and expressed their fear that the Leinster example would be held up for
o n  . . .  ,
others to imitate. This exemplified the intense public scrutiny the sale received.
William O’Brien, one of the most prominent advocates of the Wyndham Act, felt
very strongly about the sale of the Leinster estate. In his book, An olive branch in
Ireland, he condemned the selfishness of the tenants and asserted that the sale set the
tone for the province of Leinster.94 Even in England the sale of the estate made an
impact on the newspapers. The Daily Mail in particular wrote of the immense sum
which the trustees of the Leinster estate would receive and the great advantages of the
act to both the vendor and purchaser.95
The fact that the trustees, who had power of sale under the Wyndham Act, sold
virtually the entire estate while the young duke was still a minor, did not go unnoticed or
uncriticised. The earl of Muskerry, for example, severely censured their actions in the
House of Lords: ‘One great estate, which used to support the highest dignity in the Irish
peerage, has been sacrificed for ready money by the guardians of a minor, with little
respect for the future of a title divorced from property and residence.’96
As already noted, George Wyndham, the chief architect of the 1903 act, was
related to the dukes of Leinster being the grandson of Pamela, the daughter of Lord
Edward Fitzgerald who took part in the 1798 rebellion. Vernon Cochrane, a
contemporary, was scathing of the trustees treatment of the young duke. In addition, he
accused Wyndham of using his position to lubricate the sale of the Leinster estate:
The chief secretary has used his influence to secure part of the ‘bonus’ to sell the 
Leinster estate, which, whatever is its legal aspect, is a crime to the minor. When 
his constituents in England learn the true bearings of the case, the results to him 
will probably be as disastrous as ‘Home Rule’ has been to the Liberal party.97
92 F.J., 6 O ct. 1903.
931.71, 30 Sept. 1903.
94 O ’B rien , An olive  branch in Ireland, p .  301.
95 D a ily  M ail, 31 O ct. 1903.
96 H a n sa rd  4, xxx, 521 (22 Feb. 1904).
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There certainly was a sense that the best interests of the young duke had not been well 
served by the sale of the estate. The young duke reached his majority upon celebrating 
his twenty-first birthday on 1 March 1908, almost five years after the trustees had
98decided to sell the Leinster estate.
It did not take long for the ‘Leinster terms’, as they became known, to influence
other negotiations, especially those in the region of the estate. Fears that the sale would
encourage other landlords to request similar terms were well-founded. During the
negotiations on the Samuel Mills estate, situated in Co. Kildare and Queen’s County, the
agent declared that the landlord would only sell on the same terms that the trustees of the
Leinster estate had." Likewise, on the estate of R. H. McDonnell, which was situated
near Athy, an offer of twenty-three years’ purchase on second term rents was refused as
the landlord insisted on the Leinster estate terms.100
The lack of involvement in the sale on the part of the U.I.L. contributed to the
high prices given by the Leinster tenants according to nationalists. The organisation was
quite weak in Co. Kildare and there were only a handful of branches. Although Matthew
Minch was head of the Athy branch of the U.I.L., it appears it was only for political
purposes as he was a former M.P. His involvement in the sale negotiations was not in
the capacity of a U.I.L. representative and there was little mention of the organisation
during the whole process. At a league meeting held in Redwood, Co. Wicklow, D. J.
Cogan, M.P. for East Wicklow, warned of the dangers of haste and the absence of
organisation as The Times reported:
He could hardly get out of the idea that the action of the tenants there was chiefly 
due, and mainly due, to the want of organisation (hear, hear), because he was 
afraid that the wealthier and stronger tenants rushed the sale to the disadvantage 
of their poorer neighbours, and the sale was anything but a businesslike one, and 
he did think that it was one that wont prove advantageous either to the tenants 
themselves or to their posterity.101
John O’Donnell, M.P. for South Mayo, also attacked the bargain made by the Leinster 
tenants and he cited the lack of a U.I.L. organisation as one of the principle reasons for
98 Irish  Independen t [hereafter cited  as /./ .] ,  29 Feb. 1908.
99 F.J., 25 N ov. 1903.
700 Ib id ., 27 N ov. 1903.
101 Ib id ., 6 O ct. 1903.
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the high price.102 At a U.I.L. meeting in South Cork, Eugene Crean M.P., ‘urged the 
tenants not to repeat the rash and foolish action of the duke of Leinster’s tenants’.
The total sum from the purchase money, interest and ‘bonus’ amounted to 
£766,647 1l.s\ 4d. The purchase money and interest received from the estates 
commissioners amounted to £674,516 25s. 16d. The ‘bonus’ was £80,108 16s. 18d. The 
statement also contains another figure of £12,021 Is. 6d. which is derived from 
‘income’.104 When it is added to the bonus and purchase money we get the figure of 
£766,647 11s. 4d.105 When one considers that the British Treasury was allocating just 
£5,000,000 a year to land purchase, this was a huge portion to be expended on just one 
sale and it undoubtedly had an adverse effect. In 1908 one newspaper in hindsight 
declared: ‘the sale of the Leinster estate under the Wyndham Land Act fairly crippled 
that badly financed measure’.106 Expenses of sale added up to £22,815 and the 
redemption of charges on the estate amounted to £78,831 6s. Id. The bulk of the 
purchase money was invested on mortgages.107 These included a series of loans to Lord 
Tankerville of £298,000 at 3 lA %, Mr. Duncombe Shafto £82,500 at 3 3A %, Colonel H. 
Denison £39,000 at 3 % %, Lord Fitzwilliam £41,000 at 3 % % and Lord Hastings 
£122,500 at 3 %. Overall these loans amount to £603,000.108
George Montagu Bennet, seventh earl of Tankerville (1852-1931), succeeded his 
father in 1899. He was deputy lieutenant and justice of the peace in Northumberland and 
had served in the Royal Navy. During the dulce of Marlborough’s term as lord lieutenant 
of Ireland in the late 1870s George was his aide-de-camp. In 1895 he married Leonora 
Sophie Van Marther of New York.109
William Charles De Meuron (1872-1943) became the seventh earl Fitzwilliam 
upon the death of his grandfather. From 1893-4 he served as the aide-de-camp for the
102 The Times, 28 Sept. 1903.
103 Ib id ., 1 O ct. 1903.
104 It is poss ib le  th a t th is  figure, re fe rred  to  as ‘in co m e’, w as the in terest on th e  pu rchase  m o n ey  paid  by 
the  ten an ts  to  the tru stees  p rio r to its allocation .
105 ‘S ta tem en t o f  ap p lica tions o f  sum s received  on the sale o f  th e  L einster E sta tes in Ire lan d ’ (P .R .O .N .I., 
L e in ste r Papers, D  3078 /2 /15 /5 ).
1061.1., 29  Feb. 1908.
107 ‘S ta tem en t o f  app lica tions o f  sum s rece ived  on the sale o f  th e  L ein ster E sta tes in Ire lan d ’ (P .R .O .N .I., 
L e in ste r Papers, D  3078 /2 /15 /5 ).
108 Ibid.
109 W ho’s w h o  1911  (L ondon , 1911).
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marquess of Lansdowne who was viceroy of India at the time and he served in the South 
African War.110 The earl sold a considerable portion of his Wicklow estates under the 
Wyndham Act.
Born in 1847, Colonel Henry Denison had been commander of the 
Nottinghamshire yeomanry (Sherwood Rangers). He married Edith Taylor of West 
Ogwell, Devon in 1877. His address in the 1911 edition of Who’s who was given as 
Eaton Hall, Retford, Nottinghamshire.111
George Manners Astley, twentieth Baron Hastings died in September 1904 aged 
forty-seven. The statement in the Leinster papers concerning the application of the 
money received from the sale was dated July 1904 so one assumes it was the twentieth 
baron and not his son Albert Edward Delaval Astley (1882-1956) who received a loan. 
The twentieth baron married Elizabeth Evelyn Harbord, the daughter of the fifth baron 
Suffield in 1880.112
One of the mortgage loans was to Mr. Duncombe Shafto. Charles Ottiwell 
Duncombe Shafto was born in 1853 and worked as a barrister. He married Helena Rosa, 
daughter of Rev. George Pearson Wilkinson of Harperley Park, in 1877. One of their 
sons, Charles Duncombe Shafto, was a lieutenant in the army and was killed in the 
South Africa War at Scion Kop in 1900. The Leinster papers do not say for certain 
whether it was Charles or one of his two surviving sons who received the loan. His 
eldest surviving son, Captain Arthur Duncombe Shafto, served in South Africa during 
the war. George Duncombe Shafto was his other son.113
Only £61,706 18.v. Id. of the purchase money was actually invested in stocks. 
Stock was purchased in a number of Irish companies or institutions such as Dublin 
Corporation, Belfast Corporation and Bank of Ireland. Railway stock such as Caledonian 
Railway and Midland Great Western of Ireland proved popular.114 The agent for the
110 B urke's p e e ra g e  an d  baronetage  (1 0 5 th ed., L ondon, 1970).
111 W h o’s w ho 1911  (L ondon , 1911).
112 B urke's p e e ra g e  an d  baronetage  (1 0 5 th ed., L ondon , 1970):
113 See R uv igny  e t R aineval, m arqu is de (H enry  M assue  M elv ille ), The P lan tagen et ro ll o f  the b lo o d  ro ya l 
(L ondon , 1907), pp  309-10  and  W h o’s w ho 1911  (L ondon , 1911).
114 See append ix  II fo r the stocks pu rchased .
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estate, Charles R. Hamilton, received the considerable sum of £15,000 for his services 
during the sale.115
According to the statement on the legal and beneficial ownership of the purchase 
monies of the Leinster estate of December 1905, approximately £272,076 of the 
purchase money was tied up in family charges.116 Frederick, Walter, Charles, George, 
Henry and Nesta were all children of the fourth duke of Leinster, Charles William 
Fitzgerald (1819-87). They all received a portion of the purchase money. Gerald 
Fitzgerald was the eldest son of the fourth duke and succeeded him as the fifth duke of 
Leinster. Upon his death in 1901, the title passed to his eldest son Maurice who was only 
fourteen at the time and thus a minor.
A small section of the tenantry on the Leinster estate accounted for more than 
half the purchase money. By 1908, the Leinster sale was seen by many as a prime 
example of how the Wyndham Act had been exploited by those who had been in least 
need of assistance. The total number of purchasers on the estate was 506. Of that total,
1 1 777 received advances over £3,000 which amounted to £381,825. The Liberal attorney- 
general at the time, R. R. Cherry, voiced such feelings during the debates on the 1909 
Land Act:
The house would recollect that in the [1903] act power was given to make
advances up to £7,000 to a single purchaser, and soon after the act came into
operation this provision was largely taken advantage of by the rich and well-to-
do, and really the poor people were shut out. He was speaking of the tenants, and
those large tenants of the duke of Leinster’s estate were certainly not the class of
118people intended to be benefited by the land purchase acts.
The sale of large properties such as the Leinster estate had eaten into the
purchase money available and quickly exhausted it. These estates, mainly in the east of
the country, contained large holdings whose tenants were in little need of assistance.
These large sales were processed to the detriment of those tenants in the west of Ireland
who were most in need of the act. According to R. R. Cherry:
The duke of Leinster’s estate was not an exceptional case, because there were 
many others of a similar kind where large holdings had been bought. The
115 ‘L ein ster esta te  s a le ’ (P .R .O .N .I., L ein ster papers , D 3 078 /2 /15 /16 /3 ).
116 See append ix  III fo r the fam ily  charges on the L e in ste r estate.
117 H an sard  4, cxcv iii, 243 (8 D ec. 1908).
118 Ib id ., col. 243.
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purchase of large holdings had exhausted the money available, and left the poor 
and distressed portions of the country in the west, and south, in north Connaught, 
Clare, Kerry and Donegal, in the background. Those poor tenants had not the 
same energy, and assistance, and enterprise as the larger tenants, and 
consequently they could not take advantage of the act to the same extent.119
In 1909 the Liberal chief secretary, Augustine Birrell, based his justification for 
graduating the ‘bonus’ on cases such as the Leinster estate. Not only had the estate taken 
a large portion out of the available purchase money but it also used up a significant part 
of the ‘bonus’ fund available to landlords. In Birrell’s view, the ‘bonus’ was not 
introduced to allow well circumstanced landowners to make a financial killing but to 
provide the poor and encumbered landlords, especially in the west, with the opportunity 
to sell:
Therefore, though it is eminently desirable that the imperial exchequer should 
assist in the agrarian revolution in Ireland, and in bringing about a satisfactory 
solution yet nobody will say that for a well-managed estate like that of the duke 
of Leinster’s the duke should get £80,000 into his breeches pocket for selling at
market value an excellent estate upon which there has never been any particular
120amount of trouble.
In fact, Birrell was certain that the purchase money of the Leinster sale, when invested, 
brought in a much greater annual income than the estate ever had.121
V). The estate of John Redmond, M.P.
In his position as leader of the I.P.P., John Redmond was considered to be the chief 
spokesman for the tenant farmers of nationalist Ireland. As a tenant representative he 
had helped negotiate the terms of the Land Conference Report which had formed the 
basis of much of the Wyndham Act. Ironically, upon the death of his uncle Lieutenant- 
General John Patrick Redmond in March 1902, he found himself in the position of a 
landlord as his uncle’s Wexford estate passed to him. The lands were situated near the 
towns of New Ross and Wexford. The I.P.P. leader would have sold in 1902 under the 
earlier land acts but the price would not have been enough to pay off the charges on the
115 Ibid., cxcv iii, 243 (8 D ec. 1908).
120 The p a rlia m en ta ry  deba tes , fifth  series, H ouse o f  C om m ons  [hereafter cited as H a n sa rd  5 (C om m ons)], 
iii, 194-5 (30 M ar. 1909).
121 A ugustine  B irrell, ‘P roposed  [Irish] land b il l’ 13 N ov. 1908 (T .N .A ., C A B  37 /96 /151 ), p. 7.
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estate. When he inherited the estate there had been arrears of approximately £4,000 
which were due to his uncle’s widow. John Redmond had purchased the arrears at his 
own expense thus preventing the tenants being sued for their recovery. Furthermore,
there was a jointure of approximately £1,000 which had to be paid annually to the
122general’s widow.
After the Wyndham Act had received the royal assent in August 1903, the debate 
began as to what would be a reasonable price for tenants to pay to purchase their 
holdings. John Dillon had become increasingly vocal in his opposition to Redmond’s 
and O’Brien’s conciliation policy, preaching that the average price under the new act 
ought to be similar to the 1885 Ashbourne Act prices. The average prices, in terms of the 
number of years’ purchase for the years 1901 and 1902, were 18.1 and 17.9 
respectively.123 Dillon, Davitt and the Freeman’s Journal, under the control of Thomas 
Sexton, predicted that landlords would receive extravagant terms under the Wyndham 
Act to the detriment of the tenants. In September 1903 the Leinster estate was sold at 25 
years’ purchase. This led to outrage among nationalists who felt the sale would set the 
standard for exorbitant prices. Indeed there was a certain amount of resentment among 
many nationalists at the prices landlords received under the act.
John Redmond was in communication with his agents, Little and Nunn, as to the 
terms he ought to offer the tenants who wished to purchase. They promised they would 
try to make ‘the most advantageous agreement possible for...[him] with the tenants’.124 
The terms they proposed, after consultation with M. J. O’Connor the solicitor for a 
section of the tenantry on the estate, were as follows: 23 V13 years’ purchase on first term 
and non-judicial rents which represented a reduction in the tenants rent of 25 % and 26
• 1 7 S2/i3 years’ purchase on second term rents which represented a reduction of 15 %. 
However, in mid-October 1903 the section of the estate near Wexford town offered the 
terms of 24 ‘A years’ purchase on second term rents and 23 years’ purchase on first term 
rents which would subsequently appear in the press. The section of the tenantry around
122 IT . 19 O ct. 1903.
123 Return sh ow in g  by counties the average num bers o f  y e a r s '  pu rch ase  under the A shbourne A c t f o r  the 
y e a rs  1901 an d  1902, an d  under the act o f  1903, to  the 3 1'1 July, 1908, in the different counties o f  Ire lan d  
(356) H .C . 1908, xc, 1411. A shbou rne  prices in th is re turn  w ere  held to  m ean  prices u n d e r th e  1891-6 land  
acts as advances u nder the 1885 act had ceased  by then.
124 L ittle  and N unn  to  John R edm ond , 8 Oct. 1903 (N .L .I., R edm ond  papers , M S 15, 242 /11).
125 Ibid.
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Wexford town passed a resolution thanking the I.P.P. leader. The Wexford Independent 
reported:
In consideration of the low rental, and the peculiar character of the family 
charges and the jointures, and more especially in consideration of his efforts for 
the tenantry of Ireland, they were all quite satisfied with the prices that had been 
agreed upon, and were very grateful to him, as they appreciated that he was 
making a great personal sacrifice.126
The timing of Redmond’s acceptance of the Wexford tenants offer to buy was 
rather contentious. With fears that the Leinster estate might set the price of land 
widespread among tenant representatives, he was willing to accept a price that was 
almost as high. The fact that the tenants on the Wexford portion of the estate had offered 
such prices willingly was lost amid the controversy that ensued. Indeed, Redmond 
himself, seemed to have underestimated the significance of the terms and the effect it 
would have on negotiations under the act. As one of the earliest attempted sales, the 
terms offered were bound to be of significant interest to the rest of the country. By 
accepting what were viewed in many nationalist circles as exorbitant terms, his political 
position as I.P.P. leader was weakened. With Dillon, Davitt and Sexton already arguing 
against the policy of conciliation espoused by O’Brien and himself, Redmond’s 
authority was severely undermined. Any attempt to reign in that triumvirate, who 
insisted that landlords would receive excessive prices under the act, would be almost 
impossible now given the terms Redmond had accepted from his tenants. The possibility 
now also arose that the ‘Redmond terms’ would be the minimum that any landlord 
would consider.
The Irish Times recognised the significance of the Redmond sale commenting: 
‘Twenty-four and a half years’ purchase is not by any means a bad stroke of business for 
a landlord whose political followers have paraded Ireland from end to end with the 
injunction that tenants must not dream of offering more than seventeen or eighteen
127years.’ The independent nationalist M.P., Jasper Tully, was scathing in his comments 
on Redmond’s proposed terms. Tully was horrified by the Land Conference, in which 
Redmond had participated, as he believed it had greatly increased the price of Irish land:
126 W exford Independen t, 21 O ct. 1903.
127 I T .,  19 O ct. 1903.
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‘The farmers have no one but themselves to blame if every selling landlord in the
country says he would be a patent fool if he did not insist on getting at the very least 27
Vi years purchase, [Tully added three years for the ‘bonus’] the same as Mr. John
Redmond, the chairman of the Irish party’.128
Many of the nationalist rank and file were greatly angered by Redmond’s
behaviour. At a meeting of the Dungarvan Rural District Council Redmond was
lambasted by a number of members. They feared that landlords would request the same
terms that the leader of the I.P.P. had sought. James Hayes, a member of the council,
neatly summed up their feelings:
I must say that he, as a leader, has set a very bad example. I would not mind men 
like Mr. Stuart or Lord Waterford, but the leader of the party that the people have 
been going to jail for, to say that he would turn around and ask 24 lA years’ 
purchase for his land in these times is a scandal, and I think a resolution ought to 
be proposed if not condemning his action, at the least protesting in the strongest 
manner against it. If this land act was to benefit the farmers why then should men 
like Mr. Redmond, identified with the people expect 24 A years purchase for the 
land? I would blame no landlord in the country to get as much as he could for his 
land after that.129
Those who feared that the terms offered by Redmond would affect negotiations under 
the act soon had those fears confirmed. On the estate of Major Maxwell Close in Co. 
Armagh, for example, it was decided to offer the tenants the same terms as those
130accepted by Redmond. Major Close eventually sold 13,009 acres for £210,793 which 
was one of the largest sales to be processed in the first year of the act’s existence.131 
Similarly, the Redmond terms were used as a bench mark when the marquis of Ely’s
1 37lands were being sold.
At a meeting in Swinford, Co. Mayo on 20 October, John Dillon was careful not 
to openly condemn Redmond. However, he was keen to emphasise that tenants should 
compare prices by the number of years’ purchase and not by the reduction in rent they 
received. Comparing prices by the number of years’ purchase had been the predominant
128 Ibid., 20 Oct. 1903.
129 Ibid., 22 Oct. 1903.
130 Ibid., 28 Oct. 1903.
131 Return o f  advan ces m ade under the Irish L an d  Act, 1903 during the p e r io d  fro m  Is' N ovem ber, 1903 to  
31s' D ecem ber, 1905, vol. I p a r ts  i, ii, a n d  Hi [C d.3447, C d.3560, C d.3547] H.C. 1907, Ixx, 1.
1321.T., 2 D ec. 1903.
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method under previous land acts. Dillon and his supporters feared that the new system of 
comparing the reduction in rent would be exploited by landlords in order to obtain
i  a a
higher prices from unsuspecting tenants. By keeping the focus on the number of 
years’ purchase offered, the fact that Redmond’s terms gave a reduction of 20 % on 
second term rents and 25 % on first terms rents was effectively glossed over.134
The Freeman's Journal had preached that the Wyndham Act would significantly 
raise the price of land in Ireland. However, as the primary nationalist newspaper it 
sought to justify the terms accepted by Redmond and it lambasted those landlords who 
had sought to exploit the sale in order to raise the price on their own lands. The 
newspaper cited the exceptional circumstances of the case such as the low rental, the 
family charges, the cancellation of arrears of rent and the ‘special services of Mr. 
Redmond to the tenantry of Ireland’ as the reasons for the generous price. Indeed, 
Redmond’s political services to the country were put forward as justification for the 
terms agreed upon.
Michael Davitt was decidedly unimpressed with Redmond’s actions and openly
critical of the terms of sale. Davitt believed in land nationalisation and had opposed both
the Land Conference and the Wyndham Act from the outset. In response to the
Freeman’s Journal article of 31 October 1903, Davitt declared the newspaper’s attempts
to justify Redmond’s terms as preposterous:
You cannot fairly or honestly, defend the selling of any landlord’s property, 
whether he is an Irish leader or an Irish saint, for a certain price, and say at the 
same time that Mr. Talbot-Crosbie and Lord Dunraven are absurdly unfair when 
they demand a similar figure. This is turning the whole thing into a farce.136
In Davitt’s mind, the price was extortionate and it was being exploited by landlords so as 
to obtain similar terms. Indeed he considered it the height of hypocrisy for the 
newspaper to try to justify the price on account of Redmond’s position or past services 
and then to denounce other landlords for requesting similar terms.
Davitt’s savage criticism provoked an immediate response from the editor of the 
Freeman’s Journal'.
133 Ib id ., 21 O ct. 1903.
134 Ib id ., 19 O ct. 1903.
135 F.J., 31 O ct. 1903.
136 Ib id ., 4  N ov. 1903.
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Mr. Redmond’s sale to his tenants is being cited daily in the landlord press and 
by landlords throughout Ireland as a justification for extravagant demands. It is, 
therefore, both relevant and necessary to point out the differences which exist 
between the circumstances of Mr. Redmond’s estate and the circumstances of 
those other estates where high prices are claimed.137
The newspaper’s attempts to defend Redmond, however, appeared absurd in the wake of 
Davitt’s criticism. Davitt’s response to the ‘Redmond terms’ threatened to damage the 
unity of the I.P.P. Rev. James C. Cannon of Letterlcenny confided to Redmond that 
‘Davitt is acting from the worst of motives and would, if he could, plunge the country 
into another split. His mean and dishonest attempt to misrepresent the negotiations on 
your Wexford estate is quite enough justification for saying this’.138
William O’Brien had been unaware of Redmond’s sale terms until they appeared 
in the press. Despite his annoyance that his advice had not been sought by Redmond, he 
did not openly criticise him. O’Brien believed that the timing of the sale had been 
decidedly ill-judged and he held that Redmond should have waited a couple of months 
so as not to influence the standard of prices. According to O’Brien, the ‘alarm raised by 
the publication of the Wexford terms had given his [Redmond’s] critics a weapon before 
which he quailed’.lj9 Any attempt by Redmond to force Dillon and company to tow the 
party line now looked extremely unlikely. In a published letter to Rev. Father O’Flynn, 
president of the Cork U.I.L., O’Brien announced the resignation of his parliamentary 
seat in early November 1903. His reason for adopting such a course was to prevent a 
split in the I.P.P. between the advocates of a conciliatory policy towards landlords and 
the Wyndham Act and the supporters of Dillon, Davitt and the Freeman \s Journal} 0
Following O’Brien’s resignation, the pressure on Redmond steadily mounted. A 
public meeting in Limerick city was fixed for 15 November at which he would attempt 
to clarify the terms of his sale. In the days leading up to the gathering, the I.P.P. leader 
came under attack yet again. Fr. Lee C.C., St Michaels, Limerick, in a published letter in 
the Irish Times, refused to attend the planned meeting on account of Redmond’s 
presence:
137 Ibid.
138 R ev. Jam es C. C annon  to  John  R edm ond , 21 N ov . 1903 (N .L .I., R edm ond  papers , M S 15, 242/13).
139 O ’B rien , A n olive branch in Irelan d , p. 289.
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But, surely, if the farmers are not the fools I do not take them to be, they and 
everyone genuinely interested in them-priests and laymen-will keep far away on 
Sunday next from Mr. Redmond and his demonstration. Their absence, to my 
mind, would be the best demonstration of the opinion they have formed of this 
politician, and of their sense of the grievous injury he has inflicted on their class 
all over Ireland by the price he as a landlord exacted from his own tenants...We 
were led to believe that the land question was to be settled by this purchase 
bill.. .But if the action of any one man is capable of frustrating that measure, it is 
surely the action of Mr. Redmond, who, tenants’ representative as he is, and the 
leader of the nationalist party, comes forward in his capacity of landlord and sells 
his estate to his tenants at the highest possible price...at the outset of the 
operation of this act, and then gives the key to the landlords of the country as to 
the price they may look for from their tenants.141
The independent nationalist M.P. Jasper Tully followed suit claiming that Redmond had
set the price for land under the Wyndham Act after consultation with the landlords.142
There was sympathy for the I.P.P. leader in some circles. George Wyndham felt that
Redmond was being treated unjustly and confided to Moreton Frewen, who had an
estate in Co. Cork, that it was unfair ‘that anyone should have made [political] capital
out of the sale of his estate’.143
At the Limerick meeting, Redmond lamented the resignation of William O’Brien
and called for unity among nationalist interests. Fie urged tenants to approach landlords
in a spirit of conciliation and fairness but emphasised that there could be no standard
price for the whole country. The quality of the land, the rental and various other
circumstances would have to guide tenants in the prices they offered and it was unwise
to pinpoint a ‘fair equivalent’ of the Ashbourne prices. Redmond openly admitted that
some Irish landlords had sought to extract unfair prices on the strength of the published
terms he had offered to his tenantry. In a feat of mathematical gymnastics, Redmond
attempted to show that the actual terms of the sale would amount to significantly lower
than what had been published in the press:
The great majority of the tenants on that estate who never went into land courts 
at all will receive reductions amounting to about 40 per cent, or eight shillings in 
the pound, on the rents for which they are now liable; in other words, they will 
be purchasing their land for about eighteen and a half years’ purchase. But there
141 Ibid., 13 N ov . 1903.
142 Ibid.
143 G eorge W yndham  to M oreton  F rew en, 14 N ov. 1903, in G uy W yndham  (ed .), L etters o f  G eorge  
W yndham  (E d inbu rgh , 1915), p. 84.
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are two years’ arrears on this estate, and it is part of the arrangement that they 
should be absolutely wiped out. If it is fair to take that into account, then these 
tenants will be buying their lands at sixteen and a half years’ purchase and on a 
rental which over the whole estate is twenty-five per cent below Griffith’s 
valuation.144
Redmond’s position was becoming increasingly isolated, however, following O’Brien’s 
unexpected departure and the Limerick meeting had been a desperate attempt to get his 
critics back on side. It was a damage limitation exercise which would hopefully remove 
his Wexford estate from the spotlight. At a time when Redmond needed the support and 
public backing of his colleagues, it was quite significant that both Dillon and Davitt 
failed to attend the meeting. Dillon excused himself on health grounds while Davitt 
pleaded a prior engagement.
While members of the I.P.P. may have been wary of publicly criticising 
Redmond, the independent nationalist, T. M. Healy, had no such reservations. The M.P. 
for North Louth admonished Redmond for attempting to sell so quickly under the 
Wyndham Act. He believed that he ought to have waited for a number of months instead 
of setting a precedent for sales prices. In his opinion, Redmond had ‘put up the price on 
every tenant in Ireland’ and his terms would ‘echo and re-echo on every estate’.145 Healy 
expressed the hope that Redmond would reconsider the sale on such terms. The Irish 
Times reported: ‘It was too valuable an asset for the landlords to lose sight of. He [T.M. 
Healy] hoped Mr. Redmond would be well advised, and drop the sale on those terms, 
because unless he did so it would stink in the nostrils of the tenant farmers of Ireland.’146 
Back on the Wexford estate the negotiations were ongoing. Redmond came 
under increasing pressure from tenants’ representatives such as Rev. David Bolger. A 
number of priests were involved in the negotiations on behalf of tenants in their area and 
Bolger was associated with the tenantry around the New Ross part of the estate. The 
tenants on this section of the estate considered their land to be considerably poorer than 
that around Wexford town. Fr. Bolger pleaded with Redmond to reduce the price and to 
consider the implications:
144 I T ,  16 N ov. 1903.
145 Ib id ., 17 N ov. 1903.
146 Ibid.
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The average selling price of land in Co. Wexf[ord] previous to the recent act... 
was 18 years purchase. This was the price voluntarily given by tenants & 
accepted by landlords. I do believe -  and it is the opinion also of all sensible men 
with whom I’ve spoken on the matter, that your sale has increased the price of 
land. You are very much blamed in the matter. I wish you had waited a while and 
not given a lead for your own sake and the sake of the tenant-farmers of Ireland. 
And if you have taken a false step perhaps tis not too late to retrace it. In god’s 
holy name; for your own sake -  & for the sake of your people and for the sake of 
your position -  throw this bit of land to your people at 18 yrs purchase. Had you 
done so then Parnell was never as honoured as you would be today.147
While the terms published in the press in October 1903 were agreeable at the 
time to the portion of the tenantry near Wexford town, it seems that the furore that 
followed convinced them that better terms could be obtained. Additionally, the tenants 
on the New Ross section of the estate held that their land was poorer. This would 
explain why the negotiations were protracted for a number of months. In a letter to Fr. 
Bolger who was negotiating on behalf of the tenants, Redmond revealed his feelings on 
the whole matter:
If the tenants had allowed me to ‘wait a while’, I might soon have been able to 
sell at a much better price for them. But I was not allowed to wait. The Wexford 
tenants insisted upon meeting. They fixed their own price. Your tenants also met 
& urged me...to sell. Now the position is that we have almost come to an 
arrangement.. .1 am making a fight for my children, for whom I could easily have 
made proper provision had I devoted the last 25 years to working for my own 
interests instead of giving up my profession. I feel I am bound to do the best I 
can so long as I know the tenants will be getting their land upon fair & 
reasonable terms wh[ich] will enable them to live & prosper.148
After considerable correspondence between his agents, solicitors and the various priests 
acting on behalf of the tenantry, new terms were arrived at in late December 1903 which 
were lower than those previously circulated. The reason for the climb-down on 
Redmond’s part could be attributed to the negative publicity the previous terms had 
received. It was also an attempt to repair some of the damage to Redmond’ political 
reputation and standing as I.P.P. leader. A circular outlining the new terms was 
subsequently distributed among the tenants on the estate.
147 R ev. D av id  B o lg er to  John  R edm ond , 5 D ec. 1903 (N .L .I., R edm ond  papers , M S 15, 242 /14).
148 John  R edm ond  to Fr. B o lger, D ec. 1903 (N .L .I., R edm ond papers, M S 15, 242 /14).
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In March 1909, under cross-examination in court from T. M. Healy, who was
acting as counsel for the prosecution in a case brought against a number of U.I.L.
officials over their conduct at the national convention of the U.I.L. on 9 February 1909,
Redmond revealed the exact terms under which his estate was sold. This was the
infamous Molly Maguires convention, where members had debated whether or not to
support the 1909 land bill, and there had been considerable disturbance with William
O’Brien and his supporters unable to get a hearing amid the commotion. The provisions
of the sale had been as follows:
Judicial rents fixed since the passing of the act of 1896 within the ‘zones’ (29) 
sold, at 23.7 years’ purchase, with a 22 Vi per cent reduction. Not within the 
‘zones’ (2), sold at 20.7 years’ purchase, with a reduction of 35 per cent. Judicial 
rents fixed before the 14lh Aug., 1896 (15 [16?] within the ‘zones’) sold at 22.2 
years’ purchase, with 27 Zi per cent reduction. One holding not within the 
‘zones’ was sold for 24.8 years’ purchase, with a reduction of 20 per cent.. .Non­
judicial rents (46) sold at 18.3 years’ purchase, with a reduction of 40 per cent. 
Total -  94 holdings sold at 21.3 years’ purchase, with a reduction of 30 per 
cent.149
Overall Redmond sold 3,150 acres for £35,351.150
In the course of the U.I.L. prosecution case in March 1909 it was alleged that a 
private meeting of the national directory of the U.I.L. had taken place on 8 September 
1903. While cross-examining John Redmond, T. M. Healy alleged that Redmond had 
presided over a five hour meeting at which it had been decided how to approach the 
subject of prices under the Wyndham Act. He also held that a private resolution had 
been passed which set 18 lA years’ purchase on first term and non-judicial rents and 22 
1/2 years’ purchase on second terms rents as acceptable terms under the new act. Upon 
examination of the minute book of the league, however, no such evidence for the 
resolution could be found. On further questioning Redmond declared that he had no 
recollection of the meeting, to which William O’Brien exclaimed ‘oh, my god! As if any 
one could forget that meeting that was present at i f .151
O’Brien maintained that a twenty-two man committee had been appointed to go 
throughout the country advising and assisting the tenants to obtain a reasonable price for
149/. / . ,  11 M ar. 1909.
150 R eturn o f  advances m ade under the Irish L a n d  Act, 1903 durin g  the p e r io d  fro m  Is' N ovem ber, 1903 to  
31s' D ecem ber, 1905, vol. I  p a r ts  i, ii, a n d  Hi [C d .3447 , C d .3560 , C d .3547] H .C. 1907, lxx, 1.
1511.T., 11 M ar. 1909.
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their holdings. A conciliatory attitude was to be adopted towards landlords while at the 
same time ensuring that extravagant prices were not paid by tenants. O’Brien called such 
a policy ‘conciliation plus business’. He was fearful that the wealthier tenantry in many 
parts of Ireland would recklessly agree to high prices, as would occur on the Leinster 
estate. These high prices would prove detrimental to the poorer tenants who would be
1 ^ 9mined by agreeing to such terms. The policy had proved a failure though as the Irish 
Times recorded: ‘He [William O’Brien] found that owing to Mr. Dillon’s speeches, the 
attitude of the Freeman[‘s] [Journal], and the sale of the Redmond estate, the 
arrangements for the local testing of the act had been made completely unworkable.’153
O’Brien maintained that the opposition of Dillon, Davitt and company to this 
policy led to its abandonment and the result was that the tenant-purchasers paid inflated 
prices:
Had these plans been suffered to proceed, they would have effectuated the 
purchase of the land of Ireland upon terms at an average increased reduction of 
ten per cent, and an average decrease of three in the number of years’ purchase, 
as compared with the average actually paid under the act. In round numbers they 
would have achieved a saving of £20,000,000 to the tenant-purchasers.154
It was highly significant that Redmond was willing to sell his estate at prices 
considerably in excess of those which O’Brien claimed were advocated at the private 
meeting of the national directory of the U.I.L. in September 1903. Indeed it must have 
been a factor in O’Brien’s resignation in November 1903, which was not long after 
Redmond’s first set of terms were published. In O’Brien’s eyes, Redmond’s acceptance 
of these initial terms would have been a betrayal of both the Irish tenant-purchasers and 
I.P.P. policy.
By agreeing to sell in the weeks prior to the official commencement of the 
Wyndham Act, Redmond drew considerable scrutiny upon his estate. The timing of the 
sale damaged his political standing and undermined his ability to rein in the likes of 
Dillon and Davitt. The ‘Redmond terms’ followed the announcement of the Leinster 
estate sale and was certainly a godsend for landlords who feared that prices might not 
exceed precedent levels set by the Ashbourne Act. O’Brien wrote:
152 O ’B rien , An olive  branch in Ireland , pp 260-2 .
1531. T., 11 M ar. 1907.
154 O ’B rien , An olive branch in Ireland, p. 262.
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A great shout went up from every rent-office in the country. For years 
afterwards, the first reply made to almost every body of tenants who broached 
the question of purchase to their landlords was: ‘I will accept the same terms as 
your own leader, Mr. Redmond,’ and, needless to say, the terms they fastened 
upon were the ‘24 V2 years’ purchase’ of the first announcement, and not the 
reduced terms which limped along very much later.155
The fact that it was the tenants on the estate and not Redmond himself that had
offered the initial price was obscured in the confusion and outrage which followed. The
publication of the initial terms had proved exceedingly damaging to the I.P.P. leader.
Those terms became a popular reference for landlords and the fact that the estate was
finally sold at a much lower number of years’ purchase was all but ignored. This attitude
was exemplified by the northern landlord, W. H. Boyd who ‘considered that half an acre
of land under the land purchase act of 1903, was worth what the leader of the
nationalists, Mr. Redmond, had got-namely, 24 V2 years’ purchase and the ‘bonus” .156
Those initial terms of 24 !4> years purchase quickly became a weapon in the landlord
arsenal. Even later in 1908, when many landlords feared the introduction of compulsory
purchase, Lord Barrymore quipped: ‘If Mr. Redmond’s idea of compulsion is to compel
us to sell our estates upon the terms upon which he sold his, I suppose we shall all be
prepared to consider the question with a more or less favourable eye.’157
Redmond, however, made little personal gain from the sale of the estate and
obtained none of the ‘bonus’:
When the purchase money came to be allocated, it was found by Judge Meredith 
that the amount produced by the purchase was not sufficient to meet the family 
charges and the mortgages, and, therefore, he said, in public court, that the 
‘bonus’ should not be paid to me at all, and I [John Redmond] never got a 
shilling of the ‘bonus’.158
A 12 % ‘bonus’ calculated on the purchase price of £35,351 would have amounted to 
£4,242. Redmond made no financial gain from the transaction. In reality, his inheritance 
had proved to be a considerable burden both financially and politically.
155 Ib id ., p. 282.
1561.T., 26 A ug. 1905.
157 Ib id ., 14 Sept. 1908.
158 C ited  in D ennis G w ynn, The life o f  John R edm on d  (L ondon , 1932), p. 104.
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VI). The Archdale estate, Co. Fermanagh
One of the first landlords to enter into discussions with his tenants under the Wyndham
Act was Edward Archdale of Castle Archdale in Co. Fermanagh. Although he was an
extensive landowner, he was considered a model landlord and was an advocate of
tenants’ rights. During the 1903 North Fermanagh by-election, he had supported the
successful Russellite candidate Edward Mitchell. On 3 September 1903, he called a
conference of his tenants in Irvinestown at the home of his agent Anthony F. Maude,
J.P., to discuss terms. Archdale offered to sell at 26 years’ purchase based on the
tenants’ current rents which translated into a reduction of 3s. in the pound. Furthermore,
he consented to let the tenants keep any bog land which they held.
The vast majority of the tenants, however, refused the terms offered and declared
that a reduction of 55. in the pound or 23 years’ purchase was the maximum price that
they could afford. Although a handful of tenants agreed to sign agreements, the
Fermanagh Times reported that most were quite wary:
Some of the tenants present expressed the opinion that by keeping to these terms 
they would be placing upon themselves an annual burden which, in adverse 
seasons, or when the harvests were bad, they might not be able to bear, and the 
result would be that in the end they would be compelled to part with the land 
altogether.159
Archdale intimated that 26 years’ purchase was the minimum that he could afford to 
accept. Indeed, he appeared to be aware of his estate’s potential to set the price for other 
sales under the act and was determined to uphold the interests of landlords as well as 
those of tenants stating: ‘I am, of course, in favour of justice and generosity to tenants, 
but also to my own class.’160
Although the initial meeting between Archdale and his tenants failed to hammer 
out an agreement the negotiations attracted considerable attention. The Co. Kerry 
landlord, Lindsay Talbot-Crosbie, blamed the gap between Archdale’s offer and what 
the tenants could afford to accept on the failure to provide the ‘bonus’ at a higher rate 
than 12 %. Amazingly Talbot-Crosbie advocated new legislation to increase the ‘bonus’ 
even though it was only September 1903 and the act would not come into operation until
159 Ferm anagh Tim es, 10 Sept. 1903.
160 Ibid.
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1 November. As Talbot-Crosbie outlined in a published letter in the Irish Times'. ‘It is to 
be hoped now that Mr. Archdale, and all landlords similarly circumstanced, will 
maintain their position until the amendment to the act, which is just shown to be so 
necessary, is secured.’161 Archdale was also critical of the government for not providing 
the grant-in-aid at a higher rate as was recommended by the Land Conference Report. In 
a letter to the Fermanagh Times he wrote: ‘It would have been better if the government
could have seen their way to base their legislation more than they have done on the
162findings of that report. ’
The M.P. for South Fermanagh, Jeremiah Jordan (I.P.P.), was highly critical of 
the meeting in Irvinestown. He held that the Archdale offer would be copied by other 
landlords and would help set the price of land in that region as he outlined in a letter to 
the Fermanagh Times: ‘The danger I apprehend is that this unhappy incident may tend 
to fix and set the tune and crystallise the price for other county landlords, and 
indefinitely retard sales and purchase.’163 Jordan maintained that Archdale had 
inadvertently been the ‘catspaw of the landlords’ and by offering exorbitant terms at 
such an early stage he had inflicted considerable damage on the prospect of sales: ‘I fear 
the meeting was convened too hastily, and without due consideration of the probable 
effect. The terms seem to have been deficient in specific detail, were crude, immature 
and calculated to lead directly to the abortive result.’164
The earl of Belmore, in a letter to the Fermanagh Times about the proposed sale 
of the Archdale estate, was keen to draw the attention away from the number of years’ 
purchase offered by Archdale. As already mentioned years’ purchase of rent was the 
most popular and widespread method used to calculate sale prices prior to the Wyndham 
Act and had been used under the Ashbourne Act and previous legislation. Belmore felt 
that under the Wyndham Act the focus should be on the reduction in rent which the 
tenant received and how his annuity compared to his current rent. Belmore wrote: ‘I may 
add that if the new act is to work we must give up talking about the average amount of
1611 .T .,9  Sept. 1903.




years’ purchase and look to the difference only between the annuities which the tenant
will have to pay and the rent he is paying at the time of sale.’165
At the invitation of the Tenants Defence Association in Irvinestown, T. W.
Russell put forth his views on the sale in a letter to the association’s secretary published
in the Fermanagh Times. Russell counselled the tenants to:
bear in mind that they are making a final bargain, that the engagement is for 70 
years, and cannot be altered by any amount of parliamentary or other pressure. 
Good or bad seasons, high or low prices, will make no difference. The state will 
have lent the money, and the instalments must be paid.166
Russell believed that Archdale could afford to give more than the 15 % reduction on
second term rents, without any substantial loss to his income. «
Archdale, however, had supported Russell’s colleague Edward Mitchell during 
his election campaign, which, perhaps, placed the two M.P.s in an uncomfortable 
position. Mitchell held that it was not the number of years’ purchase but the amount of 
the reduction in the current rent which the annuity represented that was all important. 
However, Mitchell was convinced that Archdale could offer a greater reduction than 15 
% on second term rents and he expressed the hope that the landlord would step forth
i  rn
with more generous terms.
The M.P. for North Monaghan, Dr. Edward Thompson (I.P.P.), who considered 
Archdale ‘a model landlord, and a most estimable and liberal minded gentleman’, also
urged that the focus should not be on the number of years’ purchase but on the reduction
168 • •of rent received. However, Thompson believed that if Archdale was approached in the
correct manner, a compromise could easily be reached and a greater reduction could be
obtained for the tenants.
In response to the public commentary, around the proposed terms of the sale of
his estate, Archdale wrote to the press stating that there were a number of reasons which
influenced him in offering the price he had because he felt anything less would have
meant a reduced income. His two chief arguments were as follows: firstly, there would
be a number of incidental expenses which would eat into the purchase money and the
165 Ib id ., 17 Sept. 1903.
166 Ibid.
167 Ibid.
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‘bonus’. Secondly, it was highly unlikely that the purchase money could be invested in 
securities at 3 Va %. Archdale argued that the large volume of money which would come 
on the market would have the effect of lowering the rate of interest any landlord who 
invested his purchase money would receive. Moreover, he drew attention to the sacrifice 
that many landlords were making in selling their property. He wrote: ‘Land is rightly 
considered the best property in the world, and its present owners cannot be expected to 
part with it at too great a sacrifice, or at much further diminution of an income so much 
reduced.’169
In October 1903, Archdale bowed to public pressure and circulated a letter 
among his tenants outlining a revised offer. The new terms were a reduction of 30 % off 
first term rents and a 20 % reduction on second term rent. All tenants who signed before 
1 November were to be forgiven a half years’ rent. Remarkably, Archdale foresaw the 
flood of sales that would occur in little over a year and stated it as one of the principal 
reasons for his revised terms: ‘As I am anxious my tenants should be amongst the first to 
apply to purchase their holdings, and so avoid the block which is likely to occur later on, 
and also get an immediate and substantial reduction in the annual payment, I have 
decided to lower my former offer.’170
On 26 October a deputation from the tenantry accompanied by Edward Mitchell, 
M.P., met with Archdale and after some discussion, the revised terms were agreed to. 
The tenants would receive a reduction of 4s. in the pound on second term rents and 6s. in 
the pound on first term rents. Arrears were added to the purchase money and the running 
gale was forgiven. There had been some anxiety expressed by the tenants about turbary, 
timber and sporting rights. Eventually it was decided that the sporting rights would be 
reserved to the landlord and the timber rights to the tenants. Where a bog formed part of 
a holding, it was to be sold with it, otherwise, it would be put in the hands of trustees
. . .  171who would administer it. The various sections of the Archdale estate in Co. 
Fermanagh and Co. Tyrone agreed to substantially similar terms.
The Archdale estate was one of the earliest sales under the act and was the first 
estate upon which negotiations for sale actually commenced. The fact that it sold for a
169 F erm anagh Tim es, 24 Sept. 1903.
170 Ibid., 29  O ct. 1903.
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considerably higher number of years’ purchase than had been typical under previous
land acts did not pass unnoticed. Like the sales of the Leinster and Redmond estates, it
helped to establish a purchase price for land that was much higher than prices under the
Ashbourne Act. Edward’s nephew, Henry Blackwood Archdale, would recall how the
sale terms came in for scathing criticism:
When the Wyndham Act came into operation in 1903, he [Edward Archdale] 
promptly gave the tenants the advantages of that measure, and sold to them on 
very reasonable terms, which were afterwards quoted and taken as a standard for 
the rest of the country. Although his action was severely criticised by many 
people at the time, subsequent events have shown the wisdom of the course he 
took.172
Between 6 April 1905 and 26 March 1908 Edward Archdale received £242,047 for the 
29,334 acres he sold which would have left him with a ‘bonus’ of £29,045. Additionally 
he sold and repurchased his demesne under section three of the act. The demesne 
consisted of 1,607 acres at a price of £19,847.173 The advance for the repurchase of his 
demesne had to be repaid back by Archdale over sixty-eight and a half years at an 
annuity of 3 % %.
VII). The Arnott estate, Co. Cork
Sir John Arnott originally bought his estate in West Cork from the duke of Devonshire 
in the 1890s for a sum of £200,000.174 Upon Sir John Arnott’s death, control of the 
estate devolved to the trustees, his second wife Dame Emily J. Fitzgerald and his son Sir 
John A. Arnott (Emily’s step-son). After being approached by Canon Shinkwin, 
president of Bandon U.I.L., regarding the possible sale of the estate, Sir John A. Arnott 
intimated that he was not anxious to sell but would agree under the following terms: a 22 
% reduction on first term rents, 10 % off second term and 20 % off non-judicial rents, 
and the sporting rights were to be reserved to the trustees.175 In terms of years’ purchase 
his offer translated into 24 years’ purchase on first term rents, 27 3A years’ purchase on 
second term and 24 Vi years’ purchase on non-judicial rents.176
172 H en ry  B lack w o o d  A rchdale , M em oirs o f  the A rch da les  (E nn isk illen , 1925), p. 55.
173 R eturns o f  advan ces under the Irish L a n d  Act, 1903. See b ib liog raphy  fo r references.
174 Southern Star, 28  N ov. 1903.
175 Ib id ., 17 O ct. 1903.
176 Ib id ., 6 Feb. 1904.
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On 5 November 1903 a meeting of the tenants on the estate to consider the terms
was held in Bandon town where it was decided to reject the trustees’ offer. The
chairman, Canon Shinkwin, considered the proposed price was too high and warned the
tenants of the dangers of striking a deal which could come back to haunt them in the
future. The Southern Star reported his speech:
Remember all the risks of the future are yours, for the landlord, when he sells, 
emancipates himself from them. You will have many a bad year before the 68 Vi 
years have come to an end, years as bad as the present one, possibly a series of 
them in unbroken succession as happened on former occasions; and this danger, 
coupled with high rates and dearer labour, and a growing foreign competition
* 177must make the most thoughtless amongst you cautious.
An offer to buy at nineteen years’ purchase on the basis of second term rents was put
forth by the tenants who also proposed that the sporting rights be reserved to the trustees
but emphasised that such rights should die with them. However, Sir John A. Arnott, in a
letter to Canon Shinkwin, published in the Southern Star, turned down their offer and
warned that negotiations would stall unless the tenants were more reasonable with their
proposals. He wrote:
The tenants seems to ignore the fact that their holdings are let to them at very 
reasonable rates, and that those tenants who applied to the Land Commission 
Court gained no appreciable advantage - in fact, the rents were increased in 
several cases. I should part with this trust property with much regret, but having 
yielded to the desire of the tenants to become owners of their holdings, I 
naturally expect from them, at any rate, such a proposition as would command
* 17Rthe careful consideration of the trustees.
There was considerable annoyance and anger among the Arnott tenantry at the 
refusal of the trustees to sell on such terms. They held that when Sir John Arnott 
originally purchased the estate in the 1890s, he had offered to sell to the tenants by 
townland at eighteen years’ purchase, the same terms as the duke of Devonshire had 
offered to some of his Bandon tenants prior to the sale. Sir John Arnott’s offer had eased 
any tensions which might have arisen over the purchase of the estate from the duke. No 
sale on those terms had actually occurred but the general belief of many tenants was that 
the offer to sell on those terms had not been withdrawn. Hence, tenants felt that by
177 Ib id ., 7 N ov. 1903.
178 Ib id ., 14 N ov . 1903.
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offering nineteen years’ purchase, they had even exceeded what Sir John Arnott senior 
originally intimated he would have accepted for the estate. The ‘promise’ to sell by the
179deceased owner would continue to be a prominent theme in the negotiations for sale.
With the negotiations stalled, a number of meetings were held where it was 
decided by the tenants to ask for an abatement of the rent considering the poor season 
just passed. Canon Shinlcwin presented the tenants’ case to Sir John A. Arnott but their 
request was refused. Arnott pointed out that the rents had been fixed by the courts and 
that the quality of the seasons had already been factored in. A new sale offer was, 
however, presented by Arnott to the tenants via a published letter to Canon Shinkwin. 
The revised terms were as follows: 25 % off first term rents, 18 lA % off second term 
and 27 'A % off non-judicial rents. He also agreed to forgive half a year’s rent for all 
tenants.180 Arnott may have been influenced by a declaration of the town tenants of 
Bandon, which formed part of the estate, that they fully supported the demand of the 
agricultural tenants to purchase.181 If a town formed part of a predominantly agricultural 
estate, it was possible for the town tenants to purchase. With both the town and 
agricultural portions of the Arnott estate both eager to avail of the act, there was 
increased pressure on the trustees to sell on acceptable terms.
Sir John A. Arnott had stressed in his letter to Canon Shinkwin that his revised 
offer was final and that he wished for a reply by 15 February 1904. On 3 February 
another meeting of the tenants was held in Bandon where the revised temis were still 
considered unreasonable. The tenants decided to increase their offer to 18 lA years’
purchase on first term rents, 21 XA years’ purchase on second term and non-judicial rents
1 82to be treated as first term.
With neither side willing to yield the negotiations remained deadlocked, with the 
frustration of the tenantry being increased by the belief that the promise and terms under 
which Sir John A. Arnott’s father had apparently agreed to sell had been shamefully 
broken. The tenants held that the terms offered were exorbitant and an example of 
landlord greed.
179 Ib id ., 28 N ov . 1903.
180 Ib id ., 23 Jan . 1904.
181 Ib id ., 14 Jan. 1904.
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The relationship between Lady Fitzgerald Arnott and her stepson had been far 
from amiable. On 19 February 1904, the two of them appeared in the Court of Chancery. 
Sir John A. Arnott had gone to the court to clarify whether or not his step-mother was 
required to sign the cheques on the estate. She had refused on account of his failure to 
inform or consult her about certain business transactions and the sale of the Bandon 
estate. Without her signature on the cheques, business on the estate was at a standstill. 
The fact that Sir John A. Arnott had offered to sell on certain terms without consulting
183her had also irked Lady Fitzgerald Arnott.
The tenants on the Arnott estate and their representatives became increasingly
disillusioned with the Wyndham Act and the introduction of compulsory purchase
legislation was seen as their only hope of purchasing their holdings. The acceptance of
the high price asked by Sir John A. Arnott would almost certainly lead to ruination in
years to come as far as Canon Shinkwin was concerned. The Southern Star reported his
speech at Bandon in January 1905:
Some people said on platforms and other places that the Wyndham Act is 
working satisfactorily (cries of ‘no, no’) and that some 15 or 16 or 17 millions’ 
worth of land had been sold. Was this a proof that the Wyndham Act was 
working satisfactorily? It was only working satisfactorily for one set of people - 
it was working satisfactorily for the landlords who were demanding those high 
prices, was it working satisfactorily for the men who were expected to pay those 
prices? Not at all...it will bring them after a time into a state of bankruptcy. For 
if the instalments to be paid to the estates commissioners were too high arrears 
would accrue, and the tenants would be worse off than before for it would be 
with the state that they would have to deal, and the tenant who fell into arrear
184would be sold out and his lands pass into the hands of somebody else.
With negotiations having reached a stalemate on the Arnott estate, the tenants 
decided in January 1905 to request that the estate be sold to the estates commissioners. 
At a meeting held in Bandon on 12 January, Rev. Thomas Brown, the Presbyterian 
minister, proposed a resolution on behalf of the town tenants in support of the request to
1 S Ssell. A deputation representing both the agricultural and town portions of the estate 
met with Sir John A. Arnott at the Imperial Hotel, Cork. He again refused their request
1831.T., 20  Feb. 1904
184 Southern S ta r , 7 Jan. 1905.
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and, moreover, declined to consider selling the town portion of the estate. Arnott felt that 
it was ‘ridiculous to ask him to sell now at Ashbourne prices’ and he contested the 
interpretation held by the tenants, about the promise apparently made by his father, and 
felt himself in no way bound by it. Bizarrely, he held that his father had been referring to 
the duke of Devonshire’s Lismore estate, which incidentally, was not sold until the 
introduction of the Wyndham Act. Arnott declared he was ‘a business man born and 
bred’ and intended to treat the sale of his estate ‘as a purely business matter’.186
The report of the meeting in the Southern Star was revealing. There was, 
reportedly, considerable tension between the deputation and Sir John A. Arnott which 
was further aggravated by an inability to come to an agreement. Arnott’s understanding 
of what his father had meant when he promised to sell was seen as a gross betrayal by 
the deputation. Indeed, they felt that he had sullied the memory of his father. The 
meeting ended with the deputation storming off despite the fact that Sir John had
187ordered lunch for them.
Sir John A. Arnott’s step-mother Tady Emily J. Fitzgerald, when contacted by 
the tenants’ representatives, promised to do all she could to bring about a peaceful 
settlement.188 However, all negotiations looked to have hit a dead end. Canon Shinkwin 
advised the tenants to remain united and to wait, if necessary for a year or two. Upon his 
advice the tenants decided to organise a demonstration in Bandon. The local branches of 
the U.I.L. were to work together to organise this meeting. At a meeting of Bandon U.I.L. 
in early June 1905, it was agreed that ‘the question of the Arnott estate will be fully and 
exhaustively dealt with’ at the gathering.189 It was hoped that John Dillon and other 
party M.P.s would speak at it. The demonstration was eventually cancelled due to the 
ongoing disagreement between William O’Brien and the I.P.P. The purpose of having 
such a monster meeting was simply to put pressure on Sir John A. Arnott to sell on 
reasonable terms and it was felt that the dispute would overshadow their objective.
There were inklings that some tenants were willing to accept Sir John A. 
Arnott’s asking price and a minority of tenants on the estate had resolved to agree to the
186 Southern Star, 18 Feb. 1905.
187 Ib id ., 18 Feb. 1905.
188 Ib id ., 25 Feb. 1905.
189 Ib id ., 10 June 1905.
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terms of purchase offered. These tenants were mainly Protestant, and, in terms of
acreage, they formed a significant portion of the estate. The Irish Times reported:
There is, however, on the estate a considerable minority of tenants who are 
perfectly willing to accept Sir John Arnotf s terms. Fifty tenants have consented 
to purchase on those terms, and twenty-five of those have actually signed the 
agreements. Most of them are Protestants in independent positions, and they 
represent about two-fifths of the total acreage of the estate.190
These larger farmers agreed to the following terms. First term tenants received a 
reduction of 6s. in the pound, second term tenants As. 6d. in the pound and non-judicial 
tenants received a reduction of Is. 6d. in the pound. Sporting rights on the land were 
reserved to the trustees for their lifetime and mineral rights were vested in the Land 
Commission.191
In response, Canon Shinkwin called on the tenantry to stick together and warned
the smaller tenants not to be forced into an agreement that they would regret in the
future. Shinkwin stated:
Speaking generally, the terms offered by Sir John Arnott are not reasonable. 
They may be reasonable as far as a few holdings on the estate are concerned - 
that was in the case of the few men who have the large holdings, the best land, 
and the lowest rents; but they were a minority, and the great majority were in the 
possession of inferior land, and they were being asked to purchase their holdings 
on the same terms as were offered to the tenants of large holdings at cheap
192rates.
On 2 August 1905 a meeting of the Arnott tenantry was held in Bandon at which it was 
decided to ask Sir John A. Arnott for a reduction of 25 % on the gale (the impending 
rent) which was due and an extra two months in which to pay. The whole body of 
tenants at the gathering marched to the estate office where they presented their request to 
the agent, Mr. Hodson. Rev. M. O’Sullivan, C.C. Bandon, and Fr. Bernard, P.P. 
Newcestown, spoke in private with the agent on behalf of the tenants but Canon 
Shinkwin had been unable to attend. The priests decided to follow up with a letter to
192 />Arnott referring to the request and the meeting with the agent. Unfortunately for the 
tenants, however, Arnott refused to grant a reduction but did grant an extra month for the
1901.T., 19 A pr. 1905.
191 Ib id ., 2 M ay 1905.
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rent due. A number of tenants were processed for rent but the Bandon U.I.L. promised to
i 194pay their expenses.
To aggravate matters even further, Sir John A. Arnott put up a stud farm on the 
estate for public auction in September 1905 which his nephew purchased for £3,250 or 
approximately 33 years’ purchase.195 Many tenants felt that the sale was a ploy to set the 
price of land in the area and to trick them into offering higher prices for the purchase of 
their holdings. The Southern Star commented that ‘it looks as if the dispute between 
landlord and tenant is about the leave the region of controversy, and enter that of actual 
conflict’. A ‘defence fund’ was also started to assist those being processed for rent.196
Although many of the tenants were advised by their priests to be patient and hold 
out for better terms, little by little, purchase agreements were signed and by February 
1906, a significant number of tenants had agreed to the terms. In fact, almost 8,000 acres
197was ready to be declared an ‘estate’ for sale under the act. The records show that 
between 1 October, 1907 and 24 January 1918, the trustees of the Arnott estate received 
£178,537 (£30 was paid in cash by two tenants) for the sale of 16,704 acres under the 
Wyndham Act.198
The case studies examined illuminate the process of selling an ‘estate’ under the 
act. The sale of the Leinster, Redmond and Archdale estates all helped to set the tone 
and indeed the price for transactions. These three estates were among the earliest to be 
sold under the act and the negotiations were conducted relatively quickly. The Leinster 
and Archdale sales were two of the largest to be sold under the operation of the act. The 
Arnott estate was, however, more a long drawn-out affair and demonstrated the 
considerable frictions and tensions which existed between the trustees and the tenantry. 
It also highlighted the role of the U.I.L. in negotiations under the act. The case studies 
highlighted the role played by the Catholic and Protestant clergy in sales and the 
involvement of M.P.s and other local government officials. None of the sales on any
194 Ibid., 12 A ug. 1905.
195 Ib id ., 14 O ct. 1905.
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‘estate’ took place in a vacuum and they were influenced by outside events which in turn 
helped to influence other sales.
VIIIs). The ‘bonus’ and the repurchase of demesnes.
The ‘bonus’ or grant-in-aid was one of the most enticing aspects of the Wyndham Act, 
as far as landlords were concerned. Augustine Birrell, Liberal chief secretary from 1907 
to 1916, would describe it as ‘the pulse of the land purchase machine’ and the principal 
reason for the huge volume of sales which occurred under the act.199 For encumbered 
owners, it offered the possibility of obtaining a tidy sum of cash even if little remained 
out of the purchase money once their estate charges were paid off. For those who held 
estates which were relatively debt-free, the act offered an opportunity to make a 
considerable financial profit. The higher the price a landlord was able to obtain from his 
tenants, the larger the ‘bonus’ he received. As the cash ‘bonus’ was for the use of the 
vendor alone, the temptation to hold out for the best price possible must have been 
irresistible to some landlords.
According to the report of the estates commissioners for the year ending 31 
March 1910, applications for advances under the 1903 act were approximately £80.5 
million while the actual amount advanced was £33.9 million.200 Many landowners who 
had sold faced a lengthy wait before they received the purchase money and ‘bonus’. 
Under the terms of the 1909 act, those facing such a long interval before payment had 
the option of taking the purchase money wholly or partly in 2 3/4 % land stock at the 
price of 92. Many landlords took advantage of this option, especially if they could not 
afford to wait for years for the purchase money in cash. Although the reports of the 
estates commissioners supplied the figures for the number of landlords who took 
advantage of the clause, unfortunately neither their reports nor the returns of advances 
specify details of the individual vendors. Similarly, they do not identify the small 
number of landlords who received a 3 % ‘bonus’ between 24 November, 1908 and the 
commencement of the Birrell Act of 1909.
199 A ugustine  B ir r e l l , ‘Irish  land  b ill’ 18 A ug. 1909 (T .N .A ., C A B  37/100/1 13), p. 1.
200 R eport o f  the esta tes com m issioners f o r  the y e a r  ending 31st M arch, 1910, an d  fo r  the p e r io d  fro m  1st 
N ovem ber, 1903 to  3 1 st M arch, 1910, xv-xv i, [C d .5423], H .C . xxxi, 847.
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A sample of thirty landowners who received purchase money for the sale of their
estates from the commencement of the act up until 31 December 1909 has been
compiled.201 By adding the acreage and the advances received by each tenant in the sale,
in the returns of advances under the act, the overall acreage and purchase price can be
ascertained. The table gives an insight into the vast sums of money that were involved
under the Wyndham Act and especially the importance of the cash ‘bonus’ in lubricating
the sale of estates. After the Archdale sale the next highest in the sample was Major
Maxwell Close whose 13,009 acres in Co. Armagh earned him £210,793 in addition to a
‘bonus’ of £25,295. As regards acreage the largest sale after Archdale in the sample was
that of the earl of Carysfort who sold land in counties Wicklow, Kildare and Dublin. His
decision to sell 17,669 acres for £170,723 earned him a ‘bonus’ of £20,486. On the other
end of the scale, Thomas Hopkins sold 182 acres in Queen’s County for £3,152 which
entitled him to a ‘bonus’ of £378.
George Wyndham’s first cousin, the earl of Mayo, sold his lands in Co. Kildare
in the first year of the act’s operation. He eventually sold 3,644 acres for £92,028 which
earned him a ‘bonus’ of £11,043. The Freeman’s Journal sent a reporter to cover the
sale who was rather critical of the whole affair. The negotiations had been kept secret
and little was revealed to the press. The correspondent claimed that the large grazing
tenants had taken the lead in the negotiations and that they had rushed the rest of the
tenantry into the deal:
In the first place the initiative in the negotiations was taken by the large grazing 
occupiers. The various meetings were summoned and arranged by them, and 
throughout the entire proceedings, their attitude forced the pace and hurried the 
negotiations to a definite issue. So manifest was the desire of these large holders 
to buy at almost any price, that some of the other tenants were more or less 
helplessly drawn into agreeing to terms which they did not consider as 
favourable in any sense.202
Interestingly, the solicitor for the tenants was Stephen J. Browne, chairman of Kildare 
C.C., who had also been involved in the sale of the Leinster estate where similar 
accusations had been levelled at graziers.
201 See appendix IV.
202 F.J., 9 Jan. 1904.
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The earl of Mayo was not the only one of George Wyndham’s relatives to benefit 
from the 1903 act. His uncle, Henry Wyndham, was the second Baron Leconfield. On 
his death in 1901 his son Charles Henry Wyndham, George’s first cousin, became the 
third Baron Leconfield. The baron sold a considerable amount of land in counties Clare, 
Tipperary and Limerick. Between June 1909 and October 1917 he received £88,060 for 
9,212 acres under the 1903 act.203
Sir Anthony MacDomiell, under secretary for Ireland from 1902 to 1908 and 
whose brother Mark Anthony MacDonnell was the M.P. for Leix (I.P.P.), sold his 864 
acre Mayo estate for £3,192 which gave him a ‘bonus’ of £383. According to the 
Freeman’s Journal, the fact that his terms were very fair to his tenants served only to 
highlight the exorbitant prices which were being asked by other landlords. Nearly all of 
the tenants were on second term rents which would be reduced by 30 %. This 
corresponded to 21 A years purchase or a reduction of 6s. in the pound. In an extremely 
generous gesture a year’s rent was forgiven and a bog of 256 acres was to be divided 
among the tenants. When all these concessions were added together, the Freeman’s 
Journal calculated that MacDomiell had sold to his tenants at 17 ‘A years’ purchase or 
just over the average Ashbourne price in Co. Mayo.204 -
As previously discussed, clause three of the Wyndham Act was designed to 
encourage landlords to remain in Ireland after they had sold their estates, by enabling 
them to sell their demesnes to the Land Commission and repurchase them on the same 
annuity terms as their tenants. Just as important, it allowed landlords to become the 
owners of their demesnes in fee simple, in addition to providing them with what was 
really a low interest rate loan. By 31 March 1920, 316 demesnes had been sold and 
repurchased under the terms of the Wyndham Act. The annuities were at 3 A % (2 3A % 
for interest and A % for the actual sum loaned) and were repayable over approximately 
sixty-eight and a half years. The total area of the 316 demesnes was 112,158 acres which 
equalled £1,762,477. Of that sum, £1,540,497 consisted of advances while £221,980 was 
paid in cash by landlords themselves. In 277 cases, there was a mansion house or other 
residence situated on the demesne or lands repurchased. On 31 March 1920, nine cases
203 R eturns o f  advan ces under the Irish L a n d  Act, 1903, 1903-20. See b ib liography  fo r refe rences.
204 F. J., 9 Jan. 1904.
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were pending consisting of 2,696 acres at a cost of £59,706. Of that sum, £38,058 would 
be advanced and £21,648 would be paid in cash by the landlords themselves.205
An examination of forty samples, where demesnes were sold and repurchased by 
landlords under the Wyndham Act, revealed that demesnes were sold and repurchased in 
all thirty-two counties.206 Remarkably, the marquis of Ely repurchased two demesnes in 
Co. Fermanagh totalling 1,559 acres at a cost of £15,648, all of which was advanced. 
The largest area repurchased in the sample was 2,054 acres which belonged to the earl of 
Carysfort who repurchased his Wicklow demesne for £20,000.207
The highest price given by landlords in the sample was paid by George Ker 
Mahon who repurchased 890 acres in Co. Galway at a cost of £31,672. As the price of 
his demesne was considerably over the £20,000 limitation, he paid £14,223 himself 
while receiving an advance of £17,449. On the opposite end of the scale, the earl of 
Bandon repurchased just nine acres in Co. Cork for which he was advanced a sum of 
£166, while in Co. Wexford; Sir George F. Brooke repurchased just eleven acres for 
£55.208
IX). Problems faced by Irish landlords 1903-9.
The Irish Landowners’ Convention was keen to ensure that favourable prices were 
offered to Irish landlords for their estates. There was a fear that a large estate would be 
sold, at what they considered inadequate terms, which would, in turn, set the standard 
price for land under the act. In August 1903, just after the measure had received the 
royal assent, the secretary of the convention, G. de L. Willis, was visited by Lord Ely’s 
London solicitor. Lord Ely had estates in Fermanagh and Wexford and his rental annual 
from them was £16,000 with nearly all the tenants on second term rents. Willis was 
horrified to learn that the solicitor intended to offer, on behalf of Ely, 19 years’ purchase 
excluding the ‘bonus’. Writing to Lord Clonbrock he said: ‘I pointed out that such terms 
would be disastrous, both for Lord Ely himself and for the Irish landlords generally.’209
205 R eport o f  the esta tes com m issioners f o r  the y e a r  fro m  f  A pril 1919 to  31*' M arch 1920, an d  f o r  the 
p e r io d  fro m  f  N ovem ber 1903, to  31s' M arch 1920, 48 [C m d. 1150] H .C . 1921, x iv , 661.
206 See append ix  V.
207 Ibid.
208 Ibid.
209 G. de L. W illis  to  L ord  C lonbrock , 22 A ug. 1903 (N .L .I., C lonb rock  papers , M S 3 5 ,772  (6)).
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Willis eventually succeeded in convincing Ely’s solicitor that 25 years’ purchase, aside
from the ‘bonus’, was the minimum he ought to ask the tenants for.
The convention’s fears of low prices under the Wyndham Act were considerably
allayed by the sale of the large Leinster estate, which was sold to the tenants at 25 years’
purchase the terms of which were widely condemned by nationalists. The terms of the
Redmond and Archdale sales also helped to set the standard price under the act. Estates
such as that of E. C. King-Harman played a similar role in Connaught something which
William O’Brien would bitterly lament. The sale of the King-Harman estate in Co.
Roscommon according to O’Brien ‘gave as evil a lead for Connaught as the duke of
Leinster’s estate had already given for Leinster’.210 The tenants on the King-Harman
estate gave an average of 24 ‘A years’ purchase which represented an average reduction
of 21.4 % in their rent.211 Overall, 70,000 acres were sold for £625,000.212 With only
£5,000,000 being allocated annually for the first three years, properties such as the King-
Harman and Leinster estates consumed huge portions of the available finance and
inevitably contributed to the shortage of funds for other sales.
Land purchase proceeded more rapidly in the east of the country than in the west.
Here the tenants were wealthier, there was less agrarian agitation and organisations such
as the U.I.L. were weakest. In 1909 the Liberal attorney-general, R. R. Cherry,
reinforced this point:
The act of 1903 operated very rapidly in parts of Ireland where it was least 
required, and very slowly in parts where it was most required. Roughly speaking, 
on the east side of Ireland-the east of Ulster, the whole of Leinster, and the east 
of Munster - land purchase worked splendidly. Large estates were sold, there was 
no trouble, and there were good tenants. All went through rapidly, but when you
• TITcome to the west of Ireland there was an entirely different state of affairs.
In the west of Ireland, landlords were less inclined to sell their untenanted land along 
with the rest of their ‘estate’. The C.D.B. and estates commissioners needed such land, 
more than they did in the east, in order to combat congestion and address the issue of 
uneconomic holdings. The letting of untenanted grasslands to large farmers and graziers 
was profitable for landlords and it may explain their reluctance to part with such lands.
2 1 0  O ’B rien , An o live  branch, p. 3 0 1 .
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According to Cherry this reluctance was the justification for introducing compulsion in 
1909.
Discontent among a certain section of Irish tenants, concentrated in the west, was 
becoming increasingly vocal by mid-1904. In the counties of Galway and Roscommon 
the dark cloud of agrarian unrest was on the horizon. On 10 May 1904 in the House of 
Lords, Lord Muskerry called the government’s attention to what he described as the 
lawless behaviour of the U.I.L. and tenants in the west who were intent on forcing 
landlords to sell.214 Lord Clonbrock, a Galway landlord, concurred with Lord 
Muskerry’s assessment. He maintained that the tenants were determined to violate the 
voluntary principle of the act by coercing the landlords into selling. In his opinion, such 
behaviour had made the act virtually inoperative.
Many landlords in the west felt that a co-ordinated attempt was being made to 
destroy the voluntary nature of the act and to intimidate them into selling on unfair 
terms. The activities of the U.I.L. in Galway were denounced by the earl of Westmeath. 
He accused the U.I.L. of preventing direct sales between landlord and tenants, contrary
9 1 Sto the intentions of the framers of the act. Lord Clonbrock supported the earl’s 
comments. He prophesised that land purchase, by enabling those who were openly 
hostile to Britain to become proprietors, would prove catastrophic in years to come. In 
his opinion, the act was not being given a fair chance due to the ‘tyranny.. .allowed to
exist.. .when men are not allowed to make their own bargains, but must do so only with
216the authority of the league... and on terms settled for them by the league’. Landlords, 
such as Lord Clonbrock, called on the government to protect the voluntary nature of the 
act and to halt land purchase in areas where there were disturbances and intimidation.
Landlords held that the U.I.L. lay at the root of the disturbances. The organisation 
was accused of encouraging tenants on certain estates not to pay their rent in a calculated 
effort to force landlords to sell. Lord Barrymore, who had lands in Cork, predicted that a 
new land war was imminent unless the government took firm action against rent strikes
214 H an sard  4, cxxx iv , 876-77 (10 M ay 1904).
215 Ib id ., cxxxv , 330-4  (19 M ay 1904).
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and other forms of intimidation.217 The Conservative government was accused of being 
so eager to advance land purchase that they would turn a blind eye to the manner in 
which the transfer of land occurred.
Considerable pressure was put on some landlords to sell their untenanted land 
along with their tenanted. Lord Oranmore and Browne felt such pressure was in 
violation of the voluntary nature of the act. Many landlords were opposed to the sale of 
their untenanted land as they derived considerable income from it. Lord Oranmore and 
Browne elaborated in the House of Lords:
I would call your lordships attention more especially to another matter which 
prevents the act from working, and that is the determination which is evinced not 
to purchase holdings unless the landlord is prepared to sell what the tenants are 
pleased to call his grazing ranches. County councils, district councils, local 
newspapers, village agitators, all insist on this. And what are these grazing 
ranches? Grass land on which the landlords have spent large sums of money in 
drainage and in various improvements. These are the lands on which cattle are fed 
-  those cattle which are one of the most valuable assets we have in the west of 
Ireland. Everybody is agreed that it is desirable that landlords should remain in 
Ireland...But you cannot expect men to live in a country if they have no 
inducement to live there, and if you take away all their grasslands you take away 
from the landlords every inducement to remain there.218
Similar problems had arisen in Cork where the tenants of the earl of Cork, in addition to
refusing to pay rent, had menacingly threatened his agent in order to force him to sell his
estate on terms he considered unreasonable.219 The pressure to sell both tenanted and
untenanted land and the use of intimidation were such that the earl of Arran predicted
that the Wyndham Act would be employed as an instrument of war by tenants and not an
770instrument of peace as they had hoped. The Conservative government sought to 
soothe landlord anxiety by promising to swiftly tackle any intimidation or infringement 
of their legal rights.
Lord Clonbrock had already announced his intention not to sell his estate under 
the 1903 Land Act. In a letter to George Wyndham in 1905, he called on the government 
to take action against those who were threatening the tenants of grasslands who rented
217 Ib id ., col. 1425-26. (13 June 1904).
218 Ib id ., col. 1431-2.
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the land from landlords under the eleven-month system. While landlords such as 
Clonbrock were eager to maintain the lucrative system, tenant representatives held that 
only by dividing up such grasslands could the western problem be remedied. The chief
secretary, in reply, was sympathetic and stressed that the government condemned any
221pressure being put on landlords to part with their land.
The pressure on landlords to sell their estates at low prices mounted, as did calls
for them to part with their untenanted land. Lord Clonbrock neatly summed up the
expectations of the western tenantry and the dangers it posed in the House of Lords:
In the west, especially, of Ireland, the expectations of the people have been 
raised to such a pitch by articles in the nationalist press and by speeches made in 
different parts of the country that the voluntary character of the act of last year 
appears to be quite lost sight of, and the belief seems firmly fixed in their minds 
that a landowner is bound to sell his property to his tenants at whatever terms it 
may be perfectly convenient for the tenants to offer. The consequence is that 
only very ruinous terms are offered - terms such as no man who is prepared to 
sell, or even is anxious to sell, can possibly accept; and the act to a very large 
extent remains a dead letter. The result is that there is great disappointment and a 
smouldering discontent which past experience teaches us may be fanned into a 
flame and lead to a renewal of the land war - a state of things which would not
only be injurious to landlords, but most detrimental to the peace and prosperity
222of the whole country.
Landlords were highly critical of the influence of the U.I.L., which they believed 
was opposed to direct negotiations between landlord and tenants. With the voluntary 
nature of the act being ignored, landlords such as Clonbrock called for the government 
to repress any agitation or intimidation against landowners. Additionally, he called on 
the estates commissioners not to authorise sales where intimidation had occurred. There 
was a feeling among landowners in the west that the Wyndham Act was being used as 
an instrument of war. They felt that tenants had lost sight of the fact that landlords were 
under no moral or legal obligation to sell. The Co. Clare landlord, Colonel O’Callaghan 
Westropp, believed that most of his peers were not overly eager to sell but would do so 
if offered reasonable prices. He identified a belief which seemed to prevail among 
tenants that all of the land in the country was up for sale. The prevalence of such notions
221 I.T., 18 Jan. 1905.
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presumably served only to hamper voluntary sales under the act. The pressure on
landlords to sell their tenanted land at low prices was also combined with the demand for
the sale of the untenanted grazing ranches. The U.I.L. held that the acquisition of such
untenanted land was essential in order to alleviate congestion and to address the issue of
uneconomic holdings
Many encumbered landlords, however, were in no position to resist rent strikes
or other forms of intimidation and simply sold their estates. The earl of Westmeath
illustrated the position of such individuals in the House of Lords:
Think of the position of the poor landlord in some parts of the west of Ireland. 
He is put to great trouble and expense; he has heavy charges to meet; he is not at 
all ready to enter into a prolonged fight against his enemies; the odds are ten to 
one he may have to give in, and he sells his land at a price which will hardly pay 
the charges on his property. Do people in this country know when they see the 
returns of sales which have actually taken place, how many of those sales are 
brought about by pressure? Or do they imagine that they are all voluntary?224
An example of such a case was the Daly (Dunsandle) estate in Co. Galway which
was sold in 1904 after a U.I.L. sponsored campaign of agitation, which included a strike
against rent. Lord Clonbrock complained bitterly to George Wyndham that Daly had
been forced into selling on poor terms due to the lawlessness in the district. Although the
terms were believed to be 23 years’ purchase, Clonbrock considered them unreasonably
low. He wrote: ‘The lowness of them is a striking proof of the success of agitation & of
the power of the league. It is so marked a proof that it is improbable not to anticipate that
the same tactics will be pursued elsewhere.’223
Graziers, who rented the grasslands from the landlords, also came under pressure
to surrender their farms so that the landlords would be forced to sell them along with the
rest of their estate. The following notice was circulated in the area of Lord Ashtown’s
Galway estate, for example, in mid 1904:
The winning of Irish independence and the land for the people is the object and 
purpose of the men of Bullaun and Benmore in the present struggle with 
landlordism and grazierism, and whoever thwarts them in attaining these objects 
is a renegade and a traitor to his own. And must be dealt with as such deserve if
223
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the people are to succeed. The grazing farm of Benmore shall never be allowed 
to pass into the hands of graziers even if lives have to be sacrificed. This farm 
shall and must be divided amongst the tenants or else. Let the Congested 
Districts Board take warning from this and graziers beware for the spirit that 
animated the men of 81 and 82 is still abroad. God save Ireland.226
The notice implied that graziers were not part of ‘the people’ and were not entitled to the 
land. By late 1906, the agitation had spread beyond Galway to other areas in the west. 
This turbulent period for landlords and graziers would become known as the Ranch 
War.227
Landlords viewed the agitation, coordinated by the U.I.L., not only as an attempt 
to force them to sell their untenanted land but also to reduce the price. Members of the 
landed gentry, such as the earl of Donoughmore, stressed that they would willingly sell 
untenanted land if they were guaranteed a fair price. As far as he was concerned, ‘the 
object of this agitation is not to force the sale of the grass lands, but to force the sale of 
the grass lands at a prairie value’.228 Lord Ashbourne agreed with Donoughmore and 
called on the Liberal government, which came to power in early 1906, to take decisive 
action. Furthermore, he articulated the sense of abandonment felt by many members of 
the landed class: ‘It is all very well to say that in this state of terrorism landlords and 
farmers should display moral courage. Moral courage is very easy at Westminister, but it 
is a very difficult thing in Roscommon.’
Some western landlords such as H. D’Arcy did indeed feel abandoned by the 
government and were uncertain how to deal with the agitation. D’Arcy had enjoyed 
relatively good relations with his tenants until the commencement of the Ranch War. 
Determined to force him into selling his estate and untenanted land, D’Arcy’s tenants 
refused to pay any rent until a sale had been agreed. In response, D’Arcy offered 23 
years’ purchase which was far removed from the 17 years’ purchase his tenants 
contemplated. Despairing of the situation, he blamed the government for the U.I.L. 
agitation: ‘How can I come to terms with such people? My belief is that the government
226 L ord A sh to w n to  L ord  C lonbrock , 16 June 1904, (N .L .I., C lonb rock  papers , M S 35 ,774  (8)).
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‘winks’ at lawlessness, for the purpose of bringing down the value of land & the cheaper
230it is the less purchase money they will have to find.’
Large landowners were not the only ones who felt deserted by the government.
Smaller landlords, such as those represented by the Irish Landowners’ Alliance, felt they
were being sacrificed simply because of political necessity. These landlords viewed the
Wyndham Act as just the latest in a series of confiscatory and unjust legislation directed
against their class. In a letter to Lord Clonbrock written on 21 June 1904, the Irish
Landowners’ Alliance stated:
We strongly object to being expatriated, which will be the certain result of the 
working of the Wyndham Act in conjunction with the other existing Land Acts. 
We feel that it is but a poor reward for our unswerving loyalty to the British 
Crown if we are now to be offered up as a holocaust at the shrine of political 
expediency. We have no desire whatever to leave our country and our home 
though possibly the larger proprietors may think it more prudent - even at a 
sacrifice - to sever their connection with a country from the government of which 
all principles of justice and fair play to their class have long since been 
discarded... and we humbly submit to your lordship that no government has the
231right to ruin or sacrifice any class in the community.
Many members of the landed gentry clearly felt that the new Liberal government was 
not doing enough to tackle the cattle driving campaign which came to prominence
9 3 9during the Ranch War, 1906 to 1909. Moreover, they believed that the government 
was content to turn a blind eye to the practice as it lowered the price of land and brought 
the grasslands onto the market. According to the landlord Major John C. W. Madden: 
‘members of the government and those who held office if they were not in favour of 
cattle driving were in sympathy with it because it was a means of getting them out of a 
hole and reducing the price of land they wanted to get hold of. That seemed to be the
933whole crux of the thing.’
In the midst of the Ranch War, Irish landlords were also faced with another 
difficulty, namely the delay in receiving the purchase money and the ‘bonus’. After the 
first year of the act’s operation, there was an increasing disparity between the number of
2j0 H . D ’A rcy  to  L ord C lonb rock , D ec. 1907 (N .L .I., C lonb rock  papers, M S 35,775  (1)).
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applications for sale and the amount of money actually advanced. Many vendors faced 
the possibility of waiting a number of years before they received their money.234 Most 
received around 3 V2 % interest on the purchase money from their tenants in the interval. 
Their estate charges were almost always higher as Lord Clonbrock outlined in the House 
of Lords:
It is also exceedingly hard for the landlords who have to meet fixed government 
charges, charges on mortgages, and various encumbrances, and to pay high 
interest while they are receiving only a small amount of interest on the purchase 
money; and they are unable to pay off those charges, as they naturally would do 
immediately were they in receipt of cash.235
With the staff of the Estates Commission already overburdened with sales, the collection 
of the interest from the tenants was often problematic. The earl of Dunraven, for 
example, outlined how some tenants were being allowed to get into arrears and
236consequently that the interest was not being passed onto the landlords quickly enough. 
When the earl of Mayo sold his estate in late 1903 the interest was not collected and he
* 9  3  7had to write to the estates commissioners to force them to collect it.
In the initial stages of the act’s operation, many landlords sold their lands on the 
assumption that they would receive the purchase money and ‘bonus’ within a reasonable 
period of time. As the block in processing sales worsened many had to take the delay 
into account when negotiating terms as the earl of Dunraven outlined in the House of 
Lords:
Landlords are placed in this position. Either they must decline to sell and are 
called preposterous persons who ought to be made to sell, or they must go back 
on the bargains which they have already made, or worse than all, they have to 
ask higher terms from their tenants than they would otherwise demand. They 
must protect themselves against the expense involved in this long and 
interminable delay, and the result is that all over Ireland landlords are asking 
considerably higher terms from their tenants than they would otherwise have 
been willing to accept if they could have relied upon getting their purchase 
money within reasonable time, and if the whole thing could go through as it 
ought to, without these great delays.238
234 See chap te r five.
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While larger landlords might have had other resources to call upon, many small 
landowners were placed in a desperate position. One such small landowner was George 
H. O’Flaherty who had sold his property in the west of Ireland and despairingly sought 
the counsel of Lord Clonbrock: ‘How is a poor landlord to get along while waiting for 
the money, who has no cash, but what he receives from his property & has in the 
meantime to pay a high rate of interest on a mortgage & meet all his charges 
indispensable to his household no matter how he economises?’239 Smaller landlords who 
were solvent at the time of sale, often faced the prospect of becoming mired in debt 
while they waited for their purchase money and ‘bonus’.
One of the chief delays preventing the distribution of the purchase money was 
the necessity of proving title. Even if the money was available, the title to the land had to 
be proven which inevitably slowed the process. As early as November 1904 Wyndham’s 
private secretary, Murray Hornibrook, admitted to G. de L. Willis, secretary of the Irish 
Landowners’ Convention, that the question of proving title had put a brake on the 
progress of the Wyndham Act. He wrote: ‘Of the total amount issued for 1904 it has 
been possible to distribute only some 1 Vi millions, owing to difficulties in proving 
title.’240 The reality was that the title department simply did not have the staff or 
resources to cope with the volume of sales.
With delays in distributing the purchase money and ‘bonus’ growing calls for the 
introduction of compulsory purchase enraged many landlords. The landlords’ supporters 
in parliament had fought bitterly against the introduction of compulsion in the 1907 
Evicted Tenants Act, addressed in chapter six, because they felt it would set a precedent. 
When the royal commission on congestion, also addressed in chapter six, recommended 
the introduction of compulsory purchase in 1908, many landlords were incensed. They 
felt that any contemplation of compulsion was absurd when the estates commissioners 
were unable to process the sales they already had. As Lord Farnham opined in the House 
of Lords:
We have been informed that there are £53,000,000 of agreements now waiting to 
be financed, and I maintain that even more would have been lodged if it had not 
been for the policy of the United Irish League in interfering with negotiations.
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How can a government which is unable to finance this voluntary system, with 
any show of reason get up and say that compulsion is necessary. I maintain there 
is no foundation for any compulsion whatever.241
Others, such as the marquess of Londonderry, put the delay down to the Estates
Commission’s focus on what he considered to be the secondary objects of the act:
My own opinion is that the attention of the staff is engaged on minor and 
subsidiary branches of land purchase. Their time has been occupied in the 
reinstatement of evicted tenants, in the enlargement of holdings, and in providing 
parcels of land for what are called landless men; but their primary duty, I 
maintain is to administer the act and endeavour to promote the transfer of land 
under it.242
The consensus among many landlords was that the estates commissioners and their staff 
spent too much time on as evicted tenants, congestion, untenanted land and in answering 
parliamentary questions when they should have been concentrating on facilitating land 
purchase.
The revision of the Wyndham Act’s terms, as set forth in the 1909 Land Act, was 
seen as a betrayal by many Irish landlords. They felt that the Land Conference 
settlement and the 1903 act had been destroyed. As Col. O’Callaghan Westropp 
emotionally wrote in a published letter in the Irish Times: ‘Thus voluntary purchases are 
at an end, the Wyndham Act torn to tatters, the Land Conference policy is repudiated, 
and the chief secretary pours oil on the agrarian fire.’243 As far as Lord Farnham was 
concerned, the Birrell Act of 1909 was ‘both confiscatory and socialistic’.244 Lord 
Castletown argued that it was a ‘most ill considered evil measure’ while Lord Ashtown 
declared that the bill was ‘so vile...that it should be thrown out’.245 The guarantee of a 
12 % ‘bonus’, the payment of the purchase money in cash and the ‘zones’ had been the 
principal incentives for landlords to sell under the Wyndham Act. Under the Birrell 
Land Act of 1909 the ‘bonus’ was distributed on a graduated scale and the purchase 
money was given in stock. Agreements within the ‘zones’ could now be investigated if
241 The p a rlia m en ta ry  debates , fifth series, H ouse o f  L ords  [hereafter cited as H an sard  5 (L ords)], ii, 435  
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the estates commissioners so wished. Landlords were dismayed by the new legislation
which introduced compulsion albeit to relieve congestion. The act was seen as a triumph
for the cattle drivers and an attempt to drive the landed gentry out of the country.
The inclusion of compulsory purchase in the Birrell Act of 1909 angered
landowners such as Lord Castletown who felt that his class was being squeezed out of
their own country. In the House of Lords he set forth his fears:
Everyone knows why these compulsory clauses are inserted in this portion of the 
bill. They are the germ for compulsory acquisition of the resident landowner’s 
home farm, demesne, garden, and eventually house, and everyone in Ireland 
knows the ultimate object that the framers of the bill have in view. It is openly 
referred to by men of all shades of opinion, who say it is merely a question of 
waiting for a new bill to come in, and then this germ will develop... The portions 
unsold are mainly represented by men who desire to live in Ireland, or who wish 
their descendents to do so. If you try to force those men to leave the country, and 
if you take their land compulsorily, they will go.246
G. de L. Willis, secretary of the Irish Landowners’ Convention, held that compulsion
would ‘set up a new standard of prices, which would be called an official or government
price’.247 His fear was that such a price would inevitably be lower than that received by
landlords through their own negotiations with their tenants. For others, such as Lord
Ashtown, the undoing of the Wyndham Act only confirmed their fears that compulsory
purchase would be used as a weapon with which to drive the predominantly unionist
landed gentry from the south and west of Ireland.
Landlords were dismayed by the changes to the Wyndham Act which they
considered had been one of the few beneficial pieces of legislation, as far as landowners
were concerned, in decades. The undoing of the 1903 act only further disheartened them
and many sensed only a bleak future for their class. The dulce of Abercorn wrote to Lord
Clonbrock in February 1909:
The position of the landowners now in Ireland in the southern portion of the 
country is indeed deplorable, and has been for many years past, as you well 
know, always worked for the benefit of one party, with the exception of 
Wyndham’s Land Act - and this has up to the present time been so successful
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that the government appear to be ashamed of it and are doing everything in their 
power to restrict the benefits of the act.249
Under the Birrell Act of 1909, those who had already sold under the Wyndham 
Act of 1903 had the option of taking their payment in part-cash, part-stock or wholly in 
stock. Alternatively they could wait a number of years for the whole amount in cash. 
Such options offered little hope to many vendors who, as the earl of Shaftesbury pointed 
out in the House of Lords, were essentially caught ‘between the devil and the deep 
sea’.250 One landlord who took the option of stock was Somerset Saunderson of 
Castlesaunderson Co. Cavan. His father, Colonel Edward Saunderson, had died in 1906 
and Somerset completed the negotiation in 1908 just in time to avail of the ‘bonus’. In 
total he received £98,000 for 9,400 acres.231
X). Conclusion.
As landlords sold their lands under the Wyndham Act, the future of the landed gentry
looked uncertain. Many struggled to see what use or influence their class could have in
an Ireland of peasant proprietors. Some contemplated leaving the country and taking
their chances in Britain or elsewhere in the empire. With Ireland in the midst of a social
revolution, owing to the transfer of land from landlords to tenants, and the heyday of
landlordism a distant memory, there was considerable apprehension among those who
had or were going to sell. The earl of Dunraven believed that the landed gentry would be
in a more comfortable position after selling their lands and that there would be
opportunities for their class to exert an influence on the national life of the country. In
fact he was adamant that the sale of their land would set them free. When writing in
1907, he was positive about the future of his class and held that fears of a mass
emigration of the landed gentry had proved unfounded:
Loss of social influence and political power attaching to the possession of landed 
property, which might in some other cases largely affect the issue, may, in the 
case under consideration be disregarded; or, if regarded, the probability of 
positive gain in both respects must be admitted. Sentiment, tradition, the 
attractions of home, the comparative cheapness of living, and of field sports and
249 D uke o f  A berco rn  to  Lord C lonbrock , 22 Feb. 1909 (N .L .I., C lonb rock  papers, M S 35 ,775  (3)).
250 H an sard  5 (L ords), iii, 560 (28 Sept. 1909).
251 A lv in  Jackson , Col. E d w a rd  Saunderson: L a n d  an d  lo ya lty  in V ictorian Ire lan d  (O xfo rd , 1995), p. 204,
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outdoor amusements, must be taken into account. As a class there can be no 
question that the financial circumstances of the landed gentry will be improved 
by sale.. .They will find, as the country settles down, as large a field for pleasure 
as and a larger scope for usefulness than they have hitherto enjoyed.252
Dunraven was convinced that land purchase provided an opportunity for the landed 
gentry to reinvent themselves. However, the chance had to be seized quickly as
9 STDunraven predicted it would be their last.
Horace Plunkett, a member of the landed gentry, observed the confusion and lack
of purpose that was felt by many members of his class by 1908:
As one of that class who has made his choice, I need no apology for giving to the 
public the estimate of the existing situation and the forecast of the future which 
have led me to the conclusion that there is no better country for an Irishman to 
live in, or to work for, than his own. Almost every day I hear landlords, who 
have sold, or are hastening to sell, their estates, assert that there can in the future 
be no position of influence or utility for their class in Ireland. Their social and 
national influence and prestige already gone, they foresee a succession of 
predatory measures calculated to nullify those provisions of the agrarian 
settlement which were intended to enable them to remain in the country in the 
enjoyment of their houses and demesnes.254
Plunkett, however, viewed the Wyndham Act as a great opportunity for his class and a 
chance for them to involve themselves fully in the national life of the country. He had 
staked his future on remaining in Ireland and was keen to emphasise the opportunities he 
foresaw for the resident gentry. With the abolition of landlordism an inevitability, the 
barriers which had existed between landlord and tenants would no longer be 
insurmountable. As he assumed that the land question would gradually be solved, 
Plunkett foresaw his class assuming positions of leadership in their local communities. 
As agrarian agitation petered out, the people would turn to the resident gentry for 
leadership. Plunkett believed that his class were the natural leaders of rural Ireland for 
they possessed the education, experience, expertise and business skills which would be 
vital in the quest to improve, modernise and organise Irish agriculture. With the land 
question no longer serving as a bone of contention, those of his class who wished could 
become very influential in the national life of the country. He wrote:
252 E arl o f  D unraven , The ou tlook in Ire lan d  (D ub lin , 1907), pp 53-4.
253 E arl o f  D unraven , The legacy  o f  p a s t y e a r s  (L ondon , 1911), p. 240.
254 H orace  P lunke tt, N obless ob lige; an Irish ren derin g  (D ub lin , 1908) pp 5-6.
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The abolition of landlordism, so far from destroying the usefulness of the Irish 
gentry, really gives them their first opportunity, within the memory of living 
men, to fulfil the true functions of an aristocracy. They have ceased to be the 
masters; they are no longer dealing with dependents. My appeal to them is that 
they should recognise this fact, and take their new position as men who, working 
among others in a rural community, have by their wealth and education special 
advantages which they desire to use for the common good; and I assure them that 
for men who are willing and qualified to take that position it will be open.255
Therefore, Plunkett held that the choices which faced the landed gentry were of 
grave importance; either they immersed themselves in the national life of the country or 
they remained aloof from the rest of society. The Wyndham Act had provided a glorious 
opportunity for the resident gentry to reinvent themselves and to become the leaders of 
the national life of the country. Plunkett believed that the chance would not arise again. 
Indeed, the future of his class depended on the choices they made once they had sold 
their estates:
In the choice we must make, the future of our class in Ireland is involved; on this 
choice will depend the world’s judgement of our historic character and our 
present worth. If we have any public spirit, or even self-respect-if we have any 
pride in those from whom we sprang, any concern for those who will come after 
us-we shall not let judgement go by default. We were originally placed by force 
of arms in a position to exercise a commanding influence upon our country, and 
we have been maintained in that position mainly by external power. It is charged 
against us-and we cannot deny the fact-that we have failed up to the present so to 
identify ourselves with the national life as to establish our influence upon the 
only sure foundation-popular goodwill. What is our excuse? The blame must 
either have been in ourselves or in the system. If in ourselves, it is not from want 
of capacity, for we have given to the service of the British Empire every quality 
that the service of Ireland now demands. If it was in the system, that hindrance 
will soon have passed. And in the passing there will come to us, if not the first, 
most assuredly the last, opportunity of showing that we stood ready, had the
n c c
occasion served, to do our duty by our country.
Aside from offering the resident gentry a genuine opportunity to take the lead in 
the national life of the country, the Wyndham Act proved a god-send for many members 
of the class. The ‘bonus’ in particular changed the fortunes of many encumbered 
landlords and gave them sufficient capital to establish themselves in other areas of
255 Ibid., p. 26.
256 Ib id ., pp 37-8.
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business if they so wished. Elizabeth, Countess of Fingall, recalled the boon that was the 
‘bonus’: ‘George Wyndham got his twelve millions. And it was certainly a jolly ‘bonus’ 
for the broken-down landlords, and for the spendthrifts, who were relieved of their 
mortgaged estates and made a free gift as well, for the ‘bonus’ went to the tenant-for- 
life.’257
The Wyndham Act allowed many landlords to escape the financial quagmire 
they found themselves in. Even if the bulk of the purchase money went towards paying 
charges on their estates the ‘bonus’ remained in the landlord’s own hands. Landlords, for 
the first time in living memory, had the opportunity to establish themselves in other 
spheres of business free of the millstone which Irish land had become. Not long after the 
act was passed, George Wyndham, while on holidays in Monte Carlo, encountered a
previously impecunious Irish peer gambling in a gaming room: ‘L ord  had had a big
estate in Ireland, but never a penny in his pocket. As George Wyndham passed by, Lord 
—  pointing to the pile of notes and counters before him, called out gaily: “George! 
George! The ‘bonus’!”’.258
In 1908 David Lloyd George, president of the board of trade, emphasised in a 
cabinet memorandum that: ‘A landlord who obtains twenty-five years’ purchase and can 
invest the proceeds at 4 per cent -  by no means a difficult operation at the present time -  
is actually better off than he was before he sold.’ Furthermore, the option under clause 
three of the Wyndham Act of selling and repurchasing their demesne under the same 
annuity terms as the tenant-purchasers was highly significant. The clause enabled cash 
strapped landlords to obtain what was essentially a sizeable loan under very generous 
repayment terms. In 1913, the comptroller of the national debt office, W. G. Turpin, 
pointed out that the landlords who had sold under the 1903 act had done quite well 
overall:
As the prices of securities have fallen continuously since 1902, thus yielding a 
higher rate of interest, it is patent that in cases of cash advances the landlord has 
been enabled to secure an income of at least 90 per cent of the second term rent 
of the land...When it is remembered that in the majority of cases part of the 
purchase money is used to pay off encumbrances on which the interest payable
257 E lizabe th , C oun tess o f  F ingall, Seven ty  y e a r s  yo u n g  (D ub lin , 1991 ed .), p. 282.
258 Ibid.
259 D. L loyd  G eorge, ‘Irish land purchase  fin a n c e ’, 17 N ov. 1908 (T .N .A ., C A B  37 /96 /154 ), p. 3.
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was 4 per cent, 5 per cent and sometimes even 6 per cent, it is manifest that the
* 260 bargain must have been exceptionally favourable to the landlord.
For those landlords who were relatively unencumbered, the act presented an
opportunity to make a financial killing. Decades of agrarian agitation, alongside the
commitment of both the Liberal and the Conservative parties to establish a peasant
proprietorship, left many landlords looking for a viable way out. Both British parties had
settled on the policy of land purchase. The real battle was between those who advocated
the system of voluntary purchase and those who wanted compulsory purchase. The
movement for the compulsory purchase of the landlords’ estates, as already discussed,
had been instrumental in bringing about the Wyndham Act. The fear was that
compulsion had only been postponed and that it would inevitably be resorted to in the
years to come. Once the Liberal government came to power in 1906, it was evident that
the terms on offer to landlords under the Wyndham Act were unlikely to be improved.
The Wyndham Act provided the Irish landlords with an escape route and its terms were
simply too enticing to be ignored.
Many landlords who had sold were reluctant to invest their purchase money in
Ireland. The renewed agrarian agitation in the form of the Ranch War of 1906 to 1909
and the possibility of home rule undoubtedly acted as major deterrents. In 1903, a
northern landowner, Hugh de F. Montgomery declared ‘that in the present state of
Ireland no conscientious trustees for any limited owner would think of investing one
halfpenny in the trust funds of this country’.261 Frankly, Montgomery felt that the
lawlessness in the south and west was sufficient enough to frighten investment out of the
country, something which could only have a negative effect on the future of Ireland. The
earl of Donoughmore was equally pessimistic about the prospects of landlords investing
their purchase money in Ireland:
The agitation [Ranch War] had not only ruined eight counties, but it had made its 
influence felt throughout the length and breadth of the land. (Hear, hear.) It had 
not only affected the agricultural interests, but every other interest. Some people 
talked about landlords who sold their estates putting their money in Irish 
investments. But was it advisable to invest money in Irish undertakings when
260 W . G. T urp in , ‘Irish  land purchase (1 9 1 3 ),’ 3 M ar. 1913 (T .N .A ., C A B  37 /114 /17 ), p. 10.
261I.T., 14 D ec. 1907.
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they did not know whether it would assist in the development of these 
undertakings? Was it advisable to do so with the prospect of home rule?262
Speaking before the royal commission on congestion in 1907, Lord Ashtown was 
adamant that the bulk of the purchase money under the Wyndham Act would not be 
invested in Ireland. He held that the government legislation of previous decades had left 
resident landlords with only two incentives to stay in Ireland, those being sport and 
farming their own land but that these were both being eroded by the Wyndham Act. In 
Ashtown’s opinion, the demand for their untenanted land to be sold and the continued 
agrarian agitation were frightening landlords and their capital out of the country: ‘As 
matters are going on now, the money they invest will leave the country. It will not be 
invested here.’263
The evidence suggests that most landlords did not invest the proceeds of their 
sales in Ireland. In the case of the Leinster estate the purchase money was nearly all 
invested in mortgages and loans to members of the landed gentry in Britain. A tiny 
portion of the purchase money was invested in stock and shares in Ireland. There seems 
to have been an eagerness to invest in America and throughout the British colonies. 
Somerset Saunderson invested virtually all of the money he received from the sale of his 
estate in the British Empire and beyond. He invested in railways and other stocks.264
Other landlords, however, were simply unable to adapt from a rent-based income 
to the business of investing in stocks and shares. Unfamiliar with the world of 
commerce, many simply frittered their finances away. According to Shane Leslie, ‘a 
great number had departed after the Wyndham purchase, while the going was good. 
Others stayed and muddled their purchase money away’.265 Shane’s brother, Seymour 
Leslie, would recall in later life how their father, Sir John Leslie, intensely disliked the 
world of business and after selling the bulk of the estate under the Wyndham Act, the 
purchase money was invested in various stocks and shares on the advice of Sir Ernest
262 Ib id ., 10 O ct. 1907.
263 Tenth R eport o f  the R oya l C om m ission  app o in ted  to inquire into an d  rep o r t upon the opera tion  o f  the 
A cts  dea ling  w ith  C ongestion  in Irelan d , 182 [C d.4007] H .C. 1908, xli, 5.
264 See Jackson , Col. E d w a rd  Saunderson.
265 S hane L eslie, The Irish tangle fo r  E nglish  readers  (L ondon , n .d .), p. 146.
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Cassel.266 Having spent his life as a landed gentleman, Sir John Leslie was loath to 
involve himself in the rough and tumble of business and ‘any business decision brought 
on an agonised grimace of distaste’.267
A great debt of gratitude was felt by many members of the landed gentry, such as 
Shane Leslie, towards George Wyndham. There was a belief that Wyndham had made a 
genuine effort to provide a better future for the class. Leslie recalled in later years how 
the 1903 act had attempted to save his class from the dead weight that was Irish land. He 
wrote: ‘Thanks to George Wyndham the whole landed class were set free from their own 
shackles to go their way into pensioned oblivion or to attempt to make good in Ireland
yet - George Wyndham, grandson of Pamela the daughter of Lord Edward Fitzgerald, to
• 268 whom the presidency or kingship of Eire would be gladly awarded today.’
While the 1903 act provided a financial solution for many landlords it also
compounded the sense of abandonment that many already felt. Although the act was
voluntary and there was no compulsion to sell, there was a sense among landlords that if
they did not sell under the Wyndham Act they would not receive terms as favourable in
the future. As a class, they were committed to the union with Britain but felt deeply
betrayed by successive governments. Elizabeth Bowen would recall that the financial
terms on offer were quite adequate, but the Wyndham Act was viewed by the landed
gentry as just another in a long series of legislative measures undermining the power and
belittling the position of landlords in Ireland:
The modus vivendi should have been good enough. But there is no doubt that by 
a number of Anglo-Irish landlords this abrogation of their power, and by a 
Conservative government was felt as a bitter blow. It was, “Et tu, Brute!". One 
felt injured in spirit, if not in purse. As to the purse, the landlords were 
compensated by the issue of bonds backed by the government, and landlords 
willing to sell received bonuses. But the landlords were, or felt themselves, 
sacrificed to the hopes of successful continuance of that very union to which they 
had looked to maintain their authority.269
266 S ir E rnest C assell w as a Jew ish  G erm an-born  banker w ho becam e p rivate  financia l ad v iso r to  K in g  
E dw ard  VII in 1902.
267 S eym our L eslie , The Jerom e C onnection  (L ondon , 1964), p. 36.
268 L eslie, The Irish  tangle  f o r  E nglish  readers, p. 144.
269 E lizabe th  B ow en, B o w e n ’s C ou rt (C ork , 1998 ed.), pp 395-6.
218
CHAPTER FIVE: ‘A CRAZY SCHEME FOUNDED ON CRAZED FINANCE’: 
LAND PURCHASE AND FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES.1
I). Introduction.
U n d e r th e  land  ac ts  o f  1885-8 , co m m o n ly  k n o w n  as th e  A sh b o u rn e  A cts , ad v an ces  to  
ven d o rs  h ad  b een  m ad e  in  cash . T he te n a n t’s an n u ity  w as  se t a t 4 %  an d  he rep a id  the  
sum  lo an ed  to  h im  o v er fo rty -n in e  y ea rs  a lb e it w ith  d ecad a l reductions. U n d e r the 
B a lfo u r A c ts  o f  1891-6 th e  sy stem  o f  land  p u rch ase  w a s  a lte red  so th a t th e  v en d o r 
re ce iv ed  p ay m en t in  g u a ran teed  2 % %  land  stock  in s tead  o f  p ay m en t in  cash . T he ra te 
o f  th e  te n a n ts ’ an n u ity  rem a in ed  at 4 %  and  the  sy s tem  o f  decad a l red u c tio n s  w as 
in tro d u ced . T he W y n d h am  A c t o f  1903 rev e rted  b ac k  to  p ay in g  v en d o rs  in  c a sh  w ith  the 
ra te  o f  the  te n a n t’s an n u ity  lo w ered  to  3 !4 %. T h is  im p ac ted  on th e  p e rio d  o f  rep ay m en t 
w h ich  w o u ld  n o w  be ap p ro x im a te ly  s ix ty -e ig h t an d  a h a lf  years.
U n d e r th e  lan d  ac ts  p rio r to  th e  W y n d h am  A ct, 73 ,809  h o ld in g s  h a d  b een  
p u rch ased  co n sis tin g  o f  ap p ro x im a te ly  2.5 m illio n  acres. T he trea su ry  h ad  p ro v id ed  
ad v an ces  to  th e  tu n e  o f  £23 ,89 4 ,7 6 5  and  ten an t-p u rch ase rs  h ad  co n trib u ted  £884 ,411 . 
T h e  to ta l p u rch ase  m o n ey  w h ich  h ad  b een  ad v a n ced  u n d e r th ese  ac ts  a m o u n ted  to  
£ 2 4 ,7 7 9 ,1 7 6 .3 B y  31 M arch  1906, a fte r a  little  u n d er tw o  an d  a  h a lf  y ea rs  o f  o p era tio n , 
ap p lica tio n s  to  th e  am o u n t o f  £35 ,275 ,831  had  b ee n  lo d g ed  w ith  th e  E sta tes  C o m m iss io n  
u n d er the W y n d h am  A c t.4 T h e  v o lu m e o f  sales d w arfed  th e  ach iev em en ts  o f  p rev io u s 
ac ts  and  h ig h lig h ted  the su ccess o f  the  W y n d h am  A c t in  te rm s o f  en c o u rag in g  land  
pu rch ase . W ith  ap p lica tio n s  fo r the  tran sfe r  o f  lan d  fro m  lan d lo rd  to  te n a n t b e in g  
rece iv ed  a t an  u n p re ced e n te d  ra te , se rio u s q u estio n s  w ere  a sk ed  o f  the  ab ility  o f  th e  Irish  
L an d  C o m m issio n , the  treasu ry  an d  the  g o v ern m en t to  fac ilita te  land  p u rch ase . I t w as 
n o t long  b efo re  fau lts  b eg an  to  ap p ear in  the  o p era tio n  o f  the  act. T h is  c h a p te r  w ill 
in v estig a te  th e  fin an c ia l d ifficu lties  w h ich  p lag u ed  th e  W y n d h am  A c t and  th e ir 
su b seq u en t im p lica tio n s . T he fin an c ia l in stab ility  o f  the  ac t w ill be an a ly sed  an d  w e  w ill
1 Gibson Bowles, Conservative M.P. for Lynn, Regis, Hansard 4, cxxii, 74 (7 May 1903).
2 See chapters three and four for details o f  incentives to landlords to sell their land.
3 See appendix VI.
4 Report o f  the estates commissioners fo r  the year ending 3 1'1 March, 1906 and fo r  the period from  I s' 
November, 1903, to 31 March, 1906, xxiii, [Cd. 3148], H.C. 1906, xxv, 231.
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see w h y  lan d  p u rc h ase  co u ld  no lo n g er re a lis tica lly  p ro c e e d  on W y n d h a m ite  te rm s by  
1909.
II). The financing of the Wyndham Act.
U n d e r th e  ac t a lo an  w as ad v an ced  to  th e  ten an t-p u rch ase r so th a t  h e  co u ld  b u y  h is  
ho ld ing . T h e  cash  fo r th ese  ad v an ces w as issu ed  fro m  th e  Ir ish  L an d  P u rch a se  F und . It 
w as ra ise d  by  th e  c rea tio n  o f  g u aran teed  2 3A %  lan d  s to ck  w h ich  w as f lo a ted  on  th e  
s to ck  m arket. A n y o n e  w h o  in v es ted  in  th e  s to ck  w as  a ssu red  a re tu rn  o f  2  3A %  o n  th e ir  
in v estm en t, w h ich  w as  p ay ab le  h a lf  yearly . T h e  s to ck  w as re d eem ab le  at p a r (fo r 
ex am p le , w h e n  th e  issue o f  £100  stock  ra ised  £100  in  cash ) a fte r th irty  y ea rs  fro m  th e  
d a te  th a t th e  ac t cam e in to  o p era tio n  (1 N o v e m b e r 1903). T he trea su ry  co u ld , in  th e  sh o rt 
te rm , ra ise  th e  m o n ey  fo r ad v an ces by m ean s  o f  lo an s  fro m  the  N a tio n a l D eb t 
C o m m issio n ers  (N .D .C .), th e  B an k  o f  E n g lan d  an d  th e  B an k  o f  Ire lan d .5
T h e g u a ran teed  2 3A  %  land  s to ck  w as  secu red  firs tly  o n  th e  Ir ish  L an d  P u rch ase  
F u n d  and  su b seq u en tly  o n  th e  Irish  D ev e lo p m en t G ran t w h ich  fo rm ed  a  p o rtio n  o f  th e  
G u aran tee  F und. In  th e  ev en t o f  s to ck  b e in g  issu ed  b e lo w  p a r o r a t a  d isco u n t (fo r 
ex am p le , w h ere  £100  s to ck  o n ly  ra ise d  £90  in  cash ), w h e re  the  Ir ish  L an d  P u rch ase  
F u n d  p ro v e d  in ad eq u a te , th e  Irish  D ev e lo p m en t G ran t p o rtio n  o f  th e  G u a ran tee  fu n d  w as  
accessed . O nce  th a t w as exh au sted , th e  n e x t fu n d  in  line  w as th e  D e a th  D u ty  G ran t 
fo llo w ed  by  th e  A g ricu ltu ra l G ran t, u n d e r th e  L o ca l G o v ern m en t A c t o f  1898 .6 B o th  o f  
th ese  g ran ts  fo rm e d  p art o f  th e  G u aran tee  F u n d .7
T he ad v an ce  rece iv ed  by  th e  ten an t-p u rch ase r w as to  be  rep a id  in  th e  fo rm  o f  an  
annu ity  a t 3 lA %. O f  th a t figure , 2 A  %  w as fo r in te re st an d  ‘A %  fo r th e  sin k in g  fu n d  
(the  sum  loaned). So, fo r ex am p le , on  an  ad v an ce  o f  £100  th e  te n a n t’s an n u ity  w o u ld  be  
£3 5s. T h is  rep resen ted  £2  15.v. fo r in te re s t and  10.s. fo r  the  rep ay m en t o f  the  s in k in g  
fund . T he ac t d id  n o t fix  any  p e rio d  o f  rep ay m en t, h o w ev er, ‘the  p e r io d  re q u ired  b y  a 
sink ing  fu n d  o f  10,v. p e r cen t to  am o rtize  £1 0 0  s to ck  at 2 3A p e r c e n t’ w as  ap p ro x im a te ly
5 The N.D.C. was founded in 1786 to lower and eventually eradicate the national debt. The commissioners
were involved in the investment o f government funds and particularly matters relating to the stock market.
6 Irish Land Act 1903, 38.
7 Ibid., 40.
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six ty -e ig h t an d  a  h a lf  y e a rs .8 T he te n a n ts ’ an n u ities  w ere  pa id  in  tw o  in s ta lm e n ts  on  1 
June and  1 D ecem b er o f  each  y ea r.9 C o m p ared  to the  te rm s o f  th e  p re v io u s  ac ts , the 
ten an ts  re ce iv ed  th e ir  lo an  a t a  lo w  ra te  o f  in te re st an d  by ex ten d in g  th e  p e rio d  o f  
rep ay m en t the  p ay m en t on  th e  sink ing  fu n d  w as red u ced . U n d e r th e  A sh b o u rn e  A c t o f  
1885, th e  te n a n t’s an n u ity  w as 4 %  (3 A %  fo r in te re st, Vs %  fo r the  sin k in g  fund).
C lau se  th ir ty -e ig h t o f  the 1903 ac t d ea lt w ith  the Irish  D e v e lo p m e n t G ran t. A s 
m en tio n ed  in  e a rlie r  ch ap te rs  a  sum  o f  £ 2 0 ,0 0 0  w as to be p ro cu red  an n u a lly  fro m  the  
g ran t fo r th e  C .D .B . S im ilarly , £5 0 ,0 0 0  w as to  be tak en  an n u a lly  fo r th e  f irs t fo u r years  
o f  the  a c t’s o p era tio n , up  un til 31 M arch  1907. T h is w as to  be  p u t to w ard s  the  Ir ish  L an d  
P u rch ase  F und. T he re m a in d e r o f  the  gran t, once  all the  ch a rg es  to  w h ich  it w as  su b jec t 
w ere  paid , fo rm ed  p a rt o f  th e  cash  p o rtio n  o f  the  G u a ran tee  F und. £ 5 ,0 0 0  w as  to  be  pa id  
an n u a lly  ou t o f  the  Irish  D ev e lo p m en t G ran t to  in d em n ify  T .C .D . ag a in s t any  loss o f  
incom e re su ltin g  fro m  the  sale o f  lan d  u n d er the  act. T he in d em n ity  m o n ey  w h ic h  w as 
n o t ca lled  u p o n  w as to  be in v es ted  and  co u ld  be u sed  in  la te r years  w h e n  th e  £ 5 ,0 0 0  w as 
in su ffic ien t to  m ee t the  co lle g e ’s lo s se s .10
T h e L an d  P u rch ase  A id  F u n d  ( ‘b o n u s ’ fu n d ) o f  £ 1 2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  fo rm e d  p a rt o f  the  
Irish  L an d  P u rch ase  F und. T he ‘b o n u s ’ fu n d  w as  accu m u la ted  by  issu in g  g u a ran teed  2 3A 
% lan d  stock. T he ‘b o n u s ’ fund  w as essen tia lly  a g ift fro m  the  state . T h ere fo re , the 
in terest an d  the  sin k in g  fu n d  o f  the  s to ck  issu ed  fo r th a t fu n d  w ere  b o rn e  o n  th e  L and  
C o m m iss io n  vo te  in  parliam en t. A  12 %  ca sh  ‘b o n u s ’, ca lcu la ted  o n  th e  p u rch ase  
m o n ey , w as  p a id  to  the  v en d o r b u t any  lan d  w h ich  th e  v en d o r rep u rch a se d  w as  n o t 
in c lu d ed  in  th e  ca lcu la tio n s . A s m en tio n ed  in  the  p rev io u s ch ap te r a  ‘b o n u s ’ w as  no t 
p a id  out in  sales in  the  L an d  Ju d g e ’s C o u rt or w h ere  an  o rd e r fo r sa le  issu ed  b y  th e  lan d  
ju d g e  w as in  fo rce  w h en  the  W y n d h am  A c t rece iv ed  the ro y a l assen t. W h e re  th e  esta te  
w as so en c u m b e red  th a t th e  v en d o r w as  n o t en titled  to  the ren t, the  ‘b o n u s ’ w as 
w ithheld . In  su ch  in stan ces, and  cases in  th e  L an d  Ju d g e ’s C ourt, the  ‘b o n u s ’ w as ad d ed  
to  the  p u rch ase  m oney . A  m o rtg ag ee  w ith  th e  p o w er to  se ll w as n o t en titled  to  rece iv e
8 Report o f  the Departmental Committee appointed to enquire into Irish Land Purchase Finance in 
connection with the provision offunds required fo r  the purposes o f the Irish Land Act, 1903, 7, [Cd. 4005] 
H.C. 1908, xxiii, 267.
9 ‘Rules and regulations made by the treasury, 14 April, 1905’ rule 13 cited in Cherry and M axwell (eds), 
Irish Land Acts, p. 1255.
10 Ibid., 39.
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th e  ‘b o n u s ’ either. F ive  y ea rs  afte r the ac t had  b eco m e  o p era tiv e  (1 N ov . 1908), the 
treasu ry  h ad  th e  o p tio n  to  ch an g e  th e  p e rcen tag e  at w h ich  the  ‘b o n u s ’ w as a llo ca ted , 
tak in g  in to  ac co u n t the  su m  th a t rem a in ed  an d  the  fu tu re  d em an d s  o n  i t .11
In  d irec t sa les b e tw een  a lan d lo rd  an d  h is  ten an ts , o n ce  th e  h o ld in g  w as  v es ted  in  
th e  p u rch aser, the  p u rch ase  m oney  w as d ep o sited  in  the  B an k  o f  Ire lan d . A n  o rd e r w as 
m ad e  by the  L an d  C o m m issio n  affix in g  any  c la im s to  th e  p u rc h ase  m o n ey . W h ere  land  
so ld  to the  es ta te s  co m m issio n e rs  w as v es ted  in  the  L an d  C o m m iss io n , u n d e r c lau se  
six teen  o f  th e  1903 act, th e  L and  C o m m iss io n  p a id  an  an n u a l in te re st o f  3 !/2 %  to  the  
v en d o r on  th e  p u rch ase  m o n ey  w h ich  re m a in ed  u n a llo ca ted . T h is  w as in  p lace  o f  the 
p ay m en t o f  ren t. T he in te re st w as p a id  from  the  da te  o f  th e  v es tin g  o rd e r o r w h e n  the  
p u rch ase  m o n ey  w as d ep o sited  in  th e  bank , d ep en d in g  on th e  m e th o d  o f  sale.
T he 3 */2  %  in te re s t w as f ix ed  in  a sa le  to  the  L an d  C o m m iss io n . T he ten an t- 
p u rch asers  p a id  it to  the  L an d  C o m m iss io n  w h o  th en  pa id  the  vendor. T h e  sam e sy stem  
o p era ted  in  d irec t sa les b e tw een  lan d lo rd  an d  ten a n t ex cep t th a t  th e  ra te  w as w o rk ed  o u t 
in  th e  ag reem en t b u t it cou ld  n o t be  less th an  3 ‘A %. In  b o th  cases  in te re s t w as p a id  by 
th e  ten an t-p u rch ase rs  u n til th e  p u rch ase  m o n ey  w as a llo ca ted . W h ere  an  es ta te  w as 
b o u g h t in  th e  L an d  Ju d g e ’s C o u rt o r p u rc h ased  by th e  C .D .B ., th e  ten an t-p u rch ase rs  also  
p a id  3 Vi % in te re s t on  the  p u rch ase  m o n ey  to  the  L an d  C o m m iss io n  w ho  co n v e y ed  it to 
th e  vendor.
O nce  th e  c la im s o f  those  en titled  to  th e  p u rch ase  m o n ey  w ere  v a lid a ted , the  
m o n ey  w as d is trib u ted . T h e  red em p tio n  o f  any  c la im  o r ch a rg e  o n  th e  lan d  cam e o u t o f  
th e  p u rch ase  m o n ey . In  add ition , the  q u es tio n  o f  o u ts tan d in g  ren ts  w as ad d ressed . A ny 
u n p a id  ren t due on  a h o ld in g  up  until the day  o f  p u rc h ase  o r the  day  o f  ag reem en t to  sell 
in  th e  case  o f  a sa le  to  the  L and  C o m m issio n , co u ld  be  p a id  ou t o f  the  p u rch ase  m oney . 
H ow ever, th e  sum  co u ld  n o t be g rea te r th an  one y e a rs ’ rent. S u ch  an  a rran g em en t had  to  
be in c lu d ed  a lo n g  w ith  the ab s trac t o f  t i t le .12 T he ex p en se  o f  p ro v in g  title  an d  o f
I T
a llo ca tin g  the  p u rc h ase  m o n ey  w as p a id  by  the  L an d  C o m m ission .
11 Irish Land Act, 1903,48.
12 ‘Provisional rules under the Land Purchase Acts, 4 December, 1903’, order iv (3) cited in Cherry and 
Maxwell (eds), Irish Land Acts, p. 1215.
13 Irish Land Act, 1903, 24 (9).
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T h e p u rch ase  m o n ey  w as d is trib u ted  by a ju d ic ia l co m m iss io n e r. I t co u ld  be 
in v es ted  by th e  tru s tees  o f  the  se ttlem en t, w ith  th e  co n sen t o f  th e  ten an t-fo r-life , in  
stocks, shares, bonds, m ortg ag es o r d eb en tu res , a  lis t o f  w h ich  w as  p rin ted  p e rio d ica lly  
in  th e  Dublin Gazette,14 A n  ex am p le  o f  som e o f  the  in v es tm en ts  au th o rised  w ere  B ank  
o f  E n g lan d  stock , B an k  o f  Ire lan d  stock , In d ia  3 %  stock , In d ia  g u a ran teed  ra ilw ay  
s to ck s o r sh ares, in sc rib ed  stocks o f  co lo n ia l g o v ern m en ts  g u a ran teed  by  th e  im p eria l 
g o v e rn m en t an d  d eb en tu re  p re fe ren ce  g u a ran teed  or ren tch a rg e  s to ck s o f  ra ilw ay s  in  
G rea t B rita in  o r I re la n d .15
III). Irish Land Act, 1904.
W ith in  m o n th s  o f  th e  ac t b eco m in g  law  it en co u n te red  d ifficu lties . A  d ec is io n  in  the  
L an d  Ju d g e ’s C o u rt by  Ju stice  R oss, reg a rd in g  th e  sale  o f  th e  m arq u is  o f  E ly ’s W ex fo rd  
esta te , ca s t som e d o u b t o n  the  a llo ca tio n  o f  the  ‘b o n u s ’. T he fram ers  o f  th e  ac t had  
in ten d ed  fo r th e  ‘b o n u s ’ to go to  the  ten an t-fo r-life  o r to  th e  cu rren t o w n e r fo r h is 
p e rso n a l use. Ju d g e  R oss questio n ed  th is  in te rp re ta tio n  o f  th e  w o rd in g  o f  the  act. In  
ad d itio n , d o u b ts  h ad  arisen  over w h e th e r o r n o t th e  ‘b o n u s ’ co u ld  b e  g iv en  on  the  sa le  o f  
u n ten an ted  land , as w e ll as the  p o w ers  o f  the  esta te s  co m m iss io n e rs  an d  th e  C .D .B . to 
d ec la re  w h a t w as  an  ‘e s ta te ’ u n d er the  act. T h ese  d ifficu ltie s  th rea ten ed  to  m ak e  th e  ac t a 
d ead  le tte r  an d  the  C o n serv a tiv e  g o v ern m en t re sp o n d ed  sw iftly  by  an n o u n c in g  th a t a 
sh o rt am en d in g  ac t w o u ld  be in tro d u ced  in  the  n ew  p arliam en ta ry  session .
D esp ite  the ac t b e in g  in  its  in fan cy , th e re  w ere  sec tio n s  w ith in  Ir ish  ag ricu ltu ra l 
socie ty  w h o  had  a lready  lost fa ith  in  it. O n 2 Jan u ary  1904, the  L im erick  and  C lare 
F a rm e rs ’ C lub  p asse d  the  fo llo w in g  m otion : ‘T h a t as the p o licy  o f  co n c ilia tio n  has 
b ro k en  d o w n  b ec au se  th e  lan d lo rd s w a n t to o  h ig h  a  p rice , w e ca ll u p o n  th e  d irec to ry  o f  
the  U n ited  Ir ish  L eag u e  to  p u t th e  o ld  p o licy  o f  co m p u lso ry  p u rc h ase  b e fo re  th e  coun try , 
an d  th a t w e re q u es t the  d irec to ry  to  p ass  su ch  a re so lu tio n  at th e ir  n ex t m e e tin g .’16
O n  4 Jan u a ry  1904 the  n a tio n a l d irec to ry  o f  the U .I.L . h e ld  its  an n u a l m eeting . 
F ears  w ere  ex p ressed  th a t the  co n c ilia to ry  a ttitu d e  o f  th e  ten an ts  w as n o t being  
rec ip ro ca ted  by  th e  lan d lo rd s w h o  w ere  h o ld in g  ou t fo r ex trav ag an t p rice s  o r w ere
14 Ibid., 51.
15 Cherry and M axwell (eds), Irish Land Acts, p. 1113.
161.T.,A Jan. 1904.
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s im p ly  re fu s in g  to  sell. C o n cern  ab o u t the a llo ca tio n  o f  th e  ‘b o n u s ’ o n  u n ten an te d  lan d  
fea tu red  p ro m in en tly . T he Irish Times rep o rted  a  p ro p o sa l by P .A . M cH u g h , M .P . fo r 
N o rth  S ligo:
It ap p ears  tha t the  law  o ffice rs  o f  th e  c ro w n  in Ire lan d  hav e  g iv en  it as th e ir  
o p in io n  th a t the ‘b o n u s ’ is n o t p ay ab le  o n  the  sale to  the  co m m iss io n e rs  o r  the  
C o n g ested  D istric ts  B o ard  o f  u n ten an te d  land  sep a ra te ly  fro m  ten an te d  lan d s and  
th a t lan d lo rd s  m ay  sell co n g es ted  p o rtio n s  o f  th e ir e s ta te s  and  rece iv e  th e  ‘b o n u s ’ 
on su ch  sa le  w h ile  re ta in in g  u n ten an ted  la n d . . .w e  d esire  to  sta te  th a t the  
ex p ress io n  o f  such  an  o p in io n .. .is ,  in  o u r ju d g e m e n t, a sh am ele ss  an d  crim in a l
v io la tio n  o f  so lem n  p led g es  to  w h ich  th e  law  o ffic e rs  w ere  p a rtie s , an d  on  the
fa ith  o f  w h ich  the p u rch ase  ac t o f  last sess io n  w as accep ted  by the  Ir ish  party ; 
th a t su ch  o p in io n s i f  ac ted  u p o n  by  th e  esta te s  co m m iss io n e rs  an d  th e  C o n g ested  
D is tric ts  B o ard  w o u ld  re n d e r th e  n ew  ac t ab so lu te ly  w o rth le ss  an d  n u g a to ry  in
17th e  p ro v in ce  o f  C onnaught.
In  o rd e r to  p re v en t su ch  a scenario  co m in g  to  pass, the d irec to ry  ad v o c a ted  th a t the  I.P .P . 
p ress  fo r an  am en d in g  act en ab lin g  th e  co m p u lso ry  p u rch ase  o f  u n ten an te d  land . T he 
re lie f  o f  co n g es tio n  and  the  re in s ta te m e n t o f  ev ic ted  ten an ts  w ere  p r io ritie s  fo r the  
n a tio n a lis ts .18 T h e  u n ce rta in ty  o v er th e  ‘b o n u s ’ fo r u n ten an te d  land  d irec tly  a ffec ted  
th ese  tw o  issues as the acq u is itio n  o f  u n ten an ted  lan d  w as essen tia l i f  p ro g re ss  w as  to  be 
m ade.
A n o th e r so u rce  o f  fru stra tio n  fo r all sides w as the  lack  o f  in fo rm a tio n  av a ilab le  
on  th e  w o rk in g  o f  th e  act. T hey  fo u n d  it u n accep tab le  th a t th ey  h ad  v irtu a lly  no
in fo rm a tio n  o n  issues su ch  as sa les w ith in  the  ‘z o n e s ’, sa les o f  u n ten an te d  lan d s an d  the
re s to ra tio n  o f  ev ic ted  tenan ts. F u rth erm o re , the  ad  in te rim  re p o rt o f  th e  esta tes 
co m m iss io n e rs  fo r the  p erio d  1 N o v e m b e r, 1903, to  31 D ecem b er, 1904 w as on ly  
p u b lish ed  in  A p ril 1905. T h is w as a y ea r an d  a h a lf  a fte r th e  ac t h ad  b ec o m e  o perational.
T h is  sen se  o f  d issa tis fac tio n  w as v ery  ev id en t in  U ls te r  w h ere  m an y  fe lt th a t  the 
lan d lo rd s  in  the  p ro v in ce  w ere  n o t ac tin g  in  the  co n c ilia to ry  sp irit o f  the L and  
C o n feren ce  and  w ere  d em an d in g  u n re aso n ab le  te rm s fo r the  sa le  o f  th e ir  esta tes. T he 
U ls te r  F a rm e rs ’ and  L ab o u re rs ’ U n io n  m e t on  25 January  1904 to  d iscu ss  th e  p ro g ress  o f  
the  act. T h e  re fu sa l o f  m any  lan d lo rd s  to  ev en  co n sid er se llin g  an d  d em an d s  fo r in fla ted
17 Ibid., 5 Jan. 1904.
18 See chapter six.
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p rice s  w ere  so u rces  o f  d iscon ten t. T h is  d issa tis fac tio n  w as  ex p re ssed  by  R ev. L y ttle  a
m em b er o f  the  un ion . T he Irish Times repo rted :
W h e n  it w as b o rn e  in  m in d  tha t the  lan d lo rd s  w o u ld  re ce iv e  th e  ‘b o n u s ’, 
ea sem en t in  legal ex p en ses, and  p ay m en t in  cash , an d  th a t th ese  ad v an tag es  
co m b in ed  gave  th em  an  ad d itio n a l 5 or 6 y e a rs ’ p u rc h ase  as co m p ared  w ith  
p rice s  u n d er p rev io u s ac ts, he  th o u g h t it co u ld  n o t be  co n ten d e d  fo r  one m o m en t 
th a t th e  lan d lo rd s h ad  risen  to  th e ir  sp len d id  o p p o rtu n ity . So fa r th ey  h ad  th ro w n  
th a t o p p o rtu n ity  aw ay , and  p ro v e d  th a t th ey  w ere  in sa tiab le . T h ey  h ad  w re ck ed  
th e  p o licy  o f  co n c ilia tio n  and  h ad  m ad e  a  ren ew al o f  th e  fig h t fo r  co m p u lso ry  
p u rch ase  a p re ssin g  n ecess ity  th ro u g h o u t U lster. It m ig h t be  th a t th e  so u th  and  
w est and  eas t o f  Ire lan d  co u ld  a ffec t o ccu p y in g  o w n e rsh ip  u n d e r th e  ac t w ith o u t 
co m p u lsio n ; b u t it w as ev id en t th a t U ls te r m u st e ith e r w a it in d e fin ite ly  o r  pay  an 
e x o rb itan t p r ic e .19
L y ttle  u rg ed  th a t the  m o v em en t fo r co m p u ls io n  be re su m ed  im m e d ia te ly  and  th a t the 
co m p u lso ry  p u rc h ase  o f  lan d lo rd s’ es ta tes  be m ade a p rio rity  th ro u g h o u t U ls te r in  the 
n ex t g en e ra l e lec tio n .20 L ik e  the  U .I.L . in  the  south , the  U ls te r  F a rm e rs ’ and  L a b o u re rs ’ 
U n io n  in  th e  no rth , w as read y  to  fa ll b ac k  on the  call fo r co m p u lso ry  p u rch ase .
T. W . R u sse ll h ig h lig h ted  th e  g rav ity  o f  the  s itu a tio n , cau sed  by  th e  u n ce rta in ty  
o v er th e  p ay m en t o f  the ‘b o n u s ’ o n  u n ten an ted  land , p a rticu la rly  in  the  p o o re r a reas o f  
th e  w est:
I f  th e  lan d lo rd s  in  the  w e st o f  Ire lan d  w ere  ab le  to  se ll th e ir  p a tch es  o f  lan d  - 
th o se  u n eco n o m ic  h o ld in g s o f  fo u r and  five ac res in  ex ten t - a t a h ig h  p rice  and 
re ta in  th e  g razing  lands b ecau se  th e  ‘b o n u s ’ cou ld  n o t be  p a id  on  u n ten an ted  land  
- and  th a t w as the o p in io n  p re v a ilin g  - the  p o sitio n  w as  one  o f  th e  g rav es t danger. 
T he m a in  p u rp o se  o f  the ac t w o u ld  be fru stra ted  i f  th ese  m en  w ere  a llo w ed  to  sell 
th e ir  p a tch es  o f  land , w h ich  w ere  no  secu rity  fo r the  B ritish  tax p ay e r, an d  to
re ta in  th e ir  g razing  lands. T he p ro b lem  o f  the lan d  in  the  w e s t o f  Ire lan d  w as
21u n se ttled  now .
R u sse ll m a in ta in ed  th a t th e re  w ere  tw o  g roups o f  lan d lo rd s  in  U ls te r; th o se  w h o  re fu sed  
to  sell a t any p rice  and  those  w h o  w ere  on ly  w illin g  to  sell at ex to rtio n a te  p rices. H e fe lt 
th a t w h ile  lan d  pu rch ase  w en t ah ead  in  th e  so u th  and  w est, th e  U ls te r ten an t, w ho  had  
n ev e r b e e n  in v o lv ed  in  ag ra rian  ag ita tio n , w as p rev en ted  fro m  b eco m in g  a  p u rch ase r by  
h is lan d lo rd  an d  h is on ly  o p tio n  w as to  p ay  an  ex o rb itan t p rice  fo r h is h o ld in g .22
19/. T., 26 Jan. 1904.
20 Ibid.
21 Hansard 4 , cxxix, 257-8 (3 Feb. 1904).
22 Ibid., col. 256-61.
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U ls te r  lan d lo rd s , such  as C o lonel S aunderson , asse rted  th a t  lan d lo rd s  w e re  n o t 
req u es tin g  u n reaso n ab le  p rice s  b u t th a t the  in itia l re lu c tan ce  w as due to  th e  
u n w illin g n e ss  o f  lim ited  o w n ers to  sell b ecau se  o f  the  u n ce rta in ty  o v e r the  ‘b o n u s ’. H e 
b e liev ed  th a t the  am en d in g  ac t w o u ld  so lve  th is  p ro b lem  th o u g h . H o w ev er, S au n d erso n  
c la im ed  th a t th a t th e re  w as a sec tio n  w ith in  the  I.P .P . w h ich , in  a llian ce  w ith  th e  
Freeman’s Journal, w as d e te rm in ed  n o t to  g ive the  W y n d h a m  A c t a  fa ir  tria l. 
S au n d erso n  a sse rted  th a t W illia m  O ’B rien  had  re sig n ed  b ec au se  o f  th is  an im o sity  w ith in  
the  I.P .P . to w ard s  the  lan d  ac t.23 L an d lo rd s , like S au n d erso n , w ere  co n fid en t th a t  th ere  
w o u ld  be  p len ty  o f  sa les  u n d e r the  ac t and  he b ased  th is  o n  th e  fa c t th a t th e  ren t 
rev a lu a tio n , h e ld  ev ery  fifteen  years, w as  due ag a in  in  1911. T h is  w o u ld  m o tiv a te  
lan d lo rd s  to  se ll.24
L an d lo rd s  h e ld  th a t th ey  h ad  o ffe red  te rm s in  k ee p in g  w ith  th o se  la id  ou t a t th e  
L an d  C o n fe ren ce  b u t th a t th e  ten an ts  w ere  o fferin g  p rice s  w h ic h  w ere  sim p ly  u n v iab le . 
L an d lo rd s  b e liev ed  reaso n ab le  te rm s h ad  b een  o ffe red  an d  th a t th ey  w ere  en titled  to  
ex p ec t a  d ecen t price . T h e ir  in te rp re ta tio n  o f  a fa ir  p rice  w as  a  su m  w h ich , i f  in v es ted  a t 
3 o r 3 % % , w o u ld  p ro d u ce  a la n d lo rd ’s g ross in co m e eq u iv a le n t to  th a t he  h ad  re ce iv ed  
fro m  ren ts .25
A t th e  n in e teen th  an n u a l m ee tin g  o f  the Irish  L an d o w n ers  C o n v en tio n  on  15
A p ril 1904, W . H. B o y d  a r ticu la ted  th o se  sen tim ents:
It w o u ld  be p rem a tu re  to  ex p ress  any  d efin ite  o p in io n  a t th e  p re se n t tim e as to  th e  
p ro b a b le  e ffec t o f  th e  lan d  ac t o f  1903 as a m ean s  o f  se ttlin g  the  Ir ish  lan d  
q u es tio n  w ith in  a re a so n ab le  p e rio d , w e feel th a t its  u ltim a te  su ccess  w ill la rg e ly  
d ep en d  u p o n  th e  lan d lo rd s  b e in g  o ffe red  ‘an  eq u itab le  p r ic e ’ . . .a n d  on  th e  ac t 
b e in g  ad m in is te red  in  a sp irit ca lcu la ted  to  en co u rag e  an d  fa c ilita te  lan d  p u rch ase  
n eg o tia tio n s .26
M an y  lan d lo rd s  fe lt th a t th e ir  sen tim en ta l a ttach m en t to  th e ir  lan d s in  ad d itio n  to  the  
fish in g , sp o rtin g  and  tu rb ary  rig h ts  o n  th em  o u g h t to  b e  co n s id e red  w h e n  the  q u es tio n  o f  
p rice  arose . C o lonel O ’C a llag h an  W estro p p  w as k een  to  stress  th a t the  m ajo rity  o f  
lan d lo rd s  d id  n o t w an t to  sell th e ir  lands an d  w o u ld  on ly  do so i f  it  p ro v e d  ad v an tag eo u s. 
T h e  co lo n e l d ec la red  th a t th ere  w as ‘a v ery  w ide , a very  in flu en tia l, an d  a very  h ig h ly
23 Ibid., cxxxii, 687-9 (24 Mar. 1904).
24 Ibid, cxxix, 282-4 (3 Feb. 1904).
251.T., 16 Apr. 1904.
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o rg an ised  effo rt, ev en  th o u g h  it w as an  in sid io u s effo rt, b e in g  m ad e  to  p o iso n  the  m in d s 
o f  th e  ten an ts  ag a in s t g iv ing  an y th in g  like  fa ir  te rm s on w h ic h  th e  lan d lo rd  co u ld  deal.
• • 27In d eed , he w o u ld  ca ll it a  co n sp iracy  a lm o s t’.
T he I.P .P . h o p ed  to use  the  d eb a tes  on  th e  1904 am en d in g  bill to  m ak e  o th er 
ch an g es  to  th e  p rev io u s y e a r ’s leg isla tion . T hey  w ish ed  to  a lte r th o se  areas re la tin g  to  
th e  p rice  ‘z o n e s ’, the  co n g ested  d is tric ts  and  the  ev ic ted  ten an ts . T h e  seco n d  read in g  o f  
th e  am en d in g  b ill d id  n o t tak e  p lace  u n til 8 Ju ly  1904 an d  it sp ark ed  a v ery  rev ea lin g  
d eb a te  in  th e  H o u se  o f  C om m ons. P ro ceed in g s o p en ed  w ith  Jo h n  R ed m o n d  p ro p o sin g  
th e  fo llo w in g  m otion :
N o  m easu re  d ea lin g  w ith  th e  am en d m en t o f  the Ir ish  L an d  A c t o f  1903 can  be 
accep ted  as sa tisfac to ry  w h ich  dea ls  on ly  w ith  fa c ilita tin g  Irish  lan d lo rd s  in  
o b ta in in g  th e  ‘b o n u s ’, an d  w h ich  p ro v id es  no  re m e d y  fo r th e  g rave d e fec ts  o f  
th a t ac t a ffec tin g  Ir ish  ten an ts , p a rticu la rly  th e  c rea tio n  o f  a sy stem  o f  ‘z o n e s ’ 
lead in g  to  the  u n ju s t in fla tio n  o f  p rices, an d  the  ab se n ce  o f  p ro v is io n s  fo r th e  
co m p u lso ry  acq u is itio n  o f  u n ten an ted  lan d  essen tia l fo r th e  en la rg em en t o f
h o ld in g s, the  re s to ra tio n  o f  ev ic ted  ten an ts , and  the  final se ttlem en t o f  the  Irish
28lan d  question .
R ed m o n d  em p h asised  th a t the  m o tio n  w as n o t an  a ttac k  on  th e  1903 ac t b u t a 
m an ife sta tio n  o f  h is p a r ty ’s fru stra tio n  at th e  g o v e rn m e n t’s u n w illin g n e ss  to  tack le  the  
a c t’s o th e r flaw s aside  from  the  ‘b o n u s ’ d ilem m a. T he I.P .P . fe lt th a t the  u n ce rta in ty  
o v er th e  a llo ca tio n  o f  the  ‘b o n u s ’ w as on ly  one o f  th e  re aso n s  fo r th e  C .D .B .’s lack  o f  
p ro g ress  in  acq u irin g  u n ten an te d  land. T hey  w ish ed  to  a lte r  th e  m ak e  up o f  the  b o ard  
and  to  g ran t it co m p u lso ry  p o w ers  so as to  re in v ig o ra te  the  ac t in  th e  w est. S uch  
co m p u lso ry  p o w ers  w ere  n ecessa ry  in  o rd e r to  p u rch ase  su ffic ie n t u n ten an te d  lan d  and  
to  en la rg e  the u n eco n o m ic  h o ld in g s w h ich  ex is ted  in  the  co n g es ted  d istric ts.
C ap ta in  A. J. C. D o n e lan , M .P . fo r E ast C ork , sec o n d ed  R e d m o n d ’s m o tio n  
a rg u in g  th a t lan d lo rd  d em an d s fo r ex o rb itan t p rices  co u ld  spell th e  d o w n fa ll o f  the  act. 
D o n e lan  b e liev ed  th a t the  ‘b o n u s ’ h ad  on ly  ‘w h e tted  the  ap p e tites  o f  th e  Irish  la n d lo rd s ’ 
an d  th a t i f  the  ten an ts  w ere  sh o u ld e red  w ith  an n u ities  th ey  co u ld  n o t p ay , th ere  w o u ld  be 
tro u b le  in  the  fu ture . D o n e lan  also  rem ark ed  th a t the p rev io u s  y ea r h ad  b een  a  v ery  b ad  
one  in  ag ricu ltu ra l term s:
27 Ibid.
28 H ansard4, cxxxvii, 1115 (8 July 1904).
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C o n seq u en tly  th e  ten an ts  very  n a tu ra lly  to o k  re fu g e  in  p u rc h ase  at a lm o s t any  
p rice . T h e  ten an ts  w ere  tem p ted  to  do th is  b ecau se  u n d e r th e  lan d  ac t o f  la s t y ea r 
th ey  w ere  ab le  to  add  the  cu rren t y e a r ’s ren t to  th e  p u rc h ase  m o n ey  an d  th a t no  
d o u b t gave th em  som e tem p o ra ry  re lief. H e w as a fra id  th a t in  m an y  ca ses  the 
Ir ish  ten an ts  h ad  c lu tch ed  at th is  p riv ileg e  as a  d ro w n in g  m a n  c lu tch ed  a t a 
straw .
In  th e  case  o f  a sale ag reed  w ith in  the  ‘z o n e s ’ there  w as no in sp ec tio n  by th e  es ta te s  
co m m iss io n e rs  w h o  w ere  o b lig ed  to  san c tio n  the  ag reem en t d esp ite  any  m isg iv in g s  they  
m ig h t h av e  as reg ard s  p rice  or security . T he I.P .P . w ere  a fra id  th a t ten an ts  w e re  b e in g  
ex p lo ited  u n d er the  ‘z o n e ’ sy stem  an d  w o u ld  su b seq u en tly  fin d  th e ir  an n u ities  a  b u rd en  
th a t th ey  w o u ld  be u n ab le  to bear.
T h e  I.U .P .P . ag reed  th a t th e re  w ere  d efec ts  in th e  1903 ac t th a t o u g h t to  h av e  
b e e n  ad d ressed  ea rlier, d efec ts  su ch  as the ex p en se  in v o lv ed  in  p ro v in g  th e  title  o f  
su p e rio r in te rests . T h is  p ro cess  w as a b u rd en  to  the  lan d lo rd  an d  w as  b eg in n in g  to  a ffec t 
th e  ra te  o f  pu rchase . T hey  w ere  o p tim istic  abou t th e  fu tu re  o f  th e  1903 ac t and  h e ld  th a t 
it sh o u ld  be g iv en  tim e  to w ork . T h ey  o p p o sed  R ed m o n d ’s m o tio n  as th ey  fe lt  it w o u ld  
rad ica lly  a lte r the  act. T. W . R usse ll, h o w ev er, fo u n d  th a t th e  ac t had  tem p o ra rily  b ro k en  
d o w n  in  th ree  h u g ely  s ig n ifican t areas, n am ely  the  re in s ta tem en t o f  the  ev ic ted  ten an ts , 
the  p u rch ase  o f  u n ten an ted  lan d  and  th e  en la rg em en t o f  u n ec o n o m ic  ho ld ings. T he 
p rin c ip a l re aso n  fo r th is  w as  Judge  R o s s ’ d ec is io n  on th e  ‘b o n u s ’ w h ich  he b e liev e d  the
i n
n ew  b ill w o u ld  reso lve .
G eo rg e  W y n d h am  p lead e d  th a t th e  1903 ac t w o u ld  b eco m e  a  d ead  le tte r  i f  th e  
am en d in g  b ill w as no t passed . H e fe lt th a t the  call fo r  co m p u lso ry  p u rc h ase  to  be 
in c lu d ed  in  the am en d in g  bill w as u n n ecessary  and  w o u ld  do little  to  acce le ra te  the 
p u rch ase  o f  un ten an ted  land. R e d m o n d ’s m o tio n  w as d efea ted  a fte r a d iv is io n  by  203 
v o tes  to  90. T he am en d in g  b ill p asse d  its seco n d  read in g  by  199 v o tes  to  88, d esp ite  th e  
I.P .P . v o tin g  ag a in st it.31
T he b ill p assed  q u ick ly  th ro u g h  p a rlia m e n t w ith o u t fu rth e r inciden t. T he Irish  
L an d  A c t, 1904 n o w  c la r ified  b ey o n d  d o u b t tha t an  ‘e s ta te ’ co u ld  co n sis t o f  any  lan d  
p a rtia lly  ten an te d  o r co m p le te ly  u n ten an te d  w h ich  w as so ld  to  th e  L an d  C o m m iss io n  or
29 Ibid., col. 1114.
30 Ibid., col. 1126-30.
31 Ibid., col. 1138-42.
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C .D .B . C ru cia lly  the  ‘b o n u s ’ w as to  be  p a id  to  the  v en d o r in  th e  sa le  o f  su ch  esta tes. T he 
am b ig u ity  reg ard in g  th e  ‘b o n u s ’ w as c la rified  w ith  th e  en title m en t o f  th e  ten an t-fo r-life
32to  the  ‘b o n u s ’ recogn ised .
T h e  n a tio n al d irec to ry  o f  the  U .I.L . m et in  D u b lin  o n  10 A u g u s t 1904. It w as  
d isp leased  w ith  the  g o v e rn m e n t’s fa ilu re  to  p ro v id e  any o p p o rtu n ity  to  am en d  o th er 
a reas  o f  the 1903 act, aside  fro m  the  ‘b o n u s’ . A  re so lu tio n  w as p assed  a sse rtin g  th a t the  
ac t h ad  n o t so lv ed  the  land  q u es tio n  fo r a n u m b er o f  reaso n s. F irs tly , it w as fe lt th a t the  
‘z o n e s ’ had  c rea ted  an  a rtific ia l p rice  fo r land . S eco n d ly , it w as b e liev ed  th a t the  
lan d lo rd s  h ad  a ttem p ted  to  in tim id a te  the ten an ts  into p ay in g  in fla ted  p rices. T h ird ly , it 
w as seen  th a t th e  p ro v is io n s  d ea lin g  w ith  co n g es tio n  h ad  u tte rly  fa iled  an d  las tly , th e  ac t 
h ad  no t b ro u g h t ab o u t the  re s to ra tio n  o f  the  ev ic ted  ten an ts . T h e  p o s itio n  th a t w o u ld  be 
a d o p ted  by the  U .I.L . in  th e  fo llo w in g  m o n th s is u n d e rs ta n d ab le  on read in g  Jo sep h  
D e v lin ’s reso lu tion :
T h a t p en d in g  the  am en d m en t o f  th e  lan d  ac t and  th e  secu rin g  o f  a  m o re  v ig o ro u s 
and  sy m p ath etic  ad m in is tra tio n , it b eco m es the  d u ty  o f  the  p eo p le  to  m ee t th e  
ag g ressiv e  ac tio n  o f  th e  lan d lo rd s , and to  su p p lem en t th e  d e fic ien c ie s  o f  th e  ac t 
i ts e lf  an d  its ad m in is tra tio n  by  a s trong  o rg a n isa tio n  an d  a  v ig o ro u s  ag ita tion . W e 
th e re fo re  stro n g ly  ap p ea l to  all n a tio n a lis ts  to  a id  us in  s tren g th en in g  and  
sp read in g  th is  leag u e  and  w e adv ise  th a t all lo ca l ex ecu tiv es  sh o u ld  m ee t 
regu la rly  and  freq u en tly  an d  ac t as ad v iso ry  co m m itte e s  to  all the  b o d ies  o f
TO
ten an ts  n eg o tia tin g  w ith  th e ir  land lo rds.
IV). Agricultural labourers.
A lth o u g h  th is  ch ap te r fo cu ses  p rim arily  on  the  fin an c in g  o f  th e  act, th is  su b -sec tio n  on 
ag ricu ltu ra l lab o u re rs  fits in  co m fo rtab ly . T he u n w illin g n ess  to  p ro v id e  th e  sam e fin an c ia l 
te rm s fo r lab o u re rs  w as a  co n ten tio u s  fea tu re  o f  the  W y n d h am  A ct. W h en  a  lab o u re rs  ac t 
w as  p assed  in  1906, it u tilised  the  Ir ish  L an d  P u rch ase  F u n d  and  the L an d  P u rch ase  A id  
F u n d  at a tim e  w h en  the  fin an ce  fo r lan d  p u rch ase  w as in  sh o rt supply .
O n  1 Jan u a ry  1904 a t A g h ad o w n ey , Co. D erry , Jo h n  G o rd o n , M .P . fo r S ou th  
L o n d o n d erry , ad d ressed  h is  co n stitu en ts  o n  the su b jec t o f  th e  1903 L an d  A c t w h ich  had 
b ee n  in  o p era tio n  fo r ju s t  o v er tw o  m on ths. In  p articu la r, G o rd o n  h o p ed  fo r leg is la tio n  to
32 Irish Land Act, 1904. [4 Ed. VII, c. 34]
33/T ., 11 Aug. 1904.
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im p ro v e  th e  p o s itio n  o f  th e  ag ricu ltu ra l labourers: ‘T h e  lan d  ac t b are ly  to u c h e d  the  
q u es tio n  o f  th e  la b o u re r . . .T he  c h ie f  secretary  h ad  p ro m ise d  to  deal w ith  th e  la b o u re rs ’ 
q u es tio n  in  an  in d ep en d en t b il l . . .[a n d ]  the  n ecessity  fo r su ch  leg is la tio n  w as  ad m itte d  in 
every  p a rt o f  th e  c o u n try .’34 T h ere  w ere  th o se  w h o  fe lt th a t th e  W y n d h am  A c t w o u ld  
h av e  an  ad v erse  e ffec t on  th e  fo rtu n es  o f  ag ricu ltu ra l lab o u re rs . A  p rim e  ex a m p le  w as 
L o rd  M uskerry :
T he o p e ra tio n  o f  th e  lan d  ac t m u st in ev itab ly  d im in ish  th e  d em an d  fo r labour, 
m u s t d im in ish  th e  d em an d  fo r th e  p ro d u c ts  o f  trad e  an d  in d u stry , m u s t d im in ish  
every  k in d  o f  em p lo y m en t w h ich  is g iv en  in  a co u n try  by  th e  h ig h e r c la sse s  o f  
the  co m m u n ity . A s y o u  p lace  Ire lan d  in  the  h an d s  o f  m en  o f  lo w  cu ltu re , o f  
u n cu ltiv a ted  ta s te s , w ith  little  d esire  fo r im p ro v em en t, w ith  no ca ll u p o n  th e ir 
ex e rtio n s b u t th e  d em an d  fo r fre sh  ex ten sio n s o f  e c c le s ia s tica l ed ific es  and  
en d o w m en ts , y o u  strip  all the h ig h e r c lasses  o f  to w n  trad es , as w e ll as th e  m ass  
o f  ag ricu ltu ra l lab o u re rs , o f  the  w h o le  o f  th o se  em p lo y ers  an d  cu s to m ers , w ho , 
b e lo n g in g  to  th e  gen try  and  the  lea rn ed  p ro fess io n s  co n n e c ted  w ith  the  gen try ,
h av e  b een  co n d em n ed  to  im p o v erish m en t an d  b a n ish m e n t by  su ch  leg is la tio n  as
35is em b o d ied  in  th e  re cen t lan d  act.
D u rin g  th e  d eb a tes  on  the  land  ac t o f  1903, G eo rg e  W y n d h am  h ad  p ro m ised  to 
in tro d u ce  a  sep ara te  co m p reh en siv e  lab o u re rs ’ b ill to  o v e rco m e  th e  d isap p o in tm e n t o f  the 
m eag re  p ro v is io n s d ea lin g  w ith  th e  labourers. T he firs t re ad in g  o f  th a t sep a ra te  b ill had  
tak en  p lace  o n  9 M arch  1904 in  the  H o u se  o f  C om m ons. W y n d h a m  h ad  d ec la red  th a t h is 
p rin c ip a l a im  w as to  lo w er the  co st o f  o b ta in in g  a  co ttag e  fo r  a  lab o u re r an d  to  s im p lify  
th e  p ro ced u re . H o w ev er, Jo h n  R ed m o n d  h e ld  th a t fe w  w o u ld  be  sa tis fied  w ith  it an d  th a t 
it w o u ld  req u ire  serio u s am en d m en t.36
O n 24 June 1904 th e  la b o u re rs ’ b ill w as re ad  fo r a seco n d  tim e  b u t no  ex p lan a tio n  
o f  th e  b i l l ’s te rm s w as fo rth co m in g  fro m  th e  c h ie f  sec re ta ry  o r any  o th e r g o v ern m en t 
m em ber. Jo h n  M u rp h y , M .P . fo r K erry  E as t (I.P .P .) ex p ressed  h is d isap p o in tm e n t th a t the 
h o u se  h ad  rece iv ed  so little  exp lan a tio n . H e d esc rib ed  th e  n ew  b ill as a  ‘h a lfh e a r te d  [and] 
ca re less  e f fo r t’, w h ich  had  b ee n  in tro d u ced  sim ply  to  fu lfill th e  c h ie f  sec re ta ry ’s p ro m ise
34 Ibid., 2 Jan. 1904.
35 Hansard 4, cxxx, 523 (22 Feb. 1904).
36 Ibid., cxxxi, 593-9 (9 Mar. 1904).
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o f  th e  p rev io u s  p a rlia m e n ta ry  sess io n  b u t th a t it w o u ld  do  little  to  re so lv e  th e  lab o u re rs  
q u es tio n .37 D. D. S heehan , M .P . fo r M id  C ork , w en t ev en  fu r th e r dec laring :
R a th e r th a n  lo se  h is land  b ill o f  la s t y ea r, th e  c h ie f  sec re ta ry  so lem n ly  p led g ed  
h im s e lf  to  dea l w ith  th e  la b o u re rs ’ q u es tio n  th is  year. Y ie ld in g  to  th e  p re ssu re  o f  
c ircu m stan ces , a lth o u g h  m an y  o f  th em  on  the  Ir ish  b en ch es fe lt  in  d o in g  so th ey  
w ere  to  som e ex ten t sac rific in g  th e  lab o u re rs , th ey  a c c e p te d .. .the  p led g e  g iv en  
by th e  c h ie f  sec re tary  th a t he w o u ld  g ive  h is  p e rso n a l a tten tio n  to  th e  m a tte r  
d u rin g  th e  au tum n . T h is  d istin c tly  im p lied  th a t h e  in ten d ed  to  b rin g  fo rw ard  a  
g rea t co m p reh en siv e  m e a s u re .. .H e  d id  n o t k n o w  w h e th e r th e  rig h t hon . 
g en tlem an  reg a rd ed  th e  b ill befo re  the  h o u se  as a  fu lfilm en t o f  h is  p le d g e . . .b u t  
th is  he  d id  k n o w , th a t th e  Ir ish  p eo p le  an d  Irish  lab o u re rs  d id  n o t re g a rd  it as 
su ch .38
M an y  in  th e  I.P .P . q u es tio n ed  w h y  hu g e  sum s o f  m o n ey  co u ld  be  ra ise d  fo r lan d  p u rch ase  
b u t n o t fo r th e  h o u sin g  o f  labourers.
T h e  I.U .P .P . w ere  also  d isap p o in ted  w ith  the  m easu re . W illiam  M o o re , M .P . fo r 
N o rth  A n trim , th o u g h t th a t  it w as a ‘u se less  b i l l ’ and  fa r re m o v e d  fro m  th e  
co m p reh en siv e  and  g en e ro u s m easu re  th a t he  h ad  h o p ed  fo r.39 J. B L o n sd a le , M .P . fo r 
M id  A rm ag h , co n ten d ed  th a t th ere  w as too  m u ch  red  tap e  su rro u n d in g  th e  ac q u is itio n  o f  
lan d  fo r the lab o u re rs ’ co ttages. H e w as also  stau n ch ly  o p p o sed , as w ere  the  o th e r U ls te r  
u n io n is t m em b ers, to  c lau se  th irteen , w h ich  a lte red  the  w ay  in  w h ich  th e  g o v ern m en t 
g ran t fo r th e  c rea tio n  o f  la b o u re rs ’ co ttag es  w as d is tr ib u te d .40 T h e  m o n ey  w o u ld  n o w  be 
a llo ca ted  in  p ro p o rtio n  to  the  n u m b er o f  co ttag es  b u ilt in  each  coun ty . U ls te r  d is tric t 
co u n c ils  h ad  a p o o r re co rd  o f  u tilis in g  its g ran t fu n d s to  b u ild  la b o u re rs ’ co ttag es , 
co m p ared  w ith  th e  o th er p ro v in ce s  and  n o w  the  p ro v in ce  s tood  to  rece iv e  a  co n sid e rab ly  
red u ced  g ran t due  to  its lack  o f  ac tiv ity .
C o lo n e l S au n d erso n  av o w ed  th a t th e  b ill w as ‘a c ru e l d isa p p o in tm e n t’, w h ich  fe ll 
w e ll sh o rt o f  h is ex p ecta tio n s. H e ex p ressed  h is  o p p o s itio n  to  c lau se  th ir te en  an d  he 
q u es tio n ed  w h y  w h en  it cam e to  the  lab o u re rs , u n lik e  th e  ten an t fa rm ers , th e re  w as su ch  a 
sh o rtag e  o f  fin an ce  co m b in ed  w ith  an  u n w illin g n ess  to  p ro v id e  it. In  ad d itio n , 
S au n d erso n  co m p la in ed  th a t the  m a tte r o f  es tab lish in g  title  re m a in ed  co m p lex  and
37 Ibid., cxxxvi, 1121-24 (24 June 1904).
38 Ibid., col. 1133.
39 Ibid., col. 1124-33.
40 Ibid., col. 1140-44.
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expensive.41 Charles Craig, M.P. for South Antrim, also expressed his disgust at the 
measure and held that ‘it was almost in the nature of an insult to produce [such] a bill.. .as 
a settlement of the question’ 42
George Wyndham attempted to allay unionist fears by promising that any money 
held by Ulster district councils, which had not been utilised, would not be confiscated 43 
Although they were deeply disappointed with the bill, the I.P.P. voted for it in the hope 
that it could be amended satisfactorily in committee. However, the Ulster unionist 
members pledged not to support the bill. They were opposed principally to the presence 
of clause thirteen. Upon the defeat of a motion by Charles Craig, by 316 votes to 27, to 
reject the measure, the house passed the second reading of the bill.44
Despite passing its second reading, the chief secretary’s bill was destined to have 
only a short lifespan. On 21 July 1904, it came before a House of Commons committee 
known as the Grand Committee on Trade but little progress was made. The committee 
convened again on 26 and 27 July before George Wyndham dropped the bill because he 
was unable to meet the demands for increased finance which Irish M.P.s from all sides 
felt was desperately needed. Essentially, he was unsuccessful in persuading the treasury 
to raise money along similar lines to that which had financed the 1903 land act. Another 
factor in the failure of the bill was that it had been introduced very late in the 
parliamentary session and there had been very little time to properly discuss it. In an 
attempt to further the progress of the bill and reduce the workload of the House of 
Commons, the measure appeared before the Grand Committee on Trade as opposed to a 
committee of the whole house. Not all the Irish M.P.s were part of this committee either 
which lead to further discontent.
The frustration at the meager provisions of the Wyndham Act for agricultural 
labourers manifested itself when John Redmond spoke at Drogheda, Co. Louth, on 13 
November 1904. He was addressed by the agricultural tenants of Drogheda Corporation 
who declared that the act had been inoperative as far as they were concerned. They
41 Ibid., col. 1149-51.
42 Ibid., col. 1167.
43 Ibid., col. 1151-1157.
44 Ibid., col. 68.
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pointed out the paucity of sales in the Drogheda area, and the lack of reform with regards 
to the labourers. They called for the I.P.P. to work for a compulsory purchase bill.45
The agricultural labourers question was brought to the fore once again on 1 March 
1905 upon the reopening of parliament. Captain Donelan, M.P. for East Cork, proposed 
the following:
But we humbly represent to your majesty that this house expresses regret that no 
promise has been made to deal during the present session with the pressing need 
for the improvement of the conditions of the labourers in Ireland, 
notwithstanding the complete unanimity which exists upon the question amongst 
all sections of the Irish representation.46
All shades of Irish opinion in the House of Commons condemned the failed bill of 1904
as an inadequate measure and held that the chief secretary’s pledge to introduce a
comprehensive labourers’ bill, made during the passage of the 1903 land act, had been
shamefully broken. Charles Craig, M.P. for South Antrim, deftly summarised the
thoughts of the I.U.P.P. on what needed to be done for labourers:
In the first place, there must be cheaper money; then the simplification of 
procedure; next the provision of guarantees that the acts should be properly 
administered; and lastly, on which he laid particular stress, that provision should 
be made by which deserving labourers would be able to become owners of their 
houses and their plots of land. The labourers’ question was part and parcel of the 
land question, and until that had been fully settled it would be impossible to say 
that the Irish land question had been definitely set to rest.47
All Irish M.P.s were agreed that bureaucracy posed a significant challenge and that
urgent action was needed to relieve the plight of labourers. The Irish representatives felt
aggrieved that money could not be raised for the labourers as had been done for the
tenant farmers under the 1903 land act.
The belief was widely held that the treasury would not provide sufficient finance 
despite the efforts of George Wyndham to convince them otherwise. The chief 
secretary’s failure to adequately honour his pledge of 1903 had left many feeling 
disappointed and betrayed. The attorney-general for Ireland, John Atkinson, shed light on 
the Conservative government’s position, however, pointing out that the chief secretary
45 7. T., 14 Nov. 1904.
46 Hansard 4, cxlii, 106 (1 Mar. 1905).
47 Ibid., col. 112.
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had never promised that money could be raised on the same terms as under the 1903 land 
act. He confirmed the treasury’s unwillingness to provide finance on such terms:
He [John Atkinson] could give the assurance that the government would be 
willing to bring in their last bill amended in such a way as to expedite still further 
the carrying out of the scheme; but he could not give an assurance that the money
4-8would be provided at a cheaper rate. To that project the treasury were opposed. 
While in agreement with Captain Donelan’s proposal, the I.U.P.P. members abstained 
from the vote because they held that by voting for it they would put the government out 
of office. The proposal was rejected by 228 votes to 184.49
The section of the 1903 Land Act which had dealt with Irish labourers had been 
acknowledged as completely inadequate from the outset. Wyndham had overcome this 
obstacle by promising to introduce a separate comprehensive labourers’ bill. His 1904 
measure had been a failure, however, upon winning the 1906 election, the Liberal 
government accepted that they were obliged to fulfil the promise of the previous 
administration. Previous labourers’ acts including the relevant section in the 1903 Land 
Act, had not been effective for a number of reasons as the Annual Register outlined: ‘The 
existing legislation intended to promote the erection of labourers’ cottages by rural 
district councils had been a failure, owing to the cost of the procedure, the slackness of 
the councils, and the insufficiency of the funds available.00
In a letter to Canon Quin, parish priest Camlough, Co. Armagh, which appeared 
in the press on 17 January 1905, William O’Brien expressed his wish that the Land 
Conference, in cooperation with the Irish Reform Association, should reconvene to 
discuss the labourers question and other problematic areas of the land act. The association 
was formed in 1904 out of the Land Purchase Committee which had supported the Land 
Conference. Its members included Colonel Hutcheson Poe, Colonel Nugent-Everard, 
Linsay Talbot-Crosbie and Sir Josslyn Gore-Booth. It was in favour of promoting co­
operation between all political and religious groups on the island in order to solve 
Ireland’s social and economic problems. The Irish Land and Labour Association, at a
48 Ibid., col. 123.
49 Ibid., col. 128.
50 The annual register, a review ofpublic events at home and abroad fo r  the year 1906 (London, 1907) p. 
151.
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meeting on 23 January 1905, gave their support to such a conference.51 The association 
hoped that it would advance the labourers’ question. Although O’Brien acknowledged 
that there was a body of nationalists hostile to any gesture of conciliation or good will 
towards landlords, he advised Canon Quin to put forward a resolution at the meeting of 
the U.I.L. directory which was to be held on 24 January. Unfortunately the proposal 
was unsuccessful. Despite this, William O’Brien was intent on publicising the labourers 
question and he worked closely with the Irish Land and Labourer Association. He spoke 
at Croom, Co. Limerick on 18 March 1906, where he declared that it was now the turn of 
the labourers to have their claims addressed.53 On 15 April at Tralee, Co. Kerry, O’Brien 
advocated that all nationalists support the claims of the labourers.54
According to the report of the estates commissioners for the period up to 31 
March 1906, very little had been done to improve the predicament of agricultural 
labourers. The sections of the Wyndham Act dealing with the question had proved inept. 
The estates commissioners had forwarded only fifty-one representations to the Local 
Government Board and the rural district councils recommending the erection of ninety- 
four cottages to cater for the needs of sixty-eight holdings.55 Virtually no progress had 
been made on these recommendations, with the estates commissioners commenting that 
they were ‘not aware whether any action has been taken on these representations’.56 The 
estates commissioners relied on the inspectors and surveyors who visited the estates for 
their information. Where the holdings on an estate were in the ‘zones’, it was usually 
only visited by a boundary surveyor. The information they provided was neither 
sufficiently reliable nor extensive for the local authorities to adopt the representations.57
James Bryce, the new Liberal chief secretary (1905 to 1907), introduced his 
labourers’ bill on 28 May 1906 hoping to finally resolve the issue. The measure was 
greeted with enthusiasm by all shades of Irish opinion and quickly passed its first and
51 The Irish Land and Labour Association was formed in the 1890s to organise and advance the rights of 
small farmers and labourers. It was mainly confined to the province of Munster.
52 F.J., 17 Jan. 1905.
531. T., 19 Mar. 1906.
541.1., 16 Apr. 1906.
55 Report o f  the estates commissioners fo r  the year ending 3 V' March, 1906 and fo r  the period from  I s' 
November, 1903, to 31 March, 1906, xxviii, [Cd. 3148], H.C. 1906, xxv, 237.
56 Ibid.
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second readings in the House of Commons. Although he did not believe the bill would 
completely solve the labourers’ question, John Redmond warmly welcomed it as ‘a
58comprehensive and honest measure’. Colonel Saunderson heartily approved the 
measure and congratulated the government ‘on bringing in a bill which had on the whole 
the united support of the members for Ireland’.59
James Bryce aimed to make it easier and less expensive for a labourer to obtain a 
cottage and the new act would shorten and simplify the procedure. Bryce succeeded, 
where Wyndham had failed, in obtaining money for labourers on land purchase terms. 
The labourer would pay an annuity of 3 14 % which would be repaid over approximately 
sixty-eight and a half years. £4,250,000 was to be made available for loans to district 
councils who would provide the labourer with a house and a small plot of land. This sum 
was to come from the Irish Land Purchase Fund. It was estimated that over 25,000 
cottages would be built under the operation of the act with the money. Bryce calculated 
that it would cost £130 to build a house and £40 to acquire a plot of land which could be 
up to one acre.60
Section four of the Wyndham Act was also amended by Bryce’s 1906 Labourers 
Act to enable district councils to hold land as trustees for the benefit of labourers. 
Previously it had only allowed trustees to hold land for such purposes as turbary. 
Henceforth councils could be made trustees of a parcel of land which formed part of an 
estate that was being sold. The land could be used to provide cottages for labourers. 
Similarly, section two of the Wyndham Act was amended to make a labourer eligible for 
a parcel of untenanted land. This effectively allowed him to make the transition to a small 
farmer. To qualify, the labourer had to have been resident on the estate or in the 
neighbourhood for at least five years prior to the advance. Furthermore, the new measure 
authorised the compulsory acquisition of land, in a limited form, to facilitate the 
provision of cottages for labourers under certain conditions.61
58 Hansard 4 , clviii, 116 (28 May 1906).
59 Ibid., col. 984 (13 June 1906).
60 Ibid., col. 107-16 (28 May 1906).
61 See Labourers (Ireland) Act, 1906 [6 Ed. VIII, c. 7.] (4 Aug. 1906).
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With the amount of untenanted land that could be purchased in the congested 
districts restricted by the C.D.B.’s lack of finance, it was little wonder that there were 
clashes with rural district councils who were trying to find land for labourers under the 
Labourers Act, 1906. These councils had applied for land on estates purchased by the
C.D.B. in order to build labourers’ cottages. The C.D.B. refused such requests as they 
needed the land for their own purposes:
Our view was that, while we were prepared to give sites for the erection of 
cottages for bona fide labourers in lieu of unsuitable dwellings at present 
occupied by them upon or immediately adjacent to our estates, the land we had 
acquired was urgently needed by smallholders for whom it was bought. We felt 
bound to object to the proposals made to place large numbers of cottages on 
lands required by us for the purpose of placing thereon working farmers who 
would employ little or no paid labour outside their own families.62
In May 1907 the C.D.B. issued a circular stating their intention to object to 
requests for labourers’ cottages on congested estates that they had purchased. They held 
that there was a separate code of acts for labourers and that the Labourers Act of 1906 
should not impede on the board’s work. The circular was intended to save rural district 
councils the expense of drawing up schemes which would be opposed by the C.D.B.
The introduction of the 1906 Labourers’ Act saw an acceleration in the provision 
of cottages and plots for agricultural labourers. By 31 March 1909, £1,042,595 had been 
advanced to rural district councils under the act but despite the injection of finance a new 
labourers act was introduced in 1911. Indeed this aspect of the Irish land question would 
survive into the era of the Irish Free State.
V). Delays in the distribution of the purchase money and the ‘bonus’.
By 31 December 1904, tenant-purchasers had applied for advances totaling £19,115,830 
under the Wyndham Act. The bulk of that sum, £16,279,630, had consisted of direct 
sales between landlord and tenants. However, only £4,233,928 had actually been 
advanced. Similarly, in sales to the Land Commission, advances amounting to 
£1,752,340 had been applied for but only £139,943 had actually been advanced. In the
62 Seventeenth report o f  the Congested Districts Board fo r  Ireland fo r  the year ending 31s' March, 1908,
16, [Cd.4340] H.C. 1908, xxiii, 443.
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Land Judge’s Court, £955,744 had being applied for but only £132,253 had been 
advanced. Lastly, £128,116 had been applied for to purchase untenanted land under
63section eight of the Wyndham Act but no advances had actually been made. Therefore, 
it was blatantly obvious at the time that a five-fold increase in finance was required if 
the backlog in sales was to be tackled.
The ad interim report of the estates commissioners clearly demonstrated that in 
its initial stages the act was operating far more rapidly, in terms of transferring land, in 
Leinster and Ulster than in Munster and, particularly, in Connaught. In the case of direct 
sales, which constituted the majority of sales under the act, the number of sales 
agreements lodged in Ulster was 10,422, in Leinster it was 10,057, in Munster it was 
6,846 and in Connaught it was 3,808.64
Wyndham’s arrangement with the treasury was that no more than five million 
was to be allocated to land purchase annually for the first three years. The ad interim 
report of the estates commissioners had shown that this was wholly inadequate. 
Concerns about the delay in the allocation of purchase money quickly began to surface. 
The president of the Incorporated Law Society, Edward MacLoughlin, identified the 
problems which were already arising:
If that limitation [five million annually] of the money available was adhered to, 
estates under the act could not be sold with the same rapidity as during the past 
twelve months. This condition of things must mean that the landlords would have 
to wait for years until there was money available to meet their case. In the 
meantime they would have to heavy rates of interest upon the charges on the 
estates. The rates of interest probably varied from 4 to 6 per cent, and they would 
only receive during that time such a rate of interest as the tenants might agree to 
pay, and hitherto he thought those rates had been from 3 14 to 3 14 per cent. Now, 
unless the treasury could be induced to provide free money to meet sales 
according as they came in, or unless the tenants could be induced to pay a rate of 
interest commensurate with the interest on the charges on the estates.. .there must 
be a cessation of land sales...accompanied by a very great agitation in the 
country.65
63 A d interim report o f  the estates commissioners fo r  the period from  1" November, 1903, to 31" 
December, 1904, 50, [Cd. 2471], H.C. 1905, xxii, 177.
64 Ibid., p. 5.
65 F.J., 29 Nov. 1904.
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As already mentioned, landlords were afraid that they would have to wait for 
years before they received their money from the sale of their lands. This would 
adversely affect those who had charges on their estates. More often than not, the rate of 
interest paid by the tenants, in lieu of rent until the purchase money was advanced, was 
lower than the charges that many landlords had on their estates. For some, such delays 
would be catastrophic as they had little room to manoeuvre financially. For tenants the 
delay was equally unsatisfactory. Instead of repaying their loans they might end up 
paying interest in lieu of rent for a number of years. At the opening session of the 
Bankers’ Institute on 30 November 1904, the earl of Dunraven warned of the dangers 
that would arise as a result of delays in allocating purchase money:
Long delay in obtaining the purchase money will be vexatious to both parties. 
The application of purchase money to the liquidation of encumbrances is of the 
essence of the transaction in most cases. Occupiers cannot pay more than 3 'A per 
cent on the purchase money pending completion. Owners cannot make a loss of 
the difference between 3 Vi and 4 Vi or 5 per cent payable on mortgages. It is not 
to be expected that mortgagees will reduce interest to 3 Vi per cent. If means are 
not found to finance agreements with reasonable rapidity a situation may be 
created which will seriously imperil the results of an act so potential for good.66
The estates commissioners also appeared to be faltering. Their workload had 
proven far greater than anyone had anticipated. The ad interim report of the estates 
commissioners revealed that their staff consisted of fifty-two indoor officials, twenty- 
three purchase inspectors, three assistant inspectors and nine surveyors and 
draughtsmen.67 The offices of the commission were situated on Upper Merrion Street in 
Dublin and both the accommodation and the insufficient number of staff had proved a 
hindrance:
The estates commissioners’ staff and the office accommodation were arranged 
on the supposition that the applications for the advances and the amount to be 
advanced by the department would not at first exceed the proceeds of an issue of 
five millions land stock per annum. Both the staff and the accommodation have 
already become insufficient for the purpose of enabling the commissioners to
66 Ibid., 1 Dec. 1904.
67 A d interim report o f  the Estates commissioners fo r  the period from  I '1 November, 1903, to 31'u 
December, 1904, 1, [Cd. 2471], H.C. 1905, xxii, M l.
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deal rapidly and methodically with the applications for advances that have come 
before them.68
The processing of the examination of title was also causing delays. The volume of sales 
had ensured that the investigation of titles would take a considerable length of time. 
According to William Fry, a former president of the Incorporated Law Society, an initial 
grant from the treasury to employ extra barristers to speed up the process had quickly 
run out.69 Titles had steadily begun to pile up.
The first issue of guaranteed 2 3/4 % land stock under the Wyndham Act occurred 
on 19 March 1904. Five million pounds worth of stock was issued which raised 
£4,337,121 in cash (for every £100 stock issued £87 was raised in cash). The flotation of 
the stock so far from par resulted in a deficit of £662,878. This deficit for issuing stock 
at a discount would form an annual charge on the Irish Development Grant which would 
be repaid at 3 lA % similar to the tenant’s annuity. Matters did not improve in January 
1905 when the second flotation occurred. Six million pounds worth of stock was floated 
at just over 89 which raised £5,354,332 in cash (for every £100 stock issued just over 
£89 was raised in cash). There was still a deficit of £645,667 which would fall as a 
charge on the Irish Development Grant.70
While the issue of Irish land stock remained considerably below par, the losses 
involved upon its flotation would be problematic. The calls for the government to 
provide the finance required to prevent a delay in sales were ever increasing. Charles 
Flemphill, Liberal M.P. for North Tyrone, believed it was a ‘monstrous thing that any 
financial reasons should now stand in the way of the act being fully earned out’.71 All 
sides were becoming increasingly vexed over the delays and the absence of finance. The 
crux of the matter was that unless stock could be floated near par, the losses involved 
would be considerable and they would be charged on Irish funds.
In early June 1905, the report of the commission appointed to inquire into the 
Trinity College estates was published. The commission consisted of T. M. Healy, Lord
68 Ibid., p. 2.
69 F.J., 29 Nov. 1904.
70 Return o f guaranteed 2 % per cent stock issues under the Irish Land Act o f  1903, (279) H.C. 1909,1,
343. See appendix VII.
71 Hansard 4, cxlii, 967 (9 Mar. 1905).
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Justice Gerald Fitzgibbon and George F. Trench. The report shed light on the execution 
of the Wyndham Act and revealed some of the problems that were hindering its 
operation. The report confirmed that there was insufficient finance to realise the number 
of sales where advances had been sanctioned. It predicted that further sales would be 
prevented unless more than £5,000,000 worth of stock was issued annually. Tenants paid 
interest on the purchase money, which was collected by the Land Commission and paid 
to the vendor, until the money was allocated. The report found that the rate of interest 
was usually 3 IT % or 3 % %. The charges on many encumbered estates would be greater 
than the interest paid which could have ruinous implications:
Though the vendor only receives the reduced interest in lieu of his former rent, 
all the outgoings of the estate-including head rents and other payments to the 
owners of superior interests, and also the interest on incumbrances charged on 
the estate, must be paid in full up to the date of the payment of the redemption 
price of the same, and this payment camiot be made until the purchase money has 
been paid by the treasury into the bank of Ireland. The longer the interval 
between the date of the purchase agreement and the date of the redemption, and 
the heavier the outgoings, and the more heavily encumbered the estate, the more72
serious are the consequences to the selling landlords.
The T.C.D. estates inquiry believed that the delay in the completion of sales 
would lead to landlords looking for higher rates of interest so that they would be able to 
pay their estate charges. They would be unable to add arrears of rent to the purchase 
money, as they would need all of their income to meet their charges. Thus a considerable 
inducement for tenants to purchase would be lost. If the treasury continued to release the 
same amount of money annually, sales would be delayed by many years. Sales would be 
adversely affected if tenants had to wait for years before they began paying their 
annuities. The commissioners proposed a solution to these problems. They advocated 
that the advances be made promptly, but when they could not be, the Land Commission 
should issue ‘an amount of land stock equal in value at the price of the day to the sum of 
money’.73
72 Report o f  the commissioners appointed to inquire into Trinity College, Dublin, estates, 64, [Cd.2526] 
H.C. 1905, xxvii, 81.
73 Ibid., p. 65.
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On 20 July 1905 the Conservative government suffered an unexpected defeat in 
the Commons on the vote for the civil services and revenue depts. estimates. Arrears of 
sales totaling approximately £18,000,000 had accumulated because the treasury had 
released just £5,000,000 annually for advances. Walter Long, the Conservative chief 
secretary from March 1905 to December 1905, who had replaced George Wyndham, 
proposed to introduce a short amending bill which would give landlords the option of 
taking some of the purchase money in stock if they desired. By allowing landlords to 
take cash and stock, Long hoped to alleviate the block. However, the ‘bonus’ was to 
remain exclusively in cash.
Long’s proposal received scant support from the I.P.P. who were angered that 
such a measure had been proposed so late in the parliamentary session thereby not 
allowing adequate time for debate. They were outraged that the Conservative 
government was content to ignore their concerns on such issues as evicted tenants, 
congestion, the ‘zones’ and the redistribution of untenanted land, but were ready to 
address what was perceived as a landlord grievance. Long’s admission that he had 
consulted certain Irish landlords about the proposal while no such consultation had been 
held with the tenants’ representatives only fuelled their anger. In protest John Redmond 
moved a motion that the salary and expenses of the Land Commission office be reduced 
(the amount to be reduced was negligible) which was passed by only three votes, 199 to 
196, signaling the defeat of the Conservative government.74 The defeat proved to be a 
timely omen that the government’s days in office were numbered. On 27 July 1905 the 
prime minister, A. J. Balfour, announced that the government would not proceed with 
the proposed bill due to the lateness of the session and the hostility of the I.P.P. to it.75
Aside from the defeat of the Conservative government, the debate was highly 
significant as it revealed the fundamental differences between the perceptions of the 
Wyndham Act held by the I.P.P. and the I.U.P.P. John Redmond rather strikingly spelt 
out what his party expected of the Wyndham Act:
The truth was that the working of the land act of 1903 had in its essential portion
broken down...[the chief secretary, Walter Long] was quite correct when he
74 Hansard 4, cxlix, 1409-90 (20 July 1905).
75 Ibid., cl, 620 (27 July 1905).
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spoke of the rapidity with which the act was working as judged by the amount of 
money that had been applied for. But that did not convey an accurate idea as to 
whether this act was working successfully or not. What was the primary object of 
the bill? It was not merely to facilitate the transfer of land, for that was only the 
means. The object was to settle the Irish land question and put an end to the Irish 
land war. The Irish land question was, to a very large extent, centred in the 
poorer parts of the country where there was congestion on the one side and large 
depopulated tracts of grazing on the other. If every estate of the well-to-do were 
sold tomorrow on fair terms the land question would remain so long as the 
question of congestion and cattle ranches remained untouched. The working of 
the act showed a complete and absolute breakdown in dealing with congestion 
and the breaking up of grass lands. With regard to the evicted tenants the act had 
been equally a failure.76
The I.P.P. viewed land purchase as the catalyst for tackling areas such as the 
reinstatement of evicted tenants, the redistribution of untenanted land and the relief of 
congestion. Land purchase was a means to an end rather than an end itself. The I.U.P.P. 
considered the principal objective to be the facilitation of land purchase. Issues such as 
congestion and the evicted tenants were only of secondary importance as far as the 
unionists were concerned. Following the resignation of George Wyndham in March 
1905, the disparity in thinking between the two-sides widened into a chasm. This 
fundamental difference was articulated by the marquess of Londonderry: ‘I would like, 
however, to point out that the main object of the act of 1903 was to promote the sale of 
land between landlords and tenant. The reinstatement of evicted tenants and the 
enlargement of small holdings were minor objects.’77
The Irish administration, led by Walter Long who would become leader of the 
I.U.P.P. in 1906, considered the 1903 act a success because sales were outstripping the 
available finance. His limited view was confirmed in a letter to the Conservative M.P. 
and landlord spokesman, Sir John Colomb, where he confided that ‘the successful 
working of the act of 1903 has been met, so far, by only one impediment - the 
insufficiency of funds’.78 As far as unionists such as Colonel Saunderson were 
concerned, the ‘great success of the act was shown by the enormous number of 
applications under it to sell estates and purchase farms’.79 Similarly J. B. Lonsdale felt
76 Ibid., cxlix, 1417 (20 July 1905).
77 Ibid., clxxvii, 308 (1 July 1907).
1S IT .,  11 Sept. 1905.
79 Hansard 4, cxlix, 1429 (20 July 1905).
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that the ‘great and pressing need at present was for more money’. The only area in 
which the Conservative government and the unionists admitted that the act was defective 
was in the lack of finance available for sales. Thus, while the I.U.P.P. viewed the 
success of the act in terms of land purchase, the I.P.P. viewed it in terms of land 
redistribution. Unless untenanted land and grasslands were redistributed to provide 
economic holdings, to assist the restoration of the evicted tenants and to alleviate 
congestion, the act would be considered a failure by the I.P.P. For unionists the shortage 
of finance was the only problem but for the I.P.P. this was only one of the act’s many 
defects and not the most important one.
Landlords blamed the delays on the lack of finance and the poor utilisation of 
staff. They held that the Estates Commission was not concentrating enough on land 
purchase. Lord Ashbourne spelt out the problem as landlords saw it:
My noble friend Lord Clonbrock thinks -  and with some reasonableness, so far 
as I know -  that one of the great causes of the delay is that more power and 
earnestness appear to be given to the aspects of the administration that are not 
connected with direct sales; in other words, to making provision for evicted 
tenants, and for the discovery and purchase of untenanted land. These two 
matters have been so much present to their minds that the commissioners are 
believed to have given undue weight and attention to them, important as they are, 
as contrasted with the infinitely larger question of direct sales. 1
VI). The Shelbourne Hotel Conference, 1906.
On 25 August 1905, the Irish Landowners’ Convention held its annual meeting in 
Dublin. The principal topic of discussion was the lack of finance to provide the purchase 
money to those landlords who had agreed to sell their estates. The chairman of the 
convention, the duke of Abercorn, was anxious that landlords should not incur expense 
due to the delays. He was willing to accept ‘a temporary alternative proposed under 
which vendors might be enabled to accept either part or full payment in stock instead of
cash, provided always that the stock was of such a character that it would command its
82par value in the market’. Abercorn stressed that this did not signify any willingness to
801.T., 10 Oct. 1905.
81 Hansard 4, clxxvii, 296 (1 July 1907).
S2F .J ,  26 Aug. 1905.
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abandon the principle of payment in cash which landlords regarded as essential. Another 
resolution was put forth by Lord Clonbrock, to request that the treasury issue landlords 
with temporary advances or certificates to enable them to pay off their charges and to 
clear the title to the estate, was passed. The convention called upon the government to 
formulate an acceptable scheme to relieve the deadlock as soon as possible.
The Irish Landowners’ Convention took a narrow view of the difficulties of the 
1903 act and one which, not surprisingly, was concerned primarily with the interests of 
landowners. The amiual meeting was dominated by the financial problems of the act. On 
the other hand, the Irish Reform Association, chaired by the earl of Dunraven, took a 
much broader view of the act’s difficulties. In early July 1905, the association issued a 
report outlining the problems that had arisen which held that the administration of the 
act had broken down due to a shortage of staff and inadequate finance. The association 
called on the government to provide sufficient cash and to address three areas in which 
they felt the act was failing: evicted tenants, agricultural labourers and in the congested 
districts.83
Thus, while the Irish Landowners’ Convention was chiefly concerned with class 
interests, the Irish Reform Association was more inclined to view the difficulties from a 
wider perspective. Indeed, the divergent ways in which the organisations approached the 
land act’s difficulties, accentuated the different opinions prevalent within the landlord 
class. On 29 September 1905 the association met in Dublin, under its chairman, the earl 
of Dunraven. It issued a statement proposing a conference to consider the amendment of 
the 1903 land act.84
Of course the delays in the distribution of the purchase money not only affected 
landlords and tenants but also had consequences for groups such as land agents and 
solicitors. At the annual general meeting of the Irish Surveyors’ Institution, its president, 
Thomas Courtney Townshend, gave voice to land agents’ fears. He stated that he 
viewed:
with apprehension the serious position brought about by the probable delay of
several years before the purchase money of such estates can be distributed,
83 Ibid., 1 July 1905.
84 IT .,  2 Oct. 1905.
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owning to the treasury regulation limiting the advances to five millions a year. 
This partial block in the working of the act is also detrimental to every other 
interest involved in the transfer of land in Ireland, and the institution desires to 
press upon the government the absolute necessity for increasing the funds
85available for the purposes of the land purchase acts.
The solicitors’ representative body, the Incorporated Law Society of Ireland, held a 
special general meeting to debate the matter on 7 July 1905. In its view, the land act was 
on the verge of collapse due to inadequate finance and staffing. The solicitors called on
os
the government to provide enough money so that the deadlock could be overcome.
The growing fears over the act’s financing motivated the chief secretary, Walter 
Long, to approach the treasury in the hope that it could remedy the situation. The 
treasury agreed to provide an extra £2,000,000 in advances for 1905 and promised to 
issue two loans in 1906 which would provide £10,000,000 for land purchase. Long also 
persuaded the treasury to finance extra staff in the Estates Commission which would 
hopefully, along with the increase in finance, bring the backlog of payments to an end.87
In early October 1905, the report of the estates commissioners for 1 November 
1903 to 31 March 1905 was issued. The ad interim report had concluded at 31 December 
1903. While the report contained a lot of statistical information, it revealed little about 
the underlying causes of the act’s lack of success in certain areas. The report revealed 
that the amount of advances applied for had reached £20,145,370 but that the actual 
amount in advances that had been paid out only added up to £4,653,054.88 This figure 
fell far short of what was required for expensive delays to be avoided. Direct sales 
between landlords and tenants still constituted the bulk of the money applied for.
The lack of funds to finance the Wyndham Act had become a most serious 
matter for Irish landlords whether they had already sold their estates or they intended to 
sell. In a letter to the Irish Times on 1 February 1906, Robert Sandars, bemoaned the 
lack of funds and he made the suggestion that a conference of all interested parties
85 Ibid., 1 May 1905.
*6 F.J., 8 July 1905.
87 7.7t, 11 Sept. 1905.
88 Report o f  the estates commissioners fo r  the year ending 3T ' March, 1905 andfor the period from  T 1 
November, 1903, to 31 March, 1905, 6-7, [Cd.2742] H.C. 1906, xxv, 183.
246
should meet to discuss the issue.89 A conference of landowners and other individuals 
closely associated with landlords did take place at the Shelbourne Hotel on 6 February 
1906. Members of the Irish Landowners’ Convention including the organisation’s 
secretary, G. de L. Willis, attended. Other prominent attendees were the earls of Mayo, 
Meath and Westmeath, Lords Clonbrock and Castletown, and there were a number of 
solicitors and land agents present. George Browne chaired the meeting and his opening 
address revealed landlords’ frustrations. Browne called attention to:
The serious position in which many landowners who have sold their estates 
under the land act find themselves placed, owing to the want of funds for 
administrating the act. Not only does this state of things affect the vendors under 
the act, but it seriously interferes with all commercial and agricultural credit in 
the country. We cannot help finding fault with the government for the delay in 
providing money. We have disposed of our properties, and are getting only 3 Vi­
per cent in most cases on the purchase money, while we have to pay 4, 5 and 6 
per cent on our charges. If I had known how this were going to turn out I should 
not have sold to my tenants, as I expected to be paid within a reasonable time.90
The conference members were of the general opinion that the government ought 
to provide adequate finance to ensure that landowners did not suffer financially because 
of their decision to sell their land. A number of interesting suggestions were put forward 
to help alleviate the difficulties. Robert Sandars, for example, proposed that the 
government provide loans to landlords, to enable them to pay off their charges, while 
they waited for the distribution of the purchase money. Alternatively, it was proposed 
that landlords could group together to acquire finance at a lower rate to pay back their 
charges. The idea of a government certificate, which would enable landlords to borrow 
money to pay their charges on the strength of the purchase money, was also floated by 
Colonel O’Callaghan Westropp. The conference concluded with resolutions to call to the 
government’s attention the plight of landlords and the need to remedy the financial 
deadlock.91
891.T., 1 Feb. 1906. Sandars was an English man whose mother, Isabella Synge, hailed from Co. Wicklow. 
He became Conservative M.P. for Bridgwater in 1910 and in 1929 was raised to the peerage as Baron 
Bayford.
90 Ibid., 8 Feb. 1906.
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The executive of the Irish Landowners’ Convention met on 21 February 1906 to 
address the same issues. They decided to send a deputation to the chief secretary to 
highlight their predicament. The deputation would present a draft bill, for his 
consideration, which would enable landlords to obtain a certificate from the government. 
This certificate would enable them to borrow at a low rate of interest, pending the 
allocation of the purchase money, in order to pay their charges. This proposal was 
almost identical to the suggestion put forward at the Shelbourne Hotel conference a few 
weeks earlier.92
VII). Incidental charges and the liability for the issue of land stock at a discount: 
the case of Kildare County Council.
The money required for advances to tenants was raised by the creation of 2 % % 
guaranteed land stock which the public were free to invest in. The finance for the act 
worked on the assumption that stock would be issued at par which meant that it would 
require £100 land stock to raise £100 in cash. The tenant’s annuity only covered the 
interest and sinking fund so long as the stock was not issued below par. Likewise it 
made no allowance for incidental charges which arose from the operation of the Irish 
Land Purchase Fund.
When stock was issued below par the difference was to be made up out of the 
Irish Development Grant portion of the Guarantee Fund. Therefore, if it cost £110 stock, 
to raise £100 in cash, for example, the tenant’s amiuity would only cover £100 and the 
interest and sinking fund on the difference of £10 would have to be recouped out of this 
grant.
The first issue of guaranteed 2 % % land stock, in March 1904, was issued at an 
average price of 87 (£100 stock raised £87 in cash). Stock worth £5,000,000 was issued
• ■ 93but the amount in cash raised was only £4,337,121. As more stock was issued below 
par, the difference between the cost of issuing the stock and the finance raised increased. 
Stock was never issued at anywhere near par under the operation of the Wyndham Act
92 Ibid., 24 Feb. 1906.
93 See appendix VII.
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and as a consequence there was a heavy charge on the Irish Development Grant. By 6 
July 1909 this annual charge was £146,247.94 This money was recouped from the 
Guarantee Fund which consisted of a number of grants. The first grant that would be 
accessed was the Irish Development Grant, followed by the Death Duty Grant and then 
the Agricultural Grant. The last two grants were created to assist taxation and to reduce 
the amount paid by the ratepayer. If land stock continued to be issued at a discount, the 
Irish Development Grant would quickly become exhausted and the other grants in the 
Guarantee Fund would have to be accessed to recover the loss. In 1914 Augustine 
Birrell, Liberal chief secretary from 1907 to 1916, summarised the problems with the 
1903 act’s finance:
The whole finance of the Wyndham Act was based on the assumption that land 
stock would be at par or thereabouts, which it never was... The real fact of the 
case is that the then chancellor of the exchequer (Mr. Ritchie) gambled upon the 
price of stock, and, in order to secure himself against loss for five years, stole the 
Ireland Development Grant of 160,000/. a-year and deflected it from its proper 
purpose to make good the deficiency under this and other probable or possible 
heads of loss.95
The losses on the flotation of land stock had not exhausted the Irish Development 
Grant by 1907, but at the rate that land purchase was continuing the grant would be 
consumed in a couple of years. There was, however, a more immediate danger from a 
number of incidental charges which would fall on Irish county councils. These were 
charges which arose from the operation of the act. They included unearned or ‘bonus’ 
dividend, advance dividend, unproductive balances, interest accrued but not received 
and arrears of annuities. In 1908 the report of the Runciman committee, called after the 
financial secretary to the treasury Walter Runciman, and appointed to investigate into 
land purchase finance, estimated that these incidental charges would amount to ‘twenty 
to forty thousand pounds for every five million of stock issued’, all of which would fall 
on the Guarantee Fund as stipulated by section twenty-nine sub-section two of the
94 Ibid.
95 Augustine Birrell, ‘Irish land purchase’ 14 July 1913 (T.N.A., CAB 37/120/86), pp 1-2.
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Wyndham Act.96 In the case of land stock issued at a discount the Irish Development 
Grant was accessed first. However, in the case of incidental charges, the Death Duty 
Grant and the Agricultural Grant were to be accessed to make up the losses before the 
Irish Development Grant. The crux of the matter was that the tenant’s annuity only met 
the interest and sinking fund when the stock was issued at par. It did not allow for the 
issue of land stock at a loss or incidental expenses.
In March 1907, Kildare C.C. was informed by the Local Government Board that 
a sum amounting to £8,454 would be withheld from the Death Duty Grant and the 
Agricultural Grant that the county normally received in order to cover incidental charges 
that had accrued in the county as a result of land purchase.97 The sum withheld generally 
corresponded with the amount of land purchase which had occurred in the county. The 
greater the sum advanced in a particular county, the higher the incidental charges were 
likely to be. The sale of the Leinster estate for £766,647, which included the cash 
‘bonus’, was undoubtedly one of the main reasons why the charge on Kildare C.C. was 
so high.98 In 1905 Dennis Kilbride, M.P. for South Kildare, had anticipated that in the 
light of the Leinster estate, the Irish Development Grant would eventually have to bear 
the brunt of the high prices in the country: ‘The duke of Leinster’s estate afforded the 
best illustration of how the Irish ratepayers were being robbed under the Land Act of 
1903.’99 Without the Death Duty and Agricultural grants, the taxpayers of the county 
would have to bear a significant increase in their rates.
The total sum which was to fall on Irish ratepayers for 1907 was £70,996. 
County Kildare would foot the largest bill at £8,454 while counties Cork, Roscommon, 
Kilkemiy and Limerick would all pay over £4,000. At the other end of the scale County 
Cavan would pay just £198 while the counties of Leitrim, Louth, Monaghan and Clare 
contributed no more than £600 each.100 Those who had purchased their holdings under
96 Report o f  the departmental committee appointed to enquire into Irish land purchase finance in 
connection with the provision offunds required fo r  the purposes o f  the Irish Land Act, 1903, 8, [Cd. 4005] 
H.C. 1908, xxiii, 267.
971.T., 9 Apr. 1907.
98 ‘Statement o f applications o f sums received on the sale o f the Leinster estates in Ireland’ (P.R.O.N.I., 
Leinster Papers, D 3078/2/15/5).
99 Hansard 4, cxliii, 754 (21 Mar. 1905).
100 See appendix VIII.
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the act were also liable to pay rates. The prospect arose whereby tenant-purchasers 
would not only have to pay their annuities but would have to pay extra rates to facilitate 
land purchase.
On 14 June 1907, the general council of the Irish County Councils met in Dublin
to discuss the report of a committee appointed by the council to examine the financial
difficulties associated with the Wyndham Act. It emerged from the report that although
the payment of the incidental charges was a burden the real danger was that the Irish
Development Grant would be exhausted within a couple of years. This would lead to the
Irish ratepayer having to bear the losses resulting from land stock being issued below
par. The report estimated that the average loss on land stock up to that date had been 12
% and that the Irish Development Grant would be consumed once £40,000,000 worth of
land stock was advanced. It was calculated that up to £160,000,000 would be required to
complete land purchase in Ireland: ‘At present market prices, land stock cannot be
floated at a lesser discount than 15 per cent. At this discount the loss on the flotation of
£120,000,000 land stock would amount to £18,000,000.,101 If such a situation
developed, the ratepayers would simply be unable to bear the burden. Furthermore, land
purchase and local government in the country would grind to a standstill. Eventually the
general council decided to send a deputation to the prime minister, Sir Henry Campbell-
♦ ] 02Bannerman, who had led the Liberals to victory in the 1906 election.
All shades of Irish opinion agreed that it would be disastrous if the burden fell on 
Irish ratepayers. The earl of Dunraven, chairman of the Irish Reform Association, 
suggested that the loss should be charged to the state, and if that was not acceptable, the
103operations of the Wyndham Act would have to be severely restricted.
Due to the unease surrounding the incidental charges and the flotation of land 
stock, John Redmond proposed the following resolution in the House of Commons on 5 
July 1907:
That in the opinion of this house, the method at present in force for providing 
money for land purchase in Ireland has broken down in practice, and, if persisted
1011.T., 15 June 1907.
102 15 June 1907.
103 H ansard4, clxxvii, 280-90 (1 July 1907).
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in, will throw such a ruinous charge on the already overburdened ratepayers of 
Ireland as to endanger the entire scheme of land purchase.104
The Liberal government acknowledged the gravity of the situation and agreed that the
ratepayers of Ireland ought not to be forced to bear the loss on stock issued at a discount.
No less than the whole future of land purchase and the operation of the Wyndham Act
was at stake.
So long as land stock continued to be issued at a loss the financial impediments 
to the operation of the act would only escalate. The financial structure of the act came in 
for intense scrutiny and the general consensus in the House of Commons, on the Liberal 
government benches and among the Irish M.P.s, was that it required a radical overhaul. 
Indeed the chancellor of the exchequer, H. H. Asquith, made it clear that land purchase 
could not continue based on the financial guidelines of the Wyndham Act.105 Walter 
Runciman, financial secretary to the treasury, blamed the inadequate discussion on the 
financial aspects which had taken place during the measure’s passage through 
parliament as a lengthy debate on the bill’s financing would have identified some of the 
pitfalls.106 Asquith also felt that debate on the bill’s finance in 1903 had not been 
adequate:
I do not want to recriminate, but I think if any of us had foreseen, or taken the 
trouble to exercise ordinary prevision in 1903, we should never have assented to 
what I do not hesitate to call the improvident system of finance embodied in the 
act...However we cannot go back upon that. We are all victims. We were all 
falling on each other’s necks in the desire to solve the Irish question by kindness, 
and did not quite realise the difficulties, with the result that we passed these
• 107financial clauses without adequate supervision.
Some suggestions were put forward by government representatives as to how to tackle 
the incidental charges which arose from the operation of the act. However, on the major 
question of the losses resulting from the flotation of stock, they had no answer. Now that 
the gravity of the situation had been acknowledged, it was up to Irish landlords, tenants 
and ratepayers to find a solution.
104 Ibid., col. 978 (5 July 1907).
105 Ibid., col. 1028-9.
106 Ibid., col. 999-1003.
107 Ibid., col. 1026-7.
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The chancellor of the exchequer, H. H. Asquith, maintained that neither the Irish 
ratepayer nor the British taxpayer ought to be forced to bear the financial loss. He had no 
solution to the problem but highlighted that there were two years before the Irish 
Development Grant was would be exhausted, during which time he hoped that the 
government would introduce new legislation to overhaul the financing of the act and put 
it on a more secure footing.108
It would be November 1907 by the time that the deputation from the general 
council of Irish County Councils met with the prime minister. The four-man deputation 
was accompanied by John Redmond.109 The delegates outlined their concerns and 
anxieties regarding the immense financial burden that looked set to fall on the Irish 
ratepayers. They pressed for greater details as to how the dilemma was to be resolved. 
M. A. Ennis, deputy chairman of Wexford C.C., compared the position of Irish county 
councils to that of ‘someone walking blindfold on the edge of a precipice’ and pleaded 
that the govermnent reveal their intentions.
H. H. Asquith was sympathetic but he admitted that the government had no plan 
to tackle the difficulty. An inquiry, the Runciman committee, had been instigated which 
he hoped would enable the government to formulate a plan before for the reopening of 
parliament in 1908. The prime minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, confirmed 
Asquith’s statement but stressed that the burden would not fall on Irish ratepayers.110
While land purchase could continue in the short term, the long-term outlook was 
grave. The Liberal government had insisted that the burden accruing from stock issued 
at a discount would not be borne by the Irish ratepayers but it was also adamant that the 
taxpayers of Britain would not be forced to shoulder the cost. As the year 1907 drew to a 
close, there was still no solution in sight despite the precarious nature of the situation. 
The Liberal government faced a stark choice as the Irish Development Grant money 
dwindled: they either discovered a way to allow land purchase to continue by revising
108 Ibid, col. 1025-29.
109 The four delegates were P.J O’Neill, chairman o f the general council, M.A. Ennis, deputy chairman of 
Wexford County Council, Mr. Long, high sheriff o f Limerick and Dr. J.F. Ryan o f  Tipperary County 
Council.
110 7 ,r ,  7 Nov. 1907.
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the financial provisions of the Wyndham Act or they restricted the act’s operation, 
maybe even halting the transfer of land in Ireland.
In mid August 1907 the estates commissioners’ report for the year ending 31 
March 1907, was issued. It detailed that the amount applied for in advances for the year, 
under all methods of sale, was approximately £9,000,000. When added to the sum 
applied for since the commencement of the act, the amount of advances applied for was 
approximately £45,000,000. In terms of advances actually allocated for the year 1906/7, 
only £5,747,644 was distributed. Overall only £15,602,701 had actually been advanced 
since 1 November 1903. Of this sum, the estates commissioners calculated that 80.2% 
had gone to direct sales between landlords and tenants, 14.4% to sales to the estates 
commissioners by landlords and 5.4% to sales by landlords to the C.D.B. Four-fifths of 
all sales up to 31 March 1907, where advances had been made were direct sales between 
landlord and tenant.111
As mentioned earlier Co. Kildare was to suffer the largest deduction in the Death
Duty Grant and the Agricultural Grant that it would receive from the government. If
deducted, the loss would fall on the ratepayers of the county. The losses in grants, which
virtually every county faced, to varying degrees, were due to incidental charges arising
from the operation of the act. Kildare C.C. took the matter to the court of the King’s
Bench Division, claiming that the deductions were unlawful and also that they should
not bear the brunt of the losses arising from stock being issued below par. However, the
court ruled in favour of the crown and conveyed beyond doubt that incidental charges
arising from the operation of the Wyndham Act would be taken from county council
112grants and that such grants were also liable for losses accrued on the issuing of stock.
The judgement in the case of Kildare C.C. had heightened the suspicions of 
county councils as to the Liberal government’s intentions. At the meeting between 
representatives of the general council of the Irish County Councils and the government 
late in 1907, assurances had been given that losses upon the flotation of stock would not 
fall to the ratepayers. In late July 1908, the executive committee of the Irish County
111 Report o f  the estates commissioners fo r  the year ending 31s' March, 1907 and fo r  the period f  
November, 1903 to 31 March, 1907, xvi-xvii [Cd. 3692] H.C. 1907, xix, 187.
"2 /./., 19 May 1908.
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Councils’ general council called upon John Redmond to pressurise the government to
■ * 1 1 3honour its promises and to clarify its intentions.
In late August 1908 the report of the estates commissioners for the year ending 
31 March 1908 was issued. The report revealed that from 1 April 1907 to 31 March 
1908, the number of applications for the sales of ‘estates’ was 1,102 at a price of 
£9,809,552. Overall, the number of applications stood at 6,080 at a price of £56,133,758 
compared to the 1907 report which contained 4,698 applications for £45,199,716. 
Despite the financial impediments and the delays in obtaining the cash ‘bonus’ and 
purchase money, applications for sales continued to pour in, albeit at a slower pace than 
the previous year.114 A possible reason for this was that landlords feared that a Liberal 
government would change the terms of the Wyndham Act and alter areas such as the 12 
% ‘bonus’.
During the year 1907/8, £5,802,182 worth of advances was actually allocated, 
bringing the total advances to tenant-purchasers since the commencement of the act to 
£20,769,368. When the applications for advances to tenant-purchasers were compared 
with the amount actually advanced, there was approximately £36,000,000 worth of land 
waiting to be dealt with.115 The slow progress in processing sales and the inability to 
advance more than £5,000,000 per year would have a detrimental effect on landlords and 
tenants.
VIII). The Runciman report on land purchase finance.
In early April 1908, the report of the departmental committee on land purchase finance 
was issued. The committee was chaired by the financial secretary to the treasury, Walter 
Runciman.116 The objective of the committee had been to investigate the reasons for the
1131. T., 29 July 1908.
114 See Report o f  the estates commissioners fo r  the year ending 31s' March, 1907 and fo r  the period 1st 
November, 1903 to 31 March, 1907, xv-xvi, [Cd. 3692] H.C. 1907, xix, 187 and Report o f  the estates 
commissioners fo r  the year ending 31st March, 1908 and fo r  the period f  November, 1903 to 3 f '  March, 
1908, xiii-xiv, [Cd.4242] H.C. 1908, xxiii, 1.
115 Ibid., pp ii-xiv.
116 The other members o f the committee were Sir Felix Schuster, T.L. Heath, W. Blain, Patrick Duncan 
and W. R. Davies.
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financial deadlock and to recommend solutions which would not put the exchequer to 
further cost.
Incidental charges paled in comparison to the possible liability for issuing stock 
at a discount. The 2 3/4 % land stock required to raise the money for advances had been 
issued below par since the commencement of the 1903 act. The cost of issuing stock at a 
discount was borne by the Irish Development Grant, an annual grant of £160,000 (once 
£20,000 was taken for the C.D.B. and £5,000 to indemnify T.C.D.) which was intended 
for educational and economic purposes. By the time of the Runciman report in 1908 the 
losses on land stock totalled £2,837,388. The figure was arrived at by subtracting the 
cost of raising the stock from the actual cash sum raised. The Irish Development Grant 
would have to bear an annual sum of £92,215 which represented an annuity of 3 % per 
cent over sixty-eight and a half years. The report estimated that land purchase would 
cost £160,000 to complete and not £100,000,000 as George Wyndham had forecast in 
1903. The amount of cash raised for advances to tenant-purchasers thus far was 
£20,912,612. The nightmare scenario that looked set to emerge was outlined by the 
committee:
If, therefore, the balance of the cash required, viz £139,000,000, were to be 
raised on precisely the same terms as the existing £20,912,612, the charge on the 
Guarantee Fund in respect of excess stock would ultimately amount to about 
£705,000 a year, and this annual sum, less £160,000 from the development grant, 
would fall upon Irish rates.117
The Runciman committee considered that the financial basis of the Wyndham 
Act was highly unstable and that the poor performance of securities and stock on the 
market had increased its problems. The general consensus was that land purchase had to 
continue but that it would be unfair to saddle the exchequer with the cost of the excess 
stock required to raise the cash for advances to tenant-purchasers. The exchequer already 
covered the Land Purchase Aid Fund (‘bonus’ fund) of £12,000,000 and the cost of 
stock being issued below par to raise the finance for that fund. Unlike the advances to 
the tenants, the costs arising from the Land Purchase Aid Fund were borne by the
117 Report o f  the departmental committee appointed to enquire into Irish land purchase finance in 
connection with the provision offunds required fo r  the purposes o f  the Irish Land Act, 1903, 7, [Cd. 4005] 
H.C. 1908, xxiii, 267.
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exchequer through the Land Commission vote (money set aside by parliament for the 
running of the Land Commission). Interestingly, the reductions in the costs of the Irish 
administration in areas such as policing to offset the ‘bonus’, which George Wyndham 
predicted the act would signal, had not occurred.118 If land purchase was to involve 
advances of £160,000,000, it was obvious that the amount contained in the ‘bonus’ fund, 
if given out at a rate of 12 % would soon prove inadequate. The Runciman report 
estimated that only £4,946,898 remained in the Land Purchase Aid Fund for sales in the 
future and that if this sum was divided equally, vendors would only receive a 5 % 
‘bonus’. Under section forty-eight of the 1903 act, the percentage at which the ‘bonus’ 
was to be allocated could be re-examined after 1 November 1908. Thus the principal 
incentive for landlords to sell was in danger.119
The most important recommendations advocated by the Runciman committee 
were as follows: a deadline was to be set after which no more sales would be allowed 
under the terms of the 1903 act as it stood. Pending sales would not be affected but the 
landlord was to be given the option of accepting stock instead of cash for the purchase 
price. This guaranteed 2 3/4 % land stock could only be given to the landlord so long as 
£100 stock raised at least £92 in cash. The ‘bonus’ would still be distributed in cash and, 
if necessary, a larger sum than £12,000,000 was to be made available by the treasury. No 
further issues of stock were to be sanctioned so long as it remained below par. As long 
as that remained the case, finance for land purchase was to be ‘limited to the amount of 
cash which the N.D.C. may be able to provide in exchange for stock’.120
While the treasury would retain the ability to raise land stock at 2 3A %, it was 
envisaged that 3 % land stock would be raised in the future. This would hopefully 
provide a greater inducement for people to invest in land stock. To prevent similar 
problems with stock reoccurring, 3 % stock could not be issued at a discount. If no 
issues of stock were sanctioned because such stock remained below par the landlord was 
to have the option of taking the stock at the market value of the day. Thus, if cash issues 
were halted land purchase could still proceed. It was recommended that the tenants’
118 Ibid., p.8.
119 Ibid., p. 10.
120 Ibid., p. 18.
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annuity should be no lower than 3 s/s % which represented an increase in the amount to 
be repaid. On top of providing for the sinking fund and interest the annuity would also 
cover the cost of a number of incidental charges.121
The recommendations of the Runciman committee to solve the deadlock were 
not very encouraging. In fact if implemented, they would have essentially put a break on 
land purchase. According to the Runciman committee the financing of the Wyndham 
Act had proved to be ‘radically unsound’ and its deficiencies had been significantly 
‘accentuated by the subsequent depreciation of all securities, and of guaranteed 2 3/4 per 
cent stock in particular’.122 It was estimated that the N.D.C. could provide £ 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  
for advances and £1,000,000 for the cash ‘bonus’ annually if issues of guaranteed 2 % % 
land stock were prohibited.123 This might put the act on a sounder financial footing but it 
would do nothing do remove the long delays in receiving purchase money. If such a 
system were adopted, the report estimated that the money in the Irish Development 
Grant would suffice for three years before the ratepayers would be liable for covering 
excess stock.124 The committee hoped that in that time period the price of stock would 
return to par but there was no guarantee that this would happen. In reality, the 
implementation of that particular recommendation would only buy the government time 
before new legislation would have to be drawn up.
The Runciman committee acknowledged that it was of the utmost importance to 
speed up land purchase but admitted that their recommendations would have the 
opposite effect. Nevertheless they believed that the ‘delay which is involved in the 
suggestion as the least evil of any that we have had to face, and as inevitable in the
1 y c
circumstances’. Noticeably, the committee judged that, in view of the prices obtained 
by landlords under the Wyndham Act in comparison to previous acts, they had no 
grounds to complain about the delay in the distribution of the purchase money and 
‘bonus’. The delay prevented the costs arising from stock issued at a discount falling on 
the ratepayers, and in view of the advantageous terms received, landlords had no case
121 Ibid., pp 18-19.
122 Ibid., p. 13.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid., pp 13-14.
125 Ibid., p. 14.
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for complaint. The Runciman report accepted that some encumbered landlords had 
charges on their estates which were higher than the interest paid by their tenants prior to 
the advancement of the purchase money. It was held that this was offset by the fact that 
the landlords’ ‘rental was less secure than the interest on his purchase money which is 
collected for him by the Land Commission’.126 It .was also held that tenant-purchasers 
had little grounds to grumble at the delay. In the interval between the sale and the 
allocation of the purchase money to the vendor, they paid less in interest than they 
would have previously done in rent. Furthermore, they could look forward to another
127reduction once they had commenced paying the annuity.
The negotiations in late 1907 and early 1908 to heal the divisions within the 
I.P.P. eventually bore fruit. William O’Brien and T. M. Healy returned to the party early 
in the new year. The party’s reaction to the Runciman report on the act’s finance was far 
from approving. John Redmond acknowledged the dangers which threatened the land 
purchase scheme but he emphasised that the Runciman report’s recommendations were
not binding. He rejected the committee’s proposals as they would not accelerate land
128purchase but instead would see it delayed for decades. The Irish County Councils’ 
general council met on 24 April 1908 and its reaction to the report was equally negative. 
M. A. Ennis, deputy chairman of Wexford C.C., described the report as ‘reactionary and
i 2 q
practically proposed to stop land purchase in Ireland’.
A few days later, on 28 April 1908, a meeting of the I.P.P. was held. The 
Runciman report on land purchase finance was condemned. The party stressed that any 
alteration of the act’s finance would have to ensure that ratepayers were not liable for 
any charges except unpaid annuities. They hoped that the ‘bonus’ would be increased 
which would hopefully lead to a reduction in the number of years purchase paid by 
tenants. Furthermore, they hoped that the allocation of the ‘bonus’ would be altered to 
increase sales in the congested districts and the sale of grasslands. The possibility of 
holding another land conference had resurfaced a number of times since the act had 
begun to encounter problems. A resolution, proposed by William O’Brien, for a meeting
i u i v j ., p p  i-T- iv,
l28/./., 16 Apr. 1908.
129I.T., 25 Apr. 1908.
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of landlord and tenant representatives to attempt to further land purchase was defeated 
by forty-two votes to fifteen. Despite the reunion of the I.P.P., the old differences lurked
130beneath the surface.
The delay in land purchase, coupled with the inability to raise the finance to fund 
pending and future sales, was a threat to all classes associated with Irish land. There was 
a genuine fear that land purchase might be stalled or even stopped for a period. Many 
landlord and tenant representatives had strong suspicions that the treasury was secretly 
attempting to repudiate its financial responsibilities.
There were other factors which heightened suspicions that the finance required 
for land purchase would not be forthcoming. A considerable amount of money would be 
required under the forthcoming Irish university bill (1908). The planned introduction of 
an old age pension scheme was another drain on British finance, not to mention the 
escalation of the naval arms race with Germany. The 1908 report of the royal 
commission on congestion, if implemented, would also incur substantial government 
expense.131 All of these were competing with land purchase for funds. According to the 
report of the Runciman committee, sales of approximately £40,000,000 were pending. 
Almost £100,000,000 in advances was needed to complete land purchase not to mention 
the funds required to pay a 12 % ‘bonus’ to each vendor.132 This was a massive sum to 
raise and it was little wonder that the treasury was accused of trying to evade its 
responsibilities.
The threat to Irish agricultural society from the perceived stoppage of land 
purchase was sufficient for the I.P.P. to seek the views of the Irish Landowners’ 
Convention on the subject. The landlord body responded with a minute on the issue in 
early May 1908. This minute, produced by the organisation’s executive, condemned the 
report of the Runciman committee, as had the Irish County Councils’ general council 
and the I.P.P. They predicted that ‘most of its recommendations, if adopted, would make 
further negotiations for the sale of estates under the act of 1903 practically impossible
130 Ibid., 29 Apr. 1908.
|j| See chapter six.
132 Report o f  the departmental committee appointed to enquire into Irish land purchase finance in 
connection with the provision offunds required fo r  the purposes o f  the Irish Land Act, 1903, 9-10, [Cd, 
4005] H.C. 1908, xxiii, 267.
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and useless in the great majority of cases’.133 The minute was adamant that land 
purchase ought to continue and, like the I.P.P., opined that the imperial exchequer 
should bear any losses arising from issuing stock below par. There were no grounds to 
halt purchase and it should continue until the Irish Development Grant fund was 
exhausted. The convention objected to any increase in the tenants’ annuities or any 
decrease in the ‘bonus’. They opined that the purchase money should continue to be paid 
in cash and that landlords could not afford to take lower prices than they were currently 
receiving.134 There were three cardinal features of the Wyndham Act that landlords 
considered crucial - the cash ‘bonus’, the payment of the purchase money in cash, and 
the ‘zones’. Any alternation to these key features would lead to ferocious landlord 
opposition.
IX). Attempts to ensure land purchase continued.
In an attempt to address the financial crisis, the Irish Land Purchase Association was 
formed with Lord Kenmare as chairman. The organisation declared itself to be non­
political and open to anyone interested in the issue of land purchase. However, almost 
all on the committee were Irish landlords or people associated with that class and it 
included the earl of Mayo, Lord Castletown, the earl of Drogheda, Sir John Arnott, Sir 
George Brooke and Colonel O’Callaghan-Westropp, to mention a few. Their purpose 
was to find a solution to the financial crisis which threatened the operation of the 
Wyndham Act and to ensure that land purchase continued on terms stipulated by the act. 
Indeed, dissatisfaction with the Irish Landowners’ Convention may well have played a 
part in the formation of the association.
As mentioned earlier, it was widely held that the Estates Commission was not 
adequately staffed. The commission’s offices in Dublin were cramped and were 
scattered through various buildings as opposed to one centralised location. It was, 
therefore, little wonder that there were serious delays in completing sales. The lengthy 
process of proving title in many estates had led to protracted sales. Landlords such as the
1331.T., 6 May 1908.
134 Ibid.
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earl of Donoughmore believed that the estates commissioners and its staff had spent too 
much time and effort on the evicted tenants question when those resources should have 
been directed towards land purchase.135 The marquess of Londonderry believed that too 
much time was being spent attempting to provide landless men with farms under section 
2.136 The marquess also accused the I.P.P. of doing nothing to further the land purchase 
process:
The nationalist party have made no request for the acceleration of land purchase. 
Their desire has been, as Mr. Dillon put it, that Mr. Birrell would, as much as 
possible, speed up the commissioners on this particular question of the evicted 
tenants. Consequently we see that the desire of the nationalist party is not to 
promote purchase.. .Therefore we are justified in believing that the estates 
commissioners have considered that it was the desire of their chief that they 
should devote themselves to a very great extent to these subsidiary duties instead
• • 137of to the main duties which the bill entrusted to them.
Irish landlords in the House of Lords maintained that the implementation of 
Runciman’s report would halt land purchase and that the losses on stock being issued 
below par ought not to be borne by the ratepayers but by the imperial exchequer. They 
also believed that the landlords and tenants had upheld their end of the bargain while the 
treasury was attempting to evade its responsibilities. The response of the government 
representatives did little to appease the anxiety in Ireland.
Lord Denman, chief Liberal government whip in the House of Lords, on the 
question of stock being issued below par, ruled out putting the loss on the Irish ratepayer 
or the imperial exchequer. Denman believed that the onus was on landlords and tenants 
and that it ‘was perfectly evident there will have to be a readjustment of the existing
138terms of the contract so far as these two parties are concerned’. He advocated that the 
purchase money should be paid to landlords in stock and not cash in the future. The earl 
of Crewe, lord president of the council in the House of Lords, stressed that the 
government was unwilling to ‘find any more of the taxpayers’ money for the working of 
this act. I have to say, with equal explicitness, that equally they are not prepared to add
135 Hansard 4, cxcii, 776 (15 July 1908).
136 Ibid., col. 805.
137 Ibid., col. 805-6.
138 Ibid., col. 794-5.
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this charge to the national debt.’139 The government solution appeared to be that 
landlords would have to accept stock rather than cash in the future.140
The notion that sections of the I.P.P. were not overly concerned by the deadlock 
gained credence on 5 August 1908. William O’Brien and T. M. Healy addressed a 
meeting in Cork where they accused members of the party of not encouraging land 
purchase as they believed it would have an adverse effect on the home rule cause. John 
Dillon and many of his supporters held such views. O’Brien opined that the lack of 
urgency on the part of the I.P.P. had led the Liberal government to believe there would 
not be significant opposition to their attempts to escape the financial expense of carrying 
out land purchase. The statements of Lord Denman and the earl of Crewe were 
condemned. He also made it known to the government that any scaling-down of land 
purchase would be resisted.141
On 1 September 1908 the national directory of the U.I.L. held its annual meeting. 
John Redmond, addressing the central branch of the organisation, repeated that the 
money for land purchase would have to be found by the government. He urged a 
reorganisation of the machinery of the Land Commission. In order to stiffen the Liberal 
government’s resolve he stated that the country would become ungovernable if there 
was not new legislation which would address the failings of the Wyndham Act. In mid 
September the standing committee of the U.I.L. issued a circular to all its branches. The 
document outlined how the I.P.P. had worked fervently to overcome the financial 
difficulty and promote land purchase.142 It was to refute claims in the House of Lords 
and by William O’Brien and T. M. Healy that sections of the party did not support the 
continuation of land purchase.
On 1 October 1908, a remarkable meeting was held in Cork which was 
representative of both landlord and tenant interests. Some of the most noticeable 
attendees were the earl of Dunraven, chairman of the Irish Reform Association, Lord 
Castletown, Lord Barrymore, the earl of Kenmare, chairman of the Irish Land Purchase
139 Ibid., col. 820-21.
140 Ibid., col. 763-823
141 /./., 6 Aug. 1908.
142IT .,  19 Sept. 1908,
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Association, Col. O’Callaghan Westropp, S.H. Butcher, M.P., William O’Brien, M.P.,
D.D. Sheehan, M.P., A. Roche, M.P., and the chairman of Cork C.C., A. McDonnell.
The sight of old enemies like William O’Brien and Lord Barrymore speaking on 
the same platform demonstrated the power of the land question to transcend politics as 
both men had fought on opposing sides during the Land War and the Plan of Campaign 
in the 1880s. The earl of Bandon presided over the meeting and the objective was to 
send a deputation to key government ministers to ‘impress upon them the necessity of 
carrying out the obligation contracted by both English parties under the act of 1903, to 
complete the abolition of dual ownership by the help of imperial credit’.143 The meeting 
represented a united attack on the treasury and the Liberal government because of their 
failure to resolve the financial deadlock. The unwillingness of the imperial exchequer to 
bear the losses on stock being issued below par or to procure the necessary finance was 
seen as a breach of faith by those present. William O’Brien summed up the sentiments 
of the gathering in his resolution:
That failure on the part of the imperial parliament to find money for continuing 
the beneficent process of land transfer with reasonable speed would constitute 
repudiation of a contract virtually entered into; would be deeply represented by 
all classes in Ireland; would cause cruel disappointment to occupying tenants; 
would engender fresh agrarian strife, and embitter the relations existing between
. • 1 4 4the two counties.
The Liberal government denied any breach of contract or repudiation of a 
bargain. The Liberal chief secretary, Augustine Birrell, in a letter to S. H. Butcher, a 
Conservative M.P. who also owned land in Co. Kerry, stated that the government had 
upheld its responsibilities as stated in the Wyndham Act. He did, however, concede that 
the treasuiy had failed to appoint sufficient numbers staff. Birrell believed that the 
ratepayers had to be protected from loss and that any measures intended to raise the 
money, had to be done without burdening the ratepayers. In Birrell’s opinion, no such 
scheme had yet been put forward but he believed that the new land bill, which he would 
soon introduce, would give all sides a chance to address the problem.145
I.T .,2  Oct. 1908.
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid., 8 Oct. 1908.
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The Irish Landowners’ Convention advocated that a select committee, 
comprising members from both houses of parliament, be appointed to inquire into the 
matter of land purchase finance. It was generally felt in Ireland that the Runciman 
committee, which had reported on land purchase finance, had been too restricted in its 
brief in addition to being biased towards the interests of the treasury.146 On 9 October 
1908 the convention’s annual meeting was held where fears were expressed that land 
purchase might be suspended or the terms radically altered. There was support for the 
Cork meeting of 1 October. The fact that erstwhile bitter enemies such as Lord 
Barrymore and William O’Brien had shared a stage, in order to ensure the continuation 
of land purchase, was deemed indicative of the feeling in the country.147
A similar meeting to that in Cork was held in Monaghan town on 19 October 
1908 and was presided over by Lord Rossmore. The meeting had been called at the 
behest of the chairman of Monaghan C.C., Thomas Toal and it saw landlords and tenants 
share the same platform. Some of the most prominent attendees were Col. John Leslie, 
Major J.C. Madden and the earl of Dartrey as well as numerous J.P.s and clergy. The 
local newspaper, the Northern Standard, summed up the extraordinary nature of the 
gathering:
The hall was crowded, even standing room being difficult to obtain, and not only 
was the audience representative of both landlords and tenants, but it was also 
unique in that politics of every shade, religious creeds of every kind, and social 
standing of every degree had their representatives in the throng which assembled. 
Such a meeting has not been held in the town in living memory.148
Resolutions were passed seeking that adequate funds be provided for pending and future
sales, more staff given to the estates commissioners to accelerate the processing of sales
and that any losses incurred be borne by the imperial treasury, not Irish ratepayers.149
On 1 November 1908 the Wyndham Act had been in operation for five years and 
on that date the treasury had the option of re-examining the percentage at which the 
‘bonus’ was to be allocated to vendors. In the period leading up to the date there had 
been a rush by landlords to sell their lands as all the indications were that the terms of
146 6 Oct. 1908
147 Ibid., 10 Oct. 1908.
148 Northern Standard , 24 Oct. 1908.
149 Ibid., 24 Oct. 1908.
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sale would be radically changed in any future legislation to the detriment of the 
landlords. This only added to the estates commissioners’ workload and also increased 
the delays in the allocation of purchase money. The Liberal government was content to 
provide only £5,000,000 annually, maintaining that this fulfilled its obligations under the 
act. However, George Wyndham had intended that that limit would only apply for the 
first three years of the act’s operation after which time he believed that an acceleration in 
pace would be necessary.150
X). The Birrell Land Act, 1909 and land purchase.
The 1909 act could certainly be classified as a ratepayers’ act. By the end of 1908, land 
purchase was grinding to a halt and a further flotation of land stock would have 
exhausted the Irish Development Grant. This would have meant that the Irish ratepayers 
would have to cover the losses accruing from issuing stock below power. The Birrell Act 
relieved the Irish ratepayer from the large debt that had arising relating to stock being 
issued below par in addition to the cost of incidental charges. These charges, although 
small by comparison to that relating to land stock, had already begun to fall on 
ratepayers.
Opponents of the 1909 Land Act labelled it a treasury relief measure. Landlords 
were to be paid in stock instead of cash, the 12 % ‘bonus’ was changed and the tenants’ 
annuities were raised. However, matters were not so clear cut. The 1903 act had 
confined the ‘bonus’ fund to £12,000,000. In 1909, it was placed on a graduated scale 
which meant that several millions would be added to the fund by the treasury if land 
purchase cost as much as Birrell predicted it would. The treasury agreed to cover the 
costs of stock for all completed and pending sales which otherwise would have fallen on 
the Irish ratepayer. The majority of the incidental charges would also be paid by the 
treasury.
The financial basis of the 1903 act had turned out to be very unstable. Although 
concern had been voiced by non-Irish M.P.s during the bill’s passage through
150 Hansard 4 , cxx, 201 (25 Mar. 1903).
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parliament, the British taxpayer had realistically never been in any danger. The act 
specified that any losses arising from issuing excess stock or from incidental charges 
were to be paid out of Irish funds or by the Irish ratepayers. Wyndham had openly 
admitted that it had not been the intention of the authors of the act to burden the Irish 
ratepayer with the loss for the issue of stock at a discount. Equally he had hoped that any 
expenses accruing from the operation of the act would be covered by a grant of £50,000 
for the first four years a sum to be taken out of the Irish Development Grant.151 
However, the act was so drafted that the £50,000 could not be used as a working balance 
and instead it went towards the losses accruing from issuing stock below par.
One of the reasons Wyndham had secured £100,000,000 for advances and 
£12,000,000 for the ‘bonus’ fund was that any losses incurred were to be covered by 
Irish sources, principally the Irish Development Grant. Owing to the depression in the 
stock market from 1903-9 Irish land stock never reached anywhere near par during the 
period which meant there was a significant loss to be recouped from each flotation. 
Wyndham seemed to have underestimated the extent of the losses that would result from 
issuing stock below par. He had believed that the Irish Development Grant was 
sufficient and he might have been proved correct but for the slump in the stock market 
and volume of sales.
By late 1908, it was obvious that land purchase could not continue to operate 
under the terms of the 1903 act. The reality was that the terms of the act specifically 
stated that the Irish ratepayers had to pay the losses on issuing stock below par once the 
Irish Development Grant ran out and if more stock was to be raised for advances to 
tenant-purchasers, the losses on flotation would have to be borne by the Irish ratepayer. 
The question of the ‘bonus’ was equally problematic. The terms of the act had only 
provided a sum of £12,000,000 for the 12 % ‘bonus’ to landlords. According to the chief 
secretary, Augustine Birrell, sales totalling £25,000,000 had been completed during the 
period up to 31 October 1908 and there were pending agreements of approximately 
£52,000,000. Birrell discarded Wyndham’s estimation of 1903 that £100,000,000 would
151 Ibid., cxcvi, (23 Nov. 1908).
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suffice to cover advances to tenant-purchasers under the act, for in his estimation the
152cost would be somewhere in the region of £180,000,000.
With the amount of money available limited to £12,000,000, it was impossible to 
continue to distribute the ‘bonus’ at 12 %. Once advances to tenant-purchasers reached 
£100,000,000, that fund would be exhausted. However, the Wyndham Act stipulated 
that the ‘bonus’ fund could not be increased except by new legislation. On 24 November 
1908, it was cut to 3 % on all future transactions. The cost of abolishing dual ownership 
had certainly been underestimated in 1903 and a bargain was made with the treasury to 
raise just £5,000,000 annually for land purchase for the first three years. However, sales 
quickly outstripped the finances available and the depreciation in guaranteed land stock 
meant the treasury was wary of increasing the amount of money advanced annually. The 
pace of land purchase could not be increased because the losses would have to be repaid 
by the Irish ratepayer. At that pace some landlords would have to wait many years 
before they received the purchase money and ‘bonus’. Similarly, tenants paid interest on 
the purchase money during this period when they should have been repaying their 
annuities. Land purchase, as it had occurred under the Wyndham Act, could not continue 
without new legislation.
Although it was supposed to be an amending act, the 1909 measure 
fundamentally altered the terms of the Wyndham Act. The recommendations of the 
Runciman report were obviously quite influential. The tenant’s annuity was increased 
from 3 lA % to 3 ‘A %. The treasury could issue 3 % stock in addition to 2 3A % issued 
under the 1903 act. As regards pending agreements under the Wyndham Act, the 
landlord had the option of accepting payment in 2 % % land stock at the market price so 
long as it was not below 92. This limited the loss to the state. In the case of all 
agreements after 15 September 1909, the vendor had to accept stock at its nominal value 
as payment in cash had been abolished. By 31 March 1921 vendors whose sales were 
pending under the Wyndham Act had availed of the half-cash half-stock payment option 
to the tune of £12,004,113 while advances in stock only amounted to £3,251,281.153
153 Ibid., col. 1811-13.
153 Irish Land Commission, Report o f  the estates commissioners fo r  the year ended 31 March, 1921 and 
fo r  the period 1 Nov. 1903 to 31 March, 1921 (Dublin, 1922), p. vi.
268
Under the 1909 act the ‘bonus’ was no longer allocated at 12 %, instead, it was 
distributed on a graduated scale. For agreements entered into before 24 November 1908 
the vendor received the ‘bonus’ of 12 % but after that date the new system came into 
force. The treasury took on the cost of issuing stock at a discount to clear pending 
agreements.
Under the terms of the Birrell Act of 1909 the operations of the Estates 
Commission and the C.D.B. were to be kept completely separate. In the congested 
districts, the board was to be the sole authority that could purchase land. Similarly, the 
Estates Commission was the sole authority in the rest of Ireland. Although the price 
‘zones’ were not abolished, changes were introduced and the estates commissioners 
were given the power to investigate the circumstances of sales if they so wished. If there 
were any misgivings as regards security, equity, intimidation, duress or arrears of rent 
they were entitled to examine the sale in more detail. A limited form of compulsory 
powers in order to deal with congestion was granted to the estates commissioners and 
the C.B.D. The judicial commissioner decided the matter of price and there was the 
option of an appeal to the Court of Appeal. Land compulsorily acquired was to be paid 
for in cash. On 3 December 1909 the new land act became law.
XI). The increase in prices under the Wyndham Act.
The report of the estates commissioners for the year ending 31 March 1921, contained 
the final sales statistics for the whole of Ireland prior to the formation of the Irish Free 
State and Northern Ireland. At that stage there were still a sizable number of advances 
which had not been made. Almost all were direct sales, where advances were pending to 
the tune of £8,192,141 for an area of approximately 887,000,000 acres.154 Pending sales 
to the Land Commission, to the C.D.B. and in the land judge’s court had virtually all 
been dealt with by 1921. All of the advances that had been pending under the Wyndham 
Act, had been distributed by the late 1920s.
154 Ibid., p. vii.
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Unlike a benevolent landlord, the Irish Land Commission as a government body, 
expected the tenants’ annuities to be paid on time and in full. Whereas a landlord might 
be persuaded to make allowances in the event of a bad harvest or adverse weather 
conditions, the state tolerated no excuses. As early as November 1904, the commentator 
Arnold White had warned of the consequences of Irish tenants paying inflated prices: 
‘There are already so many cases of an inordinate price being paid for the land that, 
although the process of transfer has only begun, inevitable trouble awaits the next 
generation, for the farmers, both Protestants and Catholics, are paying higher prices for 
the land than it is worth.’135
Although the tenant’s annuity had to be lower than the rent the he had previously 
paid, it was fixed for a period of sixty-eight and a half years. The annuity might be 
manageable in periods of economic stability but in the event of a depression or a period 
of uncertainty in the agricultural markets, the tenant-purchaser was liable to find 
themselves under pressure. Such an economic depression occurred in the 1920s 
following the end of World War I and the Wall Street economic crash of 1929. Terence 
Dooley has highlighted how the Irish Free State Government found that well over half of 
the land purchase annuities of £4.6 million that were due in the year 1932 were in
156arrears.
Dan Breen, the leader of the Third Tipperary Brigade of the Irish Republican 
Army (I.R.A.) during the War of Independence, recalled how the Wyndham Act had 
‘brought great joy to the farmers...who seemed to have entered an utopia where the 
threat of famine no longer existed. In a short time, however, they began to complain of
• 157 • . . .the high rent [annuities]’. Breen had been born into a farming family in Grange, 
Donohill, Co. Tipperary. Conditions during his youth in the early part of the twentieth 
century were harsh and, as he recalled, his ‘family barely existed above the hair-line of 
poverty. Most of the neighbours were in a similar plight. Potatoes and milk were our 
staple diet. On special occasions we had a meal of salted pork but the luxury of fresh
155 Arnold White, ‘What Ireland really wants’ in Fortnightly Review, Ixxvi, no. 455 (Nov. 1904), p. 838.
156 Dooley, The land fo r  the people, pp 30-1.
157 Dan Breen, My figh t fo r  Irish freedom  (Dublin, 1981 ed.), p. 8.
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meat was altogether beyond our reach’. If such families purchased their holdings at 
exorbitant prices or purchased uneconomic holdings, the chances of being unable to 
repay their annuities were increased.
Christopher Blanchfield who had been a tenant on the Leinster estate in Co. 
Kildare had rented a holding of four acres, two roods and thirty-two perches. His judicial 
rent had been £2 5s. 2d. and the tenement valuation was put at £8 10s. Upon the sale of 
the estate by the trustees in 1903, Blanchfield became a tenant-purchaser. The purchase 
money for Blanchfield’s holding was £51 and this sum was advanced to the trustees on 
11 May 1904. From then on the holding was subject to a purchase annuity. By 1920 
Blanchfield had begun to default on his payments and had failed to pay the previous 
three purchase instalments. He was in arrears for £2 2s. 9d. The report of the Irish Land 
Commission stated that sale proceedings had been taken for the recovery of the money 
due.159
On 2 July 1918, Viscount Gough received the purchase money for the sale of his 
Galway ‘estate’ under the Wyndham Act. Included in that sum was the purchase money 
for Thomas Connolly’s holding in the townland of Kileen which amounted to £88. 
Connolly had rented ten acres, one rood and twenty-eight perches from the viscount at 
an annual rent of £4 9s. 6d. and his tenement valuation was £5 5s. Connolly had quickly 
run into trouble with the payment of his annuities. By 1 July 1920, he had failed to pay 
two instalments and was in default to the sum of £4 8s. 2d. Sale proceedings were 
initiated here also to recover the money due.160 The cases of Christopher Blanchfield and 
Thomas Connolly are clear examples of the difficulties many tenants ran into with their 
annuities in the years after they commenced their repayments.
Both the estates commissioners and the C.D.B. noted that the prices received by 
landlords for their ‘estates’ under the Wyndham Act had increased significantly when 
compared with previous land acts. The estates commissioners, in their report for the year 
up to 31 March 1906, highlighted the rise in the price of land under the act:
1 5 8
158 Ibid., p. 8.
159 Report o f  the Irish land commissioners fo r  the period from  1 April 1919 to 31 March, 1920, 74-5, 
[Cmd. 1064] H.C. 1920, xix, 1149.
160 Ibid., pp 76-7.
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Whether looked at from the point of view of the number of years’ purchase [of 
rent] or the rate per acre, it is manifest that the prices now being paid by the 
tenants for purchase of holdings show a very large increase on the prices which 
were paid before the passing of the act, while, when the ‘bonus’ of 12 per cent in 
addition is taken into consideration, the increase of price obtained by the 
landlords is still greater.161
Under the act of 1885, the average rate per acre had been £10.5 (cash) while the acts of
1891-6 produced an average per acre of £9.2 (stock). Up to 31 March 1906, the average
per acre under the Wyndham Act was £13.4 (cash), which was a significant increase.
When the 12 % ‘bonus’ was added on, the increase was even more substantial with an
• * 162 • average price of £15 per acre being received by landlords. Estates commissioner
Wrench, regarded as being pro-landlord, was reluctant to accept these figures, however,
as he felt that the sale of certain estates in the early days of the act had unduly influenced
i /•}
the figures. Undoubtedly he was referring to the high prices obtained on large 
properties such as the Leinster estate but even when this is taken into account there is 
little doubt that landlords made very significant gains on the sale of their lands when 
compared to previous acts. Wrench acknowledged that the price of land was higher 
under the Wyndham Act than under earlier land acts. In his evidence to the royal 
commission on congestion in November 1906, he qualified this with the contention that 
the tenant’s annuity was smaller than under previous acts and that those landlords who 
had sold could not have afforded to do so but for the increased prices being offered by 
the Wyndham Act.164
By 1905 the increase in prices under the Wyndham Act, compared to previous 
land acts, had begun to impact on the C.D.B. Prior to the act, when they purchased an 
estate from a landlord and then sold it on to the tenants, it involved an average loss of 5 
Vi % to the C.D.B. However, under the 1903 act the average loss up to 31 March 1905, 
after rearranging and improving holdings, would be at least 8 %. The board’s report for 
the year up to 31 March 1905 summed up the position: ‘In short, we cannot, with our 
present funds deal advantageously with the volume of estates work which the act of
161 Report o f  the estates commissioners for the year ending 31" March, 1906 and for the period from  T' 
November, 1903, to 31 March, 1906, xiv, [Cd. 3148], H.C. 1906, xxv, 237.
162 Ibid., pp xiv-xv.
163 Ibid., p. xiv.
164 Third report o f  the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into and report upon the operation o f  the 
Acts dealing with Congestion in Ireland, 92-3 [Cd.3414] H.C. 1907, xxxv, 337.
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1903 devolves upon us.’165 The C.D.B. desperately sought an increase in its financing to 
deal with the costs of migration and of improving congested estates. The C.D.B. found 
land to be considerably more expensive to purchase than had been the case prior to 
1903:
The finance of our estates operations since 1903 has been affected by an element 
which was not taken into account when the land act was before parliament. We 
refer to the increase in the price we have had to pay for both tenanted and 
untenanted land, exclusive of the ‘bonus’ of 12 per cent paid to the vendors from 
the land purchase aid fund.166
In terms of poor law valuation, the C.D.B. paid on average 12 3A years’ purchase for
tenanted land and 21 years’ purchase for untenanted land prior to the passing of the
Wyndham Act. Between 1 November 1903 and 31 March 1908, however, the averages
had risen significantly to 18 years’ purchase for tenanted land and 27 2A years’ purchase
for untenanted. When measured in years’ purchase of rent the C.D.B. had paid an
average of 15 A years’ purchase for tenanted land prior to 1903 but prices had increased
to an average of 20 years’ purchase under the Wyndham Act.167 These higher prices
resulted in the C.D.B. sustaining increased losses upon the resale of land they had
purchased. Furthermore, they were unable to pass on the increased prices to the tenants
as they would simply have been unable to repay the annuities.
The rise in prices had not gone unnoticed and the commentator, L. Paul-Dubois, 
highlighted how land hunger among Irish tenants had raised the price of land and 
threatened their future prosperity:
The purchase prices agreed to by the tenant-buyers are, as a general rule, 
extremely high, and the resulting charge upon Irish agriculture will prove not 
only very heavy but even dangerous. Hardly had the act of 1903 been passed 
when the farmers, so far from imitating the reserve of the landlords, began to 
press onward and push forward their applications with such haste as to cause a 
considerable proportionate rise in the price of land.168
165 Fourteenth report o f  the Congested Districts Board fo r  Ireland fo r  the year ending 3 1'1 March, 1905, 
17 [Cd.2757] H.C. 1906, xcvii, 355.
166 Seventeenth report o f  the Congested Districts Board fo r  Ireland fo r  the year ending 31st March 1908, 
11, [Cd. 4340] H.C. 1908, xxiii, 443.
167 Ibid., p. 11.
168 L. Paul-Dubois, Contemporary Ireland  (Dublin, 1908) p. 291.
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As already mentioned, the annuities would have to be repaid over the course of a 
number of generations. Unlike a benevolent landlord who might give a reduction in bad 
seasons, the annuities would have to be repaid in full and on time to the government. 
Laurence Ginnell, M.P. for North Westmeath, was gravely concerned by the price land 
was being sold for. He believed that the poorest tenants were often paying the highest 
prices and predicted that many would not be able to repay their annuities in the future.169
For hard-pressed tenants, an immediate reduction in the form of their annuity 
was so tempting that they often agreed to purchase at inflated prices. The tendency was 
to avail of the immediate relief that purchasing offered. In the long term these could 
prove ruinous as the condition of their holding simply could not justify the price. The 
implications of a fixed annuity over a period of sixty-eight and a half years were not 
always thought through properly.
The chief land inspector of the C.D.B., Henry Doran, had also found that small 
landholders tended to ‘measure their bargain by the immediate relief they obtain in
1 7 0annuity as compared with the rent’. The Wyndham Act reduced the rate at which the 
tenant would repay his annuity to 3 % % but extended the period of his repayment to 
approximately sixty-eight and a half years. By enabling the tenant to borrow money at a 
lower rate and to repay it over a longer period than previous acts (4 % over 49 years 
under the 1885 Ashbourne Act, for example,) he could pay a higher purchase price, but 
his annuity still represented a reduction compared to his current rent. According to 
Doran, the price of land had increased because ‘the tenant is being financed in a way that 
enables him to pay a higher price without making his annual payments higher than he
171
would have had to pay under the previous land acts’.
XII). Conclusion.
The sale terms of the Wyndham Act proved enticing to many landlords and applications 
for sales reached an unprecedented level compared to those made under previous land
169 Laurence Ginnell, Land and liberty (Dublin, 1908) p 108-12.
170 First report o f  the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into and report upon the operation o f  the 
Acts dealing with Congestion in Ireland, 80 [Cd.3267] H.C. 1906, xxxii, 621.
171 Ibid., p. 80.
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acts. However, the volume of sales led to problems. The staff of the Estates Commission 
was only intended to process sales of approximately £5,000,000 for the first three years 
of the operation of the act. The staff and the office accommodation at the disposal of the 
estates commissioners were not adequate to cope with the volume of sales. Proving title 
to the estates being sold also proved a protracted affair owing to insufficient staff and the 
number of applications.
The financing for the operation of the act had proved decidedly unsound. A lack 
of any in-depth discussion when the bill passed through parliament was to prove 
regrettable. Incidental charges, as a result of the act’s operation, had not been taken into 
consideration and as a result, the burden fell on the county councils and ratepayers of the 
country to pay them. During the duration of the Wyndham Act there was a depression in 
the stock market which ensured that guaranteed land stock was never issued at anywhere 
near par. The cost of issuing stock at a discount had a snowballing effect so that by 1908 
the deficit had reached a couple of million. If land purchase had continued under the 
terms of the Wyndham Act the ratepayers of Ireland would have been forced to cover 
the costs of stock being issued below par, as had been the case with the incidental 
charges. In reality, the act had been structured in such a way that incidental charges and 
the cost of issuing land stock at a discount was taken out of Irish monies and not from 
the imperial exchequer.
The delays in the distribution of the purchase money and the ‘bonus’ caused 
great hardship for both landlords and tenants, not to mention other groups associated 
with sales such as land agents or solicitors. A heavily encumbered landlord, who had 
sold his ‘estate’ but who had no other sources of income apart from land, faced financial 
ruin due to the delays. The interest paid on the purchase money prior to allocation was 
rarely sufficient to pay off the charges on many estates. Tenants also faced the prospect 
of paying interest on the purchase money for years when they could have begun the 
repayment of their purchase annuities.
The last report made by the estates commissioners was for the year ending 31 
March 1921. This is the last source for land purchase statistics covering the whole of 
Ireland. By March 1921, £74,434,402 had been advanced while £904,876 had been
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lodged by purchasers. The two figures combined gave a total price of £75,339,278. By 
this stage virtually all the pending sales under the Wyndham Act, except for direct sales 
between landlord and tenants, had been dealt with. Advances pending amounted to 
£8,192,141 while £47,563 was awaiting lodgement by the tenant-purchasers. The two
• ■ 172figures combined gave a price of £8,239,704 for approximately 887,969 acres. Those 
landlords who were still waiting for their purchase money must have been extremely 
anxious about the delay especially if their only source of income was the interest on the 
purchase money. If a landlord had sold in 1908, he would have already been waiting 
thirteen years for the proceeds of the sale. Likewise, the tenant-purchasers on those 
estates would have spent the same period paying interest on the purchase money when 
they should have been repaying their purchase annuities.
By adding the figures from the pending direct sales to the sales which had 
already been concluded by March 1921, the achievement of the Wyndham Act, in terms 
of land purchase, can be analysed. The total number of ‘estates’ sold was 9,410, for 
which, £82,626,543 was advanced to tenant-purchasers and they lodged £952,439 in 
cash. The amount advanced and the cash lodged gave an overall total of £83,578,982.173
Under the Wyndham Act, an ‘estate’ consisted of whatever the estates 
commissioners sanctioned. It could consist of a single holding, a townland or a much 
larger area of land. Where an ‘estate’ sold contained land in different counties, it 
appeared in the statistics of each county. Therefore, the number of ‘estates’ sold was not 
an accurate reflection of the actual number of landlords who had sold their property. In 
terms of advances to tenant-purchasers, Leinster and Munster led the way far
outstripping Connaught and Ulster. Leinster and Munster accounted for over 
£50,000,000 of the advances to tenant-purchasers between them. In Leinster, the
counties Meath, Kilkenny, Kildare, Dublin, Wexford and Westmeath led the way. The
lodgement of cash was usually associated with the stronger tenant-purchasers. It 
normally indicated where large holdings were purchased such as those which surpassed 
the £5,000 or £7,000 limits imposed by the Wyndham Act. To bypass these limits, some 
opted to receive an advance up to the limit and pay the surplus in cash. Just over half a
172 See appendices IX and X.
173 Ibid.
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million was lodged in cash by tenant-purchasers in Leinster alone. Tenant-purchasers in 
Co. Meath lodged the enormous sum of £137,699 in cash while those in Dublin and 
Kildare lodged £77,251 and £60,275 in cash respectively.174
In terms of advances received, Co. Cork was considerably ahead of the rest of 
the country with £8,860,220. Counties Tipperary and Limerick followed in the Munster 
region with £60,918 and £38,882 respectively. These three counties also led the way in 
the province as regards cash lodgements. Although it was well behind Leinster there was 
still over £200,000 lodged in Munster by tenant-purchasers. In Ulster, the majority of the 
advances went to counties Down, Armagh, Antrim and Tyrone while just over £153,000 
was lodged in cash by purchasers in the province. In terms of land purchase, Connaught 
benefited far less than the other three provinces with advances totaling just £10,949,066, 
although counties Galway and Roscommon saw considerable sales. As regards the 






CHAPTER SIX: ‘THE LANDLESS MEN FOR THE MANLESS LAND’: THE 
RANCH WAR, THE WESTERN PROBLEM AND THE EVICTED TENANTS.1
I). Introduction.
The C.D.B. was founded in 1891 by Arthur J. Balfour who was chief secretary of Ireland 
at the time. Its principal objective was to alleviate congestion through the enlargement of 
holdings and migration. The development of the fishing industry and other small scale 
enterprises in addition to the improvement of agriculture and livestock were other key 
aims. The method by which areas were assigned to the congested districts was based 
upon the electoral divisions. A division was deemed congested where the average 
valuation per person was below thirty shillings and where one-fifth of the population of 
that county lived in the division. However, this method of defining a congested district 
was far from satisfactory as the presence of a number of substantial grazing farms might 
have been enough to push the valuation per head above thirty shillings. In reality, there 
might have been numerous small uneconomic holdings in the region. The stipulation that 
one-fifth of the population of the county had to be resident in the division was 
undoubtedly intended to concentrate the C.B.D. on the worst areas of the west coast of 
Ireland.
The congested districts comprised just over 3.6 million acres and accounted for 
over one-sixth of the total area of Ireland which included parts of the counties of 
Galway, Leitrim, Mayo, Roscommon, Sligo, Donegal, Clare, Kerry and Cork. 
According to the census of 1901, over half a million people lived in these designated 
districts.2 In 1908 the royal commission on congestion in Ireland estimated that a £10 
valuation per holding was the minimum required for a farmer to support his family and 
live in reasonable comfort. However, of the 84,954 holdings in the congested districts, 
74,414 were below the ten pounds valuation and 45,138 of those were under four pounds 
valuation.3 Land in such districts was generally very poor and, as such, holdings had to 
be larger than elsewhere in the country to make them economically viable. The report of 
the royal commission on congestion commented that:
1 Report o f  the royal commission on congestion in Ireland. Final report, 47, [Cd.4097] H.C. 1908, xlii,
729.
2 Ibid., p. 4.
3 Ibid.
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The outstanding feature of the congested districts, and indeed, of the greater part 
of the nine counties which contain such districts is not an excessive population, 
but, first, a fairly dense population in certain areas, mostly along the sea coast, 
where the land is hardly capable of supporting any population at all, and 
secondly, excessive population in districts mainly consisting of poor land but 
adjacent to extremely thinly populated districts of better land.4
In many cases the plot of land farmed was insufficient for the family to survive on and 
remittances from family members in America and elsewhere often helped pay the rent. 
Seasonal migration to Britain was also common as it offered a means of raising much 
needed finance. The predominance of grazing farms in much of the congested districts 
ensured the demand for agricultural labourers remained low.
According to the agricultural statistics for Ireland in 1903, there were 590,648 
holdings in the country. A significant portion of these (291,813) were less than fifteen 
acres in size.5 Even taking into account the disparity in the quality of the land depending 
on its location, it was evident that the vast majority of these holdings would have to be 
enlarged to make them economically viable.
In the congested districts, untenanted land was desperately required for the 
enlargement of holdings and to cater for the migration of tenants. However, there was 
simply not enough untenanted land for those who needed it. The Wyndham Act had 
increased competition for untenanted land by allowing the sons of tenants and the 
landless to acquire a parcel of such land where it was sold along with an estate. The 
Ranch War agitation would prove popular in counties such as Westmeath because these 
landless men realised that if landlords were forced to sell their untenanted land along 
with the rest of their estate, there was a chance that they might secure a farm of land. In 
July 1906 the Liberal chief secretary, James Bryce, informed Laurence Ginnell, M.P. for 
North Westmeath, that there were 80,000 acres of untenanted land in the county.6 With 
such a considerable amount of land available in midlands counties like Westmeath, it 
was little wonder that the anti-grazing agitation which had sprung up in Connaught also 
spread to areas of Leinster and north Munster.
4 Ibid., p. 7.
5 Agricultural statistics fo r  Ireland with detailed report fo r  the year 1903 [Cd.2196] cv, 333, 1904, p. xv.
6 Hansard 4, clx, 1035 (12 July 1906).
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The question of untenanted land also directly affected evicted tenants as they 
were eligible for a parcel of such land if they could not be reinstated in their former 
holdings. The Wyndham Act provided the Estates Commission and the C.D.B with the 
means to reinstate evicted tenants to their original holdings or to provide them with new 
holdings. However, the clause only applied to those tenants who had been evicted from 
their holdings in the twenty-five years prior to the introduction of the act.
II) Nationalist discontent.
Despite the Wyndham Act being in operation for only a few months, discontent was
brewing within the I.P.P. by early 1904. The lack of progress in areas such as the
purchase of untenanted land, the relief of congestion and the reinstatement of evicted
tenants were sources of grievance. On 18 February 1904, in the House of Commons, P.
A. McHugh, M.P. for North Sligo, proposed the following:
We humbly represent your majesty that serious amendments including the 
abolition of the ‘zones’ system are required in the Irish land act of last year to 
prevent the unjust inflation of land in Ireland; and that the powers possessed 
under that act by the estates commissioners and the Congested Districts Board 
for the acquisition of untenanted lands are not sufficient to provide a remedy for 
the evils of congestion by the redistribution of the land.. .without which the Irish 
land question can never be settled; and that the power of compulsory purchase of 
untenanted lands should be conferred upon that body [C.D.B.] and upon the 
estates commissioners...and that provision should be made that sales in cases of 
congested estates under the act should be made only to the board or to the estate 
commissioners.7
McHugh argued that the act, as it stood, would not solve the land question. The act had 
been passed to create tenant-purchasers, to solve the evicted tenants question and to 
resolve congestion. McHugh maintained that in the west where the problem of 
congestion was most acute, the act had made few inroads. The M.P. for North Sligo was 
damning in his criticism of the price ‘zones’ which he asserted had inflated the price of 
land. Estates sold within the price ‘zones’ were not subject to inspection and this had led 
to tenants paying excessive prices which, in turn, put the taxpayer at risk. McHugh 
called for the return of inspection and the abolition of the ‘zone’ system.8
7 Ibid., cxxx, 284-5 (18 Feb. 1904).
8 Ibid., col. 263-79.
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McHugh’s proposed resolution was seconded by J. P. Farrell, M.P. for North
Longford, who held that the crux of the difficulty was the question of price:
The breakdown of the act as far as it had gone was not due to any act covert or 
overt, on the part of the tenants, their leaders, or the representatives of the 
tenants. The breakdown of the act should be left at the door of the landlords.. .It 
appeared to him that when land was sold they were not dealing with an 
unfortunate rain-sodden country but with a diamond mine at Kimberley or a 
goldfield at Coolgardie. The landlords regarded their interest as almost as 
valuable as if it were situated in such places.9
As already mentioned in earlier chapters there was a fear that if the tenants paid 
exorbitant prices that they would fail in the repayment of their annuities. This was 
especially relevant in the congested districts of the west where holdings were small and 
generally uneconomic. With a ‘bonus’ fund of £12,000,000 set aside to encourage 
landlords to sell there were many nationalists who felt that this money, or at least a 
portion of it, would be better invested in the relief of congestion. P. A. McHugh 
expressed such feelings: ‘£1,000,000 spent...in the west of Ireland would do more to 
settle the land question than the £12,000,000 they were wasting in the futile effort to 
satisfy the landlords.’10
As already noted, an amending act was promised by the Conservative 
government to clarify any ambiguity regarding the allocation of the ‘bonus’ to the 
tenant-for-life. The I.P.P. viewed this essentially as a landlord difficulty and hoped to 
use the amending act to strengthen areas of the Wyndham Act, such as those dealing 
with the relief of congestion, which they believed were being neglected. The refusal of 
the Conservative government to even consider addressing any area of the act except that 
relating to the ‘bonus’ greatly antagonised the I.P.P. They had hoped to introduce an 
element of compulsion or at least pre-emption in the congested districts so that the 
C.D.B. could acquire land with greater ease. They also sought to secure some form of 
popular elected representation on the C.D.B. In essence the I.P.P. viewed the relief of 
congestion as one of the principal aims of the Wyndham Act. They felt that it was not 
receiving the resources or time that it required. James Flynn, M.P. for North Cork, 
summed up the I.P.P.’s understanding of the act:
9 Ib id ., col. 281.
10 Ibid., col. 276.
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The act was passed for the alleviation of poverty and misery, and one of its main 
features was the division of the large grazing tracts in the west of Ireland. The 
result now appeared to be that those grazing tracts were to be retained in the 
hands of the landlords and graziers, and that the destitution of the poor people for 
whom the act was passed was to be perennial. What was the use of advancing 
money to purchase a wretched holding on a bog or mountain valued at only £6 or 
£7? The tenant would only exchange one condition of misery for another; and 
instead of being a wretched tenant he would become an occupier who would not 
be able to work out a position of comfort for himself or his family.11
Flynn understood that there was little point in making tenants the owners of uneconomic
holdings unless they received parcels of untenanted land to enlarge their farms. If
congestion was to be tackled in the congested districts, and elsewhere in Ireland,
untenanted land had to be acquired along with tenanted estates.
The I.P.P. was not alone in its calls for a re-examination of the issue of
congestion. The Liberal M.P. for North Tyrone, Charles Hemphill, believed that the
problem could only be solved by the introduction of compulsion:
Unless the act were amended in the manner foreshadowed by the motion before 
the house it would be a mockery, a delusion, and a snare, both to the people of 
Ireland and to the taxpayers of this country. The experience of the year had 
confirmed him in the opinion that finality was remote and that they were only in 
the process of evolution in the settlement of the land question, and compulsion 
was the ultimate resort to which the house must at no very distant date have 
recourse.. .he appealed to the... [chief secretary] to carry out the resolution of the 
Congested Districts Board of 1895, for unless compulsory powers were granted 
to the board the act would be a failure.12
Despite Hemphill’s support, P. A. McHugh’s resolution was defeated by 219 votes to 
124. 13 As far as the Conservative government was concerned, compulsory powers were 
unnecessary. They argued that the act should be given a fair trial.
Time passed and little progress was made in the acquisition of untenanted land. 
On 13 November 1904 at Boyle, Co. Roscommon, the North Roscommon U.I.L. 
organised a demonstration advocating the break up of the grasslands and condemning 
the eleven-months system where calls for the redistribution of the grazing ranches were 
voiced.14 At Westport, Co. Mayo on 20 November, William O’Brien outlined how the
11 Ib id ., col. 313-4 .
12 Ib id ., col. 300.
13 Ib id ., col. 342.
14 F.J., 14 Nov. 1904.
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purchase of small uneconomic holdings was of little use unless untenanted land was also 
acquired to enlarge them:
Therefore, it is clear that what concerns you here is not so much the purchase of 
your present patches of tenanted land, but the purchase of those splendid 
expanses of untenanted lands, and it is equally clear that the purchase of these 
untenanted lands cannot be carried on by the poor tenants themselves, but must 
be carried on either by the Congested Districts Board or by the estates 
commissioners, who are provided with ample funds for the purpose.15
While the sale of estates was progressing adequately in the east of Ireland, there were
few sales in western counties such as Mayo. William O’Brien admitted that the
Wyndham Act was a ‘dead letter’ in the west of Ireland and that its people, whose
predicament was most dire, had benefited least.
HI). The failure of the Wyndham Act to tackle the western problem and the evicted 
tenants.
Up to 31 December 1904, no untenanted land had actually been purchased by the estates 
commissioners under clause eight. This clause had been specifically inserted to enable 
the purchase of such land as a separate ‘estate’. Offers to purchase had been made for 
7,663 acres and negotiations were pending.16 The estates commissioners had 
encountered considerable obstacles:
On the general subject of untenanted land the commissioners would point out 
that when the land does not form part of a tenanted estate under sale, it can only 
be acquired by them under section 8 of the act. That section limits the action of 
the commissioners to the purchase of such untenanted land as they consider 
necessary to facilitate the sale or re-distribution of estates purchased or proposed 
to be purchased by them under sections 6 [sales to the commissioners] or 7 [sales 
in the Land Judge’s Court]. The number of estates so purchased is small, and 
consequently the power of the commissioners to purchase untenanted land under 
section 8 of the act is limited.17
As the vast majority of sales were direct between landlords and tenants the estates
commissioners had little opportunity to buy untenanted land.
15 Ib id ., 21 N ov. 1904.
16 A d  interim  rep o r t o f  the esta tes com m issioners fo r  the p e r io d  fro m  I s' N ovem ber, 1903, to  31s' 
D ecem ber, 1904, 49  [Cd. 2471], H .C. 1905, xxii, 177.
17 Ib id ., p. 12.
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Untenanted land was predominantly held by the landlord himself or by graziers 
by means of the eleven-month system. Sales would involve considerable delay. 
Livestock would have to be moved, graziers would have to give up their farms, the land 
would have to be surveyed, divided up and fenced and roads may have to be constructed. 
All of this had to be completed before the estates commissioners even decided on the 
recipients of parcels of land. Up to 31 December 1904 the estates commissioners had 
held no estates for the purpose of improving them, even though they could hold up to 
£5,000,000 worth of property for this purpose under the act. Improvements to 
untenanted land and estates had been severely curtailed by a lack of finance. The 
Reserve Fund which totalled just £250,000 was the only source of funding in most cases. 
Just £4,276 had been advanced out of the fund for the purpose of improvements by the 
end of 1904.18
Aside from the financial restraints, the estates commissioners had been impeded 
in another way. They had planned to ‘employ a special establishment for the 
management and improvement of estates brought by them, for the purchase of 
untenanted land, and for the reinstatement of evicted tenants’.19 However, after 
consultation with the treasury, the plan had had to be dropped, The estates 
commissioners were ordered to ‘confine their inquiries to estates actually before them 
for sale, and to Plan of Campaign estates, or to other estates similarly situated where 
evictions were not due to ordinary causes but to the Land War’.20 A significant 
proportion of applicants from those claiming to be evicted tenants came from estates 
which were not actually in the process of being sold. In such circumstances, the estates 
commissioners’ hands were tied as they had been instructed not to attend to such cases. 
By confining their investigations to estates involved in the Plan of Campaign and others 
involved in the Land War, their ability to deal with the evicted tenants question was 
similarly restricted.
Owing to these restrictions, the estates commissioners had been unable to 
establish the scope of the evicted tenants problem or even identify the numbers involved.
1
18 Ibid.
19 Ib id ., p. 17.
20
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In fairness to landlords who had or were in the process of selling, the Estates 
Commission had found that they had ‘shown no unwillingness to reinstate the tenants 
evicted from them where their former holdings were in the landlord’s hands, but where 
the former holdings were occupied by tenants the landlords cannot disturb the existing
21 i •tenants’. The directions received by the estates commissioners hampered their work in 
that they could not assist in the reinstatement of evicted tenants except where an ‘estate’ 
was being sold under the act. Even where a ‘planter’ tenant signalled his willingness to 
give up the holding they could do nothing unless the ‘estate’ was being sold.
Many landlords were willing to restore the evicted tenants to their former 
holdings. However, where the evicted tenant’s former holding was occupied, the only 
option was to create a new holding out of untenanted land and landlords, in general, 
were unwilling to sell such land because they could let it under the profitable eleven- 
month system. Furthermore, the evicted tenants had competition for the limited amount 
of untenanted land because such land was required under the act to relieve congestion, 
assist migration and enlarge uneconomic holdings. The sons of tenants and the landless 
were also eligible for holdings created out of untenanted land. The attorney-general for 
Ireland, John Atkinson revealed in March 1905 that untenanted land accompanying an
estate was to go towards enlarging uneconomic holdings first and evicted tenants
22second.
The I.P.P. became increasingly frustrated by the lack of progress as regards the 
purchase of untenanted land and the relief of congestion. John Dillon began the year 
1905 with a speech at Swinford, Co. Mayo, where he reiterated that the Wyndham Act 
was a ‘dismal failure’ in the congested districts due to the failure to procure grazing 
lands and to create economic holdings and the high purchase prices. He declared that the 
policy of conciliation towards the landlords had proved futile as they had refused to 
reciprocate the good will of the tenants. The M.P. for East Mayo spoke again at Tuam, 
Co. Galway on 7 January where he called for compulsory purchase to be introduced in 
the west and for the abolition of the ‘zones’ which had inflated the price of land.
21 Ibid.
22 H an sard  4, cx lii, 676  (7 M ar. 1905).
23 F.J., 4 Jan. 1905.
285
Although the price ‘zones’ did not apply in the congested districts, Dillon argued that 
they had still raised prices in the west because landlords were determined to get the same 
prices for their lands as landlords in Munster and Leinster.24
John Redmond opened 1905 with a speech in Roscommon town on 5 January. 
The I.P.P. leader avowed that the land question in the west would never be resolved until 
the grazing ranches were divided among the tenantry to create economic holdings. As 
Dillon had stated at Swinford the previous day, Redmond stressed that compulsory
7 S —powers would be necessary to break up the grasslands. ' At Portumna, Co. Galway on 8 
January Redmond repeated his view on compulsory purchase. He announced that the 
grasslands would have to be compulsorily acquired ‘either within or without the law- 
“upon my word”...“I don’t care which’” .26 The tone of the speech was more 
inflammatory and aggressive that any he had made since the act was passed. Redmond 
declared that there was a landlord conspiracy in the west which sought to force tenants 
to purchase at dangerously high prices. He claimed that landlords were taking advantage 
of the plight of tenants in the west enticing them to purchase by writing off a half year or 
a year’s rent, which in their miserable condition, was often enough to make them agree 
to exorbitant terms. Some landlords also threatened legal proceedings for arrears of rent 
in order to force tenants to purchase. Lastly, the leader of the I.P.P. made a rather salient 
point concerning the ‘bonus’. He warned landlords that the ‘bonus’ would be reviewed 
five years after the passing of the act and that if they refused to sell or persisted in 
holding out for extravagant prices, the generous terms on offer might be rescinded by
9 7future legislation.
T. W. Russell asserted that the failure of the land act in the west was as a result 
of the deliberate attempts of landlords to thwart the good intentions of the act by 
refusing to sell to the C.D.B. or the estates commissioners. Instead, landlords attempted 
to sell directly to the tenants at inflated prices and they refused to part with the 
grasslands which were needed to relieve congestion. In Russell’s opinion, that was the 
crux of the problem and he recommended that the act be amended and compulsory
24 Ibid., 7 Jan. 1905.
25 Ibid., 6 Jan. 1905.
26 I T .,  9 Jan. 1905.
27 Ibid.
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purchase applied. Despite the fact that his main concern was Ulster, the M.P. for South 
Tyrone recognised that the western question was of primary importance and that it had 
to be resolved before the land question could be settled. He admitted that ‘there... [were] 
other questions and other issues that ...[could] wait. The western problem demands 
instant settlement’.28
The members of the I.P.P. were also keen to emphasise to the government that 
the 1903 land act had failed in the province of Connaught. Its failure in the west was 
akin to an outright failure as far as they were concerned. As John Redmond outlined: ‘If 
the Irish Land Act of 1903 failed in Connaught it failed in Ireland. No number of sales 
of land to comparatively prosperous tenants in other parts of Ireland could by any 
possibility settle the Irish land question as long as the real seat of the disease remained
9Quntouched.’ The I.P.P. firmly believed that the redistribution of untenanted land to 
enlarge uneconomic holdings should be at the forefront of the Wyndham Act. However, 
by 1905 little progress had been made and they sought additional powers for the C.D.B. 
and the estates commissioners to tackle congestion and the evicted tenants question. 
Even some landlords, such as the earl of Dunraven, were ready to concede that the 
Wyndham Act was not tackling congestion:
Parliament intended that the effect of the act should be that the estates 
commissioners would obtain possession of a sufficient quantity of good land to 
add to these uneconomic holdings, and apparently that has not taken place... 
There is no question at all that the act is to a very large extent a failure as regards 
the uneconomic portions of the west, mainly in Connaught.30
On 4 July 1905, John Redmond moved for the adjournment of the House of 
Commons due to the reactivation of sections of the Coercion Act in Co. Galway. The 
arrest of many members of the U.I.L. in the county on charges such as unlawful 
assembly was a source of grievance for the nationalists, who held that the meetings had 
simply been called to highlight the failure of the land act and the failure to break up the 
grasslands. Throughout July 1905 trials were heard at the Galway assizes and a number
28 A y ., 18 Jan. 1905.
29 H an sard  4, cx lii, 1470 (14  M ar. 1905).
30 Ib id ., cxlix , 689-90  (1 1 July 1905).
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of men were accused of sending threatening letters, boycotting, unlawful assembly and 
various other forms of intimidation against graziers. Their object was to force graziers to 
give up their grasslands and the majority of the men tried were linked to the U.I.L.3' The 
government was accused by the I.P.P. of attempting to curry favour with unionists and 
the landlord class through the use of coercion. However, the I.U.P.P. emphasised that 
there was an ongoing illegal campaign to drive graziers off their lands and that the 
motion had only been raised because the government was cracking down on the U.I.L. 
so as to loosen its control in the western districts. George Wyndham’s successor as chief 
secretary, Walter Long, dismissed allegations that the government was responsible for 
the sluggish operation of the act in the west and asserted that the act was making steady 
progress. In fact, he placed the blame for any breakdown of the measure on the I.P.P.:
The responsibility lay with hon. gentlemen opposite for retarding the operations 
of the act if they made speeches supporting a policy which sought to bring grass 
land into the market by illegitimate and coercive measures rather than by 
supporting the policy of maintaining the law and carrying out the development of 
the land act of 1903 by legitimate and peaceful methods.
Upon going to a division, the motion for the adjournment of the House of Commons was
defeated by 176 votes to 136.33
IV). Regulations.
The I.P.P. was angered and frustrated by Conservative government regulations which 
were hampering the efforts of the estates commissioners to solve the land question. The 
Conservative govermnent claimed that the directions received by the estates 
commissioners were in the form of written correspondence which could not be 
published. The attorney-general for Ireland, John Atkinson, told the house that no formal 
regulations had been compiled but that confidential instructions had passed between 
George Wyndham and the commissioners. Wyndham had resigned as chief secretary at 
the beginning of March 1905 on health grounds. However, his resignation probably had 
more to do with the controversy which had erupted in 1904 over the nature of Sir
31 S e e /T . ,  1 9 ,2 1 ,2 2 ,2 4  and 25 Ju ly  1905.
^  H a n sa rd 4, cx lv iii, 1097 (4 Ju ly  1905).
33 Ibid., col. 1071-1104.
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Anthony MacDonnell’s appointment as under secretary. Atkinson refuted the claims of 
the I.P.P. and T.W. Russell that such instructions were supposed to be printed.34 The 
confusion and lack of transparency surrounding the regulations under which the estates 
commissioners operated worried the I.P.P. There was a lack of information about the 
act’s operation and apart from the ad interim report of 1904, the estates commissioners 
had not issued another report. Both parliament and the public were in the dark as regards 
the act’s operation and it was only in September 1905 that the first annual report of the 
estates commissioners was issued.
The Conservative government issued printed instructions to purchase inspectors 
in February 1905 and regulations in July. The regulations of July 1905 proved a major
-i c
source of friction. ' These only compounded the difficulties facing the estates 
commissioners in solving the issue of evicted tenants. In their report for the period up to 
31 March 1906, commissioners Bailey and Finucane condemned these instructions and 
regulations as they ‘contained provisions which, in the commissioners’ opinion, 
seriously impeded the expeditious and efficient working of the act, especially in the 
matters of the acquisition of untenanted land... [and] the restoration of evicted tenants’.36 
Flowever, commissioner Wrench differed in his views. Fie held that they should not 
comment on such issues and should follow the directions of the government of the day
t •i
without comment.
The first regulation prevented the estates commissioners from favouring one 
class of sale over another. All sales of ‘estates’ or untenanted land whether in the Land 
Judge’s Court, to the Estates Commission or direct to the tenants were to be treated 
equally. Effectively, the advances were to be allocated according to the date on which 
the agreement to sell was made. However, the commissioners had the power, in special
TO
circumstances, to accelerate or even defer the sale. Sales to the estates commissioners
34 Ib id ., col. 678-80.
35 R egulations m ade by the lo rd  lieu tenant under sec tion  (23) (8) o f  the Irish  L an d  Act, 1903 , [Cd. 2604] 
H .C . 1905, lxv. 559.
j6 R eport o f  the esta tes com m issioners f o r  the y e a r  ending 31" March, 1906 an d  f o r  the p e r io d fro m  1" 
N ovem ber, 1903, to  31 M arch, 1906, iv, [Cd. 3148], H .C. 1906, xxv, 237.
37 Ibid., p. iv.
38 R egulations m ade by the lo rd  lieu tenant under sec tion  (23) (8) o f  the Irish  L an d  Act, 1903, [Cd. 2604] 
H .C . 1905, lxv. 559
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had been minimal. This prevented the execution of those sections of the act dealing with 
the improvement of estates and evicted tenants. Landlords, such as the earl of Dunraven, 
believed that the regulations would stifle any hope of implementing those sections 
because the current huge volume of direct sales between landlords and tenants would 
have to be dealt with first. Even if landlords could be persuaded to sell to the estates 
commissioners, they would have a lengthy wait before the large number of direct sales 
ahead of them was cleared. Sales in the Land Judge’s Court would be in the same 
position. Dunraven argued then that the finance for land purchase should be divided 
between the three methods of sale which would alleviate the block in the land court and 
encourage more sales to the commissioners.
John Redmond denounced the new regulations as they had ‘completely knocked 
the bottom out of the land act so far as the evicted tenants and the congested districts 
were concerned’.40 He agreed with Dunravens’s proposal that the £5,000,000 for 
advances should be divided up between the three methods of sale. The first regulation, 
by enforcing a first-come first-served policy, ensured that the huge volume of sales 
already agreed, which were nearly all direct sales, would have to take precedence. 
Redmond claimed that in the case of direct sales, landlords were auctioning off the bulk 
of their grasslands before the sale for a tidy profit. The only real chance of obtaining 
untenanted land for evicted tenants and to alleviate congestion was through sales to the 
estates commissioners. The first regulation would thus have a detrimental effect on such 
sales.41
Regulation two dealt with the issue of intimidation. However, it addressed tenant 
intimidation of landlords and ignored landlord intimidation of tenants. In all sales, the 
estates commissioners were to inquire as to whether or not any intimidation, direct or 
indirect, had occurred. Where they found evidence of such activity, the application for 
sale was to be put to the end of the queue.42 Lord Clonbrock welcomed the regulation
39 H a n sa rd  4, cx lix , 691-3  (14 Ju ly  1905).
40 Ibid., col. 1 4 1 8 (2 0  Ju ly  1905).
41 Ib id ., col. 1418-20.
42 R egulations m ade by the lo rd  lieutenant under sec tion  (23) (8) o f  the Irish L and Act, 1903, [Cd. 2604] 
H .C . 1905, Ixv. 559
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and declared that the act was not thriving in the west because of U.I.L. intimidation.43 
The earl of Arran thought that the regulation would prove valuable and declared that ‘the 
knowledge that intimidation is discouraged is of the greatest use, because this is not 
meant so much as punishment for the offender but as a warning to others, and if people 
in Ireland know that intimidation will be severely punished they will hesitate before they
• i  44repeat it .
The I.P.P. protested vigorously against the second regulation. Redmond saw the 
regulation itself as a form of intimidation against tenants as it would silence any 
criticism or discussion of a sale.45 T.W. Russell was also unimpressed by the new 
regulations and claimed that they were proof that ‘there was a conspiracy to undo the 
philanthropic part of the act’.46 He questioned why intimidation by landlords had not 
been guarded against. He believed that some landlords were threatening to withhold 
bogs and using that threat to acquire an inflated price for their land. Yet the regulations 
did not provide any protection to tenants in such cases.47 The earl of Dunraven was one 
of the few Irish landlords in the House of Lords who did not wholeheartedly approve of 
the intimidation regulation. He failed to see how the estates commissioners could 
identify intimidation and foresaw a single threatening letter preventing the sale of an 
estate.48
It appeared that regulation three curtailed the Estates Commission’s power to 
acquire untenanted land and to* reinstate evicted tenants. Evicted tenants could only be 
given a farm on their original estate and the estate had to be up for sale. Evicted tenants 
who had lost their holdings ‘in consequence of some general rent dispute’ were to take 
preference.49 This effectively confined the commissioners to dealing with tenants from 
‘Plan of Campaign’ estates. The estates commissioners, in their reports, had outlined 
how the majority of those estates were already settled or were in the process of 
settlement. Despite that, there had been 4,275 applications to the commissioners from
43 H an sard  4, cx lix , 702-4  (14 Ju ly  1905),
44 Ibid., col. 708-10,
45 Ibid., col. 1420-2 (20 Ju ly  1905).
46 Ib id ., col. 1437.
47 Ib id ., col. 1433.
48 Ibid., col. 693-4  (14 Ju ly  1905).
49 Ibid.
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persons claiming to be evicted tenants. The vast majority o f these cases were now 
relegated in terms of importance.
The third regulation confined the commissioners to using any untenanted land 
acquired to reinstate a former evicted tenant, to enlarge the holding of a tenant on the 
estate or to provide a holding for his son and any tenant in the neighbourhood whose 
valuation was below £5. ‘Neighbourhood of the estate’ essentially meant right beside the 
estate so tenants from other areas could not be moved. Even if there was land available, 
the commissioners could not use it except for those specific purposes. Any other class of 
tenant could not be given a parcel of land. The migration of tenants from other 
congested areas was also ruled out. As the earl of Dunraven pointed out, the 
commissioners were ‘not allowed to use it [land] in the way the act intended they 
should. The regulation restricts them to using the land in a particular manner. The effect 
of which is to absolutely stop migration’.50 Indeed there was truth in Dunraven’s 
assertion that the regulations effectively repealed sections o f the 1903 land act.
Amazingly, the estates commissioners’ report for the period up to 31 March 1905 
stated that no advances for untenanted land under section eight o f the 1903 act had been 
made although negotiations were pending for 5,277 acres.51 Under sections six, seven 
and eight, offers to purchase untenanted land had been made and there were ongoing 
negotiations for 56,858 acres.52 The report clearly demonstrated that there were severe 
difficulties in acquiring untenanted land and that little was being done to provide or 
improve holdings for those groups under section two of the 1903 act.
The fact that the vast majority of sales were direct sales between landlords and 
tenants curtailed the estates commissioners’ ability to acquire untenanted land. As 
already mentioned, when such land was not part of a tenanted estate it could only be 
purchased under section eight. This confined the estates commissioners to the purchase 
of untenanted land that they considered to be essential to the resale or redistribution of 
estates sold to them or purchased from the land judge. As the bulk of the sales were
50 Ibid., col. 696.
51 R eport o f  the esta tes com m issioners f o r  the y e a r  en ding  31 M arch 1905 an d  f o r  the p e r io d  fro m  1st 
N ovem ber 1903 to  31st M arch 1905, 6, [C d .2742  ] H .C. 1906, xxv, 183.
52 Ib id ., p .51.
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direct, the estates commissioners had little opportunity to purchase untenanted land. 
Under the regulations of 1905, they could only allocate parcels o f untenanted land to 
those classes of tenants specified in section two. This regulation effectively ruled out the 
migration of tenants from other areas even if there was land available. Funds for 
improvements were to come out of the Reserve Fund which was wholly inadequate. The 
lack of finance and the difficulties in the acquisition of untenanted land meant that the 
act had made modest progress as regards congestion. Therefore the social, philanthropic 
and humanitarian objectives of the act, upon which George Wyndham had placed such 
emphasis, had not been realised.
A two-day National Convention of the U.I.L. was held on 6 and 7 December
ST •1905 at the Mansion House, Dublin. The land question and the 1903 land act featured 
prominently in the proceedings and the convention revealed the depth of dissatisfaction 
with the act. The delegates unanimously acknowledged that the act was a failure in the 
congested districts and in the west. This was attributed, in no small part, to the 
regulations restricting the commissioners. While land purchase was progressing rapidly 
in the rich lands of the north and the east, little progress was being made in the west 
where not land purchase but land redistribution was the measure urgently required. The 
failure of the estates commissioners to acquire untenanted land had retarded the 
execution of the philanthropic clauses of the land act such as the redistribution of land to 
create economic holdings and the migration of tenants from congested areas to new 
holdings.
In the general election of early 1906 the Liberal party swept to power with a 
sizable majority. The instructions and regulations issued by the Conservatives were 
replaced. The estates commissioners were allowed to approach the owner of an estate, 
even he was not selling under the act, and offer to purchase land in order to reinstate an 
evicted tenant. Lists of evicted tenants were to be drawn up to aid the process of 
acquiring land for them. As regards untenanted land, the estates commissioners could 
now investigate the possibility of purchasing such land as an ‘estate’ on its own or 
alongside an ‘estate’ being sold under the act. When parcels of untenanted land were
531.T., 7 and 8 Dec. 1905
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allocated, under section two of the Wyndham Act, to evicted tenants or the other classes 
stipulated, the commissioners had to ensure that the tenant-purchaser had enough land to 
make an economic holding and that he would be able to repay his annuity. Lastly, the 
commissioners could act as arbitrators in disputes between landlord and tenants in the 
course of a sale.54 The new regulations appeared to have been concentrated on those 
areas of the act which the I.P.P. felt were not being executed satisfactorily, namely 
evicted tenants and untenanted land. The regulation dealing with intimidation and the 
sale o f estates was repealed and this undoubtedly influenced those nationalists who 
would become involved in the Ranch War. However, only time would tell whether or 
not the new regulations would make a difference
V). Report of the estates commissioners for the period ending 31 March 1906
In early September 1906, albeit six months late, the estates commissioners issued their 
annual report for the year up to 31 March 1906. Unlike the reports produced under the 
Conservative administration, which had been short and uninformative, the new report 
was comprehensive and almost twice as long. For the first time too the extraordinary 
differences of opinion between the three estates commissioners were revealed with W. 
F. Bailey and Michael Finucane making a series of recommendations to which Frederick 
Wrench refused to give his approval. Despite an increase in staff, the Estates 
Commission was still undermanned and its accommodation remained inadequate. 
Furthermore, the commissioners had to deal with over 600 parliamentary questions 
during the year 1905/6 alone.55 Responding to the inquiries had interfered with their 
regular work and had delayed the issue of their annual report. As already mentioned, the 
regulations of July 1905 and the instructions to purchase inspectors o f Februaiy 1905, 
supplied under the Conservative government, came in for severe criticism from Bailey 
and Finucane. The introduction of new regulations and instructions by the Liberals had 
resolved much of the difficulties.
54 R egula tions m ade by the lo rd  lieu tenant in pu rsu ance o f  the p ro v isio n s o f  sec tion  23  (8) o f  the Irish  
L an d  Act, 1903, [Cd. 2834] H .C. 1906. c.577.
55 R eport o f  the esta tes com m issioners f o r  the y e a r  ending 31s' March, 1906 an d  fo r  the p e r io d  fro m  1" 
N ovem ber, 1903, to  31 M arch, 1906, ix, [Cd. 3148], H .C. 1906, xxv, 237.
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Legal difficulties had impeded the working of the act. There had been 
uncertainty as to the powers o f the estates commissioners, under sections six (sales to the 
commissioners) and seven (sales in the Land Judge’s Court), to buy untenanted land as 
part o f an ‘estate’. If they were unable to do so then the question arose as to whether 
untenanted land sold on its own could be declared an ‘estate’ under section eight. It was 
uncertain if the commissioners could acquire untenanted land under section eight, except 
‘for the purpose of facilitating the resale or redistribution of particular estates actually 
purchased or proposed to be purchased’.56 The treasury had refused to sanction money 
when an ‘estate’ consisted solely of untenanted land. However, in November 1905 the 
matter was settled in the Land Commission Court. The court sided with the 
commissioners and ruled that land entirely untenanted could be sold to the 
commissioners as an ‘estate’ under sections six and seven. The ruling undoubtedly 
furthered the estates commissioners’ efforts to acquire untenanted land.
The treasury had created significant problems by refusing to authorise advances 
to tenancies created from untenanted land. The commissioners had been left in a 
situation whereby ‘unless...[they] had persons coming within section two and four 
[advances to trustees for purposes such as turbary] ready to take up such land, although 
they could let it to tenants, they would not have been able to sell to them, and would be 
compelled to remain in the position of landlords collecting rent from them ’.57 The 
treasury had maintained the same stance for over two years but not long into the Liberal 
government’s tenure it had agreed to sanction advances.
Commissioners Bailey and Finucane had expressed anxiety about the financial 
security for the government in the sale of ‘estates’ which were congested or primarily 
consisted o f uneconomic holdings. They feared that the tenant-purchasers would be 
unable to repay their amiuities over such a long period. In such holdings, it was not the 
land that paid the majority of the rent but remittances from America.58 Circumstances 
could change dramatically over the course of the repayment period of sixty-eight and a 
half years. Unlike rent, which could be reviewed every fifteen years, the annuities would
56 Ibid., iv.
57 Ibid., v.
58 Ibid., v ii-viii.
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have to be paid in full without any reduction for almost three-quarters of a century. The 
estates commissioners reported:
There is no certainty that the assistance obtained from outside sources will 
continue, and, if the holding comes into the hands of an occupier who does not or 
is not able to supplement the return from the holding by other means, there can 
be no security for an annuity which is not produced out of the land itself. The 
fact that large prices are often obtained for the right to occupy such holdings is 
not a proper or a safe basis for an estimate of security. These prices are due to 
local causes or the land hunger which the land legislation of recent years is 
intended to discount both in the fixing of fair rents and in estimating the security 
for purchase advances.59
Commissioner Wrench, however, did not give any opinion on the subject but felt that
matters such as money from America or changes in the market were unsuitable for
inclusion in their report.60
Cases had come before the estates commissioners where they had refused to 
declare a section of land an ‘estate’ due to the actions of the landlords. Some landlords 
had divided up their untenanted land and auctioned it off for rent to graziers or 
substantial farmers. Subsequently, the landlord proceeded to sell the land to the new 
occupier under the Wyndham Act. These methods, apart from inciting the anger o f the 
other tenants in the area and those other groups who also hoped to obtain a parcel of 
untenanted land, allowed the landlord to make a significant financial profit. In such 
cases, commissioners Bailey and Finucane felt the actions of landlords were in breach of 
the ideals of the act and they held that such vendors had no entitlement to the ‘bonus’. 
Wrench, however, declared that, upon inquiry, he had discovered only three such cases 
had officially come to their attention. He stressed that there was nothing in the act to 
make such transactions illegal so long as the tenancy was real and the transaction 
genuine.61
The estates commissioners had also come across instances whereby agreements 
to fix judicial rents had not been genuine but had been made ‘for the purpose of bringing 
the cases within the ‘zones’, and thus withdrawing then from the jurisdiction of the
Ib id ., viii.
60 Ib id ., viii
61 Ib id ., v iii-ix.
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commissioners as to equity o f price and security’.62 They had refused to recognise these 
as judicial rents but held that they were agreements outside the ‘zones’.
VI). The C.D.B. and the western problem.
The fifteenth annual report of the C.D.B., for the year ending 31 March 1906 was issued 
in early October 1906. Under the Wyndham Act the board had purchased 103 ‘estates’ 
for £1,220,135 up to that date. These ‘estates’ consisted of 263,175 acres of which 
68,306 was untenanted land.63 The C.D.B had encountered a number of difficulties in its 
attempts to address congestion. The costs involved in migrating tenants and improving 
estates had been a considerable drain on its resources. The board hoped the treasury 
would sanction a loan from the Board of Works to assist it in its attempts to enlarge 
tenants’ holdings. The C.D.B. also felt that new legislation was urgently needed in two 
areas. Firstly, there was considerable trouble clearing title in cases where tenants were 
being migrated or were exchanging holdings on estates purchased. Secondly, the board 
wished to amend section seventy-five of the Wyndham Act which dealt with purchases 
by the board of congested estates which were not located in the congested districts. The 
board appealed for greater powers to tackle congestion in the area of these congested 
estate as their powers outside their designated districts were limited under the 1903 act.64
Dissatisfaction with the Wyndham Act was not confined to the I.P.P. The 
independent unionist T.W. Russell bemoaned the absence of compulsion and felt that 
this was the cause of the act’s failure in the west:
The big well-to-do farmers of Kildare - the men whose ancestors were brought 
by the duke of Leinster from Scotland after the famine - have all bought their 
land under the act, and the Leinster estate has ceased to exist as such...But the 
wretched holders of small bog holdings in the west are still left in their 
misery.. .This is the most serious point of failure. With the west unsettled nothing 
is settled...In a word, both the estates commissioners and the Congested Districts
62 Ib id ., ix. See chap te r th ree  fo r d iscussion  o f  the ‘z o n e s ’ and ju d ic ia l rents.
63 F ifteenth rep o rt o f  the C o n gested  D istric ts  B o a rd  fo r Ire la n d  fo r  the y e a r  ending 31s' M arch, 1906, 8 
[C d .3 161] H .C . 1906, xcv ii, 493.
64 Ib id ., p. 11.
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Board must have compulsory powers against men who persist in a whole
province being steeped in misery, with the means of relief at hand.65
The Liberal chief secretary, James Bryce, was sympathetic to nationalist 
grievances. He pointed out that the replacement of the Conservatives’ regulations ought 
to expedite reform in the areas of untenanted land and the evicted tenants. Furthermore, 
he indicated his support for the establishment o f economic holdings through the 
redistribution of land.66 Despite the chief secretary’s benevolence, the questions of 
congestion, evicted tenants and untenanted land would continue to resurface in 
parliament.
‘Connaught was responsible for the act o f 1903, but Connaught, that deserved 
most, had derived least from it. As a remedy for congestion the act of 1903 was a 
failure’.67 This statement by Conor O’Kelly, M.P. for North Mayo, on 28 June 1906 
typified the attitude of the I.P.P. to the failure of the act in the province and in the west 
of Ireland. I.P.P. calls to introduce compulsory purchase or even pre-emption, rejected 
during the debates on the 1903 land act, were becoming increasingly vocal among its 
M.P.s in the House of Commons.
The fact that the vast majority of sales were made directly between landlords and 
tenants and not to the estate commissioners was of consequence. Neither the C.D.B. nor 
the commissioners could acquire sufficient untenanted land to relieve congestion and 
enlarge uneconomic holdings. According to T. W. Russell:
When the western sections of the act were being passed, Mr. W yndham...provided 
for the sale of congested estates to the estates commissioners or to the Congested 
Districts Board. Special inducements were given to sales under these sections. The 
cost of sale was borne almost entirely by the state, and the commissioners were 
authorised in such cases to spend money upon the improvement of the holdings. The 
policy was excellent. But the landlords have ruined it. They quickly discovered that if 
they sold to the estates commissioners the land would be inspected by an expert 
valuer, and its price would depend on its value. This was not their idea of how things 
should be done. They preferred to sell to the tenant direct, against whom they could 
use the screw of arrears of rent, and from whom they could exact a higher price.68
65 R ussell, ‘T he Irish  land question : w hat rem ains to  be d o n e ’, p. 10.
66 H an sard  4, clv i, 813-18 (3 M ay 1906).
61 Ib id ., clix , 1162 (28 June 1906).
68 R ussell, ‘T he Irish  land  question : w hat rem ains to  be d o n e ’, p. 9.
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A royal commission to inquire into congestion was proposed which the I.P.P. 
hoped would serve as a precursor to comprehensive legislation on untenanted land and 
the congested districts. The Liberal government proved receptive to the idea of a 
commission on congestion. The chief secretary, James Bryce, announced that ‘His 
Majesty’s government had come to the conclusion that an inquiry into the problem of 
congestion in Ireland would be a very proper and seasonable inquiry.’69 The commission 
would be chaired by the earl of Dudley with Walter Callan, assistant secretary to the lord 
lieutenant, appointed as secretary. The other members o f the commission included Sir 
Anthony MacDonnell, the bishop of Raphoe, Sir John Colomb, Sir Francis Mowatt, J. 
Annan Bryce, Conor O ’Kelly, Angus Sutherland and W. McMurrough Kavanagh.
VII). The Land Conference reconvenes to consider the evicted tenants question.
In October 1906, all the members of the Land Conference reconvened in Dublin with the 
exception of John Redmond and the earl of Mayo, to consider the question of the evicted 
tenants. The proposal for the Land Conference to reassemble had been put forth by the 
Cork Evicted Tenants’ Association as the Wyndham Act had failed to resolve the issue. 
Redmond declined to attend, arguing that the ‘remedy...[was] not to be found in an 
attempt to reconstitute a body whose functions [had] been fulfilled.70 At Grange, Co. 
Limerick on 23 September, Redmond had confirmed that the I.P.P. intended to pursue 
the acquisition and break up of the grasslands in partnership with the reinstatement of 
evicted tenants.71 Despite his wish to resolve the evicted tenants question, Redmond 
could not afford to exacerbate the tensions within the I.P.P. With Dillon’s contempt for 
the Land Conference common knowledge, Redmond chose to abstain from the 
reconvention of the Land Conference to avoid splitting the party.
On 22 October 1906 the report of the reconvened Land Conference was
72published in the press. A copy of the report was sent to the Liberal prime minister, the 
chief secretary and the lord lieutenant. The conference members recognised that unless
69 H an sard  4, clix , 1208, (28 June  1906).
70I T ,  20 Sept. 1906.
711.1, 24  Sept. 1906.
72 See F .J., 20  O ct. 1906.
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the evicted tenants question was settled, the Irish land question would never be resolved. 
They admitted that the sections o f the Wyndham Act dealing with the problem had 
failed. This was attributed, for the most part, to the constraints placed on the estates 
commissioners who were confined to estates being sold under the act. Secondly, the 
commissioners were restricted in that the tenant could only be put back on his original 
estate if  it was up for sale and if there was surplus land on it or he could be given a 
holding on another estate being sold. The Land Conference members argued that the 
commissioners needed to be given wider and more defined powers to deal with the issue.
The conference members recommended a simplification of proving title, an 
increase in staff for the Estates Commission and that the Reserve Fund, from which 
money for improvements was obtained, be taken out of the control of the treasury and 
put in the commissioners’ hands. It was proposed that the Reserve Fund be used 
exclusively for dealing with evicted tenants so long as sufficient finance was provided to 
cover the other sections of the act which relied upon the fund. With the bulk of the sales 
being direct sales between landlords and tenants and not to the estates commissioners, 
the commissioners were restricted in their ability to restore evicted tenants. The only 
section o f the report where the Land Conference members failed to unanimously agree 
was the recommendation to introduce compulsory purchase to assist in the reinstatement 
of evicted tenants. The earl of Dunraven, Colonel Nugent Everard and Colonel 
Hutcheson-Poe did not support that recommendation citing that more tenants had been 
reinstated by landlords than by the Estates Commission. They held that it was the 
regulations introduced by the Conservative government which had restricted the 
resolution o f the issue but now that they had been ousted from government and the 
regulations withdrawn, they hoped ensure greater progress would ensue under the 
Liberals.
The 1906 Land Conference report was savagely attacked by John Dillon. He 
viewed the conference as an attempt by Dunraven and other moderate landlords to 
replace the I.P.P. as the dominant force in Irish politics. As for the report, he declared 
that it did not ‘contain one single practical suggestion of the smallest value...[and
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showed] an incredible ignorance of the history of the question'.73 The question of 
evicted tenants came in for further scrutiny when John Redmond moved a motion for the 
adjournment of the House of Commons, in order to have the matter discussed in October 
1906. With the publicity that the Land Conference’s report received, Redmond was 
probably trying to retake the initiative on the question and reaffirm the commitment of 
the I.P.P. to the evicted tenants.
According to James Bryce, who had been appointed chief secretary by the 
Liberals after their 1906 election success, there were four main reasons for the previous 
lack of progress in reinstating the evicted tenants. Firstly, many ‘planter’ tenants simply 
refused to give up the holdings they occupied. Secondly, there was a shortage of 
untenanted land which landlords would agree to sell. Thirdly, evicted tenants from 
outside a locality often encountered hostility from the locals who felt that their needs 
should be catered for before introducing outsiders. Finally, certain landlords were simply 
unwilling to give up the former holdings o f evicted tenants that they held.74
The I.P.P. held that the settlement of the question was vital if  the land question 
was ever to be solved. The leader of the party, John Redmond, was not slow to remind 
the government in the House of Commons of the pledges which had been given in 1903:
He said without hesitation that the Land Act of 1903 would never have been 
canned were it not that that land bill held forth the promise, and that the 
promoters of the bill in the most explicit way held forth the promise in public and 
in private that it would mean the speedy settlement of the question of the evicted 
tenants.75
Initially the I.P.P. had blamed the regulations imposed by the Conservative government 
for the delays in reinstatement. However, even after those regulations had been 
withdrawn by the Liberals, they found that very little progress had been made. While the 
Liberal government had cited a number of reasons for this, the I.P.P. put it down to two 
distinct causes, the unwillingness of landlords to sell untenanted land and the refusal of 
those tenants who held evicted holdings to relinquish them. Their solution to these
73 Ibid., 22 O ct. 1906.
74 H an sard  4, c lx iii, 716-7  (29 O ct. 1906).
75 Ib id ., col. 779.
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obstacles was to give the estates commissioners compulsory powers to reinstate the 
evicted tenants.
During the Wyndham Act’s passage through parliament the unionist position had 
been reasonable and conciliatory but by 1906 this had all changed. The I.U.P.P. believed 
that the I.P.P. were using the evicted tenants question as a weapon to achieve political 
goals. They were concerned almost solely with the progress of land purchase and were 
anxious that time, staff and finance which ought to be utilised to further the transfer of 
land would be diverted towards others aspects such as evicted tenants. With land 
purchase floundering due to financial difficulties, the I.U.P.P. was keen that efforts 
would not be wasted on what they considered a minor objective of the act. They were 
opposed to ‘estates’ with evicted tenants being given preference over other ‘estates’ 
being sold and to the introduction of compulsion in order to move the ‘planter’ tenants. 
Upon Colonel Saunderson’s death in October 1906, the former Conservative chief 
secretary, Walter Long, M.P. for Dublin County South, had become the leader of the 
I.U.P.P. in the House of Commons. He epitomised the unionist attitude: ‘At present 
many landlords and tenants who had entered into arrangements were being kept waiting,
76and every step of this kind meant more delay for them. ’
The frustration felt by the I.P.P. manifested itself in November 1906. A bill was 
introduced, by W. J. Duffy, M.P. for South Galway, to expropriate the estates of the 
marquess of Clanricarde. There was a large number of evicted tenants from the estate 
who the marquess refused to reinstate or even negotiate with. Duffy revealed that a ‘state 
of unrest and disaffection, constantly bordering on rebellion and civil war’ existed on the
• • 77  •estate and in the adjoining areas. The Liberal prime minister, Sir Henry Campbell- 
Bannerman, was sympathetic and declared that it was ‘distressing beyond measure that a
♦ • 7Rgreat landlord like... [Clanricarde] should use and abuse his powers’. While the 
government empathised, the bill was not taken any further as the parliamentary session 
was almost over.
76 Ib id ., col. 811.
77 Ibid., clxvi, 89 (28 N ov. 1906).
78 Ib id ., col. 92.
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In early February 1907, John Redmond and John Dillon received a deputation 
representing the evicted tenants from the Clanricarde and Lewis estates in Co. Galway. 
These were the only estates, investigated under the evicted tenants commission of 1893, 
which remained unresolved. The deputation outlined how the estates commissioners 
had had no success and they hoped that the I.P.P. would highlight their plight. Redmond 
responded by predicting that compulsory purchase was inevitable if the evicted tenants 
question was to be confronted and he hoped that it would arrive in the coming 
parliamentary session.79
Just over a week later the I.P.P. drew attention to the evicted tenants question in 
the House of Commons. J. P. Hayden, M.P. for South Roscommon, seconded by Hugh 
Law, M.P. for West Donegal, proposed that the Wyndham Act had not solved the 
evicted tenants question and that urgent action needed to be taken to restore the tenants 
to their old holdings as speedily as possible.80 John Dillon reiterated that the 1903 act 
had only been passed because the I.P.P. had been promised that the evicted tenants 
question would be resolved. Yet after more than three years the situation remained 
unacceptable.81
The new Liberal chief secretary, Augustine Birrell, had replaced James Bryce in 
early 1907, after Bryce was appointed British ambassador to the United States. The 
Conservatives had pledged to find a solution to the evicted tenants question but they had 
failed to do so, and the onus was now on the Liberal government to honour that pledge. 
According to Birrell:
The bargain was made and the people for whose benefit it was made now come 
to us, pointing out that three and a half years have gone by, and those promises 
are only very partially fulfilled. That is the general spirit in which we approach 
the bargain, I recognise the obligation, I admit the length of time, and I agree as 
cordially as any man can do that this is a question that brooks no delay, not only 
in the interests of the evicted tenants themselves, but in the interests, for which I 
am particularly responsible, of peace and order in Ireland.82
791.T., 7 Feb. 1907.
80 H an sard  4, c lx ix , 340-1 (14 Feb. 1907).
81 Ibid., col. 341-52.
82 Ib id ., col. 364-5 .
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Birrell’s announcement was greeted with enthusiasm by the I.P.P.. There was the 
prospect of future legislation, with the possibility of compulsory purchase being 
introduced to resolve the evicted tenants question.
VIIIL The Ranch War.
A new movement which sought to break-up the grazing ranches was launched in Co. 
Westmeath on 14 October 1906. Following the appointment of a royal commission to 
examine congestion in the west, nationalist M.P.s such as Laurence Ginnell (North 
Westmeath) anticipated that legislation would be introduced to permit the compulsory 
purchase of grasslands in the congested districts. However, there were also plenty of 
grazing ranches in the midlands, Leinster and north Munster. Ginnell and his supporters 
were determined to ensure that the rest of the country would not be left behind. The 
Freeman’s Journal reported Ginnell:
For a long time past they had been hearing a demand for the distribution of the 
untenanted land in Connaught. He had always maintained that the people of 
Leinster and Munster had an equal right to have the grazing lands 
distributed...he (Mr. Ginnell) did not propose to allow any measure to pass 
which did not include the grazing lands of Meath, Westmeath, King’s County 
and Kildare and Tipperary from which the people had been exterminated. He 
sympathised with any effort to split up the untenanted land of Connaught, but 
why, he asked, should not the untenanted land of Leinster and Munster be
83divided up amongst the people?
John Hayden, M.P. for South Roscommon, and Dennis Kilbride, M.P. for South 
Kildare, accompanied Ginnell at the movement’s initiation in October 1906 at The 
Downs just outside Mullingar, Co. Westmeath. The M.P. for North Westmeath 
advocated a method of agitation known as cattle driving. The agitation was aimed at 
graziers and those who held land on the eleven-month system. The Irish Times reported 
his speech:
If the graziers found their ranches empty some fine morning, and after six or 
eight weeks found their cattle not all together, but some in Connaught, some in 
Munster and some among the Wicklow mountains...and some in the glens of
83 F.J., 16 Apr. 1906.
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Antrim: and if they persisted in it from now until next Christmas, the ranchers 
would lose their taste for people’s land...leave those ranches unfenced, unused, 
unusable, unstocked, uncut, to bleed and wither and whiten and rot before the 
world.84
Ginnell intended to launch a vigorous campaign that would pressurise the government 
into breaking up the grazing ranches, not just in congested districts but throughout the 
country.
Following Laurence Ginnell’s advocacy of a war on graziers and the eleven- 
month system, it was not long before a period of agrarian unrest, which would become 
known as the Ranch War, began. Historians have tended to date its commencement from 
the date of Ginnell’s speech at The Downs in October 1906. However, agrarian 
discontent had been simmering away in Connaught and areas of the west since the 
introduction of the Wyndham Act in November 1903. Much of the agitation had been 
directed towards landlords in an attempt to force them to sell or to offer better terms for 
purchase. As time passed, pressure mounted on landlords to sell their grasslands so they 
could be redistributed, and on graziers to surrender the land that they held under the 
eleven-month system. As tenants on small holdings in the west and throughout Ireland 
began to purchase they quickly realised that the ownership of their holdings did not 
make them economically viable overnight. They saw that the grazing ranches and 
grasslands would have to be broken up and redistributed in order to consolidate their 
farms and to create new economic holdings.
Furthermore, there were several groups who had not benefited from the 
Wyndham Act. Disinherited farmers’ sons, the landless and other sections of the 
agricultural community had seen the operation of the Wyndham Act as a chance to 
obtain holdings of their own but they had been disappointed. The evicted tenants and 
labourers, for whom the Wyndham Act had achieved little, realised that their only hope 
of acquiring land lay in the break up of the untenanted grasslands.
The agitation was encouraged by a number of junior I.P.P. members who had 
viewed the Wyndham Act with distrust and by late 1906 had become disillusioned with 
its provisions and its lack of progress in the acquisition of untenanted land. Laurence
84/T .,  15 Oct. 1906.
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Ginnell opined that ‘it is the greatest landlord relief act ever passed, the most extensive 
and successful raid ever made upon the pockets of the Irish people, and its ‘zones’
85relating to tenanted land the greatest instrument of extortion ever invented’. Aside 
from Ginnell, the other principal I.P.P. figures were J. P. Hayden (South Roscommon), 
J. P. Farrell (North Longford), David Sheehy (South Meath), Dennis Kilbride (South 
Kildare) and John Fitzgibbon (chairman of Roscommon County Council). The chief 
weapon employed was the driving or scattering of cattle. The agitation also involved 
boycotting and other forms of social ostracisation against graziers, landlords and those 
associated with the grasslands. Grazing tenancies usually ended on 1 May each year and 
the approach of that date in 1907 saw an escalation in agitation.
On 26 April 1907, for example, approximately 1,000 people marched to the
home of a grazier near Elphin, Co. Roscommon and sought to intimidate him into
86surrendering a farm he was renting under the eleven-month system. A few days later in 
the same county, a large crowd which including a band succeeded, despite clashes with 
the R.I.C., in scattering the cattle of two graziers. The agitation was not confined to 
Connaught and soon spread to other areas of the country. In King’s County, for example, 
Nathaniel Luttrell, a merchant who held land on an eleven-month tenancy, had his 
livestock on the Slieve Bloom Mountain driven through Roscrea town to his house 
door.87 On 2 May 1907 a large crowd clashed with police in Athenry, Co, Galway when
o o
they were prevented from demonstrating in front of the home of a grazier. Such 
incidents became increasingly common in many areas of the country throughout 1907. 
The anti-grazing movement deliberately appealed to the landless young men in rural 
society who had few other prospects except emigration as Laurence Ginnell recorded:
What the landless country people watch particularly is - how soon they are going 
to get the land. Less than that will not do; and they cannot afford to wait either, 
but must get it at once or move towards the emigrant ship. Why should they 
sacrifice themselves for the convenience of noble lords and gentlemen who are
o n
indifferent and to whom they are under no obligation.
85 L aurence  G innell, L an d  an d  liberty  (D ublin , 1908) p. 96.
86/. 71, 27 A pr. 1907.
87 Ib id ., 2  M ay  1907.
88 Ib id ., 3 M ay 1907.
89 G innell, L a n d  a n d  liberty, p. 218.
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Judge Ross, who presided over the Land Judge’s Court, condemned the agitation 
and outlined that there was a:
widespread and audacious conspiracy at present rampant in the west of 
Ire!and...this was actually a conspiracy which on ordinary moral grounds 
amounted to highway robbery, to seize on these grasslands, to drive away the 
stock of the people who had been in the habit of taking it, and then, and then 
when the owner had been starved out, the estates commissioners were expected 
to buy up the property and to distribute it among the very people who had been 
urging on the business, and who had been engaged in these outrages and 
unlawful assemblies.90.
On 4 and 5 June 1907, the anti-grazing campaign was debated in the House of Lords and
a heated discussion ensued. The Irish landowners in the house called on the government
to stamp out the agitation which they believed was being orchestrated by the U.I.L. They
maintained that the inflammatory public speeches of many nationalist members had
incited the people. The marquess of Londonderry accused the government, through its
failure to tackle the disturbances, of perpetuating the false belief that it supported this
unlawful campaign. In his opinion, the retraction of the intimidation regulation had
persuaded some that the government was secretly in favour of their crusade.91
Lord Clonbrock agreed with Londonderry’s comments. He held that ‘the people 
are firmly convinced that while the government would repress any overt act of violence, 
they look with no unfavourable eye on the agitation.. .as it may lead to the grass lands
92being sold by landlords at a low rate’. The government representatives in the Lords 
acknowledged that there was unrest and lawlessness in certain districts but claimed that 
it was being addressed and prosecutions were taking place. They contended that the 
country was not in such a state of anarchy as was claimed by some Irish landlords. 
However, Irish landlords and their supporters in the house were enraged by the 
statement of the Liberal peer, Lord Denman, that although cattle driving was a crime it 
could not be ‘considered a crime of a very serious nature’.
The earl of Donoughmore accused the agitators of using their campaign to obtain 
the grasslands at extremely low prices. He declared that the eleven-month system was
901.T., 18 M ay  1907.
91 H an sard  4 , c lxxv, 434-43 (4 June 1907).
92 Ibid., col. 447.
93 Ibid., col. 450.
307
not unlawful and should be protected by the government.94 Lord Ashbourne lambasted 
the government for its handling o f the agitation. He declared that the country was in the 
midst o f a revolution, whose chief weapons were cattle driving, boycotting, intimidation, 
malicious injury and terror.95
M any landlords believed that there were many more incidents that were not 
being reported because people had little faith in the R.I.C. taking firm action against the 
perpetrators. The letting o f land under the eleven-month system was a hugely valuable 
source o f income for the landowning class and the anti-grazing agitation was a direct 
threat to their interests. The Liberal government’s retraction o f  the regulation relating to 
intimidation was viewed as one o f the précipitants o f  the agitation. The belief that the 
government was sympathetic to the movement was widespread. This, in turn, only 
motivated the campaigners to redouble their efforts. From the agitators’ viewpoint, if the 
grazing lands remained unlet, the landlords would be forced to sell to the estates 
commissioners or the C.D.B.
By the end o f June 1907 conditions had deteriorated to such an extent that Lord 
Ashbourne declared the following in the House o f Lords:
The west o f Ireland is at the present mom ent so disturbed as to be in a state 
almost o f civil war. It is not suggested that there is a wide state o f general crime 
in the seven or eight counties where lawlessness exists, but it is asserted that 
there is what amounts to a conspiracy to make the lives o f those who own these 
grass lands a burden, and either to compel them to surrender their lands, or to 
induce them, when their lands are reduced almost to the zero value, to sell at 
gross under-valuation.96
There were calls in the House o f Lords to proclaim the U.I.L. as an illegal organisation
under the Coercion Act. Landlords felt that the organisation was fanning the flames o f
discontent in order to bring about the sale o f the grasslands at low prices. Suggestions
that the extent o f the agitation was being grossly exaggerated by unionists for political
means were refuted by the earl o f  Arran:
I know that the accusation has been made against Irish unionists that we try to 
make out that the condition o f Ireland is worse than it is in order to prejudice the
94 Ibid., col. 615-20  (5 June 1907).
95 Ibid., col. 633-39.
96 Ib id ., clxxvi, 828 (24  June 1907).
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English mind against granting home rule. I would be very sorry to think that 
anyone in a responsible position would stoop to believe a suggestion so 
baseless.97
In the House o f Commons the chief secretary, Augustine Birrell, was quick to 
emphasise that the government would not tolerate lawlessness and that it was tackling 
the agitation as best it could. The R.I.C. simply could not watch the stock o f  all graziers 
continuously. Cattle driving often occurred at night and the chances o f the police 
intercepting the drivers in the dark o f  the countryside were slim. Likewise the drivers 
often numbered hundreds o f people and would not be dissuaded by a handful o f police.
While condemning cattle driving the chief secretary, Augustine Birrell, could see 
how the unrest had arisen. In his opinion, the furore surrounding the W yndham Act had 
led people to believe that the land would be transferred rapidly and that the untenanted 
grazing ranches would be swiftly broken up and redistributed. W ith congested areas and 
small holdings usually bordering the grazing lands, it was easy to see how  discontent 
could arise. Birrell also held that graziers had done little to assist the R.I.C. or to protect 
their stock:
But these graziers had grown so much into the habit o f having police protection 
that they would do nothing to protect themselves. Often when the police gave 
them  notice o f a contemplated cattle drive from their lands, they neglected to 
turn up to assist the police even in the most im portant work o f the identification 
o f the offenders...These people had learned to rely on the Irish Constabulary, 
and had neglected their own powers o f defence and their own instincts o f 
preservation. He would not say that they should take firearms for their defence, 
but at least there should be there to assist the police against the ruffians o f  the
n o
neighbourhood and to identify their own property.
Birrell was loath to implement coercion as it would incite further agitation. However, he 
believed that the acquisition and division o f grazing lands was vitally im portant in 
removing the causes o f the unrest.99
Throughout July and August 1907 numerous meetings were held in the west, the 
midlands and north Munster. Laurence Ginnell was particularly active, concentrating on
97 Ib id ,  col. 818.
98 Ib id ,  c lxx ix , 223 (25 Ju ly  1907).
99 Ib id , col. 220-27.
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the counties of W estmeath and Meath. At Killelagh, Co. W estmeath, on 15 July he
cautioned the crowd against violence but simultaneously maintained that the government
did not consider cattle driving to be a serious crime, obviously taking his lead from Lord
D enm an’s statement in the House o f Lords.100 Ginnell was keen to avail o f section two
o f the Wyndham Act which enabled landless groups to obtain parcels untenanted land.
In essence, not enough untenanted land was being sold and divided in his opinion:
The section o f the agrarian agitation known as the anti-ranching m ovem ent has, 
in addition to its inherent moral strength, this legal justification - that its object is 
largely to make existing law operate. We are not concerned with the secret 
motives o f statesmen in enacting provisions for distributing untenanted land 
among people in need o f it, and then secretly preventing the operation o f these 
provisions. Those provisions may have served the statesm en’s purpose in helping 
the passage o f the operative provisions favourable to the m onopolists [landlords]. 
The people want to make their ostensible purpose their real one by making them 
operate. 01
In August 1907 Ginnell spoke before the Navan Board o f Guardians advocating the 
break-up o f the grazing ranches and the redistribution o f the land. He stressed that the 
campaign ought to be ‘carried on in Meath without injury to man or beast, because in 
that method only their strength lay’.102 The M.P. for North W estmeath acknowledged 
that many graziers were nationalists, nonetheless he asserted that the eleven-month 
system had to be destroyed or young men would be forced to emigrate.
In late August 1907, the six counties o f Clare, Galway, Longford, K ing’s 
County, Leitrim and Roscommon were proclaimed under the Coercion Act. These 
counties were considered to be in a state o f disturbance and extra police were to be 
immediately dispatched to restore peace to the areas. On 27 August news emerged that J. 
P. Farrell and fifteen other U.I.L. members had been arrested for ‘riotous and unlawful 
assem bly’ at grazing ranches near Newtownforbes, Co. Longford The m en were all
103members o f or linked to the South Longford branch of the league.
The government came in for fierce criticism for its lax attitude to the anti-grazing 
campaign. On 30 August the Irish Unionist Alliance met in Dublin to express its anger
100 I T . ,  16 Ju ly  1907.
101 G innell, L a n d  a n d  liberty, pp 181-2.
102 M eath C hron ic le , 17 A ug. 1907.
103 / . / . ,2 8  A ug. 1907.
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about the lawlessness that prevailed in many areas o f the country. Lord D enm an’s 
statement that cattle driving was not a serious crime and B irrell’s admonishments to 
graziers to defend their lands had angered many unionists. James Campbell, M.P. for 
T.C.D., was enraged by the lack o f government action against those I.P.P. members, 
such as Ginnell, who incited crowds at public meetings to attack the grazing system. 
Indeed many at the meeting felt that there was support among certain sections o f the 
government for the cam paign.104
W ith the end o f the parliamentary session in late August 1907, those I.P.P. 
members in favour o f the campaign began to appear regularly at public meetings in the 
disaffected areas. Ginnell spoke at Kill in South Meath on 1 September, where he urged 
his audience ‘to make it known far and wide that the 11 months system would not be 
allowed to continue in this country (hear, hear). They should not give the rancher 24 
hours more peace or grace’.105 David Sheehy, M .P for South M eath, warned graziers at 
Dunboyne on 22 September that if they took up an eleven-month lease, they would be in 
breach o f the wishes o f the populace and would have to bear the consequences.106
Judge Curran, at the opening o f the Longford quarter sessions in October 1907, 
condemned the cattle driving conspiracy which he viewed as an attack on private 
property. He protested that cattle driving, along with associated boycotting, was a 
serious crime and one which urgently needed to be addressed.107 Aside from cattle 
driving, the weapons used against the graziers included boycotting, threatening letters, 
the knocking o f walls and various other forms o f intimidation. Many instances went 
unreported, and even if  they were, the options o f  the R.I.C. to deal with them were 
limited. M oreover, where individuals were prosecuted for cattle driving, it was next to 
impossible to find a jury  able or willing to convict the drivers.
In Decem ber 1907 Ginnell gave a most revealing interview to the M idland  
Reporter where he confided that compulsory purchase would have to be introduced 
throughout Ireland. He vented his frustration at those I.P.P. members who were willing
104 Ib id ., 31 A ug. 1907.
105 M eath  C hronicle, 7 Sept. 1907.
106 Ib id ., 28 Sept. 1907.
107 I.T., 22  O ct. 1907.
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to settle for compulsory purchase in the west only. In order to force Augustine Birrell to 
introduce legislation to break up untenanted land in the midlands, he firmly believed that 
the grazing ranches would have to be kept clear o f stock.108 Soon after, Ginnell was 
arrested and sentenced to six months in prison. The charge against him, which was 
imposed by Judge Ross, was contempt o f court for promoting cattle driving on an estate 
held by the Land Judge’s Court.
IX). Unionist and landlord opposition to the Ranch War.
W hile the anti-grazing campaign had escalated following the end o f the parliamentary 
session for 1907, an opposing campaign had been launched by Irish unionists and 
landlords with the support o f many Conservative party members. The issues o f law and 
order and the failure o f the Liberal government to address the anti-grazing agitation were 
its principal grievances. W alter Long, leader o f the I.U.P.P., declared at Coleraine, Co. 
Londonderry on 7 October that the U.I.L. was the only authority in some parts o f  the 
country where the government had completely failed to uphold law and order. Long 
condemned cattle driving and he railed at the governm ent’s failure to stamp out the 
inflammatory speeches o f  men such as Laurence G innell.109
James Campbell, M.P. for T.C.D., addressed the cattle driving issue at a meeting 
o f St. M attias’ Y.M.C.A. in Dublin, on 21 October 1907. He repeated the accusation 
made by many other unionists that there was sympathy for the anti-grazing movement 
within the Liberal government. He felt that its timid reaction to the agitators was proof 
o f its partiality. In Cam pbell’s opinion, the effect o f the agitation ‘if  allowed to continue, 
would be to kill one o f the greatest o f Ireland’s industries by which more money was 
brought into the country, more employment given, and more capital circulated than any 
other’.110
The unionist campaign was not confined to Ireland but had spread to the United 
Kingdom. At the conference of the National Union o f Conservative Associations in
108 1.1., 20 D ec. 1907.
109I.T., 8 O ct. 1907.
110 Ib id ., 22  O ct. 1907,
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Birm ingham on 14 November, S. H. Butcher, M.P. for Cambridge U niversity and a 
Kerry landlord, lamented the state o f unrest in Ireland as a result o f the cattle driving 
campaign. He also underlined the detrimental effect it would have on one o f  Ireland’s 
principal industries, namely the export o f cattle to Britain. Indeed he com pared the 
virulence o f  the agitation to the campaigns waged in Ireland during the 1880s. A. J. 
Balfour also jo ined in criticising the Liberal government at a Conservative m eeting in 
Devonport, England on 9 December. He alleged that disorder was on the increase and, if  
unchecked, would have catastrophic results in Ire la n d ."1
Pressure was mounting on the government as a result o f the anti-grazing 
m ovement and the disquiet among unionists and landlords. In addition, the rejection of 
the Irish Council bill by a National Convention o f the U.I.L. in May 1907 had added to 
the tension between the Liberals and the I .P .P .'12 T. W. Russell, who had been appointed 
vice-president o f the Board o f Agriculture by the Liberals in May 1907, spoke at the 
Dublin and County Liberal Association on 22 O ctober."3 He stressed that the land 
purchase acts had not solved the western question and that the anti-grazing agitation 
would only be brought to an end by the introduction o f legislation. The Irish 
Independent reported that Russell announced that ‘the grazing ranches and the 
untenanted land would have to be acquired in order that it should be distributed among 
the people now  living in bogs and ditches. W hen this western problem  was settled they 
would have got rid o f agrarian trouble and cattle driving would cease to worry Mr. 
W alter Long and the Irish Times’.114
Landlord fears about the spread o f lawlessness, were evident at the annual 
meeting o f the Cork Defence Union on 19 January 1907. The chairman, Lord 
Barrymore, voiced their concerns in his statement that he did ‘not think we can say that 
the state o f affairs in the country is very satisfactory, nor that the outlook is a particularly
Ibid., 10 D ec. 1907.
112 The Irish  C ounc il bill o f  1907 in tended  to  estab lish  an Irish C ouncil w hich  w ou ld  o versee  a n u m b er o f  
Irish  departm en ts. H ow ever, it w ould  have no leg isla tive  pow ers.
113 D espite  fie ld in g  a nu m b er o f  cand ida tes in U lste r in the 1906 general e lec tion  R u sse ll’s m o v em en t 
fa iled  to  m ake  s ig n ifican t gains. A side from  R ussell only  R obert G lend inn ing  in N orth  A n trim  w as 
re tu rned  and th e  seats held by Jam es W oods in E ast D ow n and by E dw ard  M itchell in N o rth  Ferm anagh  
w ere  lost. F o llo w in g  the elec tion  R ussell increasing ly  drifted  tow ards the L ibera l party .
114/.Z , 23 O ct. 1907.
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bright one for u s’.115 Similarly, on 30 January 1907 the Ulster U nionist Council 
condemned the U.I.L. and its agrarian agitation. At the meeting W alter Long, leader o f 
the I.U.P.P., was elected chairman of the council.116
The executive o f the Irish Landowners’ Convention was fearful o f the Ranch 
W ar which was flourishing in the west and areas o f the midlands. At a m eeting on 17 
July 1907 the government’s response to intimidation and cattle driving was condemned. 
The executive also stressed the damage that the agitation would cause to the cattle 
industry. I f  graziers were intimidated into relinquishing grazing farms, one o f  the most
■ 117profitable sources o f income for many Irish landlords would disappear. Many 
landlords who had sold under the W yndham Act, owing to the shortage o f funds were 
suffering long delays in obtaining their purchase money and ‘bonus’ and were 
increasingly reliant on the income they received from letting tracts o f untenanted land on 
the eleven-month system.
A deputation from the Irish Landow ners’ Convention was sent to meet with the 
chief secretary, Augustine Birrell, and the attorney-general, R. R. Cherry, on 13 
December 1907. Sir Thomas Butler summarised the landlords’ anxieties in the following 
points:
(1)That a state o f disorder, lawlessness, boycotting, and intim idation has been 
allowed to arise in many districts, which is a disgrace to a civilised country, that 
owning to it both life and property are subject to outrage; people cannot enjoy 
the civil liberties to which all British subjects are entitled; and they cannot 
exercise the ordinary rights o f property or follow their legitimate business;
(2)That this state o f things is paralysing credit and interfering with the staple 
trade o f Ireland, and if  not brought promptly to an end will entail great loss on 
the small farmer as well as other classes.
(3)That the government could have foreseen and prevented this state o f things
arising; that its longer continuance is intolerable, and that the government
118possess ample means in the existing law to bring it quickly to an end.
Birrell assured the deputation that the government was determined to maintain law and 
order. Interestingly, Birrell revealed his hope that new legislation in 1908 would quell
115 Ib id ., 21 Jan . 1907.
1161.T., 31 Jan. 1907.
117 Ib id ., 19 Ju ly  1907.
118 Ibid., 14 D ec. 1907.
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the unrest. Therefore, it was looking increasingly likely that an attempt to amend the 
Wyndham Act would be made in the coming months.
X). Special report by the estates commissioners on the evicted tenants, 1907.
In late June 1907 a special report was presented to parliament by the estates 
commissioners outlining their progress on the reinstatement of evicted tenants up to 31 
May 1907. Up to that date, 8,401 applications had been received under section two sub 
section one of the Wyndham Act, 6,143 of which had been investigated. The total 
number of evicted tenants reinstated or provided with new holdings was 1,033.119 The 
commissioners reiterated what they had stated in their ad interim report, that they had 
initially intended to establish a special branch to tackle the question. However, their 
appeals for more staff and resources had been rejected and they had been instructed to 
restrict their investigations to the Plan of Campaign estates. By 31 May 1907, only the 
Clanricarde and Lewis estates in Co. Galway remained unresolved.
The estates commissioners’ powers had been curtailed by the Conservative 
government’s regulations of 4 July 1905. They could only reinstate or provide a new 
holding for an evicted tenant where the estate was being sold under the Wyndham Act. 
The limited amount of untenanted land acquired under the act and the inability to 
approach landlords who were not selling had posed a significant challenge: ‘The 
commissioners were unable to make any effective attempt to inquire into the numerous 
applications already lodged and continuously being lodged with them, and thus to form 
an idea of the real extent of the problem to be dealt with.’120 Fortunately, the Liberal 
government’s regulations of 13 February 1906 had allowed the commissioners greater 
scope. They could now approach a landlord from whose estate tenants had been evicted 
and offer to buy a portion of it for the purpose of reinstatement or provision of new 
holdings. The commissioners’ capacity to purchase untenanted land had also been
119 S pecia l rep o r t by the esta tes com m ission ers o f  their proceed in gs up to  the 31s' May, 1907, in respec t o f  
p erso n s  app ly in g  as ev ic ted  tenants, or their represen ta tives, f o r  res to ra tion  to  their fo r m e r  holdings or 
fo r  p a rce ls  o f  la n d  in lieu  th e re o f  under the Irish L an d  Act, 1903, 5, [Cd. 3570] H .C. 1907, lxx. 1 ] 55.
120 Ib id ., p. 4.
315
increased. Furthermore, between May and November 1906, the Liberal government had 
provided eighteen extra inspectors to accelerate the progress of the work.
Up to 31 May 1907, the total number of applications rejected was 2,935. There
were a variety of reasons for this: applicants were evicted more than twenty-five years
prior to the Wyndham Act, they were persons to whom the land law acts did not apply
121such as herds, or they already had a farm which was adequate for their needs. Where 
evicted tenants were reinstated or given new holdings, they required support from the 
commissioners to establish themselves as farmers. Roads, walls, fences, buildings and 
outhouses had to be constructed, farms had to be stocked all of which cost money. Up to
31 May 1907, the amount provided by the Reserve Fund to enable the evicted tenants to
* 122begin their new lives was £65,184.
Out of the applications received thus far, it was estimated that 2,000 would be 
eligible for holdings. This would require the acquisition of approximately 80,000 acres,
* 123assuming that each holding would consist of approximately forty acres. The estates 
commissioners revealed that even if that much untenanted land was purchased, it could 
not all go towards the reinstatement of evicted tenants, as there were a number of 
obstacles to be surmounted:
[untenanted land] is needed for the enlargement of small holdings in the 
localities in which the land is situate, and the people of these localities would 
strongly object to the whole, or even a considerable portion of the lands being set 
aside to meet the requirements of evicted tenants alone; nor is it probable that 
evicted tenants would be willing to take land at a distance from their former 
holdings, and in localities where their introduction would meet with local 
opposition. Moreover, the purchase of untenanted land under the powers given 
by the act of 1903 is necessarily slow, in as much as it depends on the consent of 
the owner and proof of title to the purchase money.124
Local hostility to the introduction of evicted tenants from other areas would not 
be easy to overcome. There were other interested groups such as the landless, 
agricultural labourers, the younger sons of farmers and the holders of uneconomic
121 Ib id ., p. 6.
122 Ib id ., p. 7.
123 Ib id ., p. 9.124
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holdings who felt they had an equal if not greater right to a parcel of untenanted land. 
Even if sufficient untenanted land was obtained, the cost of equipping the farms, 
purchasing stock and constructing roads and buildings would be immense. The average 
expenditure by the estates commissioners on each evicted tenant reinstated to his 
original holding up to 31 May 1907 had been £152. However, the expense arising from 
the creation of new holdings on untenanted land had been noticeably higher averaging at 
£218 per evicted tenant.125 The commissioners faced the unenviable task of finding 
sufficient untenanted land for evicted tenants in addition to all of the other groups who 
had claims to such land. They also had to extract the finance to stock and equip the new 
farms from a dwindling Reserve Fund.
With all this in mind, the Liberal chief secretaiy, Augustine Birrell, set about 
creating his evicted tenants bill. One of the principal difficulties he faced was the 
availability of untenanted land. While the estates commissioners were in negotiation 
with landlords for up to 80,000 acres, the vast majority of this would be required for the 
enlargement of uneconomic holdings.126 In addition, in counties where there was a 
significant number of evicted tenants, the amount of untenanted land available was 
small. As matters stood, the evicted tenants were in direct competition with the holders 
of uneconomic holdings and the other classes eligible for a portion of untenanted land 
under the Wyndham Act. Although the evicted tenants were very important politically, 
no community was going to welcome them if they felt the needs of its members had not 
been tended to first. Augustine Birrell was not oblivious to the problem:
It must not be forgotten that although evicted tenants occupy a great place 
politically they are by no means popular persons in rural Ireland, and any attempt 
to reinstate them on land which in the opinion of the neighbourhood ought 
properly to go to make the holdings of existing tenants economic will be bitterly
1 97opposed.
Birrell cited the difficulties in obtaining untenanted land as justification for the 
introduction of limited compulsion. Such untenanted land compulsorily purchased off
123 Ib id ., p. 7.
126 A u gustine  B irre ll, ‘E v ic ted  T enan ts (Ire land ) B il l’ (T .N .A ., C A B  3 7 /89 /69 ), 15 June  1907, p. 4.
127 Ib id ., p. 4.
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the landlord would be used to provide a holding for the evicted tenant. The compulsory 
purchase of tenanted land would also be sanctioned albeit under special circumstances. 
Birrell considered that a significant portion of the ‘planter’ tenants or tenants in 
occupation were not genuine farmers: ‘No inconsiderable number of these ‘planters’ are 
shams, they are not bona fide tenants at all, they are simply caretakers put in by the 
landlords.’128
On the earl of Clanricarde’s estate in Co. Galway a sizeable number of ‘planter’ 
tenants had been introduced who were neither genuine nor experienced farmers. A report 
based on an investigation into the circumstances on the estate, had concluded that the 
‘planters’ had received every assistance from the landlord in the form of buildings and 
farm equipment. However, they had still failed to make a success of the farms:
With the exception of two or three cases, as farmers they have singularly failed, 
and, generally speaking, the land in their hands has been badly worked and 
incessantly cropped without proper cultivation, and is at the present moment in 
an excessively deteriorated condition. Much of it has been allowed to run to
129waste and is now covered by whins and blackthorns.
It was ‘planter’ tenants such as those on the earl of Clanricarde’s estate that 
compulsion was designed to target. A Liberal peer, Lord Eversley, who had visited 
many of the Plan of Campaign estates, recognised that fresh legislation was required to 
tackle the question:
The act of 1903, however generous and successful so far as it went, failed to deal 
with the whole case. It was wanting in backbone - in coercive power as against a 
residuum of landowners. Two campaign estates - the Clanricarde and the Lewis 
estates - remained unresolved, and about 2,000 tenants evicted from other, not 
campaign, estates were left out in the cold. It was to supply coercive power for 
dealing with these remaining cases that the recent act [Evicted Tenants Act, 
1907J was passed.130
128 Ib id ., p. 7.
129 Ib id ., p. 7.
130 L ord  E versley , ‘T he ev icted  ten an ts  (Ire land ) A c t’ in F ortn igh tly  R eview , Ixxxii, no. 492  (D ec. 1907), 
p. 989.
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On 27 June 1907, the evicted tenants’ bill was introduced by Augustine Birrell.131 The 
measure was influenced to a great degree by the special report of the estates 
commissioners up to 31 May 1907. Compulsory purchase was to be introduced to 
acquire land to reinstate, or to provide new holdings for, evicted tenants. Birrell took the 
figure of 2,000 tenants, estimated by the estates commissioners in their report, to be the 
maximum number for whom land had to be found. Once put on a holding, the evicted 
tenant would be in the position of a tenant-purchaser and would pay an annuity 
accordingly. The finance for his advance was to come out of the Irish Land Purchase 
Fund. Compulsion was not to be used in the case of tenanted land unless the estates 
commissioners, after due deliberation, considered it necessary. The ‘planter’ tenant was 
to be given an alternative holding which would be subject to a purchase annuity. If he 
refused to accept the alternative farm, he could opt to take financial compensation 
instead. The finance needed to establish the evicted tenants on their holdings was to 
come from the Reserve Fund. When that was exhausted the finance would come from 
the Land Commission vote. The estates commissioners would estimate the price of the 
land and purchase it. They could then resell it at a loss to the former evicted tenant if 
required. Ironically, the difference would come out of the Land Purchase Aid Fund from 
which the landlords received their ‘bonus’.
The second reading was held on 8 July 1907. The I.U.P.P., through a motion 
proposed by William Moore, M.P. for North Antrim, and seconded by H. T. Barrie, M.P. 
for North Londonderry, moved to reject the bill. Their discontent centred on a number of 
the bill’s features. They objected chiefly to the use of compulsion against landlords and 
to the estates commissioners setting the price for the land. Any appeal concerning the 
price would come before the commissioners who, after examination, could uphold or 
reject it. The I.P.U.P held that the inability to appeal to an independent body was a gross 
injustice. They felt that compulsion was unnecessary and that the Wyndham Act, if 
given adequate time, would eventually resolve the question. They believed that the 
figure, put forth in the estates commissioners’ special report, of forty acres to each
XI). The Evicted Tenants’ Act, 1907.
131 H ansard4, clxxvii, 124-135, (27 June 1907).
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evicted tenant was far too generous and would lead to serious disturbances among other 
classes in agricultural society.
The I.U.P.P. were also angered that the Reserve Fund was to be accessed until it 
was exhausted and that money was to be taken from the Irish Land Purchase Fund for 
purposes other than land purchase. H. T. Barrie accused the government of ‘secretly 
doing their best to prevent the tenant farmers from peacefully getting possession of their 
land’ by siphoning money from the ‘bonus’ fund.132 The number of tenants remaining to 
be reinstated, put at approximately 2,000 by the estates commissioners’ report, was 
viewed with suspicion by unionists. They argued that there was nothing to prevent 
further applications which would lead to a need for more land and finance. James 
Campbell, M.P. for T.C.D., predicted that if the bill was passed, those whose 
applications had been rejected would immediately embark on a campaign of agitation. 
Campbell condemned the measure as ‘a farce and a sham’.133 The use of compulsion 
against the ‘planter’ tenants was fiercely resisted as was the change in the tenure of 
estates commissioners Bailey and Finucane to make them more secure from political 
pressure.
The independent unionist M.P. for South Belfast, T. H. Sloan, differed from his 
official unionist party colleagues by coming out in favour of the measure. He felt that 
the unionist opposition to the bill was ridiculous and advised that the second reading 
ought to be passed as any areas of friction could be addressed in committee. Sloan 
believed that the bill would help quell the agrarian agitation which prevailed in areas of 
Ireland at that time.134 The bill, however, received the unanimous support of the I.P.P. 
which was adamant that compulsion was necessary as the voluntary system had failed to 
resolve the issue. The chief secretary, Augustine Birrell, was of the belief that he was 
fulfilling the intentions of the Wyndham Act by introducing the bill. He justified 
compulsion by stating that the evicted tenants question deserved a swift solution. Upon
132 Ib id ., col. 1200-01 (8 Ju ly  1907).
133 Ib id ., col. 1271.
134 Ib id ., col. 1246-48.
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going to a division, Moore’s motion to reject the bill was defeated by 315 votes to 98 
and the bill subsequently passed its second reading.13:1
In essence, the I.P.U.P was opposed to the measure because of the introduction 
of compulsion. While the I.U.P.P. admitted that they were in favour of reinstating the 
evicted tenants, they failed to recognise the need for compulsion, especially since the 
majority of the Plan of Campaign estates had been resolved. They feared that the bill 
would make eviction a profitable enterprise with the tenant getting a farm of forty acres 
along with finance to stock and equip it. The opponents of the bill argued that the 
measure would make evicted tenants a priority at the expense of land purchase. The 
secretary of the Irish Landowners’ Convention, G. de L. Willis, confided to Lord 
Clonbrock:
I suppose this mischievous evicted tenants question ought to be got rid of, 
but one cannot help thinking that the country would have benefited much 
more, and that landlords and honest tenants would have had to submit to 
much less delay, if the time spent over these... applications in the last 
three years had been devoted to pushing through sales generally.136 
It was feared that money and resources which were urgently needed to tackle the
blockage of sales that had developed under the Wyndham Act would be diverted to the
evicted tenants.
The fact that tenanted land held by ‘planters’ along with untenanted land could 
be acquired compulsorily under the bill, with no limit on the number of tenants to be 
reinstated or the acreage to be purchased, was simply abhorrent to the bill’s opponents. 
However, even more unpalatable was the fact that the estates commissioners would be 
the judges of the prices offered and that any appeal was to come before them. The 
I.U.P.P. claimed that landlords had lost all confidence in the commissioners, especially 
Finucane and Bailey, and forcefully opposed the granting of such wide and discretionary 
powers to the three gentlemen. The diversion of finance from the ‘bonus’ fund towards 
the reinstatement of evicted tenants undoubtedly touched a nerve. The I.U.P.P. saw the 
measure as a concession to the I.P.P. following the fiasco of the Irish Council bill. 
However, one of their strongest objections was that the bill would establish a precedent
135 Ib id ., col. 1279-92.
136 G. de L. W illis to C lonbrock , 30 O ct. 1906 (N .L .l ,  C lo n b ro ck  Papers , M S 35 ,772  (10)).
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for the use of compulsory purchase. Once it was made law, it was inevitable that it 
would soon be applied to other areas of the land question such as land purchase.
On the other hand, the I.P.P. was completely in favour of the bill and considered 
the legislation vital if the evicted tenants question was to be resolved. The government 
justified resorting to compulsion because the Wyndham Act had gone as far as it could 
to deal with the issue. Calls for limits on the number of tenants and the amount of 
acreage were deemed dangerous as they might exclude eligible tenants simply because a 
certain limitation had been imposed. The Liberal government was keen to stress that 
‘planter’ tenants who were bona fide tenants would be protected under the bill. They 
argued that compulsion against tenanted land would not be widespread and would be 
confined to those ‘planter’ tenants who were essentially caretakers or who had little 
interest or qualification as agriculturalists. ‘Planters’, if forced to move from their lands 
to restore evicted tenants, would be offered alternative farms or financial compensation.
Augustine Birrell was emphatic that the most qualified and experienced men to 
accomplish the objectives of the bill were the estates commissioners. In his opinion, the 
landlord would receive a fair price for his land and the ‘planters’ would get ample 
compensation if they chose that option. The change in the tenures of Bailey and 
Finucane, which essentially made their tenure secure from political pressure, was 
heralded as a necessity and the government stressed that they were still subject to 
parliamentary criticism. Accusations that the measure was an attempt to appease the 
nationalists, after their rejection of the Irish Council bill in May 1907, were refuted and 
Birrell recalled how he had promised to bring in a bill in early February long before the 
nationalist decision. As virulent as the opposition to compulsion was among the 
unionists, the conviction that it was necessary among the Liberals and the I.P.P. was 
equally potent.
On 22 July 1907 the prime minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, moved a 
motion in the House of Commons which introduced a timetable for the remainder of the
13 7 •bill’s discussion. The measure was to be confined to another three days in committee 
and one day was to be allocated to the report and third reading stages. Despite fierce
137 Hansard 4, clxxix, 1192-1226 (22 July 1907).
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protests from the I.U.P.P. and their Conservative allies against what they viewed as an 
attempt to strangle debate, the motion was passed.
During the committee stage in the House of Commons the I.U.P.P. made a 
number of attempts to remove the element of compulsion in the bill both against the 
landlord and against ‘planter’ tenants. Equally repugnant to the I.U.P.P. was the fact that 
the estates commissioners fixed the prices given for land compulsorily purchased and 
that there was no appeal to an independent body. Attempts to limit the number of 
applicants that could be reinstated and the amount of untenanted land that could be 
purchased under the measure were defeated. On the third reading, the opponents of the 
bill took an unusual course of action and moved the rejection of the entire bill. However,
138the motion went to a division and was comprehensively defeated by 228 votes to 49. 
Even the combined numbers of the I.U.P.P. and the Conservatives were no match for the 
Liberal government and the I.P.P. in the House of Commons. In the House of Lords, 
however, the situation was different.
On the second reading of the bill in the House of Lords the Conservative peer, 
the marquess of Lansdowne, advised the opposition that they should not reject the bill 
but should seek to radically amend it. As regards compulsion, he reluctantly agreed not 
to try to remove it from the measure but he intended to ensure that it would not be open 
to abuses. The reasons put forward by the marquess for not rejecting the measure 
outright were that parliament had promised to reinstate the evicted tenants, the bill had 
passed with a huge majority in the House of Commons and that the rejection of the bill 
would only hand a weapon to agrarian agitators in Ireland to fuel their campaign.139
Almost all of the objections to the bill put forth by the I.U.P.P. in the House of 
Commons were reiterated by Irish landlords and their supporters in the Lords. The earl 
of Donaghmore alleged that the aim of the bill was not ‘to make it possible for the 
estates commissioners to get land, but in order to enable the government to force down 
the price’.140
138 Ib id ., 1438 (2 A ug. 1907).
139 Ib id ., col. 1706-18 (6 A ug. 1907).
140 Ib id ., col. 1791.
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Even the earl of Dunraven and Lord Hemphill, who were more or less in favour 
of the measure, were apprehensive about many aspects of the bill. The absence of a limit 
on the number of tenants to be reinstated, the acreage to be compulsorily purchased and 
the amount of finance to be expended were viewed with unease. The use of the ‘bonus’ 
fund to make up any losses, which might be incurred if land was resold to the evicted 
tenant at a loss, was hailed as a gross breach of the contract upon which the Wyndham 
Act was based. While the bill would pass its second reading, it was understood that 
forceful attempts would be made in committee to radically alter the measure.
Indeed, so altered was the measure following the first day of the committee stage 
that the lord president of the council in the House of Lords and Liberal peer, the earl of 
Crewe, declared that the changes would ‘have the effect though I dare say they have not 
the intention, of defeating the bill’.141 The bill, as altered by the House of Lords, was 
considered by the House of Commons on the 20 August 1907. Many of the amendments 
were rejected by the Liberal government. Indeed, owing to workload of the House of 
Commons, the discussion of the House of Lords’ amendments commenced at 3.30 a.m. 
before an exhausted house. This fuelled claims by the I.U.P.P. that the government was 
attempting to stifle proper debate. The government held that plenty of time had been 
made available for discussion of the measure, but that it had been wasted by the I.U.P.P. 
who had deliberately tried to block its progress owing to their opposition to compulsory 
purchase. The chief secretary, Augustine Birrell, announced that were a number of 
amendments which, if accepted, would render the bill completely worthless and he was 
determined to remove them. The Lords’ amendment which compelled the estates 
commissioners to prove compulsion was necessary was rejected after a division and it 
was immediately followed by the defeat of the Lords’ proposal to put a cap of 2,000 on 
the number of evicted tenants that could be reinstated. The Lords’ amendment whereby 
a ‘planter’ who was a bona fide tenant and had purchased under the land purchase acts 
would be exempt from compulsion was also defeated.
The opportunity for ‘planters’ and landlords to appeal a decision by the estates 
commissioners in the king’s bench division and the court of appeal was also removed by
141 Ibid., clxxx, 497 (9 Aug. 1907).
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the House of Commons. The Liberal government did, however, offer a form of 
compromise by allowing an appeal to the judicial commissioner, Justice Wylie, on the 
value of the land. In addition, the government agreed to limit the operation of the act to 
four years. The Lords’ attempt to obtain financial compensation for the compulsory sale 
of the landlords’ land was also discarded by the House of Commons. They would have 
to be content to receive the market price. The tenure of the estates commissioners, which 
had been changed in the Lords, was restored to that of a county court judge and sporting 
rights would revert back to the Land Commission and not to the landlord as the House of 
Lords had hoped.142
When the House of Commons’ amendments to the Lords’ amendments were 
considered on 23 August 1907, the House of Lords, rather comically, proceeded to 
reverse most of the government’s decisions and reinstate their amendments. The right of 
landlords to compensation for compulsory purchase, the 2,000 limit on the number of 
tenants to be reinstated and the landlords’ entitlement to the sporting rights were all 
restored. The government concessions on the issue of appealing the estates 
commissioners’ decisions were rejected and a modified system of appeal was proposed 
instead. However, the question of the commissioners’ tenure was agreed to after the earl 
of Crewe appealed that the bill would be ruined otherwise.143
Worn down by the stubbornness of the House of Lords, Birrell eventually caved 
in to a number of their demands. He declared that ‘they [the Liberal government] had 
shown their desire to secure the passage of this bill even in what he, at all events, would 
never deny was a mutilated form’.144 Having realised that he could not get the bill 
through parliament as originally drafted, the chief secretary was resigned to salvaging 
what he could for the evicted tenants. The limit of 2,000, the vesting of the sporting 
rights in the landlord and the prohibition on compulsorily purchasing the holdings of 
‘planters’ who claimed to be bona fide tenants were wearily accepted by the 
government. The duration of the act was set at four years. However, the Liberal 
government refused to budge on the introduction of compensation to landlords believing
142 Ibid., c lxxx i, 635 -99  (20 A ug. 1907).
143 Ib id ., col. 1290-1344  (23 A ug. 1907).
144 Ibid., c lxxxii, 185 (26 A ug. 1907).
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that the market value was adequate reimbursement. On the issue of the estates 
commissioners’ tenure, the government remained steadfast. The right to appeal decisions 
made by the estates commissioners’ to the county assizes or king’s bench was conceded. 
The House of Lords accepted that an appeal relating to the land’s value could be made to 
Justice Wylie who would be assisted by a valuer.145
The reaction to the much altered bill was far from uniform. According to John 
Redmond, the landlords and their supporters had attempted to destroy the bill. His 
opinion was that ‘the action of the House of Lords and the landlord party in this house 
[House of Commons] had been animated by the motive of wishing to see the chief 
secretary embroiled in the coming winter in trouble and turmoil in Ireland’.146 Redmond 
believed that in its altered form compulsion would be a failure and would only serve to 
incite agrarian agitation. Walter Long, as leader of the I.U.P.P., held that the amended 
act would offer some protection to landlords and ‘planter’ tenants. He did not believe 
‘that the difficulties which...[the] bill sought to remove really lay at the root of Irish 
discontent and trouble, and that it could not be justly described as a message of peace to 
Ireland’.147 A. J. Balfour, leader of the Conservative party, accused Redmond of inciting 
disorder with his comments on the measure. Balfour was of the opinion that the House 
of Lords had managed to shape the bill into a somewhat more acceptable form that could 
be passed by both houses of parliament.148
XII). Report of the Royal Commission on Congestion (Dudley Commission).
After almost two years of interviews and investigation, the report of the royal 
commission on congestion was published on 23 May 1908. The report was a remarkable 
document with recommendations that were wide-reaching and revolutionary in many 
aspects. Aside from its innovative proposals, it shed light on the operation of the 
Wyndham Act and the state of the Irish land question at that time. If implemented, the 
powers and income of the C.D.B. would be dramatically increased. Moreover, the
145 Ib id ., col. 181-90.
146 Ibid., col. 191-92.
147 Ib id ., col. 189.
148 Ibid., col. 196-201. See E vic ted  Tenants (Ireland) Act, 1907  [7 Ed.. V II, c. 56.] (28  A ug. 1907).
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jurisdiction of the board would be extended to include the entire province of Connaught, 
counties Donegal, Clare and Kerry and the districts of Bantry, Castletown, Schull and 
Skibbereen in Cork. It was also proposed that the constitution of the C.D.B. be altered so 
as to allow a number of democratically elected members to be added to the board. The 
relief of congestion outside of the board’s jurisdiction however was to be left in the 
hands of the Land Commission and the Department of Agriculture.
Following the precedent set in the Evicted Tenants Act of 1907, the introduction 
of compulsory purchase seemed increasingly likely. It was simply unrealistic to expect 
tenants, whose landlord did not sell under the Wyndham Act, to peacefully reside with 
others in neighbouring estates who had purchased from their landlord and who were 
paying less in annuities than they were paying in rent.
The use of compulsion was to be confined to the congested districts. Importantly, 
the report asserted that the break-up of the grazing ranches in the congested districts was 
necessary and would be of great benefit to the region. The compulsory powers 
advocated would not only affect landlords but tenants and tenant-purchasers. Untenanted 
land and non-residential holdings could be acquired as could any land held by a tenant or 
tenant purchaser in excess of £100 valuation. A special court was to be established to fix 
the price of land taken compulsorily. The price was to be ‘such a sum as after paying off 
all charges suitable for redemption by the state will yield the landlord his “average net 
income”...compensation for sporting rights being included if such rights are 
acquired...and allowance being made for the effect of existing economic or natural 
causes on the probable receipts of the next five years’.149
On the question of untenanted land the Wyndham Act had unintentionally 
highlighted the problems of Irish agricultural society. The principal method of tackling 
congestion was the enlargement of uneconomic holdings. Unfortunately for the C.D.B., 
people in the neighbourhood of the estates coveted untenanted land. Tenants, their sons, 
and those whose holdings were under five pounds valuation were all eligible for a parcel 
in sales to the Estates Commission. The Labourers’ Act of 1906 had added agricultural
1 R eport o f  the ro ya l com m ission  on congestion  in Ireland. F inal report, 112, [C d .4097] H .C. 1908, xlii, 
729.
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labourers to this category. Section seventy-five of the Wyndham Act had granted the 
C.D.B. the right to allocate any surplus land to the sons of tenants or smallholders whose 
farms were valued at under five pounds. Once congestion had been addressed, there was 
rarely any land remaining for other claimants. Any efforts by the board to migrate 
tenants from congested areas to untenanted land were fiercely resisted by these groups 
and other landless men in the locality. They believed that such land ought to be 
redistributed among themselves as opposed to outsiders. However, the C.D.B. believed 
that migration to relieve congestion was a priority and thus that migrants were more 
entitled to untenanted land than tenants’ sons or landless men. By expanding the number 
of groups eligible for land under the Wyndham Act to include non-residential tenants, 
the expectations of many in agricultural society had been raised:
The result has been to create a feeling that all untenanted land should be ear­
marked for farmers in the neighbourhood, or for the sons of those who live on 
the estate, and other landless men. Consequently in some districts, notably in 
East Galway, the intervention of the estates commissioners, who distribute the 
grass land they buy amongst those who live in the neighbourhood, is preferred to 
that of the board, who consider, and we think rightly, that the claims of congests 
who migrate from the west, if not superior to those of small land-holders in the 
neighbourhood, are undoubtedly superior to those of the sons of tenants and 
other landless men who happen to live near the grasslands.150
The attempts of the C.D.B. to relieve congestion were severely hampered by 
local opposition in the areas where untenanted land was purchased. Often these areas 
were situated outside of or bordering the congested districts. The board prioritised the 
migration of congests to these areas to relieve congestion whereas the locals in the 
region of the untenanted land felt they ought to take preference. The situation was only 
aggravated by the work of the estates commissioners who usually divided up the 
grasslands among the men in the locality. It was therefore understandable how the work 
of the estates commissioners was sometimes at odds with that of the C.D.B. A resolution 
of the conflict between accommodating the needs of the congests and those of the locals 
was key to the board’s efforts to remedy congestion. Thus, the claims of the landless 
men clashed with the board’s efforts to relieve congestion as the rival claims of the
150 Ibid., p. 17.
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congests and the landless men were simply incompatible. If the landless men were to be 
attended to, congestion would not be alleviated owing to the scarcity of untenanted land.
There was strong local opposition to the introduction of migrants unless the 
young local men were tended to first. During the interviews carried out by the royal 
commission on congestion, J. P. Hayden, M.P. for South Roscommon, shed light on the 
attitude towards migrants in his constituency:
[Walter Kavanagh] Would the young men have a greater claim than migrants 
from congested districts? - [J. P. Hayden] In my opinion they would, and I will 
give a reason for it. The ratepayers of the county are responsible under the law as 
it now stands, and as I presume it will stand, for the repayment of the purchase 
annuities, and therefore I think that the representatives of the ratepayers ought to 
have some voice as to the class of men who would be allotted land, and it is quite 
possible they might think that a young man living in their own part would be 
more suitable, solvent, and reliable man than a migrant brought in from some 
other county.151
The report concluded that any holding valued at ten pounds and upwards was 
economically viable although there were exceptions and the location and circumstances 
of the land had to be taken into account. With this rough estimate in mind, it was 
calculated that 80,000 existing holdings needed to be enlarged, at a cost of £450,000. 
The estimate was based on the land that would be under the jurisdiction of the board if it
152was expanded as recommended.
The Irish Landowners’ Convention quickly poured cold water on the suggestions 
put forward by the Dudley commission. The executive of the landlord organisation 
issued a minute condemning the report’s recommendations as ‘revolutionary’ and 
‘socialist’. The introduction of compulsory purchase was vehemently opposed as was 
the proposal that uneconomic holdings should be brought up to a ten pound valuation 
standard. It was also predicted that the break-up of the grazing ranches would injure the 
cattle industry. The convention’s executive opined that the migration of tenants was 
futile due to the opposition of the landless men:
151 R eport o f  the ro ya l com m ission  on congestion  in Ireland. Tenth report, 220 , [C d .4007] H .C . 1908, xlii, 
5.
152 R eport o f  the ro ya l com m ission  on congestion  in Ireland. F inal report, 36 -43 , [C d .4097] H .C . 1908, 
xlii, 729.
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We are compelled to regard migration as a remedy that has become impossible as 
a large policy owing to the government having allowed the ‘landless’ men to 
establish the practice of cattle driving with the object of compelling the division 
of grasslands among people immediately surrounding them.153
These landless elements, held responsible by landlords for the Ranch War, were 
usually the sons of occupying tenants. The Wyndham Act had recognised their claim to 
a holding. This had served to fan the flames of discontent as the landless men 
themselves strove to ensure that untenanted land in their locality was broken up and 
divided among themselves. Landlords, graziers and those associated with the eleven- 
month system would suffer as the disaffected became increasingly frustrated. Imbued 
with expectation, frustrated by the sluggish progress of the 1903 act and encouraged by 
agitators such as Ginnell, the landless group was at the centre of the anti-grazing 
agitation. Intent on dividing the untenanted land among the people of the locality, the 
opposition to congests was often ferocious.
Aside from some minor disagreements, the I.P.P. approved almost all the 
recommendations of the Dudley commission’s report. The party emphasised to the 
Liberal government the importance of incorporating the commission’s recommendations 
into a new land bill. Compulsory purchase had been introduced in the Evicted Tenants’ 
Act of 1907 and was now recommended by a royal commission on congestion. It 
seemed only a matter of time before compulsory land purchase would be put into 
practice in Ireland.
XIII). The shortage of funds to tackle congestion.
The estates commissioners’ report for the period up to 31 March 1908 revealed that they 
were in various stages of negotiations for 175,199 acres of untenanted land. By 31 
March 1908, 70,326 acres had been allocated to those groups deemed eligible under 
section two of the Wyndham Act or had gone towards the enlargement of uneconomic
1531.T., 22 June 1908.
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small farms.154 In the congested districts, where the need to acquire untenanted land was 
greatest, there was an acute shortage of finance. The C.D.B., in its report for the year 
ending 31 March 1908, stressed that untenanted land was being made available under 
the Wyndham Act. In fact, the C.D.B. prioritised the purchase of untenanted grasslands 
over poor tenanted estates. However, it simply did not have enough money to purchase 
all of the estates and untenanted land up for sale. This shortage of adequate funds led the 
board to complain that it was being prevented from carrying out its work as intended by 
the Wyndham Act:
Although we were given by the act of 1903 an additional income of £20,000, it 
was apparent that our funds were altogether insufficient to provide for more than 
a very small increase of our estates business, unless we abandon other schemes. 
Not only was a very considerable extension of this branch of our operations 
contemplated when the provisions of the act were under discussion in parliament, 
but this extension was clearly indicated in the act itself. It was doubtless realised 
at that time that unless we were enabled to purchase and dispose of a large 
amount of property in each year the relief of congestion by the enlargement of 
holdings could not make much progress in the present generation.155
Where congestion and uneconomic holdings were ubiquitous, the C.D.B. was 
unable to adequately address the problem. Since the introduction of the 1903 act, the 
board had had to reluctantly turn down approximately 100 estates offered by landlords 
for purchase. It simply did not have the funds to divide and improve those estates. 
Efforts by the board to exact more money from the treasury had been unsuccessful. The 
treasury was unwilling to address the board’s financing until the royal commission on 
congestion made its report but when it was issued in May 1908 no plans for additional 
finance had been put forward. As a result, the C.D.B. predicted that the relief of 
congestion and the creation of economic holdings in its jurisdiction would be a long 
protracted process:
The purchase of the £9,000,000 worth of untenanted land, estimated to be 
obtainable in the counties containing congested districts, by annual instalments
154 R eport o f  the esta tes com m issioners f o r  the y e a r  ending 31 M arch 1908 a n d fo r  the p e r io d fro m  1st 
N ovem ber 1903 to  31st M arch 1908, x i-x ii, [C d .4277] H .C. 1908, xxiii, 159.
155 Seventeenth  report o f  the C o n gested  D istr ic ts  B o a rd  f o r  Ire lan d  f o r  the y e a r  ending 3 1" M arch, 1908, 
8-9, [C d .4340] H .C. 1908, xx iii, 443.
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of £100,000, which has been the annual average of our purchases since the act of 
1903 came into force, would occupy a period of about ninety years.156
Landlords, and particularly the Irish Landowners’ Convention, had been quick to point
out that the break up of the grasslands into holdings would have a destructive effect on
the cattle industry. The C.D.B. did not hold that opinion. It argued that there would not
be any decrease in the amount of livestock raised in the country.
The contemporary French commentator L. Paul-Dubois identified the failure of 
the Wyndham Act to relieve congestion and highlighted its potentially catastrophic 
consequences:
The act offers means of remedying the agrarian evils of Ireland, namely, the 
excessive sub-division of holdings and congestion. Under this heading...it has 
produced little result. In practice the buying and selling operations are almost 
always carried out by direct bargains between landlord and tenant. The 
commissioners themselves make few purchases: they only re-settle and improve 
a very small number of congested estates.. .Apparently, then, the organic disease 
of Irish land, namely, congestion, is not being adequately treated. Indeed it is to 
be feared that the act may merely perpetuate, or stereotype, as has been said, the 
constitutional evil which, under the new regime of peasant ownership, will soon
1 S7be more dangerous than ever.
Under section six sub-sections four and five of the 1903 act the estates 
commissioners could purchase estates which were congested. Although the section had 
been motivated by a humanitarian spirit it proved to be unworkable in reality. Under the 
terms of the act the landlord of a congested estate had to agree that it was actually 
congested. Owners were reluctant to do this unless they received assurances that they 
would receive the same prices from the commissioners that they would in a direct sale to 
their tenants. The estates commissioners outlined their dilemma:
In point of fact the only terms on which vendors will ordinarily consent to having 
their estates declared ‘congested’, or can be expected to do so, is by the 
commissioners giving them a guarantee beforehand that they will offer for the 
estate the maximum price for each holding which the vendor himself could 
obtain by agreement with the tenant.158
156 Ib id ., p. 9.
157 L. P au l-D ubo is, C on tem porary Ire lan d  (D ub lin , 1908) p. 290.
158 A d  interim  report o f  the esta tes  com m issioners f o r  the p e r io d  fro m  I'1 N ovem ber, 1903, to  31" 
D ecem ber, 1904, 9, [Cd. 2471 ], H .C . 1905, xx ii, 177.
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The want of funds meant that the section’s potential to relieve congestion and to 
improve uneconomic holdings throughout Ireland was severely curtailed. In the estates 
commissioners’ report for the period up to 31 March 1909, only twenty estates had been 
purchased under that section.159 The only financial resource available to the estates 
commissioners for the improvement of congested estates was the Reserve Fund. Under 
section forty-four sub-section two, the act permitted the resale of such congested estates 
to the tenants at a loss of 10 % on the original purchase price that had been paid to the 
landlord. This would allow tenant-purchasers to buy from the Land Commission at a 
lower price than the Land Commission had paid the landlord. Understandably the estates 
commissioners wished to carry out improvements before they sold these estates.
The C.D.B. in its report for the period up to 31 March 1906, sought permission to 
borrow money from the Board of Works. The question of clearing title to the holdings 
from which tenants were being migrated had also proved problematic and had led to 
delays.160 The C.D.B.’s request for more funding was put on hold following the decision 
in 1906 to appoint the royal commission to investigate congestion in Ireland. The 
commission did not report until May 1908 and in the intervening period the C.D.B. was 
in limbo. The board needed more money to improve the land it had purchased. There 
was little point in selling on the land to the tenants without first developing the holdings. 
Without adequate funds, the board had little choice but to restrict its purchases from 
1905 on. In the years 1904-5 estates to the value of £649,544 had been purchased. 
However, there was a significant drop to £346,706 in the year 1905-6 and by 1906-7 the 
figure had fallen to £108,861.161 The effect of the appointment of the royal commission 
on congestion was to leave the C.D.B. without any increase in its funding from 1905 
until 1909.
159 R eport o f  the esta tes com m ission ers f o r  the y e a r  en ding  31" M arch, 1909 a n d fo r  the p e r io d  fro m  l"  
N ovem ber, 1903, to 31 M arch, 1909, v ia , [C d .4849] H .C. 1909, xxiii, 737
160 Fifteenth rep o r t o f  the C o n g ested  D istr ic ts  B o a rd  for Ire lan d  for the yea r  ending 31" M arch, 1906, 11 
[C d .3 161] H .C . 1906, xcvii, 493.
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The resolution of the evicted tenants question would not be brought about easily. A case 
at Four Mile House, Co. Roscommon exemplified the difficulties facing the estates 
commissioners. Having purchased untenanted land in the area, the commissioners 
attempted to settle four evicted tenants from other parts of Roscommon on the land. The 
locals protested against the decision of the commissioners to settle evicted tenants on 
land which they held ought to be divided up among themselves and a protest meeting 
was held on 9 March 1908.162 Providing evicted tenants with new holdings, where they 
could not be put back on their original farms, was admirable but the difficulties it posed 
were often immense. In many districts untenanted land was limited and the locals were 
adamant that their needs be tended to before any evicted tenants were moved into the 
area. The estates commissioners’ powers to compulsorily acquire tenanted land turned 
out to be ineffective, under the Evicted Tenants Act of 1907, as a result of a case 
involving the marquis of Clanricarde.
The estates commissioners had attempted to acquire approximately 4,000 acres 
on the Clanricarde estate with the view to reinstating evicted tenants. However, the earl 
refused to sanction the movement of a ‘planter’ tenant who himself actually wished to 
leave. In the Land Commission Court, Judge Wylie ruled in favour of the commissioners 
and the ‘planter’ who wished to leave. Clanricarde then appealed to the Court of Appeal. 
There the judge interpreted the wording of the act differently and Judge Wylie’s decision 
was overturned. The Court of Appeal’s verdict essentially prevented the estates 
commissioners from procuring tenanted land from a bona fide tenant, even when that 
tenant wished to move. Thus, at a stroke, the commissioners were unable to purchase the 
holding of a ‘planter’ tenant without the permission of the landlord.
To overcome this stumbling block, the chief secretary Augustine Birrell 
announced his intention to introduce a short amending bill in the House of Lords.163 The 
bill was introduced on 1 June 1908 and it basically provided that where the ‘planter’ 
tenant agreed in writing to move, the commissioners could purchase the land. The
1621.T., 10 M ar. 1908.
163 H an sard  4, c lxxxix , 535-43 (21 M ay 1908).
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landlord’s objection to the ‘planter’s’ decision would no longer prevent the matter 
proceeding.
The earl of Mayo considered the bill an ‘instance of political vituperation’ and he 
thought it unjust that the measure targeted the marquis of Claricarde who had 
successfully fought his case in the courts.164 Lord Clonbrock also had reservations. He 
was gravely concerned that the ‘planter’ tenants would be intimidated into moving and 
he felt they ought to be protected: ‘A written consent is worth absolutely nothing if it is 
given by a man with a pistol at his head; and this is not a mere figure of speech, it may 
represent an actual fact.’165 Thus in order to allay fears of intimidation, it was provided 
in the amending bill that two witnesses had to observe the ‘planter’ signing his consent 
and they too had to add their signatures to the document. Despite the apprehension of 
certain landlords, the bill passed through both houses and received the royal assent on 1 
August 1908.166
The introduction of the Evicted Tenants Act in 1907 had led to a noticeable 
increase in the number of applications from individuals claiming to be evicted tenants 
for the year ending 31 March 1908. Up to 31 March 1907, 2,130 applications had been 
received compared to 2,505 in 1908. The total number received by the estates 
commissioners had risen to 9,922. Interestingly, almost half of the total applications had 
been rejected because the applicants had been evicted more than twenty-five years prior 
to the Wyndham Act or because of various other reasons. By June 1908, 1,656 tenants or 
their representatives had been given new holdings or had been reinstated. In order to 
stock and equip these holdings, approximately £99,276 had been paid out of the Reserve 
Fund.167
The estates commissioners had encountered a number of other obstacles in their 
efforts to reinstate evicted tenants. The holdings of many eligible applicants were held 
by ‘planter’ tenants who were genuine farmers and thus could not be removed. However, 
many evicted tenants refused to accept any holding other than their original one and
,64 Ib id ., cxci, 4 -9  (25 June  1908).
165 Ib id ., col. 14.
166 E vic ted  Tenants (Ire lan d )  Act, 1908. [8 Ed. V II., c. 22.] (1 A ug. 1908).
167 R eport o f  the esta tes  com m issioners f o r  the y e a r  ending 31 M arch, 1908 a n d fo r  the p e r io d  1 
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even when untenanted land was available there could be fierce resistance from locals to 
the introduction of evicted tenants. Such opposition inevitably led to the evicted tenant 
rethinking his decision to move to a new holding. The estates commissioners reported:
In other and more numerous cases, the people of the locality claim that the 
untenanted land acquired or proposed to be acquired by the commissioners 
should be reserved for themselves, and oppose the allocation of any portion of it 
to tenants evicted from other properties, whose former holdings cannot be 
acquired, and consequently the evicted tenants, though at first willing to take the 
new holdings, subsequently refuse to do so. These difficulties are greatest in 
counties where there is a number of evicted tenants whose former holdings are 
occupied by bona fide tenants while the amount of untenanted land available is 
small in comparison with the demand for it. The experience of the 
commissioners is that the holders of uneconomic holdings and the sons of tenants 
think they have a better claim to land in their own locality than evicted tenants 
from another locality, and they have little sympathy with evicted tenants from 
other properties, and still less with those of other counties.168
The estates commissioners’ findings portray a very different attitude towards 
evicted tenants to that espoused by the I.P.P. The ‘wounded soldiers of the Land War’ 
were normally held up as patriots. However, when the claims of evicted tenants 
threatened to deprive others of untenanted land, the sacrifices of the ‘wounded soldiers’ 
were abruptly forgotten. The commissioners had also found that the threat of 
compulsory purchase, under the 1907 evicted tenants act, had led to more voluntary 
reinstatements by landlords.169 Voluntary settlements had been agreed in a number of 
cases where the landowner had refused offers made by the estates commissioner prior to 
the act. Landlords preferred to resolve the situation themselves rather than having their 
land purchased compulsorily at a price that they would probably not consider adequate.
XV). The reinstatement of evicted tenants.
After analysing the political aspect of the evicted tenants question and the legislation 
designed to solve the problem, it is worthwhile examining some of the individual cases. 
In 1907 a return was issued by the estates commissioners of all the evicted tenants
168 Ibid., xviii.
169 Ib id ., xv ii-xv iii.
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reinstated up to 31 May of that year, and under the Evicted Tenants Act of 1907 
quarterly reports were issued by the estates commissioners outlining the details of those 
tenants who had availed of the act. From these sources we can examine individual cases 
in detail.
James Hayden had been evicted from his holding in the townland of Barnhill 
West, Co. Kildare, in May 1883. Hayden had been a tenant on the duke of Leinster’s 
estate and paid an annual rent of £33 at the time of his eviction. His holding consisted of 
approximately forty-six acres. Upon applying to be reinstated as an evicted tenant, he 
received a new holding of approximately forty-two acres at Kennycourt, Co. Kildare in 
the first quarter of 1908. His new holding was created out of untenanted land on the 
former estate of Andrew Fay who had sold under the Wyndham Act. Under the Evicted 
Tenants Act of 1907 Flayden was given his new holding as a tenant-purchaser and he 
now had to pay a yearly purchase annuity of £42 16.v. 2<7.170
There was little point in giving an evicted tenant a new holding and expecting 
him to survive without providing him with money to establish himself. The construction 
and repair of buildings might be called for, farms might need to be restocked and new 
roads might have to be constructed to access the farm. The basic implements and 
machinery needed to run a farm would have to be provided. Therefore, the estates 
commissioners could sanction free grants, in addition to money which would have to be 
repaid similarly to the purchase annuity. The finance required came out of the Reserve 
Fund. James Hayden received two free grants. One was of £150 which went towards 
buildings and other improvements and another of £100 which went towards farm 
implements and the purchase of livestock.171 These grants established Hayden on his 
new holding and gave him every chance of forging a livelihood.
In many cases, the evicted tenant’s former holding was occupied by a ‘planter’ 
tenant who was found to be an experienced farmer. In the case of Joseph O’Rourke in
170 Return p re p a r e d  pu rsu an t to  sec tion  3 o f  the E v ic te d  Tenants (Ireland) Act, 1907, g iv in g  p a rticu la rs  o f  
all cases in w hich  an e v ic te d  tenant (or a p erso n  n om in a ted  by the esta tes com m issioners to  be the 
p e rso n a l represen ta tive  o f  a  d ecea sed  e v ic ted  tenant) has been, w ith  the assistan ce  o f  the E sta tes  
com m issioners, reinstated, e ith er by the la n d lo rd  or by the esta tes com m issioners, as a p u rch a ser o f  h is or 
his p red ecesso r 's  fo rm e r  hold ing  or p a r t thereof, or p ro v id e d  w ith a new  p a rc e l o f  la n d  under the L an d  
P u rch ase A cts, du ring  the qu arter en d ed  3 T' M arch, 1908, 2-3, [Cd. 4171] H .C  1908, xc, 1345.
171 Ib id ., p. 3.
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Co. Limerick, for example, the ‘planter’ was willing to leave the holding. O’Rourke had 
been a tenant on the estate of Lord Langford but had been evicted in May 1891. At that 
time, his annual rent had been ten pounds on his holding of approximately eight acres in 
the townland of Clogher East. In the second quarter of 1908 he was restored to his old 
holding after the ‘planter’ tenant received compensation of £50. As a tenant-purchaser,
172O’Rourke would pay an annual purchase annuity of £5 19s. 8ri.
One of the most famous evicted tenants of the period was Dennis Kilbride (1848- 
1924) who was also an M.P. for the I.P.P. During the course of his parliamentary career 
he had represented South Kerry, North Galway and South Kildare. He had been a tenant 
on the marquess of Lansdowne’s estate in Queen’s County and had been the leader of 
the Plan of Campaign in that area. For evicted tenants such as Kilbride, the ‘main object 
of the...[Wyndham Act] was to put an end to the land war’.173 Interestingly, the 
marquess, as secretary of state for foreign affairs, had been a member of cabinet in the 
Conservative government when the Wyndham Act had been introduced and had helped 
pilot it through the House of Lords.
Kilbride was evicted from his farm in Luggacurran and Fallabeg Upper in March 
18 87.174 At the time of his eviction he had been renting approximately 890 acres at an 
annual rent of £760. However, upon reinstatement, he received just 125 acres and the 
purchase annuity he would pay amounted to £137 18v 8d. annually. In order to assist 
him in the construction of buildings and the purchase of stock, the estates commissioners 
sanctioned two free grants of £400 and £300.17:1 Rather amusingly, Kilbride was not 
reinstated in his old house but in the Lansdowne estate office.
172 Return p re p a r e d  pu rsu an t to  sec tion  3 o f  the E v ic ted  Tenants (Ireland) Act, 1907 ... du ring  the quarter  
e n d e d 30"'June 1908, 6-7, [Cd. 4344] H .C. 1908, xc. 1355.
173 H an sard  4, cxx iv , 450  (24 June 1903).
174 See L eigh-A nn  C offey , The p la n te r 's  o f  Luggacurran, County) Laois. A p ro te s ta n t com m unity, 1879- 
1927, (D ub lin , 2006).
175 Return sh ow in g  a ll ca ses in w hich an e v ic ted  tenant (or duly app o in ted  rep resen ta tive  o f  such) has 
been, w ith  the assistan ce o f  the esta tes com m issioners, re in s ta ted  as a  p u rch a ser o f  his or his 
p re d e c e s s o r ’s fo rm e r  h old in g  or p a r t th e re o f  or p ro v id e d  w ith  a new  p a rc e l o f  la n d  up to  31*' D ecem ber, 
1907, 16-17 [C d.4093] H .C. 1908, xc, 1297.
I7l’ L ord E versley , ‘T he ev ic ted  tenan ts  (Ire land ) A c t’ in F ortn igh tly R eview , lxxxii, no. 492  (D ec. 1907) p. 
988.
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On the Co. Galway estate of the earl of Clanricarde, the estates commissioners
177  ■estimated that in 1907 there were roughly 133 applications from evicted tenants. The 
earl had distinguished himself through his unwillingness to reinstate tenants evicted on 
his estate or even negotiate on the matter. In early 1910 a number of these evicted 
tenants received new holdings, created out of untenanted land on the former estate of 
Allan B. Pollok. Thomas Fahy, for example, was evicted from a forty-six acre holding 
on 25 July 1890. His new holding consisted of thirty-six acres and he received two free 
grants of £135 and £75. Furthermore, he received a grant of £60 which was to be repaid
* * 1 7 8as part of his purchase annuity.
The evicted tenants question was generally seen as being confined to the south 
and west of Ireland and was considered a nationalist issue. However, there was a 
considerable number of evicted tenants in Ulster and in predominantly unionist counties. 
Of the 8,401 applications which the estates commissioners had received by 31 May 
1907, 1,598 came from the province of Ulster. The remaining applications were divided 
between Leinster (1,933), Munster (3,192) and Connaught (1,678).179
Thomas Campbell was evicted from the marquis of Ely’s Fermanagh estate on
25 October 1895. He had rented a 100 acre farm on which he had paid an annual rent of
approximately £46. Campbell was reinstated in the second half of 1909. In order to set
him up in his holding, he received a free grant of £60 for the purchase of stock and farm
180  •implements. He also received a £50 grant which was to go towards buildings. This 
grant had to be repaid in the same manner as his purchase annuity.
Despite John Redmond’s assurances that the current occupiers of evicted tenants’ 
holdings would not be pressurised, such instances did occur. One such example was in 
September 1904 at Middle Mace near Claremorris, Co. Mayo. The windows of four 
houses, whose occupiers had rented land from which tenants had been evicted, were
177 S pecia l re p o r t by the esta tes com m issioners o f  th eir p ro ceed in g s  up to  the 31*' May, 1907, in resp ec t o f  
p erso n s app ly in g  as e v ic ted  tenants, or their represen ta tives, f o r  restora tion  to  their fo rm e r  holdings or 
fo r  p a rce ls  o f  la n d  in lieu  thereof, under the Irish  L a n d  Act, 1903, 8, [Cd. 3570] H .C . 1907, lxx. 1155.
178 Return p re p a r e d  pu rsu an t to  section  3 o f  the E v ic te d  Tenants (Ireland) Act, 1907... du ring  the qu arter  
ended  31 M arch  1910, 4-5 , [Cd. 5392] H .C . 1910, lxxvi, 883.
179 Ibid., p. 12.
180 Return p re p a r e d  pu rsu an t to  section  3 o f  the E v ic te d  Tenants (Ireland) Act, 1907... during the quarter  
ended  30  S ep tem ber 1909, 2 -3 , [Cd. 4985] H .C . 1910, lxxvi, 859.
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smashed and a threatening notice was posted. The evictions had occurred on the estate of 
Isidore Burke. The former tenants had been evicted in the 1880s but had remained on in 
the area. Apparently the occupying tenants had been approached about surrendering the 
holdings but had refused.181
XVI). The lead up to the Birrell Land Act, 1909.
In the first quarter of 1908 there was a noticeable decrease in the number of cattle drives. 
In the quarter ended 31 December 1907 there had been 247 cattle drives in Ireland 
whereas this had fallen to 123 for the first quarter of 19 0 8.182 There were several reasons 
for this. Firstly, the leader of the movement, Laurence Ginnell was imprisoned. 
Secondly, the Liberal chief secretary, Augustine Birrell, had promised to introduce 
legislation to amend the Wyndham Act which would almost certainly involve 
compulsory purchase. The leaders of the agitation such as John Fitzgibbon, chairman of 
Roscommon C. C., decided that Birrell should be given a fair chance to fulfil his pledge. 
If he failed, the agitation was to be promptly revived.183 In late 1907 Birrell had also 
indicated that it would be impossible to introduce a land bill if cattle driving and 
agrarian agitation continued. Thirdly, Birrell had met with Cardinal Logue in Armagh in 
January 1908 to discuss the question of a Catholic university. With a university bill in 
the pipeline, it appeared the Catholic Church used its influence to curtail the anti-grazing 
agitation in return for a comprehensive bill addressing the university question.
Fourthly, graziers had ceased to buy cattle from the small holders because they 
feared the beasts would be driven. Small farmers typically sold their cattle, once they 
reached a year and a half in age, to graziers who fattened them for the English market. 
Consequently, small fanners were stuck with cattle they normally sold to pay their rent, 
debts or purchase annuities. Perhaps, then, the reason for the lull in cattle driving was 
that the very men involved were beginning to suffer the consequences of the unrest. The 
Liberal government argued, however, that the respite was simply down to its policy of
181 IT . 23 Sept. 1904.
182 Return, by  counties a n d  qu arterly  p eriods, o f  the num ber o f  ca ttle -d rives re p o r te d  by the R oyal Irish  
C onstabu lary to  have taken p la c e  in Ire lan d  fro m  I s' January 1907 to 30'1' S ep tem ber 1908, (310) H .C . 
1908, xc, 3.
183 I T .,  14 Jan . 1908.
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preventing cattle drives as opposed to arresting cattle drivers. Rather than filling up the 
jails by enforcing coercion as was repeatedly advocated by unionists, the government 
stuck to the ordinary law thereby depriving the agitators of martyrs and of publicity.
Charles Craig, speaking in Belfast on 17 January 1908, voiced the suspicions of 
the I.U.P.P. concerning the anti-grazing agitation and the Liberal government’s reaction:
So long as cattle driving could be carried out without serious assaults being 
committed and without serious loss of life it served as a two fold end to the 
honest and high-minded man (save the mark) who had been sent to govern them. 
This eminent administrator [Augustine Birrell] and his henchman, Sir Anthony 
MacDonnell, had no doubt long ago come to the conclusion that it would be 
foolish to interfere with this cattle driving movement when it was doing the very 
thing which the Congested Districts Board was at its wits’ end to know how to 
do. The board did not know where to turn for land on which to plant colonies of 
uneconomic tenants, and here were huge grazing ranches being cleared of cattle 
and graziers in many cases in the very districts where the board most wanted 
them. Why should they interfere to stop a movement which was doing so much
184to solve one of the serious problems before the Irish government?
The resumption of parliament in late January 1908 would see a determined campaign 
launched by I.U.P.P. against Augustine Birrell and the Liberal government.
The Liberal government defended itself against the unionist accusation that the 
country was in a state of lawlessness. While determined to adhere to the ordinary law to 
combat the agitation, the chancellor of the exchequer, H. H. Asquith, stated that other 
measures would be necessary. Asquith acknowledged that the agitators’ expectations 
had been raised by the potential of the Wyndham Act to acquire and divide untenanted 
land. However, their expectations had not been realised and Asquith opined that ‘the 
time had come when this part of the act should be strengthened by the application of
compulsion in fit cases, and the untenanted land' without injury or loss to anybody
1 8 ^should be more freely available for the purposes of holdings’. Remarkably, Asquith 
also admitted that those involved in cattle driving had a legitimate grievance.
Lord Castletown took a similar view to Asquith on the origins of the anti-grazing 
movement:
184 Ib id ., 18 Jan . 1908.
185 H a n s a rd 4, c lxxx iii, 147-51 (29 Jan. 1908).
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Why had cattle driving arisen? What is the origin of it? Because the people see 
large areas of grass lands, which Mr. Wyndham intended should be handed over 
to the commissioners and sold to the people to enlarge their small holdings, 
being sold to the graziers. The last chance of the people being able to enlarge 
their holdings or make them pay is therefore disappearing, and there is nothing 
left to them but poverty and emigration.186
Those nationalists closely associated with the campaign, such as J. P. Hayden, firmly
outlined in the House of Commons that the failure of the Wyndham Act was the sole
reason for the unrest:
The real cause of what were called disturbances would be very quickly wiped 
away if this house would act according to its own pledges and put into proper 
operation the law which it passed in the year 1903. Then the legislature held out 
hopes to the people that the land would be properly sold and divided among 
them. That hope has been dissipated, and in consequence these so-called 
disturbances had taken place.187
They maintained that the government had failed to properly implement the Wyndham
Act and the Evicted Tenants Act of 1907. In essence, they felt that if untenanted land
was acquired and divided up promptly the root of the agitation would disappear.
While the agrarian aspect of the anti-grazing movement was obvious there was 
also a political dimension. Although the Ranch War has generally been dated from 
Ginnell’s speech at The Downs in November 1906, the movement really only flourished 
following the rejection of the Irish Council Bill in May 1907. Indeed many nationalists 
took that as their cue to transform the movement into a formidable crusade. This put 
pressure on the government to accede to their wishes regarding home rule, university 
education and the land question.
Walter Guinness, M.P. for Bury, St. Edmunds, opined that the agitation was 
inextricably linked to the home rule cause: ‘The real motive of this organised 
persecution was to drive from the country those who would fain live under the sanction
of British law, or to compel them to make peace with their enemies and enjoy the
188  ■ protection of terrorism? Furthermore, the Liberal government’s suspension of the
regulation preventing the purchase of land upon which intimidation had occurred
186 Ib id ., col. 217  (30 Jan. 1908).
187 Ib id ., c lxxx iv , 1137-8 (20 Feb. 1908).
188 Ibid., c lxxx iii, 637 (3 Feb. 1908).
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certainly spurred on the cattle driving movement as the threat of a sale being prevented 
or delayed as a consequence was removed.
By April 1908, prominent figures in the anti-grazing campaign such as David 
Sheehy, M.P. for South Meath, were calling on tenants not to purchase, no matter the
terms, unless the untenanted land was included along with the sale. Sheehy knew that a
189land bill was imminent and that it would almost certainly involve compulsion. The 
attitude of those M.P.s involved in the anti-grazing movement was neatly summed up by 
William Delany, M.P. for Ossory, at Philipstown, Co. Westmeath on 28 April 1908. The 
Irish Times reported:
In a few days the report of the Congested Districts Commission would be laid on 
the table of the House of Commons demanding compulsory powers for the 
smashing up of the ranch lands. If the government failed to carry out the division 
of the grass lands, what would happen then? To give a reply in Mr. Birrell’s own 
words there would be hell in Ireland. The hazel [a hazel stick was often carried to 
drive the cattle] was up the chimney, but he advised them not to burn the hazel, 
for the day might come when members of the Irish party would be in Philipstown 
again, and tell them to take the hazel down.190
Section two of the Wyndham Act had proved to be revolutionary, in that, for the 
first time, it was not just the occupier who was eligible for a parcel of land. The clause 
had raised the expectations of the landless elements in the agricultural community and 
drove these men to join in the cattle driving. Instead of resolving the land question the 
clause had resulted in the perpetuation of agitation.
Lord Oranmore and Browne condemned the clause as: ‘one of the greatest 
mistakes in the act of 1903’ and opined that it was of the principal reasons why the 
agitation had come about. 191 He summed up the situation created by the act in the House 
of Lords:
Small tenants and their sons knew of this provision in the act, and it was only 
natural that they should wish to take advantage of it. The result is that strong 
local opposition has been raised to the migration of tenants from other parts of 
Ireland to the grasslands in the immediate neighbourhood where these tenants
189 I T ,  17 Apr. 1908.
190 Ibid., 29 Apr. 1908.
191 Hansard 4, cxcii, 37 (9 July 1908).
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with their sons are living; and, in fear that such lands might be taken for the relief 
of congestion elsewhere, these young men have...had recourse to very 
reprehensible measures. In the hope of obtaining the land as soon as possible 
they have resorted to the practice of cattle driving.. .They have done this in the 
hope of compelling the graziers to give up their farms and the landlords to sell, 
so that the land might be divided among the landless men in the neighbourhood, 
and the effect will be to accentuate the difficulties of relieving congestion 
elsewhere.192
The report of the Dudley commission in May 1908 only heightened the expectations in
agricultural society. Augustine Birrell described the effect that the Dudley commission’s
report had throughout the country: ‘The excitement and interest occasioned by that
commission all over Ireland could not be exaggerated. What had happened? The
commission had reported in favour of this very thing, namely, the handing over of the 
1grasslands.’
There was a feeling that the occupiers of uneconomic holdings in the local area 
should get the untenanted land before any congests were migrated. For example, at a 
meeting in Ballintubber Castle, Co. Roscommon on 23 August 1908, resolutions were 
passed objecting to the C.D.B. introducing congests to the area before the occupiers of 
uneconomic holdings were taken care of. In fact, the meeting hoped that the resolutions 
would form a clause in the expected land bill.194 The introduction of outsiders into a 
locality often evoked hostility. Aside from migrants, evicted tenants were also 
competing for untenanted land in many areas. On 2 November 1908 at Oldcastle, Co. 
Meath, a meeting of the local Vigilance Committee was held to discuss the sale of the 
Thomastown estate. Rumours that the estates commissioners might allocate land to 
evicted tenants adjoining the estate in Co. Cavan had led to tensions. After heated 
debate, the committee agreed that the people of the locality should take priority over any 
evicted tenants.195
On 24 April 1908 Judge Ross made an order for the release of Laurence Ginnell 
on the grounds of ill health.196 Once released, Ginnell quickly resumed his role in the
192 Ibid., col. 37.
193 Ibid., cxciii,  1803 (30 July 1908).
194I.T., 24 Aug. 1908.
195 Ibid., 4 N ov . 1908.
196/./., 25 Apr. 1908.
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campaign to break up the grass ranches. The fact that the royal commission on 
congestion had only advocated compulsion in the congested districts did not pass 
unnoticed. In the midlands and north Leinster there was extraordinary support for the 
division of the grasslands. Ginnell believed that the only way to convince the 
government to introduce compulsion nationwide was to continue the cattle driving 
campaign. At Castlepollard, Co. Westmeath in July, the Irish Times reported his 
statement: ‘He had never heard of Mr. Birrell having given a public promise on the 
matter of compulsion for all Ireland. They should again apply that pressure that had 
before made the landlords and the government cave in. The simplest way was not to let a
1 Q7
beast rest on the land.’
The accusation that government inaction had led people to believe that it was 
sympathetic to the anti-grazing agitation proved true in many areas. At a meeting in 
Curraghboy, Co. Roscommon on 28 July 1908, for example, a local J.P. by the name of 
P. Keaveny was reported to have stated:
He would give the grazier a fair chance, and if the grazier did not knuckle down 
he should be made to do so. Not-withstanding what the mighty government of 
Britain thought-the Boers showed how mighty they were-the land had got to 
come back to the people. But the people were now backed up by the government 
of the day, and soon, perhaps, the police, instead of guarding the bullocks, would
I QQ
have to drive them.
Many I.P.P. members including Ginnell, believed that the anti-grazing campaign 
had led to progress in the acquisition and division of untenanted land. William 
Redmond, M.P. for East Clare, while not openly advocating cattle driving, nevertheless 
stressed that the ranches had to be broken up. At Lisdoonvarna, Co. Clare on 20 
September 1908, William Redmond expressed his wonder that the people’s patience had 
lasted for so long. The Irish Independent reported his speech:
Was anyone surprised that the people were becoming impatient after waiting four 
or five years for these lands? He was only surprised that they had been patient so 
long, and it was small blame to them that after these years they were anxious to
197 Ibid., 10 July 1908.
198 Ibid., 29 July 1908.
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remind everyone of what they were entitled to under the land act...He had no
blame for the men who drove the cattle.199
In late November 1908 Augustine Birrell introduced his land bill. It was 
introduced late in the parliamentary session, leaving little time for debate. Most likely it 
was brought in prematurely in an attempt to defuse the anti-grazing agitation. The bill 
would be reintroduced at the beginning of the 1909 parliamentary session. The self 
proclaimed leader of the anti-grazing movement, Laurence Ginnell, felt that such was 
the case. In a published letter to Jasper Tully, owner of the Roscommon Herald, he 
asserted that: ‘the object of introducing that bill now, when it cannot pass, is to keep the 
hazel quiet this winter’.200 The M.P. for North Westmeath held that the bill had been 
introduced as a direct result of the anti-grazing agitation and that its most advantageous 
clauses, such as compulsion, could be attributed likewise. Furthermore, he believed that 
despite the proposed measure, it was vital the agitation continue with vigour. He judged 
that the incidence of cattle driving was directly proportional to the measure’s chances of 
passing in 1909, for so long as the disorder prevailed there was less chance of the Lords 
rejecting the bill and the I.P.P. would have greater leverage to amend the measure if 
necessary.201 The belief that the bill was a response to the anti-grazing agitation was 
widespread among nationalists. In King’s County, the Eglish and Drumcullen branch of 
the U.I.L. passed a resolution proclaiming the bill to be ‘a triumph for the policy of 
cattle driving’.202
Augustine Birrell introduced his land bill to amend the Wyndham Act of 1903 
which had broken down in a number of areas for complex and varied reasons. The two 
principal aims of the act had been to facilitate land purchase and to alleviate congestion. 
After five years in operation neither had been achieved. Birrell’s measure was labelled a 
treasury relief bill, a cattle drivers’ bill and a ratepayers’ bill by various politicians. As 
far as the leaders of the Ranch War agitation were concerned, the bill was the result of 
their efforts and looked set to address the division of the grasslands. The chief secretary
199 Ibid., 22 Sept. 1908.
200 Ibid., 4 Dec. 1908.
20' Ibid.
202 Ibid., 8 Dec. 1908.
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came under fire from the I.U.P.P. who maintained that he had caved in to the demands 
of the cattle drivers. Indeed, their accusations would appear to have been justified, 
considering the bill when it was introduced. Compulsory purchase was to be used 
throughout the country and the grasslands would be broken up to enlarge holdings and to 
provide farms for landless men. However, the compulsory powers were later whittled 
down considerably in the act and were confined to the relief of congestion in the 
congested districts and other congested estates elsewhere in Ireland.
As far as the Liberals and the I.P.P. were concerned, the relief of congestion was 
equally as important as land purchase. The I.U.P.P. interpreted the objectives of the 
Wyndham Act differently. They held that the relief of congestion was secondary to 
facilitating land purchase. In James Campbell’s view: ‘Its main, its paramount purpose, 
was to transform the status of the occupying tenant into that of a purchasing owner. 
While that was the paramount purpose, it had as an ancillary purpose the restoration of
203evicted tenants, and the relief of congestion in the west. ’
The chief architect of the 1903 act, George Wyndham, admitted that the 
objectives of the act had been more radical than unionists believed:
The object of our policy in 1903 was...not a single object, but a two-fold object. 
In the first place we intended to take measures for the speedy and smooth 
abolition of dual ownership in Ireland.. .Our other object covered a smaller area, 
but I will not say it is less important. It was to proceed by special provision 
to...improve the worst class of holdings in the west of Ireland, and in a minor 
degree elsewhere, prior to the sale of the estates in which these holdings were 
situated.204
The alleviation of congestion had been impeded, though, by the C.D.B.’s inadequate 
funding in particular. The Liberal solicitor-general for Ireland, Redmond Barry was 
adamant that this was the case:
The history of the Dudley commission and its report make one thing absolutely 
plain: it is this-that the act of 1903 had the relief of congestion in Ireland before 
it as one of its leading objects, and that the act in that respect has been a 
lamentable failure...It was due to one cause, and one cause only-namely, the
• • 205insufficiency of funds in the control of the Congested Districts Board.
203 Hansard 5 (Commons), iii, 205 (30 Mar. 1909).
204 Ibid., col. 365 (31 Mar. 1909).
205 Ibid., col. 356.
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Similarly, the absence of compulsory powers in the congested districts was regarded as a 
great handicap.
The composition of the C.D.B. was also altered by the Birrell Act of 1909. The 
new board would consist of two permanent members, the chief secretary, the under 
secretary to the lord lieutenant, the vice president of the Department of Agriculture and 
Technical Instruction for Ireland and nine member appointed members. The board’s 
jurisdiction was extended to include all of Connaught, Donegal, Kerry, six rural districts 
in Clare and four in Cork. Moreover, the annual income of the board was increased to 
£250,000.
XVII). Conclusion.
The principal aims of the Wyndham Act were to facilitate land purchase and to tackle 
the problem of congestion, both in the congested districts and throughout Ireland. 
Closely tied to these objectives was the resolution of the evicted tenants question. As far 
as the I.P.P. was concerned, the relief of congestion was as important, if not more so, 
than land purchase. For the vast majority of unionists and landlords, the relief of 
congestion was only a secondary objective and one which should not interfere with the 
transfer of land from landlord to tenant.
The publicity and excitement generated by the introduction of the Wyndham Act 
raised expectations throughout Ireland. The act was hailed as the solution to the Irish 
land question. The belief arose in Irish agricultural society that not only would landlords 
sell their tenanted estates but that the untenanted grazing ranches would be acquired and 
divided. Owing mainly to legal difficulties involving the treasury, the amount of 
untenanted land acquired in the early years of the act had been modest. As more estates 
were sold small holders quickly realised that the ownership of their holdings did not 
correlate with viability. Small holders would have to acquire parcels of untenanted land 
so as to create economic holdings. Many landlords were profiting from the letting of 
land on the eleven-month system to graziers. Others, such as Lord Ashtown, were 
farming much of their grazing land themselves and they were reluctant to sell their 
untenanted land along with the rest of their estate. Once the delays in the distribution of
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the purchase money and ‘bonus’ became apparent, there was even more reason for 
landlords to hold onto their grazing lands. In the majority of cases the interest paid in 
lieu of rent, prior to the distribution of the purchase money and ‘bonus’, was lower than 
the estate charges that many landlords had to contend with. Hence, the money earned 
from the letting of land for grazing was immensely valuable in such a period of financial 
uncertainty.
Section two of the Wyndham Act had unforeseen consequences. For the first 
time, members of the agricultural community, who were not occupiers of land, were 
eligible for a farm where untenanted land was sold along with an estate. Evicted tenants, 
small holders in the neighbourhood whose holdings were valued under five pounds and, 
most importantly, the sons of tenants resident on an estate all came under this umbrella. 
For those young men, especially those who did not stand to inherit the family farm, the 
act offered the prospect of obtaining farms of their own. The Labourers’ Act of 1906 
enabled a progressive labourer to obtain a parcel of untenanted land under section two 
and to climb the social ladder. All of these groups stood to benefit from the acquisition 
and division of any untenanted land. This expectation united the small holders of 
Comiaught with the landless sons of relatively comfortable tenant farmers in areas such 
as Meath and Westmeath in their support of cattle driving.
The Estates Commission’s ability to tackle congestion and uneconomic holdings 
had been restricted in the early years of the act owing to the doubts surrounding the 
allocation of the ‘bonus’ in the sale of untenanted land. Legal difficulties had beset the 
purchase of untenanted land, and this, in turn, had impacted on the estates 
commissioners’ capacity to purchase sufficient quantities of such land. The fact that the 
vast majority of the sales under the act were direct sales between landlord and tenant and 
not between landlords and the estates commissioners was significant as it prevented the 
commission from tackling uneconomic holdings and congestion. When the estates 
commissioners wished to purchase an estate which was congested, the landlord had to 
concede that the land was, in fact, congested. Landlords were reluctant to do so as they 
believed this would result in their receiving a lower price. The C.D.B. was restricted 
greatly by the lack of finance available to migrate tenants or to improve estates.
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Therefore, by 1909 it was evident that more extensive powers and greater finance were 
required if congestion was to be relieved and uneconomic holdings improved.
All sides had acknowledged in 1903 that the settlement of the evicted tenants 
question was essential if the Irish land question was to be resolved. However, owing to 
restrictive regulations and an inability to acquire sufficient untenanted land, progress had 
been hampered during the early years of the Wyndham Act. Although matters improved 
upon the Liberals entering government in early 1906, obstacles still remained. The 
amount of untenanted land that the estates commissioners had been able to acquire was 
wholly inadequate. Such land was required for a number of different purposes such as 
the relief of congestion, the enlargement of uneconomic holdings and groups such as the 
sons of tenants also had a claim. This demand for untenanted land was a significant 
factor in the introduction of compulsion in the 1907 Evicted Tenants Act.
Aside from the introduction of compulsion, one of the main reasons for the 
I.U.P.P.’s vehement opposition to the Evicted Tenants Act of 1907 was the extreme 
difficulties facing land purchase, in terms of delays and a shortage of finance. The 
I.U.P.P. and Irish landlords did not want time, staff or money to be diverted away from 
land purchase. With the estates commissioners and their staff already overwhelmed with 
the volume of sales, any redirection of valuable resources away from land purchase was 
bound to meet determined resistance. For the I.P.P., the reinstatement of the evicted 
tenants was a core principle of the Wyndham Act and just as important as land purchase. 
In political terms, providing for their ‘wounded soldiers’ was paramount.
By 31 March 1920, 3,581 evicted tenants or their representatives had been 
reinstated to their old holdings or given new ones. They were installed as tenant- 
purchasers and repaid a yearly annuity. Landlords had been responsible for the direct 
reinstatement or provision of a new holding in 1,914 cases, albeit with financial 
assistance from the Land Commission in the form of grants to the evicted tenants. The 
remaining 1,662 cases were a result of the estates commissioners’ initiatives. In order to
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establish the evicted tenants in their holdings, £378,269 had been spent in the form of
. 206 grants.
Despite the best efforts of the Wyndham-Act of 1903 and Birrell’s Evicted 
Tenants Act of 1907, the question of the evicted tenants refused to disappear. One must 
be mindful that a considerable number of the applications received by the estates 
commissioners were refused. By 31 March 1919 the estates commissioners had received 
13,744 applications from persons claiming to be evicted tenants. The majority of these 
had been rejected. The significant numbers of applicants who were rejected ensured that 
the evicted tenants question did not fade but remained a social sore.
During the revolutionary period of 1917 to 1923 the question was still deeply 
emotive. Laurence Ginnell, who left the I.P.P. and joined Sinn Fein, used the issue to 
fuel anti-government agitation:
The claim of the evicted and their descendants has been, and must until satisfied 
continue to be, beyond all question the strongest and most urgent of all the 
victims of the English garrison. The failure to satisfy those claims is the greatest 
blot on land legislation.207
The presence of designated evicted tenants associations during the revolutionary period
and during the era of the Irish Free State indicates that it remained very much alive as an
emotive issue. Indeed, as the 1923 Land Act was being drafted, the Evicted Tenants and
Land Settlement Association sent a circular to the Irish government advocating the
division of the grazing ranches.208 Notably, the 1923 Land Act contained provisions for
the restoration of evicted tenants.
As late as 1927 the Coolgreaney and County Wicklow Evicted Tenants’ 
Association was delighted with the response they received from a number of Fianna Fail 
T.D.s (Teachta Dala) who were keen to assist in any way.209 Upon the introduction of 
the 1933 Land Bill, the South of Ireland Evicted Tenants’ Association strongly 
condemned the government for not providing a clause to enable evicted tenants to be
206 Report o f  the estates commissioners fo r  the year ended 31 March, ¡920 and fo r  the period 1 Nov. 1903 
to 31 March, 1920, xiv, [Cmd. 1150] H.C. 1921, xiv, 661.
207 Labhras MacFhionnghail [Laurence Ginnell],  The land question (Dublin, n. d. [1917]),  p. 7.
208 1.T., 20 N ov. 1922.
209 Ibid., 4 Oct. 1927.
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211alive during the revolutionary period and in the Irish Free State.
reinstated.210 Therefore, the emotive and controversial topic o f  evicted tenants remained
210 Ib id ,  10 July 1933.
211 See Terence D ooley , 'The landfor the p e o p le T h e  land question in independent Ireland  (Dublin, 
2004), pp 74-81.
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This thesis has been a study of the origins, operation and legacy of the Irish Land Act of 
1903. It has systematically sketched the progress of the act and its effect on the Irish 
land question from its creation up to its amendment by parliament in 1909. Until now, 
despite the acknowledged importance of the act, its effect and influence on the Irish land 
question had not been fully explored. The originality of this thesis lies in the 
completeness of the portrait of the act and its often contentious working out, in addition 
to the analysis of the measure’s complex financial provisions.
The tendency amongst historians had been to accept the Wyndham Act as the 
product of the Land Conference and its report. Such a view neglected the importance of 
events at ground level and gave the impression that the Land Conference and the act 
operated in a vacuum removed from the pressures of the time. Recent scholarship has 
highlighted the role of the U.I.L. in the years prior to the act. However, despite some 
acknowledgement, the role played by T. W. Russell and his compulsory purchase 
campaign in Ulster has not received sufficient recognition. This dissertation has 
therefore highlighted the fact that the origins of the act lay in the parallel campaigns of 
the U.I.L. and of T. W. Russell for compulsory purchase. In addition, it has been 
demonstrated how Russell had actually initiated his compulsory campaign prior to the 
U.I.L. and that his movement led to a significant split within Ulster unionism.
One of the unique aspects of this thesis, has been the examination of the 
parliamentary process whereby a land act was passed. The benefits of such an approach 
has been the insight it has given to the Irish land question during the period. Another 
dimension to this study has been the close analysis of the Wyndham Act’s clauses. The 
application of this methodology to the other land acts of the period would only serve to 
further our understanding of the Irish land question.
The 1903 Wyndham Act was intended to solve the Irish land question. Its 
principal objectives were land purchase and the relief of congestion while also taking 
into consideration the resolution of the evicted tenants question. In terms of encouraging 
landlords to sell their estates there is no doubt that the act was the most successful of all 
those enacted by the British government. Undoubtedly the enticements for landlords to 
sell such as the 12 % ‘bonus’ and payment in cash contributed greatly to this. George
CONCLUSION.
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Wyndham had imagined that by processing sales to the value of £5,000,000 annually the 
act would operate satisfactorily. However, neither the act nor its administrators were 
equipped to tackle the sheer volume of sales. When this was combined with the 
defective financial structure of the act grave difficulties arose.
The depression in the financial markets during the period of the act’s operation 
exacerbated the difficulties in raising sufficient funds to sustain the act. 2 % % 
guaranteed Irish land stock never stood at anywhere near par during the period. The 
losses that arose from raising stock at a discount were significant and prevented any 
acceleration of the process despite the huge volume of sales. The long delays associated 
with the distribution of the purchase money and ‘bonus’ were injurious both to landlords 
and tenants. The fact that the backlog of sales generated by the 1903 act was not 
completely dealt with until the late 1920s undoubtedly contributed to the agrarian unrest 
of the Ranch War and of the revolutionary period. The financial superstructure of the act 
was designed so that when the losses arising from issuing stock below par reached a 
certain level they began to fall on the Irish ratepayer. Such a financial system ensured 
that the British taxpayer was not liable and probably ensured that the act was passed in 
1903. The liability of the Irish ratepayers for the loss was unacceptable to all shades of 
Irish opinion. By 1909 it was found that land purchase could not proceed under the 
terms of the Wyndham Act without accruing further serious financial losses. New 
legislation was required if the transfer of land from landlord to tenant was to continue.
There were a number of aspects to the Irish land question aside from land 
purchase. Indeed, for many it was more about land acquisition and land redistribution. 
The Wyndham Act did not solve the Irish land question. Instead it proved a stepping- 
stone on the road to the resolution of the question which was still hugely relevant during 
the period of the Irish Free State and in the first few decades of the Irish republic.
The Wyndham Act raised expectations to a fever pitch in Irish agricultural 
society appearing to be all things to all men. Unfortunately, a number of important and 
numerically significant groups were left in the act’s slipstream. The purchase of a 
holding did not simply make it economically viable overnight. The occupiers of small 
uneconomic holdings, whether in the congested districts or scattered throughout the 
country, who had purchased under the 1903 act or under earlier legislation, quickly
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realised that they required additional land to make their farms economically viable. Land 
purchase would not resolve this aspect of the land question.
Evicted tenants failed to benefit significantly from the Wyndham Act and 
substantial legislation was required in 1907 and 1908. Even with the adoption of 
compulsory powers this aspect of the land question survived and remained an emotive 
issue in the period of the Irish Free State. During the revolutionary period of 1917 to 
1923 Laurence Ginnell, who had left the I.P.P. and joined Sinn Fein, would use this 
emotive issue to attempt to garner support.
One of the groups in agricultural society who benefited the least from the 1903 
act were the agricultural labourers. After a promise from George Wyndham during the 
committee stage in 1903 that a comprehensive labourers bill would be introduced in due 
course the needs of this class were sacrificed. Wyndham’s effort in 1904 was rejected by 
all shades of Irish opinion. Although a measure was introduced in 1906 by the Liberals 
the matter required further legislation under the Birrell Act of 1909, in a separate act in 
1911 and remained an unresolved issue right through to the Irish Free State.
When the 1903 act sanctioned that the sons of tenants on an estate being sold 
could receive a farm out of any surplus untenanted land its effect on the landless element 
in agricultural society was not anticipated. With the claims of the landless substantially 
recognised for the first time the failure of the act to swiftly and effectively provide 
parcels of land for such men led to the agrarian agitation known as the Ranch War. The 
call for ‘the landless men for the manless land’ became as irresistible as ‘the land for the 
people’ had previously been. With their ambitions and self-interest inflamed by the 
Wyndham Act the issue emerged as a hugely important aspect of the land question.
All of these groups required land but land purchase was of no use to them 
because they either had no land or their farms were too small to be economically viable. 
From the commencement of the Wyndham Act they put pressure on landlords not only 
to sell their estates but to sell their untenanted land along with it. This fed the agrarian 
unrest in the west from 1904 to 1905 and during the more widespread Ranch War.
The hunger for untenanted land raised considerable tensions in rural Ireland. One 
has only to delve into the report of the royal commission on congestion to see how 
problematic the distribution of untenanted land was. The uneconomic small holders and
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landless men in the locality of the untenanted land believed they were more entitled to 
such land than outsiders. The acquisition of untenanted land for agricultural labourers 
often faced considerable resistance from men in the locality who felt that their needs 
should receive priority. Their opposition to the introduction of strangers greatly hindered 
the attempts of the C.D.B. to migrate people from congested areas. It was equally 
frustrating for the C.D.B. and the estates commissioners when they attempted to resettle 
evicted tenants, especially if they were not from the locality. While all of these groups 
were in favour of acquiring and redistributing untenanted land they were also in 
competition with each other for it and the supply was limited. This aspect of the land 
question was not resolved by the 1903 act. If anything it had proved the catalyst for 
much of the trouble as it had exacerbated the land hunger and existing tensions in 
agricultural society. As more tenants became the owners of their holdings the realisation 
dawned that a social revolution was occurring. The ownership of the land was changing 
hands. The opportunity presented by the Wyndham Act of obtaining a farm or enlarging 
an existing one had to be grasped, as there was a fear it might not arise again.
The 1903 act was not an attack on the landed gentry as a class. It was a voluntary 
measure which provided landlords with a means of extricating themselves from their 
Irish lands. The enticements to sell were significant especially the 12 % cash ‘bonus’ 
and the payment of the purchase money in cash. The ‘zone’ system ensured that they 
received higher prices, in terms of the number of years' purchase of rent, than they could 
have received under previous acts. The clause under which a demesne could be sold and 
repurchased by the landlord on the same annuity terms as the tenants provided what was 
essentially a low-interest rate loan. For relatively unencumbered landlords the act 
actually offered the opportunity to make a serious financial profit. For those who were 
heavily in debt it offered an escape with the prospect of a substantial cash sum, in the 
form of the ‘bonus’, for their own use. In essence, the act gave the landed gentry the 
opportunity to move away from a rent based income and into the world of business. The 
finance raised from the sale of their estates could be invested in stocks or shares which 
would provide a more reliable and stable means of income than their rents had 
previously been.
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The intention of the 1903 act was to keep landlords in Ireland after they had sold. 
Nowhere is this more obvious than in the clause which permitted the sale and repurchase 
of their demesnes. The intention was to establish resident landlords as country 
gentlemen. The evidence provided in this thesis confirms that the landed gentry did not 
abandon the country in droves after the act. Neither the Land War nor the Wyndham Act 
ended the opportunity for landlords to reside in Ireland. Horace Plunkett identified the 
opportunity the act presented to the landed gentry in his work Noblesse Oblige; an Irish 
rendering (1908). Removed from the burden of landlord -  tenant relations the resident 
gentry had the chance to reinvent themselves and to become leaders in their localities 
and in the national life of the country.
On the other hand tenants whose landlord sold under the act enjoyed a reduction 
in their annuity as compared with their former rent. Under the act the maximum advance 
permitted to a tenant was £7,000. Under previous acts it had only been £3,000. This 
undoubtedly suited the wealthier sections of the tenantry in the east of Ireland, 
particularly in east Ulster and Leinster. A good example was the Leinster estate. We saw 
in chapter four how 77 out of 506 tenant-purchasers received advances over £3,000 
which amounted to £381,825 in total. This figure accounted for more than half the 
purchase money on the estate. Where sales occurred on properties such as the Leinster 
estate the extent to which the voices of the smaller tenants (many of whom farmed 
uneconomic holdings) were heard during the rush to purchase remains doubtful.
The tenant’s annuity was fixed for approximately sixty-eight and a half years. 
Unlike a benevolent landlord the state did not take into account localised conditions or 
events which might effect the payment. Whereas rents had been up for review every 
fifteen years in the land courts the annuity would remain constant and would not take 
economic conditions into account. Undoubtedly many tenants struggled to pay their 
annuities during periods of economic depression such as occurred in the 1920s and 30s, 
particularly those who had purchased uneconomic holdings. The joys of ownership were 
quickly replaced by the realisation that their farm was insufficient to adequately support 
a family.
In the past traditional orthodoxy surrounding the Wyndham Land Act has 
suggested that the act ended landlordism as an institution in Ireland and that very little
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land purchase or redistribution occurred after 1923. J. C. Beckett, for example, outlined
how ‘landlordism in rural Ireland had become a thing of the past’ by 1919.1 J. J. Lee
exemplifies this train of thought:
[Post independence] There was no longer a viable landlord system. Most Irish 
farmers became the effective owners of their holdings before 1921. The 1923 
Land Act permitted the remaining tenants to purchase their holdings quickly, but 
the major changes in land ownership occurred before independence... The 
government was not therefore exposed to the temptation to manipulate land 
reform extensively for political purposes, which might have spawned massive 
corruption and provoked widespread grievance. Such limited land re-distribution 
as occurred continued to be channelled through the safer conduits of the Land 
Commission. Communities were not generally rent asunder by rival claims to 
land.2
Philip Bull also contended that: ‘By 1921 most Irish farmers owned their holdings, and 
the 1923 Land Act ... speeded up the process for those who still remained as tenants. 
Landlordism, as historically understood in Ireland, no longer existed. This achievement 
had largely flowed from the 1903 act.’3 Recent scholarship, such as Terence Dooley’s 
‘The land for the people ’ (2003), has cast grave doubts on this interpretation.4 After the 
Catholic Church, the Land Commission was the most important and the most 
controversial institution in independent Ireland. The role of political patronage as 
regards the division and redistribution of land and its effects on voting patterns was quite 
significant. Successive Irish governments manipulated land reform for political 
purposes. None of this could have occurred had the Wyndham Act actually solved the 
land question.
Such assertions have distorted the legacy of the Wyndham Act. Although it 
ensured the transfer of a significant amount of land from landlords to tenants it did not 
end landlordism. Many landlords still retained huge estates prior to the 1923 Land Act. 
The earl of Leitrim, for example, held 39,000 acres in Co. Donegal while the marquis of
1 J.C. Beckett, The making o f  modern Ireland 1600-1923 (London, 1969), p. 407.
2 J.J. Lee, Ireland 1912-1985; Politics and Society (Cambridge, 1989), p. 71.
3 Bull, Land politics and nationalism: A study o f  the Irish land question (Dublin, 1996), p. 177.
4 D ooley , 'The landfor the p e o p le T h e  land question in independent Ireland  (Dublin, 2004).
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Lansdowne still owned 49,000 acres in Co. Kerry.5 Indeed, there were still 114,000 
holdings on 3,000,000 acres that had not been purchased prior to 1923.6
The Wyndham Act has been credited with making ‘redundant the close 
association of nationalism to the land issue’.7 Philip Bull, in particular, has advocated 
this theory. According to Bull: ‘The land conference and land act [Wyndham Act] 
removed from Irish politics the issue on which much of the momentum of nationalism 
had previously depended.’8 Such an interpretation certainly underestimates the agrarian 
aspect of the revolutionary period from 1917 to 1923 when Sinn Fein used discontent 
over the land question as a prop to their own nationalist ambitions. As David Fitzpatrick 
pointed out: “‘IRA engagements” were in many cases thinly disguised land seizures 
which Dublin headquarters had neither the ability nor, perhaps, the intention to 
prevent.’9 Indeed, the leadership of the I.R.A. and Sinn Fein were often driven to great 
lengths to ensure that the question of land did not threaten to subvert the nationalist 
cause.10 Thus, the close association of the land question and the nationalist movement 
was certainly not terminated by the Wyndham Act, but continued through the 
revolutionary period and during the civil war.11 It even played a part in Fianna Fail 
coming to power in 1932 and the prominence of Clann na Talmhan (‘party of the land’) 
in the 1940s and 1950s. Richard English, in his work Irish freedom; The history o f 
nationalism in Ireland (2006), revealed how I.R.A. members such as Peadar O’Donnell 
attempted to utilise the discontent arising from the payment of land purchase annuities 
for political gain.12 The vast majority of these annuities concerned purchases under the 
Wyndham Act and many farmers in the 1920s and 1930s found it very difficult to keep 
up their annual repayments.
5 D ooley , The decline o f  the Big House in Ireland; A study o f  Irish landedfamilies 1860-1960 (Dublin,  
2001),  p. 127.
6 C. F. Kolbert and T. O ’Brien, Land reform in Ireland: A legal history o f  the Irish land problem and its 
settlement (Cambridge, 1975), p. 46.
7 Philip Bull, ‘Land and politics, 1879-1903’ in D. G. B oyce  (ed.), The revolution in Ireland  (Dublin, 
1988), p. 45.
8 Philip Bull, ‘The significance o f  the nationalist response to the Irish Land Act o f  1903’ in Irish 
Historical Studies, xxviii,  no. 111 (M ay 1993), p. 283.
9 David Fitzpatrick, ‘The geography o f  Irish nationalism 1910-1921’ in Past and Present, no.78 (Feb. 
1978), p i  19.
10 Fergus Campbell, ‘The last land war? Kevin O ’S h ie l’s memoir o f  the Irish revolution (1 9 1 6 -2 1 ) ’ in 
Archivium Hibernicum, Ivii (2003),  p. 196.
11 Ronan Fanning, Independent Ireland  (Dublin 1983), p. 175.
12 Richard English, Irish Freedom; The history o f  nationalism in Ireland  (London, 2006),  pp 31 8-9.
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The assumption by historians that the land question at the beginning of the 
twentieth century was solely about land purchase has led to many misconceptions. The 
reality, of course, was much more complex. According to F.S.L. Lyons, for example: 
‘With the Wyndham Act the coping-stone was placed on the whole edifice of 
constructive unionism ... while the act undoubtedly fulfilled the immediate and urgent 
need of ending the Land War.’13 Another proponent of this argument that the Wyndham 
Act ended the Land War is Philip Bull who stated that; ‘the resulting act [Wyndham act] 
provided the basis for tenant farmers to secure the ownership of their farms, so bringing 
to an end the land war that had raged in Ireland since the late 1870s’.14 Such an 
assumption neglects the importance of the Ranch War and of the revolutionary period of 
1917 to 1923. While it provided the vehicle for the transfer of a substantial amount of 
land the Wyndham Act did not end the Land War. Rather it aggravated the tensions 
within Irish agricultural society and ensured the continuance of the Irish land question.
The Wyndham Act was contemporaneously hailed as the final solution to the 
Irish land question. However, it did not solve the question but even exacerbated certain 
aspects. Its principal objectives were land purchase, the relief of congestion and the 
resolution of the evicted tenants question. The act proved the catalyst for an extensive 
transfer of land from landlords to tenant-purchasers. The financial structure of the act 
was fundamentally unstable and unsound. When this was combined with the unexpected 
volume of sales, the administrative and staffing problems, the release of only £5,000,000 
annually for the first three years and the long delays associated with the distribution of 
the purchase money and the cash ‘bonus’ it was little wonder that difficulties arose. 
Although it far exceeded previous and subsequent acts, as regards the volume of land 
transferred, it did not operate as smoothly or as quickly as had been expected and 
required. Needless to say the act did not bring about the conclusion of land purchase as 
further legislation was required in 1909 and after independence.
The relief of congestion and the resolution of the evicted tenants question were 
not resolved by the Wyndham Act either. Subsequent legislation was quickly required to 
try to resolve these aspects of the land question. Both remained prominent topics in
13 F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland since the fam ine  (G lasgow, 1973), p. 219.
14 Bull, ‘The significance o f  the nationalist response to the Irish Land Act o f  1903’, p. 283.
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Ireland after independence. What the Wyndham Act succeeded in doing was magnifying 
the plight of uneconomic holders, evicted tenants, agricultural labourers and the sons or 
farmers or other landless elements. With the acceleration of land purchase under the act 
these groups realised that the possibility of obtaining land was slipping from their grasp. 
By heightening the expectations of these groups and failing to provide sufficient land 
redistribution to meet their demands the potential for agrarian agitation was kept alive. 
Far from being the final solution to the Irish land question the Wyndham Act proved to 
be a stepping stone, admittedly a significant one, on the road to the resolution of 
Ireland’s agrarian difficulties.
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(Maynooth) 186 Maynooth J.P.
William Chamberlain 
(Maynooth) 207 Maynooth Took the place o f  McGrath
Stephen Browne 
(Maynooth) 0




John and Hugh Shaw, 
Maynooth, owned over 200 
acres each, maybe related
Mathew Minch (Athy) 248 Athy
J.P., former M.P. for South 
Kildare, noted malt & corn 
merchant. Chairman o f  Athy 
U.I.L.
Thomas Anderson 
(Athy) 313 Kilkea J.P.
Richard Wright (Athy) 347 ICilkea J.P.
39 Castledermot
John Gannon(Athy) 257 Kilkea J.P.
Andrew Pennycook 
(Athv) 223 Athy
Acted as secretary for the 
deputation
Charles Greene (Athy) 149 Kilkea




Anthony Reeves (Athy) 80 Athy




Land registered under Margaret 
Barrington, probably his wife
Total acreage 3,580 I
Source: R e tu rn  o f  a d va n ces m ade u n d er  the Ir ish  L a n d  A c t, 1903 d u r in g  the p e r io d  
f r o m  1st N ovem ber, 1903 to 31s' D ecem ber, 1905, vol. i, p a r ts  i, ii, a n d  Hi [ C d .3 4 4 7 ,  
C d . 3 5 6 0 ,  C d .3 5 4 7 ]  H .C .  1 9 0 7 ,  lx x ,  1.
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Appendix II. Stocks purchased from the sale of the Leinster estate, 1903/4
Stocks purchased Price
£ s. d.
£ 1 0 ,0 0 0  Dublin  Corporation 3 .25%  Stock 9,225 1 0
£ 1 0 ,0 0 0  B elfast City 3% Stock 8,635 11 0
£ 1 0 ,0 0 0  B elfast  Corporation Stock 3.5% 10,125 8 6
£ 1 ,8 0 0  15s. 10d. Bank o f  Ireland Stock 11.5% 6,213 16 5
£ 4 ,1 3 9  17i.  4d. Natal Inscribed Stock  3.5% 3,96 0 19 11
£ 5 ,7 0 0  Midland Gt. Western o f  Ireland 5% Stock 7 ,872 18 0
£ 1 ,6 0 0  Gt. Southern & Western Railway 4% Guaranteed Stock 1,910 2 '1
£ 5 ,0 0 0  Caledonian R ailw ay Stock 4% 5,883 11 0
£ 3 ,0 0 0  Bristol Corporation 3 .5%  Stock 3,035 13 6
£ 3 ,0 0 0  L agos 3 .5%  Inscribed Stock 2 ,898 16 0
£ 2 ,0 0 0  Cape 3 .5%  Stock 1,945 1 0
Total 61,706 18 7
Source: ‘Statement of application of sums received on the sale of the Leinster estates 
in Ireland July 1904’ (P.R.O.N.I., Leinster Papers, D3078/2/15/5).
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Appendix III. Statement as to the legal and beneficial ownership of the purchase
moneys of the Leinster estate, December 1905
No. A m o u n t  o f  C h a rg e
£ s. d.
Beneficiary In whom vested Description of charges




£4,000 is part o f  a charge of  
£21,538 9s 2d charged for 
the late Lord Gerald 
Fitzgerald.
£4,000 is part o f  £40,000  
charged for portions.




£4,000 is part o f  the same 
charge o f  £21,238 9s 2d 
charged for the late Lord 
Gerald Fitzgerald.
£4,000 is part o f  the same 
£40,000 charged for 
portions.




Part o f  the same £40,000  
charged for portions.




£4,000 is part o f  the same 
£40,000 charged for 
portions.
£4,000 was charged for 
Lord George in 1889.
5 4,000 0 0 Lord and Lady Henry 









Part o f  the same £40,000  
charged for portions.




£4,000 is part o f  the same 
£40,000 charged for 
portions.
£4,000 was charged for 
Lady Nesta in 1887.
7 120,154 17 4 The duke upon 
attaining 21 as 
residuary legatee 
under the will o f  
Gerald duke o f  
Leinster or his next 
of kin in the event o f  
his death under age.





executors o f  Gerald 
duke o f  Leinster.
£87,000 represents charges 
to which Gerald duke o f  
Leinster was entitled at his 
death.
II). £42,000: Lord 
Henry Fitzgerald as 
trustee for Gerald 
duke o f  Leinster.
III). £33,154 17s 
4d: Lord Frederick 
and Lord Kinnaird 
as trustees o f  the 
will o f  Gerald duke 
o f  Leinster.
£33,154 17s 4d represents 
investments made out o f  
income by the trustees o f  
the will o f  Gerald duke o f  
Leinster.
Source: ‘Statement as to the legal and beneficial ownership of the purchase moneys 
of the Leinster estate’ (P.R.O.N.I., Leinster papers, D3078/2/15/4).
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Appendix III contd. Statement as to the legal and beneficial ownership of the
purchase moneys of the Leinster estate, December 1905
No. Amount of Charge
£  s. cl.
Beneficiary In whom vested Description of charges
8 8,845 2 8 The duke upon 
attaining 21 under the 
will o f  Gerald duke of  
Leinster or his next of  
kin in the event o f  his 
death under age 
except so far as the 
same may have arisen 
from real estate 
which would devolve  
upon his heir at law.
Lord Frederick 
Fitzgerald and Lord 
Kinnaird.
Represents investments 
made by the trustee o f  the 
will o f  Gerald duke of  
Leinster out o f  capital.
9 103,076 18 5.5 The duke upon 
attaining 21 as tenant 
in tail under the 
settlement o f  1884 or 
his successor under 
the settlement in the 
event o f  his death 
under age.
1). £73,076 18s 
54d: Lord Kinnaird 
and Charles Robert 
Hamilton as the 
original trustees o f  
the settlement o f  
1884.
Represents investments 
made by the trustee o f  the 
settlement o f  1884 out o f
capital.
II). 30,000: Lord 
Kinnaird and Lord 
Frederick 
Fitzgerald as the 
present trustees o f  
the settlement o f  
1884.
T ola l 272,076 18 5.5
Source: ‘Statement as to the legal and beneficial ownership of the purchase moneys 
of the Leinster estate’ (P.R.O.N.I., Leinster papers, D3078/2/15/4).
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Appendix IV. Sample of purchase prices & bonuses received by thirty 
landowners based on advances received by their tenant purchasers between 1 
November 1903 and 31 December 1909
Number Purchase Bonus
Vendor County of price at
acres £ 12%
Archdale, Edward Fermanagh/Tyrone 2 9 ,3 3 4 2 4 2 ,0 4 7 2 9 ,04 5
Balzani, Count Ugo Antrim 7 ,99 4 8 2 ,5 9 9 9,911
Carysfort, Earl of W icklow/K ildare/Dublin 17,669 170,723 2 0 ,4 8 6
Close, Major M. A. Arm agh 13,009 2 1 0 ,7 9 3 2 5 ,2 9 5
Colley, George P.A. Kildare/Cork 5,021 7 8 ,3 6 0 9 ,403
Colley, G.P.A & Pomeroy, E.A.G. Kildare 2 1 2 3 ,193 383
Coote, Capt. C. J. Limerick 1,958 5 5 ,3 6 6 6 ,643
Craig, Charles C. D ow n 840 11,222 1,346
Craig, James D o w n 411 6,013 721
Deramore, Baron D o w n 4 ,51 0 9 8 ,9 1 9 11,870
Emly, Baron Limerick/Clare 2 ,12 7 3 2 ,2 0 4 3 ,8 64
Gascoigne, Lt.-Gen. Frederick R.T.T. L im erick 6 ,28 6 96,651 11 ,598
Hopkins, Thomas Queen's 182 3 ,1 5 2 378
Kavanagh, Walter McMurrough K ilkenny 7,131 85 ,453 10,254
Leconfield, Baron Clare 25 6 4 ,24 8 509
Louth, Baron Kildare 393 5,021 602
Mayo, Earl of Kildare 3 ,64 4 9 2 ,0 2 8 11,043
The MacDermot, Charles Edward Sligo 742 3,491 418
McDonnell, Sir Anthony P. M ayo 864 3 ,19 2 383
Monck, Viscount W exford 1,949 14 ,748 1,769
Montgomery, Hugh de Fellenberg Fermanagh/Tyrone 3 ,45 4 2 9 ,9 3 9 3 ,5 9 2
Moore, William Antrim 1,139 13,780 1,653
Newman, John R. B. Cork 5,21 1 5 6 ,6 7 5 6,801
Pakenham, Lt.-Gen. T.H. Antrim 8,181 121,201 14,544
Pomeroy, Ernest A. G. Kildare 3 ,4 7 4 5 6 ,4 9 9 6 ,7 79
Power, Hamo Massy Tipperary 1,214 13,058 1,566
Redmond, John E. * W exford 3 ,1 5 0 35,351 4 ,2 4 2
Rochfort-Boyd, Charles A. W estmeath 9 8 0 19,061 2 ,2 8 7
Rossmore, Baron M onaghan 12,935 179 ,932 21 ,591
Wills-Sandford, Thomas G. R o sco m m o n 13,212 120 ,2 5 0 14 ,430
1 Totals 157,482 1,945,169 233,406
Source: Return of advances made under the Irish Land Act, 1903, 1903-20 
(see bibliography for specific references)
*John Redmond did not receive any of the bonus as the purchase money failed to 
cover the encumbrances and charges on the estate.
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Appendix V. Sample of forty landowners who sold and repurchased, under the 
provisions of the Wyndham Act, 1903, their demesnes and other lands in their
occupation
Area Payment in
Landowner County in Price Advance cash
Acres £ £ £
Archdale, Edward Fermanagh 1,607 19,847 19,847
Athlumney, Lord Meath 988 19,020 17,895 1,125
Balfour, B. R. T. Meath 856 14,000 14,000
Bandon, Earl of Cork 9 166 166
Birmingham, Louisa M. F. Roscommon 95 2,854 2 ,854
Black, William Donegal .293 4,000 2,242 1,758
Blake, Col. Llewellyn Galway 1,243 3,413 3,413
Bodkin, Martin Galway 624 8,065 8,065
Brooke, Sir George F. Wexford 11 55 55
Burrowes, Thomas C. Cavan 362 9,840 8,125 1,715
Butler, Thomas Tipperary Sth. 303 8,000 8,000
Carysfort, Earl of W icklow 2,054 20 ,000 20 ,000
Castletown, Baron Queen's 1,232 22,000 19,900 2 ,100
Clanmorris, Lord Galway 622 8,567 8,567
Collis-Sandes, F. S. Kerry 230 6,000 6,000
Connolly, Edward Michael Kildare 45 1,000 1,000
Corcoran, Michael Tipperary Nth. 124 1,890 783 1,107
Crofton, Lord Roscommon 1,812 24,000 20 ,000 4 ,000
Crosbie, Lindsay B. Talbot Kerry 528 13,000 13,000
Daly, W m .  &  Daly, D. St. George Galway 594 6,925 6,925
Darnley, Earl of Meath 270 10,000 10,000
Drought, Thomas Henry King's 505 3,974 3,304 670
Dunraven, Earl of Limerick 1,188 20,000 20 ,000
Ely, Marquis of Fermanagh 1,485 14,856 14,856
ft II 74 792 792
Einly, Lord Limerick 203 4,500 4 ,500
Evatt, George Forster Monaghan 273 4,200 2 ,300 1,900
Falls, Thomas Tyrone 1,160 5,000 4 ,000 1,000
Finlay, Henry Thomas Dublin 228 11,200 10,000 1,200
Garvey, Michael Armagh 88 2,100 1,158 942
Gosford, Earl of Armagh 694 25,000 20 ,000 5,000
Harrison, Henry Down 187 12,000 12,000
Henry, Hugh A. Kildare 203 4,245 2 ,636 1,609
Kenny, Patrick W. Waterford 59 2,300 1,173 1,127
K'Eogh, Frances de Renzy Carlow 423 6,256 6,256
King-Harman, W. H. Longford 944 11,000 11,000
MacDonnell, Charles R. A. Clare 429 5,700 5,700
Mahon, George Ker Galway 890 31,672 17,449 14,223
Massereene &  Ferrard, Viscount Louth 951 8,500 8,500
McCausland, E.O. Mayo 82 4,185 1,764 2,421
Monteagle, Baron Limerick 531 14,000 14,000
| Total 24,499 394,122 352,225 41,897
Source: Return o f advances made under the Irish Land. Act, 1903, 19 0 3 - 2 0  
(see bibliography for specific references).
367
Appendix VI. Number of holdings sold to tenant purchasers under the various
























1870 877 5 2 ,90 6 51 4 ,536 3 4 4 ,9 8 6 8 5 9 ,522
1881 731 3 0 ,6 5 7 240,801 114,793 3 5 5 ,5 9 4
1885-8 2 5 ,3 6 7 9 42 ,6 25 9 ,9 9 2 ,53 6 170 ,298 10 ,16 2 ,8 34
1891-6 4 6 ,8 3 4 1 ,482 ,749 13 ,146 ,892 2 5 4 ,3 3 4 13 ,40 1 ,2 26
Total 73,809 2,508,937 23,894,765 884,411 24,779,176
Source: Report of the estates commissioners for the year ending 31st March, 1920 
and for the period from 1st November, 1903, to 31 March, 1920 [Cmd.1150] H.C. 
1921, xiv, 661.
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Appendix VII. Issues of guaranteed 2 3A  % land stock under the Wyndham Act*
Annual Charge on the
Date of issue
Amount of stock Cash amount raised Deficit between value of stock issued
Irish Development 
Grant as a result of the
& cash raised issue of stock at a
discount #
£ s. d. £ s. d. £ s. d. £ s. d.
19 Mar. 1904 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 0 0 4 ,3 37 ,121 6 8 6 6 2 ,87 8 13 4 19,820 1 nJ
3 Jan. 1905 6 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 0 0 5 ,3 5 4 ,3 3 2 15 0 6 4 5 ,66 7 5 0 18,885 15 4
2 Jan. 1906 1 ,103 ,448 5 7 1,000 ,000 0 0 103 ,448 5 7 3 ,046 17 6
26 Feb. 1906 1,097 ,966 oJ 2 1,000 ,000 0 0 9 7 ,9 96 nJ 2 2 ,900 12 6
6 Apr. 1906 1,000 ,000 0 0 920 ,921 13 4 7 9 ,70 8 6 8 2 ,59 0 10 5
12 June 1906 7 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 0 0 6 ,21 2 ,09 3 5 7 7 8 7 ,90 6 14 5 2 3 ,04 6 5 5
2 July 1907 2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 0 0 1 ,695 ,000 0 0 3 0 5 ,0 0 0 0 0 8,425 12 6
7 Oct. 1907 3 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 0 0 2 ,54 6 ,8 7 5 0 0 4 53 ,1 25 0 0 13,499 7 0
7 Apr. 1908 2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 0 0 1,796 ,583 6 8 2 0 3 ,4 1 6 13 4 5 ,949 18 9
4 July 1908 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 0 0 4 ,46 2 ,0 1 5 16 8 5 3 7 ,9 8 4 3 4 15,736 0 9
6 Apr. 1909 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 0 0 3 ,4 6 1 ,1 6 6 13 4 538 ,833 6 8 15,541 19 6
6 July 1909 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 0 0 3 ,4 4 1 ,0 0 0 0 0 5 5 9 ,0 0 0 0 0 16,804 18 9
Total 41,201,444 8 9 36,226479 17 3 4,974,964 11 6 146,247 19 10
Source: Return of guaranteed 2 3A% stock under the Irish Land Act, 1903, H.C. 1909, (279), 1, 343.
* The finance for land purchase under the Wyndham Act was issued from the Irish Land Purchase Fund. It was raised by the creation of 
guaranteed 2 3A%  stock which the public were free to invest in. The stock yielded interest at the rate of 2 3A % which was payable half yearly.
# Under the act the Irish Development Grant had to bear the losses when the stock was issued below par. The tenant’s annuity of 3 lA%  (2 3A % 
interest and A % for the sinking fund) was only sufficient to repay with interest the cash advance he received. It did not cover the cost of issuing 
stock at a discount when it was issued below par.
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Appendix VIII. Net amounts drawn from the Guarantee Fund by the treasury 
under the Wyndham Act up to 31 January 1907*
Arrears of Cost of incidental
County annuities charges Total
Kildare 9 44 7 ,71 4 8 ,658
Cork 831 4 ,0 5 0 4,881
Roscommon 702 4 ,1 0 4 4 ,8 0 6
Kilkenny 701 4 ,045 4 ,7 4 6
Limerick 1,168 3 ,0 1 7 4 ,18 5
Meath 196 j ,  Ij j 3 ,92 9
Galway 3 04 3,321 3 ,625
Wicklow 157 2 ,9 0 6 3 ,063
Tipperary South 502 2 ,0 9 7 2 ,5 9 9
Wexford 2 00 2 ,2 6 2 2 ,4 6 2
Down 119 2 ,1 1 4 2 ,233
Westmeath 2 62 1,961 2 ,223
Tyrone 2 90 1,925 2 ,215
Mayo 64 2 ,0 2 4 2 ,0 8 8
Dublin 325 1,271 1,596
Queen's County 164 1,332 1,496
Carlow 138 1,330 1,468
Fermanagh 92 1,328 1,420
King's County 321 1,077 1,398
Armagh 70 1,293 1,363
Londonderry 66 1,296 1,362
Sligo 62 1,271 i n ^  '■yI
Longford 145 1,014 1,159
Antrim 13 1,118 1,131
Tipperary North 3 3 6 768 1,104
Waterford 280 670 9 5 0
Kerry 130 632 762
Donegal 44 643 687
Clare 164 435 5 99
Monaghan 128 4 1 9 5 47
Louth 60 301 361
Leitrim 97 2 5 2 3 49
Cavan 44 154 198
Overall total 9,119 61,877 70,996
Source: Hansard 4, clxxii, 1373-7 (22 Apr. 1907)
*Under the Wyndham Act the Guarantee Fund was liable for arrears of payment by 
the tenant-purchasers and for incidental charges arising from the operation of the act. 
As the tenant-purchasers’ annuities did not provide for incidental charges they fell on 
the portions of the Guarantee Fund that were in aid of taxation. As these portions of 
the fund were used up the charge fell on the county councils and the Irish ratepayers.
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Appendix IX. Estates sold under the Wyndham Act 1903 in each county*
Amount
Total advanced to Cash lodged
number of Total price of tenant by tenant
County (by estates estates sold purchasers purchasers 
province) sold £ £ £
Antrim 222 2 ,4 8 2 ,6 7 0 2 ,4 6 9 ,2 6 8 13 ,402
Armagh 215 2 ,6 87 ,5 08 2 ,6 5 0 ,2 1 7 37 ,291
Cavan 278 1,994 ,177 1 ,984 ,969 9 ,2 0 8
Donegal 224 1,752 ,652 1 ,745 ,058 7 ,5 9 4
Down 260 3 ,7 7 1 ,2 0 2 3 ,7 4 6 ,0 7 6 2 5 ,1 2 6
Fermanagh 194 1 ,638 ,254 1 ,623 ,494 14 ,760
Londonderry 189 1,354,581 1 ,337 ,502 17 ,079
Monaghan 179 1,814 ,244 1 ,796 ,507 17 ,737
Tvrone 367 2 ,446 ,151 2 ,43 4 ,84 3 11,308
Carlow 102 986,211 9 7 4 ,5 9 7 11 ,614
Dublin 188 1,765,301 1 ,688 ,050 77 ,251
Kildare 212 2 ,93 6 ,74 3 2 ,8 7 6 ,4 6 8 6 0 ,2 7 5
Kilkenny
(X)
Orn 3 ,2 1 6 ,5 7 7 3 ,1 7 5 ,1 9 8 4 1 ,3 7 9
King's County 263 2 ,1 35 ,2 78 2 ,1 1 3 ,4 9 9 2 1 ,7 7 9
Longford 146 1,202 ,697 1,188 ,584 14,113
Louth 127 1,689,465 1 ,665 ,495 2 3 ,9 7 0
Meath 381 4,218,321 4 ,0 8 0 ,6 2 2 137 ,6 99
Queen's County 186 1 ,364 ,960 1 ,345 ,277 19,683
Westmeath 271 2,467 ,321 2 ,4 3 5 ,4 2 6 3 1 ,8 9 5
Wexford 328 2 ,8 7 3 ,0 8 0 2 ,8 5 4 ,1 0 8 18,972
Wicklow 155 1,997,083 1,955,611 4 1 ,4 7 2
Galway 404 3 ,6 5 2 ,0 9 2 3 ,6 0 9 ,0 8 4 4 3 ,0 0 8
Leitrim 166 1,084 ,049 1 ,080 ,197 3 ,8 5 2
Mayo 162 1 ,599 ,964 1 ,595 ,916 4 ,0 4 8
Roscommon 3 07 2 ,9 0 1 ,7 1 0 2 ,8 7 2 ,0 0 3 2 9 ,7 0 7
Sligo 190 1,800,241 1 ,791 ,866 8 ,375
Clare 294 1,757,815 1,746 ,384 11,431
Cork 1,457 8 ,91 9 ,61 7 8 ,86 0 ,2 2 0 5 9 ,3 9 7
Kerry 273 2 ,9 38 ,5 43 2 ,9 1 7 ,2 8 7 2 1 ,2 5 6
Limerick 512 5 ,15 1 ,823 5,112 ,941 3 8 ,8 8 2
Tipperary Nth. 316 2 ,2 0 3 ,4 2 4 2 ,1 8 6 ,2 0 0 17 ,224
Tipperary Sth. 3 37 3 ,0 4 9 ,6 3 0 3 ,0 0 5 ,9 3 6 4 3 ,6 9 4
Waterford 197 1,725 ,598 1 ,707 ,640 17,958
Ulster 2,128 19,941,439 19,787,934 153,505
Leinster 2,667 26,853,037 26,352,935 500,102
Connaught 1,229 11,038,056 10,949,066 88,990
Munster 3,386 25,746,450 25,536,608 209,842
Total 9,410 83,578,982 82,626,543 952,439
Source: Irish Land Commission, Report of the estates commissioners for the year 
ended 31 March, 1921 and for the period 1 Nov. 1903 to 31 March, 1921 (London, 
1922), pp 16-17 and p. 35.
* This table is based on the number of sales that were completed and the number that 
were pending on 31 March 1921.
371
Appendix X. Details of completed and pending sales of estates, under the









































(130) 30,432 1 26






(1,277) 14,140 0 12






(238) 16,767 1 29






(52) 77,898 3 29






(391) 32,078 2 8






(65) 21,503 2 9






(25) 4,720 1 31






(10) 26,871 0 35






(46) 43,304 2 1






(6,564) 11,680 2 6






(2,221) 5,606 1 1






(2,096) 7,707 1 30






(1,322) 25,907 2 2






(2,778) 56, 777 1 24






05) 21,040 2 29






(1,100) 19,587 2 8






(4,706) 11,485 3 8






(558) 15,028 0 19






(8,943) 26,681 2 5






(587) 28,125 2 0






(2,924) 16,417 0 12
Source: Irish Land Commission, Report of the estates commissioners for the year 
ended 31 March, 1921 and for the period 1 Nov. 1903 to 31 March, 1921 (London, 
1922), pp 16-7 and p. 35.
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Appendix X continued. Details of completed and pending sales of estates, under




























Area of land 
pending advances
A. R. P.






(56) 13,173 0 31






(1,101) 24,202 1 30






(0) 2,288 3 18






(58) 26,130 3 8






(164) 42,568 3 39






(1,193) 32,552 0 4






(1,948) 59,005 0 0






(284) 74,991 1 7






(144) 50,180 0 12






(4,505) 27,386 1 20






(215) 11,685 1 16


















(47.563) 887,968 2 28
Overall total 9,410 83,578,982 82,626,543 952.439
Source: Irish Land Commission, Report of the estates commissioners for the year 
ended 31 March, 1921 and for the period 1 Nov. 1903 to 31 March, 1921 (London,
1922), pp 16-17 and p. 35.
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Appendix XI: Advances per 10,000 acres under the Wyndham Land Act, 1903.*

















£ £ £ statute acres £
Louth 1,689 ,465 1 ,665,495 2 3 ,9 7 0 172 ,629 9 6 ,4 7 8
Armagh 2 ,6 8 7 ,5 0 8 2 ,6 5 0 ,2 1 7 37,291 2 7 5 ,0 0 9 9 6 ,3 6 8
Dublin 1,765,301 1 ,688 ,050 77,251 192 ,574 8 7 ,6 5 7
Limerick 5 ,15 1 ,82 3 5 ,112 ,941 3 8 ,8 8 2 5 9 0 ,8 2 7 8 6 ,5 3 8
Kildare 2 ,93 6 ,7 4 3 2 ,8 7 6 ,4 6 8 60 ,275 3 5 6 ,9 0 8 8 0 ,5 9 4
Meath 4 ,218 ,321 4 ,0 8 0 ,6 2 2 137 ,699 5 3 1 ,80 8 76 ,761
Down 3 ,7 7 1 ,2 0 2 3 ,7 4 6 ,0 7 6 2 5 ,1 2 6 5 1 4 ,3 0 8 7 2 ,8 3 7
Kilkenny 3 ,2 1 6 ,5 7 7 3 ,17 5 ,1 9 8 4 1 ,3 7 9 4 5 3 ,9 7 7 69 ,941
Westmeath 2,467 ,321 2 ,4 3 5 ,4 2 6 31 ,895 3 6 8 ,9 9 9 6 6 ,0 0 0
Monaghan 1,814 ,244 1,796 ,507 17,737 2 8 1 ,8 0 0 63,751
Cork 8 ,9 1 9 ,6 1 7 8 ,8 60 ,2 20 5 9 ,39 7 1 ,402 ,329 6 3 ,1 8 2
King's County 2 ,13 5 ,2 7 8 2 ,1 1 3 ,4 9 9 2 1 ,7 7 9 3 5 1 ,3 1 5 6 0 ,1 5 9
Roscommon 2 ,9 0 1 ,7 1 0 2 ,8 72 ,0 03 2 9 ,70 7 484 ,9 13 5 9 ,2 2 7
Tipperary 5 ,25 3 ,0 5 4 5 ,1 9 2 ,1 3 6 6 0 ,918 8 8 0 ,48 6 5 8 ,9 6 8
Longford 1,202 ,697 1 ,188 ,584 14,113 2 0 6 ,28 8 5 7 ,6 1 7
Sligo 1,800,241 1 ,791 ,866 8,375 313 ,57 5 5 7 ,14 3
Wicklow 1,997 ,083 1,955,611 4 1 ,4 72 3 4 6 ,0 7 0 5 6 ,5 0 9
Wexford 2 ,8 7 3 ,0 8 0 2 ,8 5 4 ,1 0 8 18,972 513 ,21 3 5 5 ,6 1 2
Waterford 1,725 ,598 1 ,707 ,640 17,958 3 2 2 ,7 8 6 5 2 ,9 0 3
Cavan 1,994 ,177 1 ,984 ,969 9 ,208 394,551 5 0 ,3 0 9
Fermanagh 1,638 ,254 1 ,623 ,494 14,760 3 4 5 ,2 4 2 4 7 ,0 2 4
Tyrone 2,446 ,151 2 ,4 3 4 ,8 4 3 11,308 5 6 9 ,50 9 4 2 ,75 3
Kerry 2 ,93 8 ,5 4 3 2 ,9 1 7 ,2 8 7 2 1 ,256 6 8 3 ,9 0 2 4 2 ,6 5 6
Antrim 2 ,4 8 2 ,6 7 0 2 ,46 9 ,2 6 8 13,402 5 8 3 ,31 0 4 2 ,3 3 2
Queen's County 1 ,364 ,960 1 ,345 ,277 19,683 3 5 0 ,4 9 6 3 8 ,3 8 2
Galway 3 ,6 5 2 ,0 9 2 3 ,6 0 9 ,0 8 4 43 ,008 9 4 6 ,8 02 3 8 ,1 1 8
Leitrim 1 ,084 ,049 1 ,080 ,197 3 ,852 2 9 0 ,5 7 0 3 7 ,1 7 5
Londonderry 1,354,581 1 ,337 ,502 17,079 395,771 3 3 ,7 9 4
Carlow 986,211 9 7 4 ,5 9 7 11,614 194,258 2 9 ,5 7 7
Donegal 1,752 ,652 1 ,745 ,058 7 ,5 94 622 ,641 2 8 ,0 2 6
Clare 1,757 ,815 1 ,746 ,384 11,431 6 2 8 ,96 9 2 7 ,7 6 5
Mavo 1,599 ,964 1 ,595 ,916 4 ,048 6 7 6 ,5 86 2 3 ,5 8 7
Total 83,578,982 82,626,543 952,439 15,242,421
Sources: Irish Land C om m ission ,  Report o f  the estates commissioners fo r  the year ended 31 
March, 1921 and fo r  the period  1 Nov. 1903 to 31 March, 1921 (London, 1922), pp 16-17  and p. 
35; Department o f  Agriculture & Technical Instruction for Ireland, Agricultural Statistics o f  
Ireland, with detailed report fo r  the year 1903 [Cd. 2 19 6 ]  H.C. 1904, cv, 3 33 ,  p.3.
* This table is based  on the number o f  sales that w ere com pleted  and  the number that w ere pending  
on 31 March 1921.
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Appendix XII
An act to amend the law relating to the occupation and ownership of land in Ireland 
and for other purposes relating thereto, and to amend the Labourers (Ireland) Acts.
[14th August, 1903].
Be it enacted by the king’s most excellent majesty, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Lords spiritual and temporal, and Commons, in the present parliament 
assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:
Part I 
Land Purchase
P u rch a se  a n d  resa le  o f  esta tes
I. (1) In the case of the sale of an estate, whether to the Land Commission or 
otherwise, when application is made for an advance under the land purchase acts of 
the whole purchase money of a holding, and the Land Commission are satisfied that 
the tenant is in occupation of the holding, then, subject to the limitations in the land 
purchase acts on advances to tenants purchasing their holdings, the Land 
Commission shall sanction the advance in the following cases, namely:
a. In the case of the purchase of a holding subject to a judicial rent fixed 
or agreed to since the passing of the act of 1896, if the purchase 
annuity created under the act payable in respect of the advance will be 
not less than ten nor more than thirty per cent below the existing rent; 
and
b. In the case of the purchase of a holding subject to a judicial rent fixed 
or agreed to before that date, if the said purchase annuity will be not 
less than twenty nor more than forty per cent below that rent:
Provided that in the case of a holding subject to a judicial rent fixed or agreed 
to before the passing of the act of 1896, the Land Commission may, if they think it 
equitable, and if the purchase agreement so provides, treat the holding, for the 
purposes of this section, as a holding subject to a judicial rent fixed since the passing 
of the act of 1896.
(2). If the foregoing provisions are not complied with, the Land Commission 
may, subject to the limitations in the land purchase acts, sanction the advance, if they 
are satisfied with the security, and if, after giving all persons interested in the estate 
an opportunity of being heard, they consider the agreed price to be equitable having 
regard to the interests of all such persons as aforesaid.
(3). The Land Commission, if they think it expedient with a view to the 
improvement of the estate, may declare that, for the purposes of this section, a 
portion of a holding shall be deemed a holding, and in such case may apportion the 
rent of the holding between the portion proposed to be purchased and the remainder 
of the holding.
(4). Notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary contained in the Purchase 
of Land (Ireland) Amendment Act, 1888, an advance may be sanctioned under the
Irish Land Act, 1903 (Extract) 1
1 Irish Land Act, 1903 [3 Ed. VII, c. 37.] (14 Aug. 1903).
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provisions of the land purchase acts, not exceeding the sum of seven thousand
pounds to one purchaser where, in the opinion of the Land Commission, it is
expedient to make any such advance for the purpose of carrying out the sale of a 
holding to which the land the land law acts apply.
(5). This section shall not apply in the case of holdings on congested estates 
in respect of which the Land Commission have given a certificate under section six 
of this act, nor in the case of a holding on estates purchased by the Congested 
Districts Board.
II. (1) In the case of the sale of an estate advances under the Land Purchase Acts 
may be made for the purchase of parcels thereof by the following persons:-
a. A person being the tenant of a holding on the estate;
b. A person being the son of a tenant of a holding on the estate;
c. A person being the tenant or proprietor of a holding not exceeding 
five pounds in rateable value, situate in the neighbourhood of the 
estate; and
d. A person who within twenty-five years before the passing of this Act 
was tenant of a holding to which the Land Law Acts apply, and who 
is not at the date of the purchase the tenant or proprietor of that 
holding: Provided that in the case of the death of a person to whom 
an advance under this paragraph might otherwise have been made, 
the advance may be made to a person nominated by the Land 
Commission as the personal representative of the deceased person.
(2). Advances under this section shall not, together with the amount (if any) 
of any previous advance under the land purchase acts then unrepaid by the purchaser, 
exceed one thousand pounds:
Provided that the limitation in this subsection may, subject to the other 
limitations in the land purchase acts, be exceeded where the Land Commission 
consider that a larger advance may be sanctioned to any purchaser without prejudice 
to the wants and circumstance of other persons residing in the neighbourhood.
(3). The land purchase acts shall, subject to the provisions of this section, 
apply to the sale of a parcel of land in pursuance of this section, in like manner as if 
the same was a holding, and the purchaser was the tenant thereof at the time of his 
making the purchase, and the expression ‘holding’ in those acts shall include a parcel 
of land in respect of the purchase of which an advance has been made in pursuance 
of this section.
III. (1) Where the owner of an estate has entered into agreements under the land 
purchase acts for the sale to persons other than the Land Commission of the estate, 
the Land Commission may purchase from him any demesne or other land in his 
occupation and adjacent to, or on the neighbourhood of, the estate at a price which in 
their opinion represents the selling value of that land, and in such case may resell the 
whole or any portion of that land to him; provided that the Land Commission may, if 
they think it necessary for furthering the purposes of this act, dispense with the 
condition in this subsection that the land purchased and resold shall be adjacent to, or 
in the neighbourhood of, the estate.
(2) Where any land is so resold, or where a parcel of an estate purchased by 
the Land Commission is resold to the vendor, or (in the case of an estate purchased 
from the land judge) to the former owner of the estate or a person nominated by the
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Land Commission as his representative, an advance under the land purchase acts may 
be made not exceeding in any case one-third of the aggregate amount of the purchase 
money of the holdings and other parcels of land comprised in the estate, or twenty 
thousand pounds, whichever is the less.
(3) In entering into agreements for the resale of any land to the vendor of an 
estate the Land Commission shall have regard to the amount of land available for the 
enlargement of the holdings where they consider such enlargement necessary.
(4) Where any land is sold in pursuance of this section a Judicial 
Commissioner may, if he thinks it equitable, on the application within the prescribed 
time of any person who, at the date of the sale of the land to the Land Commission, 
was entitled to any estate In remainder or reversion in that land, order, upon such 
terms and conditions as he may think reasonable, that the land so resold shall devolve 
in accordance with the terms of the settlement which at the date of the sale to the 
Land Commission affected it.
(5) If the owner of any demesne or other land subject to settlement and sold 
to the Land Commission does not repurchase the same within the prescribed time, 
the Land Commission may make an advance under this section to the trustees of the 
settlement, and in such case the land resold shall be held subject to the trusts of the 
settlement.
(6) Any land resold in pursuance of this section shall not be subject to the 
provisions of the Local Registration of Title (Ireland) Act, 1891, relating to the 
devolution of the freehold registered land.
IV. (1) In the case of the sale of an estate advances under the land purchase acts 
may be made for the purchase, by any trustees approved of by the Land Commission, 
of any parcel of the estate to be held subject to the provisions of this act, for the 
purposes of turbary, pasturage, the raising of sand or gravel, the cutting or gathering 
of seaweed, the planting of trees, or the preservation of game, fish, woods, or 
plantations, or for the purposes of the Labourers (Ireland) Acts, 1883 to 1896, as 
amended by this act.
(2) An advance in pursuance of this section may be of such amount as the 
lord lieutenant may sanction.
V. In the case of the sale of an estate where an application for an advance, to 
which the provisions of subsection one of section one of this act do not apply, is 
made, the Land Commission may, subject to the limitations in the land purchase acts, 
advance the whole or part of the purchase money if they are satisfied with the 
security and are of opinion that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, 
the agreed price is equitable.
VI. (1) Where the owner of an estate makes an application on the prescribed form 
to the Land Commission requesting them to enquire into the circumstances of the 
estate with a view to the sale thereof under this part of this act, the Land Commission 
may, after due enquiry, propose to purchase the estate and in estimating the price 
shall have regard to the foregoing provisions of this act in respect of advances, and to 
the prices to which the tenants and other persons are willing to give for the holdings 
and other parcels of land comprised in the estate.
(2) If within the prescribed time the owner of the estate agrees to sell the 
estate at the estimated price, and tenants of holdings on the estate, to the extent of not 
less than three-fourths in number and rateable value, undertake to purchase from the
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Land Commission their holdings, or other designated parcels of land in lieu thereof, 
for the respective amounts on the basis of which the price of the tenanted portion of 
the estate was estimated by the commission, the commission may agree to purchase 
the estate for the estimated price.
(3) The lord lieutenant may under special circumstances and with the 
approval of the treasury, dispense with the condition in the last preceding subsection 
as to undertakings to purchase holdings where the Land Commission certify to him 
that they are of opinion that the resale of the estate can be effected without prospect 
of loss.
(4) In the case of a congested estate as defined by this section, if the Land 
Commission, with the consent of the owner, certify to the lord lieutenant that the 
purchase and resale of the estate are desirable in view of the wants and circumstances 
of the tenants thereon, then the Land Commission may purchase the estate for a price 
to be agreed upon, and in such case the condition in this section as to resale without 
prospect of loss may be relaxed to such extent as the lord lieutenant may determine.
(5) The expression ‘congested estate’ means an estate not less than half of the 
area of which consists of holdings not exceeding five pounds in rateable value, or of 
mountain or bog land, or not less than a quarter of the area of which is held in 
rundale or intermixed plots.
VII. Where it appears to the Land Commission expedient to take steps with a view to 
the purchase, for the purposes of this part of this act, of an estate for the sale of 
which an absolute order has been made under the Landed Estates Court (Ireland) 
Act, 1858, the following provisions shall have effect:
(1) The land judge may, at the request of the Land Commission, cause the 
commission to be furnished with such particulars as they may require respecting the 
estate, including a schedule in the prescribed form of the tenancies thereon and a 
statement of the superior interests (if any) to which the estate is subject;
(2) The Land Commission, after causing- the estate to be inspected, may, 
subject to the provisions to the last preceding section as to undertakings to purchase 
holdings and resale without prospect of loss, make an offer to the land judge for the 
purchase of the estate, or of any part thereof, discharged from the claims of all 
persons who are interested in the estate, whether in respect of superior or intervening 
interests, or incumbrances or otherwise, and the offer shall contain the following 
particulars:
a. The land comprised in the offer;
b. The arrears of rent which are to be transferred to the commission; and
c. The amount of the purchase money
(3) Where an estate is sold in pursuance of this section the land judge shall 
have all the powers for the apportionment and redemption of superior and 
intervening interests conferred on him by the land purchase acts:
(4) An order of the land judge declaring the Land Commission to be the 
purchasers of any land shall have the effect of an order vesting land in the 
Commission made by them under this part of this act, and shall also vest in them the 
right to collect and recover any arrears of rent specified in the order, and a certified 
copy thereof shall be transmitted to the registering authority under the Local 
Registration of Title (Ireland) Act, 1891, and the Land Commission shall thereupon 
be registered, under that act, as the absolute owners of the land:
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(5) Where the Land Commission make an offer under this section for the 
purchase of an estate, the provisions of section forty of the act of 1896 (a) shall be 
suspended and shall not have effect in the case of that estate, unless and until the 
offer is withdrawn or the estate is put up for auction and not sold.
VIL The Land Commission may purchase any untenanted land which they consider 
necessary for the purpose of facilitating the resale, or redistribution, of estates 
purchased, or proposed to be purchased, by them, and the foregoing provisions of 
this act, with respect to advances for the purchase of parcels of land comprised in 
estates, shall apply in the case of the sale by the commission of any parcel of such 
untenanted land.
IX. (1) There shall not be at any time vested in the Land Commission lands 
exceeding in the aggregate, according to the estimate of the commission, as approved 
by the treasury, the capital value of five million pounds in respect of which 
undertaking to purchase have not been received by the commission.
(2) The Land Commission shall not in any one year enter into agreements 
involving the expenditure, on the purchase of congested estates, of sums which 
would in the aggregate exceed by more than ten per cent the aggregate sums for 
which the commission estimate that those estates can be resold by them: Provided 
that, for the purposes of this enactment, any money which the Land Commission 
have expended, or propose to expend on the improvement of those estates shall be 
deemed to be repayable in full out of the purchase money on resales, and shall not be 
included in the estimate in calculating the ten per cent.
(3) For the purpose of this section the acceptance by the land judge of an 
offer shall be deemed an agreement.
X. No estate shall be purchased by the Land Commission which is not in the main 
agricultural or pastoral.
XI. No guarantee deposit shall be made or retained in respect of an advance made in 
pursuance of the foregoing provisions of this act.
XII. (1) The Land Commission may take such steps and execute, or cause to be 
executed, such works as may appear expedient for the benefit or improvement of 
estates, or untenanted land, purchased or proposed to be purchased under this act, or 
for the use or enjoyment thereof or generally for the purposes of this act.
(2) For the purpose of carrying this section into effect the Land Commission 
shall have all the powers for facilitating resales of land conferred on the Congested 
Districts Board by sections one and two of the Congested Districts Board (Ireland) 
Act, 1901, as amended by this act, and those sections, as so amended, shall apply 
accordingly, with the substitution of the Land Commission for the Congested 
Districts Board:
Provided that where, with the consent of a tenant, the area of his holding is 
altered, or he is put into possession of a new holding, the Land Commission may 
order that such charges, liabilities, and equities affect the tenant’s interest in his 
former holding shall either continue to affect that holding, or be transferred to his 
altered or new holding:
Provided also that the powers mentioned in section one of the said act of 
1901 shall not be exercised by the Land Commission unless they certify to the lord
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lieutenant that those powers are necessary for the benefit or improvement of a 
congested estate.
XIII. (1) Where at the time of sale of any land to the Land Commission or to 
tenants or others the vendor has, subject to the provisions of the Ground Game Act, 
1880, sporting rights, exclusive of the tenant, those rights may by agreement between 
the vendor and purchaser be either conveyed to the purchaser or be expressly 
reserved to the vendor, and in the absence of such agreement those rights shall be 
vested in the Land Commission, and the Land Commission may deal with the same 
subject to regulations to be made by the lord lieutenant.
(2) The expression ‘sporting rights’ includes any right of hunting, shooting, 
fishing, and taking game or fish on any land and the expression ‘game’ has the same 
meaning as in section five of the act of 1881, and also includes deer.
(3) On the sale under the land purchase acts of any land by the Land 
Commission, or of any land comprised in an estate by the owner of the estate, there 
shall be reserved, in the prescribed manner, to the commission the exclusive right of 
mining and taking minerals and digging and searching for minerals, on or under that 
land, and the said right shall be disposed of by the commission in manner hereafter to 
be provided by parliament:
Provided that this subsection shall not apply -
a. To any demesne or other land resold in pursuance of section three of 
this act; or
b. To any such right which constitutes a superior interest, or which is 
vested in the Crown; or
c. To any stone, gravel, sand or clay.
Provided also, that where any such right reserved to the Land Commission 
under this subsection is at any time hereafter let, leased, sold, or demised by them, 
the vendor (or the person who would have been entitled thereto if the lands had not 
been sold) shall be entitled to receive twenty-five per cent of any rent, purchase 
money, or other net profit received by the Land Commission in respect of the same, 
unless the Land Commission shall have purchased from the person entitled to such 
percentage his interest therein, and the Land Commission may purchase such interest 
at any time on such terms as may be sanctioned by the treasury.
(4) Where any right mentioned in this section is so reserved, there shall be 
attached thereto a right to enter upon the land in respect of which the first mentioned 
right may be exercised, and to authorise any person to do so; but any person entering 
upon land in pursuance of this subsection shall be liable to make reasonable amends 
and satisfaction for any damage done or occasioned thereof.
(5) Any person authorised by or in pursuance of the last preceding subsection 
to enter upon land for the purpose of exercising a sporting right shall have the same 
authority to prosecute for trespass in pursuit of game or fish as if he were the 
occupier of that land.
XIV. (1) Where any land, which is vested under the land purchase acts in a 
purchaser, contains any ancient monument which in the opinion of the Land 
Commission, is a matter of public interest, by reason of the historic, traditional, or 
artistic interest attaching thereto, they may, with the consent of the Commissioners of 
Public Works in Ireland, by order declare that the property in the monument shall not
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pass to the purchaser, and make an order vesting the monument in those 
commissioners.
(2) Where any such order is made, the provisions of the Ancient Monuments 
Protections Act, 1882, with respect to the maintenance of, and access and penalties 
for injury to, ancient monuments, shall apply as if the monument were a monument 
under the guardianship of those commissioners in pursuance of that act.
(3) Where those commissioners refuse to consent to the vesting of any such 
monument in them, the Land Commission may, with the consent of the council of the 
county within which the monument is situate, make an order vesting the monument 
in that council, and subsection two of section nineteen of the Local Government 
(Ireland) Act, 1898, shall thereupon apply.
(4) In this section the expression ‘ancient monument’ means any ancient or 
mediaeval structure, erection, or monument, or any remains thereof.
XV. (1) In the case of the sale of an estate the Land Commission may, if they 
think fit, declare that any person who, as a subtenant, is in the exclusive occupation 
of a parcel of land comprised in the estate shall be deemed the tenant of that parcel, 
and that parcel shall be deemed a holding.
(2) The Land Commission shall in such case redeem the interests (in this part 
of this act referred to as ‘intervening interests’) intervening between the owner of the 
estate and the person in such exclusive occupation as aforesaid, at a price which, in 
default of agreement between the owner of the estate and the owner of the 
intervening interest within the prescribed time, shall be fixed by the Land 
Commission, and the redemption money shall be paid out of the purchase money of 
the estate, and be dealt with in like manner as if it were the redemption money of a 
superior interest, or in such other manner as appears to the commission equitable:
Provided that if the Land Commission are of opinion that any intervening 
interest is of no appreciable value, they shall by order declare that interest to be 
extinguished.
(3) The foregoing provisions of this section shall not apply where any 
intervening interest is an interest sufficient to contribute the owner thereof a person 
having power to sell under the land purchase act to tenants.
(4) Where a holding in any such state is held by joint tenants or tenants in 
common, or is subdivided between two or more persons, and the Land Commission 
are satisfied that such tenants or persons are in the exclusive occupation of separate 
portions thereof, the commission may, if they think ft, for the purpose of the 
foregoing provisions of this act, declare that any such tenant or person shall be 
deemed the tenant of the parcel of land in his exclusive occupation, and that such 
parcel shall be deemed a holding, and may apportion the rent of the holding between 
such tenants or persons as the justice of the case may require.
(5) Any person aggrieved by any decision of the Land Commission under this 
section may in the prescribed appeal to a judicial commissioner.
(6) For the purpose of the sale of an estate by the land judge to the Land 
Commission, the land judge shall have the powers conferred on the commission by 
this section, but no appeal shall lie from any decision of the land judge under this 
section.
XVI. (1) The Land Commission may, where they agree to purchase any land, make 
a vesting order which shall be effectual to vest in the commission the fee simple of 
the land purchased, subject -
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a. To any public rights affecting the land;
b. To any sporting rights reserved by the vendor;
c. To any maintenance charge under the Public Works Act; and
d. To any interest of the tenants on the land, or of persons having claims
upon those interests, and to any easements, rights, and appurtenances 
mentioned in section thirty-four of the act of 1896;
but, save as aforesaid, and subject to the provisions of this act with respect to 
minerals, discharged from the claims of all persons who are interested in the land, 
whether in respect of superior or intervening interests or incumbrances or otherwise, 
and all such claims shall, as from the date of the vesting order, cease as against the 
land and attach to the purchase money in like manner as immediately before the date 
of the order they attached to the land.
(2) At any time not less than two months before making a vesting order under 
this section the Land Commission shall publish the prescribed advertisements, and 
shall serve such notices as they make think necessary stating their intention to make 
the order and the effect thereof, and any person -interested in the land may, in the 
manner and within the time prescribed, show cause against the vesting order being 
made, and in such case, unless the cause shown is disallowed, the order shall not be 
made.
(3) A certified copy of every vesting order under this section shall be 
transmitted to the registering authority under the Local Registration of Title (Ireland) 
Act, 1891, and the Land Commission shall thereupon be registered under that act as 
the absolute owners of the land, discharged from all claims as hereinbefore provided.
XVII. (1) Where any person proposing to sell land under the foregoing provisions of 
this act gives prima facie evidence that he is a person having power to sell under the 
land purchase act, and satisfies the Land Commission that for not less than six years 
immediately preceding he or is immediate predecessor in title has been, personally or 
by an agent, in receipt of the rents or profits of the land, he may, if the Land 
Commission think fit, subject to such conditions with respect to advertisements and 
notices as may be prescribed, be dealt with as the owner of the land for all purposed 
other than the distribution of purchase money, or the payment of any percentage out 
of the Land Purchase Aid Fund established under this act, without any further 
investigation of this title.
(2) Where any person not under disability satisfies the Land Commission that 
he is the limited owner of any land, he may, if the Land Commission think fit, be 
dealt with as the owner of the land for the purposes aforesaid, whether there is or is 
not a trustee of the settlement for the purposes of the Settled Land Acts, 1882 to 
1890, and whether the consent of such trustee (if any) has or has not been obtained.
XVIII. (1) The rents and profits of any land agreed to be purchased by the Land 
Commission, together with any rate of not less than three and a half per cent per 
annum, and subject to the provisions of this section, any arrears of rent due at the 
date of the purchase agreement, and not remitted by the commission, shall from the 
date of the agreement be payable to and recoverable by the commission in like 
manner as if they were instalments of purchase annuities charged upon holdings.
(2) Interest on the purchase money, at the rate of three and a half per cent per 
annum, shall be paid by the Land Commission to the person in receipt of the rents of
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the land at the date of the agreement, or such persons as may appear to the Land 
Commission to be entitled thereto, from the date of the agreement until the land is 
vested in the commission.
Provided that if the land does not become vested in the Land Commission the 
foregoing provisions of this section shall cease to have effect as from the date on 
which the commission certify that the sale cannot be completed, and an account shall 
be rendered by the commission as between the moneys received by them and any 
interest paid by them under those provisions, and the balance (if any) certified by the 
commission shall be paid by or to them accordingly, and the certificate shall be 
conclusive of the matters related therein.
(3) Section thirty-five of the act of 1896 shall, subject to the provisions of this 
section, apply with the necessary modifications to the case of an agreement with the 
Land Commission for the purchase of a holding.
XIX. Where an estate is purchased by the Land Commission and tenants on the 
estate to the extent of three-fourths in number and rateable value have agreed to 
purchase their holdings, the Estates Commissioners may, if, having regard to the 
circumstances of the case, they think it expedient, order that the remaining tenants, or 
any of them, shall be deemed to have accepted the offers made to them, and the land 
purchase acts shall apply accordingly, where the tenant could have obtained an 
advance of the entire purchase money and the L an d  Commission have offered in the 
prescribed manner to make the advance.
XX. (1) Where any land is purchased by means of an advance under the land 
purchase acts by any trustees for the purposes mentioned in section four of the act, 
the trustees shall hold the land upon such terms and conditions and with such rights 
and powers as may be specified in a scheme framed by the lord lieutenant or 
approved of by him, and any such scheme shall contain provisions for the 
appointment of new trustees, and for an appeal to the lord lieutenant by any person 
aggrieved by any action or omission of any trustees in carrying the scheme into 
effect, and for enabling the lord lieutenant, on the hearing of any such appeal, to 
make such order as may appear to him just,
(2) Where any land so purchased is not required for any of the purposes 
aforesaid it may be disposed of for any public purposes approved of by the lord 
lieutenant.
XXI. (1) In the case of the sale of an estate where portion of a holding consists of 
bog, and the purchaser had not an exclusive right of turbary before such sale, the 
Land Commission may make regulations, authorising the cutting or making of turf 
on that bog by any occupiers of land in the neighbourhood of the said holding for 
whose requirements such turf appears to be necessary, upon such terms, as to 
payment or otherwise, as may appear to them to be just, and those regulations may 
confer a right to enter upon any land for the purpose aforesaid.
(2) Regulations under this section shall secure that the cutting or making of 
turf will not prevent the future reclamation of the bog, and that sufficient turf and 
pasturage will be left for the use of the proprietor of the holding for a reasonable 
period.
(3) Regulations under this section shall provide that any person entering upon 
any land under their authority shall make reasonable amends and satisfaction for any 
damage done or occasioned thereby.
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(4) Any regulations under this section may provide for the punishment of any 
breach of them by a fine not exceeding five pounds, recoverable in a summary 
manner.
XXII. On the application in the prescribed manner of any proprietors of holdings 
purchased under the land purchase acts, the Land Commission may, at the request of 
the parties interested, if they think fit, determine all questions which may arise 
respecting the boundaries of the holdings, easements, or appurtenances, claimed by 
any such proprietors against any other proprietors or tenants of holdings.
XXIII. (1) The jurisdiction, powers, and duties of the Land Commission under the 
foregoing provisions of the act shall be exercised and performed exclusively by three 
members of the commission (in this act referred to as ‘the Estates Commissioners’) 
to be nominated or appointed as hereinafter mentioned. Any question of law may, if 
the Estates Commissioners think fit, and shall on the application of any person 
interested, be referred for the decision of a Judicial Commissioner, unless the Estates 
Commissioners certify in writing that the application is frivolous.
(2) Any person aggrieved by any refusal of the commissioners so to refer any 
such question may, in the manner prescribed by rules under section sixty-one of the 
Supreme Court of Judicature (Ireland) Act, 1877, as amended by any enactment, and 
within the time prescribed by the Judicial Commissioner, apply to the High Court, or 
to any judge thereof, for an order requiring the commissioners to refer the question, 
and the decision of the High Court or judge upon any such application shall be final.
(3) One of the Estates Commissioners shall be an existing member of the 
Land Commission, to be nominated by the lord lieutenant, and the others shall be 
persons to be appointed by his majesty, by warrant under the Royal Sign Manual, as 
additional members of the Land Commission.
(4) The persons so appointed shall be paid out of money provided by 
parliament an annual salary of two thousand pounds.
(5) The Estates Commissioners shall hold office during pleasure, but any 
Estates Commissioner shall only be removed from his office by an Order in Council, 
and any such order shall be laid before each House of Parliament forthwith, and if an 
address is presented to his majesty by either House of Parliament, within the next 
subsequent forty days on which that house has sat next after any such order is laid 
before it, praying that the order may be annulled, his majesty in council may annual 
the order, and it shall thenceforth be void.
(6) Whenever a vacancy occurs in the office of a person so nominated or 
appointed by his death, resignation, inability to act, or otherwise, or of any person 
appointed in his place, his majesty may, if he thinks fit, by warrant under the Royal 
Sign Manual, appoint some person to fill the vacancy.
(7) The two vacancies occurring next after the commencement of this act in 
the number of members of the Land Commission, other than the Judicial 
Commissioner, or an Estates Commissioner, shall not be filled.
(8) The Estates Commissioners, in carrying the foregoing provisions of this 
act into effect, shall be under the general control of the lord lieutenant, and shall act 
in accordance with such regulations as may be made by him from time to time.
(9) For the purposes of assisting the Estates Commissioners in carrying the 
aforesaid provisions into effect the lord lieutenant may, after consultation with the 
Land Commission, nominate such officers of the Land Commission, and may, with 
the consent of the Treasury as to number and remuneration, appoint or authorise the
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employment of such other persons as may be necessary, and the remuneration of 
those persons shall be paid as part of the expenses of the Land Commission.
(10) Such officers and other persons shall perform such duties as may be 
assigned to them by the Estates Commissioners.
(11) Sales of estates to the Estates Commissioners and sales by those 
commissioners to tenants and others may be negotiated by any land agents, solicitors, 
or land clerks nominated with the approval of the Estates Commissioners by the 
vendors, or in the absence of such nomination, may be negotiated by any persons 
approved by those commissioners, at a fixed price or percentage, according to a scale 
to be settled by the Estates Commissioners with the assent of the Treasury, and such 
percentage shall be paid as part of the expenses of the Land Commission.
(12) Where in the case of the sale of an estate to persons other than the Land 
Commission an agent has been employed by the vendor to negotiate the sale such 
sum as may be sanctioned by the Estates Commissioners may, with the consent of 
such vendor, be paid to that agent out of the purchase money as part of the costs 
connected with the sale.
(13) The Judicial Commissioner and the Estates Commissioners may, subject 
to the approval of the lord lieutenant, and after consultation with the President of the 
Incorporated Law Society of Ireland, make rules for carrying into effect the 
foregoing provisions of this act, and those rules shall among other things provide for 
the making of such investigations and the performance of such other duties, by the 
aforesaid officers and persons, as may be requisite and practicable, with a view to 
limiting the costs and expenses of persons applying to the Land commission to 
purchase land in pursuance of these provisions, and the expression ‘prescribed’ in 
those provisions means, unless the context otherwise requires, prescribed by those 
rules.
(14) Periodical reports of the proceedings of the Estates Commissioners shall 
be made by them, in such form and at such times as the Treasury may prescribe, and 
those reports and all rules under the last preceding sub-section shall be laid before 
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